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The Palace File
Mint condition hardcover book in its also brand new condition decorative dustjacket. This is a first condition, first printing, the true collectible edition. Kept nice all these years with help of protective mylar cover over the jacket. Enjoy being the first to read this book!
- GenresHistory
542 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 1986
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 8, 2025
The Palace File is an investigation of the end of South Vietnam from an internal perspective, written by Hung, a professor at Howard University and economic advisor to President Thieu, and Schecter, a veteran American journalist. The Palace File was a set of 31 secret letters between Nixon, Ford, and South Vietnam's President Thieu, pledging massive American support when necessary after the Paris Peace Accords. Even after the withdrawal of combat troops, when South Vietnam needed assistance, help would arrive; for American honor, for the blood of the dead, for the bravery of the South Vietnamese anti-Communists. And as we know, as the situation collapsed in 1975, that help did not come. With PAVN armored divisions moving in all from all sides, and ARVN in full retreat, President Ford and a democratic Congress delayed and ultimately did nothing, except perhaps a half-hearted evacuation.
The first topic of the book is Kissinger's secret negotiations paralleling the Paris Peace Accords. Hung and Schecter cast Kissinger's actions as an outright betrayal of an ally, and it's hard to disagree. Four years of negotiations, done without the participation of the South Vietnamese, gave North Vietnam two key points. First, PAVN forces inside South Vietnam would not have to leave. And second, American forces would depart within 60 days. Kissinger achieved his objectives: Americans home and a decent interval before another round of aggression. North Vietnam achieved theirs's; recognition of a defacto victory. And Thieu and South Vietnam only agreed with the secret promises in the Palace File.
The more interesting part of the book concerns Hung's work in Saigon between 1973 and 1975, and the strange dream of the last years of South Vietnam. Basic material conditions were very poor. PAVN and VC forces could interdict routes between cities and the countryside at will, and it doesn't take a lot of violence to convince farmers that it's not worth going to market this year. American aid dropped from over $10 billion annually to less than $1 billion, with the military taking the brunt of the cuts. ARVN, which had learned to fight with ample fire-support and air mobility, had to do without. And yet no one in South Vietnam's government seemed to grasp the gravity of the situation.
Hung describes weekly all-day cabinet meetings, none of which were solely focused on military issues. Large parts of the government, including the Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of Staff, were unable to make a decision, preferring to delegate to now absent American advisors or up to Thieu (also, the JCS ended their day at 4:30, even in the midst of the final North Vietnamese offensive). Thieu, suspicious of coup attempts, kept his intentions secret and gave vague intentions to subordinates. Corrupt and ineffective officials were maintained in power because Thieu needed their political support.
Thieu clung to the secret letters like a drowning man, but also refused to reveal them to the world until days before Saigon fell, in a press conference organized by Hung. At this point, with PAVN artillery bombarding Saigon, there was nothing to be done. There's the usual orientalist nonsense about Thieu, with his Confucian outlook, could not conceive of how America would abandon its ally and its promises. I think simple cognitive dissonance is a better explanation. Thieu couldn't see how bad his position was, until it all came crashing down.
The first topic of the book is Kissinger's secret negotiations paralleling the Paris Peace Accords. Hung and Schecter cast Kissinger's actions as an outright betrayal of an ally, and it's hard to disagree. Four years of negotiations, done without the participation of the South Vietnamese, gave North Vietnam two key points. First, PAVN forces inside South Vietnam would not have to leave. And second, American forces would depart within 60 days. Kissinger achieved his objectives: Americans home and a decent interval before another round of aggression. North Vietnam achieved theirs's; recognition of a defacto victory. And Thieu and South Vietnam only agreed with the secret promises in the Palace File.
The more interesting part of the book concerns Hung's work in Saigon between 1973 and 1975, and the strange dream of the last years of South Vietnam. Basic material conditions were very poor. PAVN and VC forces could interdict routes between cities and the countryside at will, and it doesn't take a lot of violence to convince farmers that it's not worth going to market this year. American aid dropped from over $10 billion annually to less than $1 billion, with the military taking the brunt of the cuts. ARVN, which had learned to fight with ample fire-support and air mobility, had to do without. And yet no one in South Vietnam's government seemed to grasp the gravity of the situation.
Hung describes weekly all-day cabinet meetings, none of which were solely focused on military issues. Large parts of the government, including the Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of Staff, were unable to make a decision, preferring to delegate to now absent American advisors or up to Thieu (also, the JCS ended their day at 4:30, even in the midst of the final North Vietnamese offensive). Thieu, suspicious of coup attempts, kept his intentions secret and gave vague intentions to subordinates. Corrupt and ineffective officials were maintained in power because Thieu needed their political support.
Thieu clung to the secret letters like a drowning man, but also refused to reveal them to the world until days before Saigon fell, in a press conference organized by Hung. At this point, with PAVN artillery bombarding Saigon, there was nothing to be done. There's the usual orientalist nonsense about Thieu, with his Confucian outlook, could not conceive of how America would abandon its ally and its promises. I think simple cognitive dissonance is a better explanation. Thieu couldn't see how bad his position was, until it all came crashing down.
February 2, 2023
History is never convenient, someone said that.
The book is well written, as the author was himself a secretary and well-educated intellect of the former South Vietnamese government.
If you wish to study, or just to understand more on the reason WHY the war was a failure, and by whose hands? This is the book I'd recommend.
The book is well written, as the author was himself a secretary and well-educated intellect of the former South Vietnamese government.
If you wish to study, or just to understand more on the reason WHY the war was a failure, and by whose hands? This is the book I'd recommend.
June 3, 2024
Là một tài liệu tham khảo có giá trị
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews