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Metaethics
A Contemporary Introduction provides a solid foundation in metaethics for advanced undergraduates by introducing a series of puzzles that most metaethical theories address. These puzzles involve moral disagreement, reference, moral epistemology, metaphysics, and moral psychology. From there, author Mark van Roojen discusses the many positions in metaethics that people will take in reaction to these puzzles. Van Roojen asks several essential questions of his readers, What is metaethics? Why study it? How does one discuss metaethics, given its inherently controversial nature? Each chapter closes with questions, both for reading comprehension and further discussion, and annotated suggestions for further reading.
324 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 6 reviews
February 10, 2017
This introduction is neither bad nor oustanding. I think better is to watch metaethics lecture's on youtube from Kane B. (for some gentle overview) and than try Miller's Introduction to Conteporary Metaethics (which is hard, but better).
The pros of this book is, that it is really introductory. It does not presupose much of philosophical knowledge and it's not hard to understand. Nice think is that it walks with you from begining. Some general chapters on the begining then nicely presented theories.
As for downsides: sometimes it was quite too slow and little bit boring and I felt need to skip some paragraphs.
But as for explanatory value it's cool. It helped with theories that I did not understand in Miller's Introduction. So I value this book for that.
The pros of this book is, that it is really introductory. It does not presupose much of philosophical knowledge and it's not hard to understand. Nice think is that it walks with you from begining. Some general chapters on the begining then nicely presented theories.
As for downsides: sometimes it was quite too slow and little bit boring and I felt need to skip some paragraphs.
But as for explanatory value it's cool. It helped with theories that I did not understand in Miller's Introduction. So I value this book for that.
September 19, 2024
كتاب صعب ومُرهِق جدا، بس الحقيقة إن الموضوع نفسه صعب وكبير.
في النهاية استمتعت به وأكيد ضافلي كتير وفتّح عيوني على حاجات كتيرة وزوّد عندي الرغبة إني أقرا وأبحث أكتر في المبحث ده، وده بالنسبالي شيء مهم.
في النهاية استمتعت به وأكيد ضافلي كتير وفتّح عيوني على حاجات كتيرة وزوّد عندي الرغبة إني أقرا وأبحث أكتر في المبحث ده، وده بالنسبالي شيء مهم.
April 7, 2022
Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) helps me learned more about morality, moral nihilists and/or non-cognitivists. I discovered important questions from this book that we can answer in our contemporary society.• Is there a non-relative (objective) morality?
Non-elative (objective) morality exists. Moore(351) stated that basic moral judgments convey goodness or badness to the realities of things, albeit he preferred not to separate moral ideas and moral standards in Principia Ethica. Like many of his contemporaries, he appears to believe that moral judgments are objectively true. Also, basic moral principles are universal and rational individuals may agree on their veracity. But moral relativism is the only viable counter-argument. Moral relativism is justified by the fact that various cultures have varying standards for measuring right and wrong. In general, however, even the most complicated moral decisions can be broken down into a few fundamental elements, which are then adapted to the particular material circumstances of each society. However, the fact that various communities form moral judgments differently does not imply relativism. A relativist must demonstrate that civilizations do not share basic moral judgments to justify their argument. Neither of these ideas has been fulfilled.
While society's moral practices may vary, the basic moral concepts do not. James Rachels describes the culture in "Morality Is Not Relative". Cultural relativism states that there are no established moral norms since different cultures have different beliefs about values. Rachel, for example, illustrates his point by citing other people's lives. Rachel brings up a seldom-mentioned issue of Eskimos killing babies. As Rachel points out, Eskimo women regularly murder their female children after delivery, and they do it without showing any emotion in the process. Meta-ethics should not hinder the pragmatic objective of finding direction for human social interaction based on what is a shared human nature. Many have tried to impose their morals on others, including Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong. It is also true that none of our great moral instructors ever created their morality. As an illustration, Jesus didn't invent a new moral code, but instead, he refined and expanded upon the existing one. Even objective moral norms are shaped by the society and epoch in which they are embodied. For example, a man (even a chief) has never been able to choose his bride (as far as we know). In Britain, women must be above sixteen, although this varies by country. What matters is that the objective moral principle is followed. No more than we can develop new basic color.
• Are ethical claims accurate or untrue (and why)? If so, how much do you agree with moral nihilists and/or non-cognitivists?
Humans have a shared sense of intuition, hence ethical claims are true. Our understanding of moral truths is intuitive, according to Moore (351-352), because it does not depend on reasoning from non-moral ideas, but rather relies on the recognition of specific moral statements that are self-evident, as a result of a form of direct or instantaneous insight. Suffering and theft are both morally wrong. This is a self-evident, plain reality about life. Stealing is wrong, even if you like it and even if you fool others into thinking it isn't. Intuitively, these ethical facts are objective: their reality does not change depending on one's position or choices. Moral propositions like these are objectively accurate, according to ethical realists like Moore(351). Realists think there are correct ethical responses.
However, realists and anti-realists alike seem to think Moore's Open Question Argument captures something significant about moral assertions that nonmoral claims cannot (352). According to logical Positivists, moral assertions are intrinsically linked to motivation in a manner that nonmoral statements are not (Ayer 328). The relationship to motivation is contested, but one prevalent argument (motivation internalism) is that an individual may only make a genuine moral claim if she is adequately motivated. Goodness comes from being in favor of something in ways that offer some motive (not necessarily decisive) to promote, develop, maintain or otherwise support it. People tend to presume someone who lacks such incentives yet professes to believe the subject in issue is excellent is either being dishonest or not understanding what she is saying. Unlike nonmoral assertions, which appear to imply nothing about the claimant's intentions. This is immaterial to whether or not her assertion that objects have that hue is honest and widely understood. Moral realism is based on a cognitivist interpretation of moral judgments. Moral judgments, like ordinary beliefs, are cognitive states for cognitivism. But how do we know? One approach is to think about what we want to accomplish when we make moral judgments, as well as how we say them. In the same way that statements communicate ordinary ideas, moral judgments are designed to accurately describe reality. In other words, moral expression is expressed through ethical statements. Moral judgments, like ordinary beliefs, are either true or false.
• Is egoism true (and how much)? Can humans act without self-interest (and how do we know)?
Yes, egoism exists. Depending on one's needs and self-realization. Friedrich Nietzsche's theory has been related to descriptive and normative egoism. The moral abhorrence for egoistic activity is attacked by Nietzsche to liberate higher human beings from the notion that it is beneficial for them. Other egoistic viewpoints exist alongside psychological egoism. Psychological egoism, unlike ethical egoism, is an empirical argument about our intentions, not what they should be. This is why, in contrast to the ethical egoist, the psychological egoist thinks that humans are naturally self-interested. Psychological egoism is not the same as "psychological hedonism." Psychological hedonism limits self-interested drives to pleasure and pain avoidance. It is therefore a kind of psychological egoism. Psychological egoism's origin narrative is odd. Though constantly debated, few prominent thinkers in philosophy's history have officially held it.
However, Stirner emphasizes that an egoist might be moral without egoism (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). Stirner says morality is OK as long as the egoist controls it rather than the other way around (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). His fundamental thesis is that individuals should act according to their interests, not regulations. As long as the rules do not dominate the individual, they are operating as an egoist. In contrast, one who calls himself or herself a "moral egoist" is placing norms above self-interest, which is a big no-no. A moral compass is contradictory to egoism, hence the egoist should not use one. Embodiment in so-called morality does not enable the egoist to escape the consequences of his actions (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). Any guilt someone feels should be felt, and there should be no Supreme Directive allowing him to escape the repercussions of his actions. Stirner recognized that abusers constantly justify their actions as ethically good. Egoism eliminates the get-out-of-condemnation card, forcing the egoist to reveal his motivations honestly.
In general, what can we learn about ethics from descriptive assertions about biology (or brains or institutions or emotions)?
What we can learn from ethics is that they assist us to define our moral views while making judgments. The purpose of learning ethics is to get a better understanding of morality, honesty, accountability, consciousness, decency, dignity, and respect in a variety of settings. It broadens our horizons and makes us more contemplative and thoughtful. It helps us think clearly and rationally about moral matters. The human being is by nature a 'social' being, a being in contact with other beings and the environment. All activities, whether conscious or not, affect others. That ethical arguments frequently use "facts" inside an imagined context/conventions (Ayer 326). Scientists may draw on a vast corpus of information to make judgments. But much of this information is based on value judgments, personal goals, and even the researcher's character and style. Because there are no absolute values, nothing matters and everything is significant. This is a facile way of saying that you don't have to make a decision or take a position on the morality of the situation.
Non-elative (objective) morality exists. Moore(351) stated that basic moral judgments convey goodness or badness to the realities of things, albeit he preferred not to separate moral ideas and moral standards in Principia Ethica. Like many of his contemporaries, he appears to believe that moral judgments are objectively true. Also, basic moral principles are universal and rational individuals may agree on their veracity. But moral relativism is the only viable counter-argument. Moral relativism is justified by the fact that various cultures have varying standards for measuring right and wrong. In general, however, even the most complicated moral decisions can be broken down into a few fundamental elements, which are then adapted to the particular material circumstances of each society. However, the fact that various communities form moral judgments differently does not imply relativism. A relativist must demonstrate that civilizations do not share basic moral judgments to justify their argument. Neither of these ideas has been fulfilled.
While society's moral practices may vary, the basic moral concepts do not. James Rachels describes the culture in "Morality Is Not Relative". Cultural relativism states that there are no established moral norms since different cultures have different beliefs about values. Rachel, for example, illustrates his point by citing other people's lives. Rachel brings up a seldom-mentioned issue of Eskimos killing babies. As Rachel points out, Eskimo women regularly murder their female children after delivery, and they do it without showing any emotion in the process. Meta-ethics should not hinder the pragmatic objective of finding direction for human social interaction based on what is a shared human nature. Many have tried to impose their morals on others, including Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong. It is also true that none of our great moral instructors ever created their morality. As an illustration, Jesus didn't invent a new moral code, but instead, he refined and expanded upon the existing one. Even objective moral norms are shaped by the society and epoch in which they are embodied. For example, a man (even a chief) has never been able to choose his bride (as far as we know). In Britain, women must be above sixteen, although this varies by country. What matters is that the objective moral principle is followed. No more than we can develop new basic color.
• Are ethical claims accurate or untrue (and why)? If so, how much do you agree with moral nihilists and/or non-cognitivists?
Humans have a shared sense of intuition, hence ethical claims are true. Our understanding of moral truths is intuitive, according to Moore (351-352), because it does not depend on reasoning from non-moral ideas, but rather relies on the recognition of specific moral statements that are self-evident, as a result of a form of direct or instantaneous insight. Suffering and theft are both morally wrong. This is a self-evident, plain reality about life. Stealing is wrong, even if you like it and even if you fool others into thinking it isn't. Intuitively, these ethical facts are objective: their reality does not change depending on one's position or choices. Moral propositions like these are objectively accurate, according to ethical realists like Moore(351). Realists think there are correct ethical responses.
However, realists and anti-realists alike seem to think Moore's Open Question Argument captures something significant about moral assertions that nonmoral claims cannot (352). According to logical Positivists, moral assertions are intrinsically linked to motivation in a manner that nonmoral statements are not (Ayer 328). The relationship to motivation is contested, but one prevalent argument (motivation internalism) is that an individual may only make a genuine moral claim if she is adequately motivated. Goodness comes from being in favor of something in ways that offer some motive (not necessarily decisive) to promote, develop, maintain or otherwise support it. People tend to presume someone who lacks such incentives yet professes to believe the subject in issue is excellent is either being dishonest or not understanding what she is saying. Unlike nonmoral assertions, which appear to imply nothing about the claimant's intentions. This is immaterial to whether or not her assertion that objects have that hue is honest and widely understood. Moral realism is based on a cognitivist interpretation of moral judgments. Moral judgments, like ordinary beliefs, are cognitive states for cognitivism. But how do we know? One approach is to think about what we want to accomplish when we make moral judgments, as well as how we say them. In the same way that statements communicate ordinary ideas, moral judgments are designed to accurately describe reality. In other words, moral expression is expressed through ethical statements. Moral judgments, like ordinary beliefs, are either true or false.
