Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand Aron (French: [ʁɛmɔ̃ aʁɔ̃]; 14 March 1905 – 17 October 1983) was a French philosopher, sociologist, journalist, and political scientist. He is best known for his 1955 book The Opium of the Intellectuals, the title of which inverts Karl Marx's claim that religion was the opium of the people – Aron argues that in post-war France, Marxism was the opium of intellectuals. In the book, Aron chastised French intellectuals for what he described as their harsh criticism of capitalism and democracy and their simultaneous defense of Marxist oppression, atrocities, and intolerance. Critic Roger Kimball[2] suggests that Opium is "a seminal book of the twentieth century." Aron is also known for his lifelong friendship, sometimes fractious, with philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.[3] He is also known for his 1973 book, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973, which influenced Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, among others. Aron wrote extensively on a wide range of other topics. Citing the breadth and quality of Aron's writings, historian James R. Garland[4] suggests, "Though he may be little known in America, Raymond Aron arguably stood as the preeminent example of French intellectualism for much of the twentieth century."
Indeed, it is a collection of portraits. I stopped on those of Montesquieu, Comte, Tocqueville, and especially Marx. R. Aron's biases did not bother me; quite the contrary: Aron is a talented philosopher, sociologist, and good guide. As a "Marxian," as he defined himself, I particularly appreciated his introduction to Marx's thought. In it, he shows the relevance of the analysis of Capitalism (of his time, but probably not only) while completely refuting the Marxist political orientations, whose mistakes History has shown.
رمون آرون از نسل آخرین متفکران همهدان و جامع غربی ست. تسلط فراگیر او نسبت به تاریخ و اندیشه در علوم اجتماعی واقعا تحسینبرانگیز است. این کتاب با تمام کملطفیهایام، مقدمات آشنایی من با منتسکیو، کنت، مارکس، دورکیم، توکویل، پارتو و وبر را فراهم کرد
A book of science popularization has been provoking polemic in Brazil lately (August, 2023). “Que bobagem! Pseudociências e outros absurdos que não merecem ser levados a sério” (“Bullshit! Pseudosciences and other absurdities that should not be taken seriously” https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1...) exploits an already known formula based on two goals:
(i) to debunk health treatments largely recognized by the lay public (and by some practitioners too), and, indirectly,
(ii) to prescribe what’s science and what’s not.
This type of polemic is old and comes and goes everywhere, but it’s kind of new in Brazil. The authors of the book, biologist Natalia Pasternak and science fiction writer and her husband Carlos Orsi, took advantage of Pasternak’s large exposure in the Covid-19 pandemic as a spokeswoman of science against obscurantism to now aim their artillery against practices deemed as scams.
Along with homeopathy, family constellation, essential oils, etc., the authors label psychoanalysis as pseudoscience by pointing out the lack of evidence and studies to support their prescriptions as health treatments.
The book has lit a fierce debate on whether the criticism is adequate for all practices, and has provoked the fury of entire communities of professionals, scholars, and followers or patients. The well established community of psychoanalysts and Sigmund Freud’s followers in Brazil — which is huge — of course has reacted and the discussions seem that will extend for some time.
But what does this have to do with Raymond Aron’s book “Main Currents in Sociological Thought” (“As Etapas do Pensamento Sociológico”), a book on the founders of Sociology? The answer: methodology of science. Science method is in the heart of said polemic involving psychoanalysis. In special, method used in human sciences.
Pasternak and Orsi’s main argument is that every medical treatment must have strong evidence of its efficacy demonstrated by serious scientific tests to be prescribed since they all deal with human health and well-being, be it physical or mental.
The authors point to Freud’s excessive theorization and elocubration, and attack psychoanalysis on the supposed lack of evidence of efficacy. The method used by psychoanalysis is heavily criticized in the book. Clinical observation and theories formulated more than a hundred years ago from introspection and creative insights from its founder Sigmund Freud and followers are not capable of proving that the therapy really works, so the practice doesn’t deserve to be recognized as science and should be banned.
The authors also accuse Freud of having committed frauds in his clinical observations — which would be an example of problems of observer bias typical of systems based only on observation — and go further also to mention “ad hominem” criticism borne by detractors who wrote biographies pointing to some alleged scandals in Freud’s life.
