"Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" explores conceptual issues in psychiatry from the perspective of analytic philosophy of science. Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, its multiple different theoretical frameworks, and its research links with big business - Rachel Cooper explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry. She shows how these pose interesting challenges for the philosopher of science while also showing how ideas from the philosophy of science can help to solve conceptual problems within psychiatry. Cooper's discussion ranges over such topics as the nature of mental illnesses, the treatment decisions and diagnostic categories of psychiatry, the case-history as a form of explanation, how psychiatry might be value-laden, the claim that psychiatry is a multi-paradigm science, the distortion of psychiatric research by pharmaceutical industries, as well as engaging with the fundamental question whether the mind is reducible to something at the physical level. "Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" demonstrates that cross-disciplinary contact between philosophy of science and psychiatry can be immensely productive for both subjects and it will be required reading for mental health professionals and philosophers alike.
I recently met with a (truly sensational) professor whom I asked for a list of books and articles that would help me build a PhD project. I don't really know why he gave me this particular book to read. I suppose he thought it would be a good introduction to the philosophy of psychiatry? I just thought it was... mediocre. Here, I said it. Every line of thought seems incomplete. The arguments are poorly developed and don't hold water. The book's introduction reads "It aims to be of interest to philosophers of science and their students, to mental health professionals and also to a broader 'lay' audience." So the oversimplification is not entirely justified.
For a book I still *don't* consider as bogus, the number of times it made me cringe is disturbing. The effect of nails on a chalkboard, as they say—or more accurately for me, the effect of a metal spoon on a stainless steel pan.
It might still be a good read for third-year undergrad psychology students. Might. Maybe.