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Pragmatism: An Open Question
Hilary Putnam has been at the center of contemporary debates about the nature of the mind and of its access to the world, about language and its relation to reality, and many other metaphysical and epistemological issues. In this book he turns to pragmatism - and confronts the teachings of James, Peirce, Dewey, and Wittgenstein - not solely out of an interest in theoretical questions, but above all to respond to the questions of whether it is possible to find an alternative to corrosive moral skepticism, on the one hand, and to moral authoritarianism on the other.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
128 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
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About the author
Hilary Putnam
113 books141 followersHilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
May 10, 2016
Written in an accessible manner these three essays are a helpful appreciation of Pragmatism. I particularly like the third essay, which pointed to the significance of Pragmatism in contemporary life.
February 8, 2013
A clear primer on the connections between his collapse of fact/values and Dewy's Public/Privates (had to do that).
November 25, 2013
Really Liked it! New perspective on pragmatism, Link between Wittgenstein, Kant and James.
April 24, 2018
The noted philosopher turns to pragmatism, and does it well. Looking to get back to the roots of philosophy, in which, simply, guidance is sought for the right way to live.
October 10, 2024
THREE LECTURES DEALING WITH JAMES, WITTGENSTEIN, AND DEWEY
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born 1926) is an American analytic philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who taught at Harvard for many years. He wrote many other books, such as 'Realism with a Human Face,' 'Pragmatism: An Open Question,' 'Reason, Truth and History,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1994 book, “in March 1992 I gave these three lectures … I chose to talk about Pragmatism---not Pragmatism as a movement that had its day at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, but as a way of thinking that I find of lasting importance, and an option … that should figure in present-day philosophical thought… I did not hesitate to talk about the ways in which I see the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as also paralleling certain themes in Pragmatism… I stress the PLURALISM and the thoroughgoing HOLISM which are ubiquitous in Pragmatist writing.”
He explains, “One of the chief characteristics of [William] James’s philosophy is its HOLISM: there is an obvious if implicit rejection of many familiar dualisms: fact, value and theory are all seen by James as interpenetrating and interdependent… Another characteristic of that philosophy … is a strong strain of what philosophers used to call DIRECT REALISM, that is, the doctrine that perception is (normally) of objects and events ‘out there,’ and nor of private sense data.” (Pg. 7)
He suggests, “If James’s views evoked hostility, both in his lifetime and after, they have always attracted adherents as well… the very feature of James’s world view I have been pointing to---the vision of fact, theory, value, and interpretation as all interdependent---is one of the sources of that attraction… to those of us of what James would call the Pragmatic ‘temperament,’ that vision seems simply more REALISTIC than the vision of those who try to convince us that the familiar dualisms MUST be correct.” (Pg. 19)
He observes, “Pragmatism has been characterized by ANTISCEPTICISM. Pragmatists hold that DOUBT requires justification just as much as belief…, and by FALLIBILISM: Pragmatists hold that there are no metaphysical guarantees to be had that even our most firmly-held beliefs will never need revision. That one can be both fallibilistic AND antisceptical is perhaps THE basic insight of American Pragmatism.” (Pg. 20-21)
He concludes the first lecture, “for James… and his successors, the opposition between philosophy which is concerned with how to life and philosophy which is concerned with hard technical questions is a false opposition. We want ideals and we want a world view, and we want our ideas and our world view to support one another. Philosophy which is all argument feeds no real hunger; while philosophy which is all vision feeds a real hunger, but it feeds it Pablum. If there is one overriding reason for being concerned with James’s thought, it is that he was a genius who was concerned with real hungers, and whose thought, whatever its shortcomings, provides substantial food for thought---and not just for thought, but for life.” (Pg. 22-23)
In the lecture on Wittgenstein, he points out, “Wittgenstein’s PRACTICE cannot be understood as a simple REPUDIATION of something called ‘traditional philosophy’; Wittgenstein is as much continuing a tradition of philosophical reflection as he is repudiating certain kinds of philosophical reflection.” (Pg. 31) Later, he adds, “even if Wittgenstein was not in the strict sense either a ‘pragmatist’ or a ‘neo-Kantian,’ he shares with pragmatism a certain Kantian heritage… and he also shares a central---perhaps THE central---emphasis with pragmatism: the emphasis on the primacy of practice.” (Pg. 52)
This is an excellent discussion of Pragmatism, as well as of James, Wittgenstein, and Dewey; it will be of great interest to students of contemporary analytical philosophy.