The criticism of the authors on the basis of the lack of evidence could be extended to human sciences in general, which are all in one way or another relatives of philosophy. Humanities of the 19th century were all born in an environment lacking reliable data — or any data. Scientists used thorough observation and sensibility, and theorized using insights, a lot of introspection and abstraction.
This could also be seen as the case of Sociology, whose founders’ thoughts were very well portrayed by Raymond Aron in this bulky book. Aron summarizes the main works and thoughts of Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Pareto, and Max Weber.
These authors, especially from Comte to Weber, were all men of their time. In 19th century European societies, industrial capitalism was developing fast. A new mentality based on bourgeois professional ethics, born with urban work, would challenge old traditions but had also gotten a lot from them. Max Weber, for example, sustains that capitalism borrowed its individual professional ethics from some lines of Protestantism, such as Puritanism. Work dedication and profits were not for the enjoyment of life, but for accumulation and reinvestment; in this context, wealth might be a signal of divine grace.
With massification of Western societies, scholars started to pay attention to phenomena that could be attributed to societies themselves, hence the interest in the study of societies as a specific object of study.
I’m not going through the ideas of Montesquieu and Tocqueville as they are more political philosophers than sociologists.
AUGUSTE COMTE is the true founder of the discipline who also coined the name Sociology. He also founded Positivism. By the way, the motto “Order and Progress” in the Brazilian flag is a trace of the positivist influence. Comte’s emphasis on science as the engine of modern society; in fact his intention to found a religion based on science makes him an interesting character.
I’m also not going deeply through the chapters on Marx, Pareto and Max Weber. I’ve already reviewed some of the most important works of KARL MARX:
My only comments are that there is no such a thing as a “theory of history” in Marx according to my read, and the reach of his materialism is way more limited than several authors proclaim. Marx even rejected the idea of a general theory of history for any society. This idea was in fact the result of a distortion that Russian Soviets made to his thought, which ended up incorrectly influencing most of the Western interpretation of Marx. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
The other point is that Raymond Aron, a liberal sociologist, shows some respect to Marx’s thought, although he cannot hide his more negative bias towards him. Aron points out errors and weaknesses in the thoughts of every thinker he studies in this book — though with Marx he emphasizes them more.
With respect to VILFREDO PARETO, it’s worth just pointing out that his work was founded on solid economic background as he was a member of the Lausanne School, following Leon Walras, one of the Marginal Revolutionaries who deepened the use of mathematics as a fundamental tool in economics (my review here https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
Pareto’s sociology ended up not being taken so seriously, but his law on unequal distribution of production or wealth is astonishing and even today inspires scholars to proclaim that inequality is a fate of humanity — so no communist/socialist Revolution could ever fix that. Pareto observed random, scattered activities and found a surprising pattern, which he proclaimed as a law or principle that 80% of results are always produced by 20% of causes (i.e., the 80/20 law or principle). Brought to the economic realm, 20% of people working in whatever economic activity will always respond for 80% of the production due to some psychological feature of mankind (this was further elaborated with modifications by physicist Derek Price in what became known as “Price’s Law”).
On MAX WEBER, I also reviewed two of his main works (“Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism” https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... and “Economy and Society” https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). I just wanted to comment that Aron’s passage on Weber’s ideas on historic causality is absolutely brilliant!
My focus here will be DAVID ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Durkheim's ideas for me are those that mostly matched my previous layman impression about what Sociology would be. Durkheim is the sociologist who sees society as an independent body with particular characteristics different from isolated individuals and not just the sum of several individuals together. It’s like an independent living entity. Thus, he takes the opposite route of that of Max Weber; his focus is social phenomena influencing individuals, while Weber makes his analysis from the individual to the collective phenomena.
Durkheim saw social facts as things: the observer should distance himself to analyze them properly. Durkheim recognized and saw individual freedom as important, but his object of interest was the aggregate phenomena. Individual behavior interests his sociology only when they result from collective influence.
Durkheim saw society as the result of a collective agreement. He was concerned with the elements that keep society aggregated and disaggregated. Two fundamental elements that contribute to aggregation is coercion and solidarity.
Coercion does not necessarily correspond to the common meaning of punishment for behavior deviation. Coercion also comprises that, but it’s also present when people act as if they are motivated by their nature, when in fact they have incorporated a social habit, like the habit of wearing clothes for example.
Durkheim classifies solidarity in two ways: mechanic and organic:
Mechanic solidarity is present in small, simple, primitive societies. These societies work like a gear. Each individual is born with his social role already determined and should act accordingly. Individuals cooperate and solidarize with one another so the society works.