• Is egoism true (and how much)? Can humans act without self-interest (and how do we know)?
Yes, egoism exists. Depending on one's needs and self-realization. Friedrich Nietzsche's theory has been related to descriptive and normative egoism. The moral abhorrence for egoistic activity is attacked by Nietzsche to liberate higher human beings from the notion that it is beneficial for them. Other egoistic viewpoints exist alongside psychological egoism. Psychological egoism, unlike ethical egoism, is an empirical argument about our intentions, not what they should be. This is why, in contrast to the ethical egoist, the psychological egoist thinks that humans are naturally self-interested. Psychological egoism is not the same as "psychological hedonism." Psychological hedonism limits self-interested drives to pleasure and pain avoidance. It is therefore a kind of psychological egoism. Psychological egoism's origin narrative is odd. Though constantly debated, few prominent thinkers in philosophy's history have officially held it.
However, Stirner emphasizes that an egoist might be moral without egoism (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). Stirner says morality is OK as long as the egoist controls it rather than the other way around (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). His fundamental thesis is that individuals should act according to their interests, not regulations. As long as the rules do not dominate the individual, they are operating as an egoist. In contrast, one who calls himself or herself a "moral egoist" is placing norms above self-interest, which is a big no-no. A moral compass is contradictory to egoism, hence the egoist should not use one. Embodiment in so-called morality does not enable the egoist to escape the consequences of his actions (Welsh & ProQuest (Firm), 2010). Any guilt someone feels should be felt, and there should be no Supreme Directive allowing him to escape the repercussions of his actions. Stirner recognized that abusers constantly justify their actions as ethically good. Egoism eliminates the get-out-of-condemnation card, forcing the egoist to reveal his motivations honestly.
In general, what can we learn about ethics from descriptive assertions about biology (or brains or institutions or emotions)?
What we can learn from ethics is that they assist us to define our moral views while making judgments. The purpose of learning ethics is to get a better understanding of morality, honesty, accountability, consciousness, decency, dignity, and respect in a variety of settings. It broadens our horizons and makes us more contemplative and thoughtful. It helps us think clearly and rationally about moral matters. The human being is by nature a 'social' being, a being in contact with other beings and the environment. All activities, whether conscious or not, affect others. That ethical arguments frequently use "facts" inside an imagined context/conventions (Ayer 326). Scientists may draw on a vast corpus of information to make judgments. But much of this information is based on value judgments, personal goals, and even the researcher's character and style. Because there are no absolute values, nothing matters and everything is significant. This is a facile way of saying that you don't have to make a decision or take a position on the morality of the situation.
October 3, 2022
This has the scope of a text book but is written like a normal nonfiction book; you can simply read through it and enjoy the experience. This is also the main flaw of the book; there are a *lot* of metaethical theories to keep track of and the conversational writing style makes that difficult. You wouldn't finish it if it was systematic so we'll have to grant that one. And it's worth it to finish; while it lacks some of the "ah ha!" moments I've gotten from other philosophy books, it gave me the tools to think about ethics in all new ways. If you manage to finish, enjoy your more deeply examined life!
June 8, 2024
Although it did increase my understanding, it was definitely hard to follow. Granted the author acknowledged that some things will be but don’t worry just keep following along. Also I would classify myself as intermediate when it comes to philosophy whatever weight that holds.
I think my biggest complaint was the lay out/flow of his presentation of the theories. I’d give that a one star. Ive read one other book in this series and that layout was a lot better. All and all still worth 3 stars.
I think my biggest complaint was the lay out/flow of his presentation of the theories. I’d give that a one star. Ive read one other book in this series and that layout was a lot better. All and all still worth 3 stars.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 6 reviews