The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals at War, 1940-5

by David Downing

In this study of WWII, the author examines the decisive European campaigns from the point of view of German generals who exercised the greatest influence on their planning, direction & outcome. This portrait of a select group of highly skilled & disciplined officers--from Guderian, Manstein & Rommel to von Kluge, Model, von Rundstedt & von Bock--demonstrates that ultimately the generals' strengths became the very weaknesses that doomed the German effort.

Genres: History, World War II, War, Military History

256 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 1977

About the author

David Downing is the author of a political thriller, two alternative histories and a number of books on military and political history and other subjects as diverse as Neil Young and Russian Football.

Reviews

[Militaryreader · Rating 1 out of 5]

In the aftermath of the Second World War the former German High Command through self serving memoirs and in the glare of the Cold War were able to concoct a myth that has persisted ever since, that they fought a clean war, far removed from Nazi atrocity. Furthermore they focussed their attention on the early years 1940-41, giving little coverage to the years of defeat from 1943-45. And so we have the enduring myth of an operationally brilliant team of generals only held back by the meddling hand of Hitler. Downing is happy to continue to peddle such a myth, one that recent scholarship has exposed to be just that.

While there is no denying the Wehrmacht's talents at an operational and tactical level the book falls short when dealing with the failures in strategic planning, intelligence and logistics, all major factors in the failure of the German war effort that led to their crushing defeat. More importantly it pays scant regard to the Russian contribution to victory on the Eastern Front. Downing accepts at face value all the general's hyperbole about operations in Russia in 1941. However more recent scholarship has shown this to be poorly conceived and based on a massive failure of intelligence that was totally undermined by disastrous logistical organisation....and that's before you factor in the tenacious, if poorly led, Russian resistance, which barely rates a mention.

Downing gives little, if any, attention to the complicity of the German High Command in the Nazi racial agenda. Evidence now abounds to demonstrate that the high command were not only aware of what was going on, but were active participants, if not complete believers.

In summary this book avoids original scholarship and research and instead recycles the old myths and half truths that the former generals created post-war to exonerate themselves.

[TheIron Paw · Rating 3 out of 5]

While there is nothing new in this book concerning tactics or strategy to those who have studied WWII battles, the book does provide an interesting perspective on the relationship between Hitler and his generals - perhaps a deciding factor in the war in Europe. The author leaves no doubt that the generals were masters of their trade, but were less than masterful in the political sphere, even being perhaps naive in that sense. A worthwhile read.

[Kristof · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is easy to read and understand.

It contains some new information and gives you at some points a new and clear view over the subject of commanding.
You get a clear view in what political timings the generals had to make there decision. The contrast of being a Prussian officer and his oath.

Definately a book that should earn a place on your bookshelve.

[Steve Brooker · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating take on some the key German commanders of WWII. Suggests that the military qualities that helped make them disproportionately successful on the battlefield also prevented them from resisting the moral threat created by Hitler. It's a compelling thesis for explaining of how decent, even occasionally admirable, men ended up doing truly horrific things.

[Bill V · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book focuses more on individual people and campaigns, not the entire Second World War as a narrative. Entire sections of the war are omitted such as the situation on the Eastern front after the Kursk offensive, the Greek and Yugoslavian campaigns and details of the North African struggles. There are a few interesting facts that I was not aware of prior to reading this book.