Organic solidarity is the one present in larger, modern societies. These societies work like a body. Normally there is some individual free will, and social roles are more fluid, though with increasing complexity these societies tend to require individuals to exert more fixed roles in the division of labor at the expense of the notion of totality and sense of solidarity. This idea is reminiscent of what Marx called the “worker estrangement” or “worker alienation” (my review of the “Paris Manuscripts” here https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). The illusion of free will in societies where true mobility among activities doesn’t actually happen, and the lack of true sense of cooperation and solidarity may cause social pathologies, promoting disaggregation.
Social pathologies such as anomy — which stands for the absence or weakness of rules — are caused by a deep process of losing the sense of totality by the individuals, so solidarity, or perception of solidarity, tends to weaken. One of the symptoms of anomy is what Durkheim saw as an increase in suicide rates in modern societies. He was not interested in the particular psychological circumstances that lead the individual to commit suicide, but the broad social aspects (and pathologies) that could be identified behind those increasing rates.
Now, if we apply the strict modern requirements used in hard sciences as defended by Pasternak and Orsi to all the theoretical work of the founders of Sociology, we would have to recognize that their work was also “Bullshit!”. If one criticizes Freud and psychoanalysis on those grounds it would be perfectly possible to do that against Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, and all the old Political Economy. In fact, just a few lines of modern Economics — Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics — would entirely survive the critique. The same would apply to Sociology and its old authors like Durkheim, Marx, and Weber — a trio who’s in fact reverenced as the most important sociologists of all times. But does that criticism make sense, at least for human sciences? Is using the current state of knowledge to criticize the precursors of human sciences (or any science) fair?
The authors seem to lack some sense of History to understand that evolution is on the base of every science development; that there is only advanced science with the use of a lot data — even in humanities now — because there had been great erudite authors in the past with genius and broad insights who set the grounds for a lot of advanced work nowadays.
Human sciences such as Economics, Sociology, and Psychology have several branches, each of them in different stages of development if usage of methods from hard sciences is the proxy for evolution.
The debate on appropriate scientific methods should go on and not settle down in the near future. If the use of methods of hard sciences for human sciences seems like a good attempt to confer it more reliability, its object of study (the human behavior in its various dimensions) seems to take it substantially back given its high subjectivism.
Not for nothing experiments on human behavior have been facing a replicability crisis according to some specialists. It’s uncertain where this debate will take science made in Brazil, but the debate itself is positive as it’s not common for discussions on philosophy of science to occupy any space in the public debate.
Very specialized, but really interesting overview of the basic thinkers about society. Especially the bit about Weber interested me at the time (1980!) most. Aron is superb.
La sociologie naît solidairement à l'affirmation de l'individu et de l'État au stade critique (le "problème du social") de leur commun détachement par rapport à la religion. Sur fond du déclin des aristocraties autour des administrations centralisées (Monarchies absolues), elle réagit aux prétentions de la théorie économique à surmonter leur face à face. Par la médiation de la libre recherche d'intérêts au sein de la "société civile", se réalisent des biens non visés ni voulus par personne, mais bénéficiant au plus grand nombre.
Le lecteur intéressé par la genèse du "problème du social" (dixit Aron) et plus largement, par celle des distinctions et dualismes structurant notre univers culturel-mental devra s'orienter ailleurs que vers Les étapes de la pensée sociologique dans un premier temps. Aron ne définit pas, sinon très sommairement, le "problème" où il reconnaît la pierre angulaire de la pensée des grands auteurs présentés, sauf exception (sauf Montesquieu, cf. plus bas). La succession de leur portrait fait ici office d'histoire de la naissance sociologique, portraits liés par les inspirations revendiquées, et les critiques adressées, des uns aux autres de leur vivant ; liés également, aux soins de Aron, par une attention portée au regard de chacun sur son époque ; via l'accentuation ou relativisation historique et/ou géographique du problème, et la mise de l'avant des prétentions légitimes de l'exercice sociologique à son égard (descriptif ou prescriptif ?).
Les forces de l'ouvrage sont la clarté des résumés et contextualisations, la richesse des approfondissements ; l'aisance dans l'appropriation des oeuvres se traduisant en des commentaires précis sur leurs forces et faiblesses. Aron livre le contraire des critiques postmodernes dont nous sommes repus en sciences sociales - critique à tout crin d'un pouvoir rendu omniscient et omniprésent (grâce à Foucault et cie.). L'exercice est instruit, classique, minutieux.
Chaque penseur/auteur est approché par la reconstruction d'oeuvres clefs, resituées dans leurs intentions et grandes lignes, puis regardées via les différentes traditions de lecture-réception.
Si l'on adopte temporairement un point de vue étranger à celui de Aron, celui du plus grand sociologue-théoricien des 50 dernières années (Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems), il est tentant de répartir les auteurs discutés ici selon leur différente manière d'assumer leur commune intrication à l'ontologie "Vieille Europe", soit au monde stratifiée des monarchies. Les sociétés hiérarchiques s'observent dans la communication par la désignation d'un sommet (par opposition à la base) et/ou d'un centre (urbain par opposition à la périphérie rurale) comme partie spéciale du Tout cosmique, observant le tout au complet de l'intérieur - partie spéciale départageant le conforme à l'ordre du tout du non-conforme (illusion, séduction, corruption, etc.). Tandis que la société à différenciation fonctionnelle s'observe uniquement dans la communication par des codes scindés s'excluant et se construisant mutuellement en environnement hétérarchique.
Si l'on accepte donc provisoirement cette perspective, il apparaît, comme Luhmann le prétend, qu'aucun des fondateurs de la sociologie n'a pris la juste mesure du nouveau mode de différenciation sociale - reste prisonnier de l'ancienne sémantique - et désigne un code de communication fonctionnel comme la partie spéciale produisant du tout la représentation normative directrice. Soit le classement suivant : - Le politique (pouvoir de commandement légitime) désigne le tout : Montesquieu (oeuvres présentée et résumée : L'esprit des lois , avec citations occasionnelles de Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains ) Tocqueville (oeuvres présentées et résumées : De la démocratie en Amérique , L'ancien Régime et la Révolution ) Montesquieu et Tocqueville ont en commun de proposer une vision synthétique de la société, partant des sentiments, croyances, traditions diffuses formant un tempérament (personnalité, esprit, etc.) collectif, et en commun de tenir les institutions politiques comme clef de voute de celle-ci. Tout deux s'interrogent sur la disposition mutuelle des institutions favorable à la liberté.
- L'économie désigne le tout : Marx (oeuvres discutées et présentées : Le Manifeste communiste , Contribution à la critique de l'économie politique , Le Capital sic.). Le souci directeur de Marx est de montrer que la société à régime capitaliste fondée sur l'exploitation d'une force de travail privée de moyens de production (et n'ayant d'autres moyens d'assurer sa subsistance que la vente de sa force musculaire) et sur l'extorsion de plus-value (du temps de travail non-payé) est minée par une contradiction entre les rapports et les forces de production ; entre l'accumulation des richesses retirées du travail d'une masse livrée de manière croissante à la pauvreté ; et entre le désir illimité de reconnaissance et la spécialisation du travail (spécialisant la reconnaissance possible et conduisant à l'aliénation : sentiment d'étrangeté à soi-même). Les deux premières facettes de la "contradiction" ou lutte des classes s'appuient sur la partie à prétention scientifique de l'oeuvre de Marx ; celle de sa théorie économique, où il prétend expliquer sans le voile idéologique de la bourgeoisie les problèmes classiques des économistes (dont la baisse tendancielle du taux de profit). La portion de ses oeuvres traitant de l'aliénation renvoie à la philosophie de Marx, héritée en bonne part de Hegel ( cf. Olivier Clain dir. 2009, Marx philosophe, revue Société ).
Marx est, à mon avis, l'auteur dont Aron propose la discussion la plus riche et stimulante, à la fois en raison des tensions politiques vives au moment de la rédaction des Étapes de la pensée sociologique (les sociologues se divisent alors en suivant les blocs Est/Ouest ; analytique-synthétique-historique-spéculatif-législateur vs empirique-description-actuel-prétendument neutre), et en raison des multiples niveaux que prétend englober Marx dans sa théorie (multiplicité qui pose autant de défi à l'intelligence) La matérialisme et l'atomisme sont-ils vraiment indispensables et dictés par la découverte de constantes historiques (l'antagonisme sociale notamment) ? Peut-on vraiment distingues (voire opposer) Infra- et Superstructure ? Si la propriété ou régime de propriété fait partie de la première, le droit en fait également partie (le droit à la propriété privée) ; or le droit est défini par Marx lui-même comme une partie de l'État, c'est-à-dire de l'outil employé par la classe dominante pour justifier l'exploitation. Ainsi dans ce cas précis elles (infra- et super-structures) sont indissociables (et les cas de ce type sont innombrables). Dans le même ordre d'idée, n'est-il pas simpliste de tenir l'abolition de la propriété privée des moyens de production comme garant d'une réconciliation et d'un apaisement authentique (d'une fin de l'histoire telle que Marx la conçoit : la mutation du rapport Esclave / Maître en rapport Plébéien / Patricien, puis en rapport serf / baron, compagnon / maître de jurande, prolétaire / propriétaire) ?
La morale désigne le tout : Auguste Comte (oeuvres présentées : Opuscule de philosophie sociale , Cours de philosophie positive , Système de politique positive ) Émile Durkheim (oeuvres : De la division du travail social , Le Suicide , Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse , Les règles de la méthode sociologique ). La présentation tranchée, inspirée de Luhmann, révèle rapidement ses limites avec chacun des auteurs/fondateurs, et en particulier ici avec Durkheim et Comte. Il peut sembler justifié de ranger l'un et l'autre (pris dans le même rapport assumé inspirateur > disciple que Montesquieu - Tocqueville) dans la continuité de Marx : l'un et l'autre accordent à la division du travail dans la société industrielle une position de clef de voute, de point archimèdéen dans la totalité. Il semblerait également justifié de renforcer ce parallélisme par la foi commune à Comte, Durkheim et Marx dans le potentiel émancipateur de la science historique (les lois de l'histoire).
Comte et Durkheim soutiennent essentiellement ceci : le problème social (l'avènement de l'individu séparé face au pouvoir administratif centralisé) vient de l'épuisement de l'ancienne moralité et du retard de remplacement de celle-ci par la nouvelle morale adéquate à la société industrielle. Cette nouvelle morale sera produite par la science - la sociologie comme science - et consistera en un culte de l'humanité à elle-même : le culte de la liberté humaine dans la société. Plus exactement, les deux fondateurs de la sociologie française posent que le nouveau pouvoir spirituel sera, à l'image des moralités anciennes, une représentation de la totalité du mode de vie humain idéale et à atteindre, à cette importance différence près que son autonomie (auto-construction) est maintenue advenue à la conscience collective (débarrassée de l'attribution religieuse des origines, fondements et raisons-d'être à une source extérieure-antérieure).
- La force (ou "Powerpolitic") désigne le tout : Wilfredo Pareto ( Traité de sociologie générale ) Max Weber ( Essais sur la théorie de la science , L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme , Économie et société ).
En este libro Aron resume las grandes líneas del pensamiento sociológico, o protosociológico, de siete figuras fundamentales de la filosofía política y de la sociología: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, Tocqueville, Pareto, Durkheim y Weber. Interesante, aunque no diría que es lo más interesante o profundo que ha hecho Aron, sirve como introducción a esos autores y como motivación y guía para pasar a servirse de su pensamiento sin intermediarios.
Buen libro, entretenido y muy preciso si quieres conocer las ideas de quienes forjaron el pensamiento sociológico. No es un libro fácil y tampoco está pensado para quienes no tienen nociones básicas de filosofía. Da una muy buena idea.
I read it to improve my French, as Aron is a very intelligent, level-headed, and well-read man who writes in a clear and simple style. Very good, not quite profound but comprehensive.
بسیار اتفاقی به عنوان این کتاب برخوردم. تنها یادم می آید در دوران دانشکده یکی از منابع درسی ما بود. در آن هنگام به دلیل روحیه ی دانشجویی از این آقای آرون بدمان می آمد چرا که در دورانی جزو جنبش چپ اروپا و همکار نزدیک ژان پل سارتر و سیمون دو بوآر بود. اما بعد صد و هشتاد درجه چرخید و به جبهه ی راست پیوست و در دانشگاه های آمریکا به تدریس پرداخت و... خلاصه شرح حالی که انگار بیش از نظریاتش برای ما مهم بود. اما جرات ندارم از نظریات او که بعد از این سال ها بعید می دانم درست بخاطرم مانده باشد، حرفی بزنم.
Excellent introduction to Sociology! If one needs to understand present societies needs the excellent, although preservative, view of the sociological history by Raymond Aron. I enjoyed very much!