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U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941
First of two volumes on the US Army's unconventional missions.
319 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1997
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October 19, 2020
Birtle has written a well-researched and balanced history of America’s small wars from the War Between the States to the eve of World War II. This book is also a doctrinal history and examination of domestic and foreign small wars. Each chapter is a self-contained account of a particular period, and there is a comprehensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources which will amply repay those seeking further research. Birtle’s writing style made the book a pleasure to read; at the end of each chapter, Birtle summarizes the changes in doctrine in each period.
Birtle begins by examining the concepts and doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare and how the groundwork was laid from 1861-1865. Following this background, Birtle details what he calls the Constabulary Years, 1865-1898, on the American frontier. I found this the most interesting chapter because the author peels away the sanitized myths we all grew up with, courtesy of novels and movies. The U.S. Army developed a significantly effective counter-guerrilla doctrine during these years, and Birtle emphasizes how these operations significantly improved the professionalism and efficiency of the Army.
The two chapters which follow this are on the U.S. in Cuba and the Philippines, as well as the Peking Relief Expedition, 1900-1901. Birtle’s analysis of the Army’s approach to nation building and how this impacted doctrine is superb, as it includes the bad with the good. In the remaining two chapters, Birtle examines the experiences of the Army in post-World War I Germany, as well as the small wars actions which occurred from 1914-1941. Birtle concludes that the Army considered counter-insurgency as secondary, or even tertiary, to its warfighting role and capabilities. As the lessons learned were codified into a coherent doctrine, the difficulty of the operations themselves, as well as the cost in real dollars as well as in force structure, lead the Army to leave these types of missions to the USMC. This book is strongly applicable to the contemporary operating environment. Most of the lesson learned during this period were re-learned the hard way during our more recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. If I were to point out one weakness with this book, it would be the limited discussion on the attitudes of the U.S. public toward the Philippine war and the following insurgency. I believe this would have proved fruitful in light of the current debate of the role of politics, the media and public perception on the rules of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their effect on the way in which we conduct counterinsurgency today. These factors obviously have a limiting effect which had impaired the Army’s ability to win, and the comparison would have been useful.
Overall, a very good work on a little studied period of American military history.
Birtle begins by examining the concepts and doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare and how the groundwork was laid from 1861-1865. Following this background, Birtle details what he calls the Constabulary Years, 1865-1898, on the American frontier. I found this the most interesting chapter because the author peels away the sanitized myths we all grew up with, courtesy of novels and movies. The U.S. Army developed a significantly effective counter-guerrilla doctrine during these years, and Birtle emphasizes how these operations significantly improved the professionalism and efficiency of the Army.
The two chapters which follow this are on the U.S. in Cuba and the Philippines, as well as the Peking Relief Expedition, 1900-1901. Birtle’s analysis of the Army’s approach to nation building and how this impacted doctrine is superb, as it includes the bad with the good. In the remaining two chapters, Birtle examines the experiences of the Army in post-World War I Germany, as well as the small wars actions which occurred from 1914-1941. Birtle concludes that the Army considered counter-insurgency as secondary, or even tertiary, to its warfighting role and capabilities. As the lessons learned were codified into a coherent doctrine, the difficulty of the operations themselves, as well as the cost in real dollars as well as in force structure, lead the Army to leave these types of missions to the USMC. This book is strongly applicable to the contemporary operating environment. Most of the lesson learned during this period were re-learned the hard way during our more recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. If I were to point out one weakness with this book, it would be the limited discussion on the attitudes of the U.S. public toward the Philippine war and the following insurgency. I believe this would have proved fruitful in light of the current debate of the role of politics, the media and public perception on the rules of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their effect on the way in which we conduct counterinsurgency today. These factors obviously have a limiting effect which had impaired the Army’s ability to win, and the comparison would have been useful.
Overall, a very good work on a little studied period of American military history.
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