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born 1926) is an American analytic philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who taught at Harvard for many years. He wrote many other books, such as 'Realism with a Human Face,' 'Pragmatism: An Open Question,' 'Reason, Truth and History,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1994 book, “in March 1992 I gave these three lectures … I chose to talk about Pragmatism---not Pragmatism as a movement that had its day at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, but as a way of thinking that I find of lasting importance, and an option … that should figure in present-day philosophical thought… I did not hesitate to talk about the ways in which I see the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as also paralleling certain themes in Pragmatism… I stress the PLURALISM and the thoroughgoing HOLISM which are ubiquitous in Pragmatist writing.”
He explains, “One of the chief characteristics of [William] James’s philosophy is its HOLISM: there is an obvious if implicit rejection of many familiar dualisms: fact, value and theory are all seen by James as interpenetrating and interdependent… Another characteristic of that philosophy … is a strong strain of what philosophers used to call DIRECT REALISM, that is, the doctrine that perception is (normally) of objects and events ‘out there,’ and nor of private sense data.” (Pg. 7)
He suggests, “If James’s views evoked hostility, both in his lifetime and after, they have always attracted adherents as well… the very feature of James’s world view I have been pointing to---the vision of fact, theory, value, and interpretation as all interdependent---is one of the sources of that attraction… to those of us of what James would call the Pragmatic ‘temperament,’ that vision seems simply more REALISTIC than the vision of those who try to convince us that the familiar dualisms MUST be correct.” (Pg. 19)
He observes, “Pragmatism has been characterized by ANTISCEPTICISM. Pragmatists hold that DOUBT requires justification just as much as belief…, and by FALLIBILISM: Pragmatists hold that there are no metaphysical guarantees to be had that even our most firmly-held beliefs will never need revision. That one can be both fallibilistic AND antisceptical is perhaps THE basic insight of American Pragmatism.” (Pg. 20-21)
He concludes the first lecture, “for James… and his successors, the opposition between philosophy which is concerned with how to life and philosophy which is concerned with hard technical questions is a false opposition. We want ideals and we want a world view, and we want our ideas and our world view to support one another. Philosophy which is all argument feeds no real hunger; while philosophy which is all vision feeds a real hunger, but it feeds it Pablum. If there is one overriding reason for being concerned with James’s thought, it is that he was a genius who was concerned with real hungers, and whose thought, whatever its shortcomings, provides substantial food for thought---and not just for thought, but for life.” (Pg. 22-23)
In the lecture on Wittgenstein, he points out, “Wittgenstein’s PRACTICE cannot be understood as a simple REPUDIATION of something called ‘traditional philosophy’; Wittgenstein is as much continuing a tradition of philosophical reflection as he is repudiating certain kinds of philosophical reflection.” (Pg. 31) Later, he adds, “even if Wittgenstein was not in the strict sense either a ‘pragmatist’ or a ‘neo-Kantian,’ he shares with pragmatism a certain Kantian heritage… and he also shares a central---perhaps THE central---emphasis with pragmatism: the emphasis on the primacy of practice.” (Pg. 52)
This is an excellent discussion of Pragmatism, as well as of James, Wittgenstein, and Dewey; it will be of great interest to students of contemporary analytical philosophy.
February 22, 2021
An important work by one of the 20th centuries most debated philosophers, in this work he discusses the forefathers of American pragmatism and provides an interesting reading into both Early and Late Wittgenstein - anyone who is interested in functionalism or Putnam's model-theoretical argument contra metaphysics ought to read this work; I was caught off guard by his insertion of pragmatism into the realm of ethics in lieu of his prior focus on the philosophy of mind and linguistic expressivity of epistemic questions. This work, while undeniably important in assessing the reintroduction of Wittgenstein and the American pragmatists (not Sellars & co.) into contemporary analytic philosophy, suffers from the limitation of scope and of communicated relevance in relation to other theories gaining prominence in analytic philosophy - thus I would classify this as a good monograph, but not as a cutting edge or revolutionary change of scope or methodology.
March 11, 2025
Excellent intro to Pragmatism and the thought of Hilary Putnam.
June 25, 2025
I think I’m a neo-pragmatist
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews