Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism

by Paul Boghossian

Relativist and constructivist conceptions of truth and knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. In his long-awaited first book, Paul Boghossian critically examines such views and exposes their fundamental flaws.

Boghossian focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed--one as a thesis about truth and two about justification. And he rejects all three. The intuitive, common-sense view is that there is a way the world is that is independent of human opinion; and
that we are capable of arriving at beliefs about how it is that are objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that philosophy has uncovered
powerful reasons for rejecting them.

This short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists. It will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Science, Theory, Politics

152 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

About the author

Paul Artin Boghossian is Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He was the chair of the department from 1994 to 2004 and, as of 2022, is the current chair as well.

He is also director of the New York Institute of Philosophy and Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.

Dr. Boghossian received his PhD from Princeton University in 1987. His research interests include epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.

Reviews

[Lane Wilkinson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Let's be clear...this is not a typical polemic against postmodernism. For what its worth, over the past decade, postmodern constructivism has been reasonably confined within English and Interdisciplinary Studies departments where it can do no harm (other than perpetuate the myth of the irrelevance of liberal arts programs, but that's another issue). What Boghossian presents is a well-timed argument against the spectre of constructivism in traditional philosophic studies.

Philosophy, as a field of study, has largely avoided the relentless onslaught of relativistic thinking; unlike some other areas in the humanities, philosophy has resisted such passing, cyclical intellectual fads. Yet, there have been attempted breaches by constructivist theories, and it is to the proponents of such theories that this book is directed. In particular, Boghossian directs his attention at analytic philosophers such as Nelson Goodman or Hilary Putnam: both well-respected titans within their fields. Yet, these thinkers (along with Boghossian's other whipping boy, Richard Rorty, who I can only guess is included as a rhetorical straw man) are not typical po-mo targets. Forget your Koertge-style surveys of unintellectual intellectuals like Derrida, Irigaray, or Kristeva...this book takes on real philosophers on their own turf. From arguments agains moral expressivism (and I am a quasi-realist) to category mistakes that arise when conflating Millean and Fregean conceptions of propositional content, Boghossian avoids the politicizing, rhetorical flourishes, and wolf-crying of other diatribes against relativism.

In sum, this is a book by a philosopher, about philosophy, and written for those who wish to take the philosophical high-road against the inanity of constructivism. To summarize Boghossian, I don't care if you want to make Hamlet a bi-univocal, ethno-hermeneutic discourse on Zuni nationalism, just stay the hell away from we philosophers and our respect for reality.

[Nat · Rating 4 out of 5]

This books is part of the recent wave of anti-relativist, anti-constructivist, anti-pomo works by philosophers aimed at a general audience. Other examples of the genre include Simon Blackburn's Truth: A Guide, Michael Lynch's True to Life, and Ian Hacking's The Social Construction of What. Boghossian's contribution is the most austerely philosophical, focusing on raw argument rather than diagnosis or explaining the motivations for relativism or constructivism. That makes the book wonderfully short (you can easily read it on a flight from coast to coast) and the arguments punchy. But it also means that explanation of the title issue, the "fear of knowledge", gets confined to three page epilogue, and isn't very compelling. Why is relativism, even the most implausible, factual variety, so weirdly compelling? Boghossian says that relativism is the dominant outlook in all academic disciplines except philosophy, but I think it has a significant, if shadowy, following throughout philosophy. Radical contextualists in the philosophy of language adhere to some mildly concealed form of relativism about facts. According to Boghossian, the explanation for the appeal of relativism is mainly just confusion and belief in bad arguments. That hardly seems adequate.

I do like Boghossian's improved argument against relativism about truth. The traditional argument is that the relativist faces a dilemma: either the claim that the truth of all claims is relative to some point of view is itself relative to some point of view, or it's not. If it's not, then the relativist has an inconsistent view. If it is, then there's nothing to recommend the relativist's view over the view that not all claims are relative to some point of view. Boghossian's version of the argument generates a regress for the relativist who embraces the second horn, and then claims that the regress is vicious--no one could grasp the content of any claim if relativism were true. But I don't see why grasping the content of a claim requires grasping the content of the claim that the first claim is relative to some point of view. If the relativist insists that that's not required, then the regress doesn't mean that the truth of relativism makes it impossible to grasp the content of any claims.

[Hanieh Sadat Shobeiri · Rating 3 out of 5]

«هر نظام معرفتی، بدیل ممکنی خواهد داشت که نقیض آن است.»

یا... شاید هم نه...؟
عجب کتابی بود که اصلا نفهمیدم چطوری خوندمش! با وجود ادبیات سنگین و جملات پیچیده و در خیلی موارد نامفهومش، شدیداً من رو درگیر و خودآگاه کرد نسبت به موضوعی که (تا قبل از خوندن این کتاب) اصلاً نمی‌دونستم که برام دغدغه است!
آیا باید نسبت به اخلاقیاتْ نسبی‌انگار بود، یا باید یه کدِ اخلاقی مطلق داشت که در هر شرایطی بهش عمل کرد؟
من همیشه قائل به داشتن کد اخلاقی (یا همون بوشیدؤ سامورایی‌ها اگه براتون سوال شد!) بودم که در هر شرایطی حتی اگر بهش عمل نکرد، باید بهش باور داشت. اما از اون طرف هم همیشه خودم رو نسبی‌انگار می‌دونستم. دلیلش؟ چون این‌جا خاورمیانه‌س و آدما آتیشی‌ان و کافیه یه حرف اشتباه بزنی تا طرفت اون رو توهین به خودش و جد و آبادش تلقی کنه و بزنه تا ناموست رو بترکونه!
اما آیا واقعاً نسبی‌انگاریْ عاقلانه‌ترین راهه؟ این یه جورایی شبیه همون وسط‌بازی نیست که انتخابش می‌کنی تا از دو طرف کتک نخوری و در عین حال از هر دو طرف کتک میخوری!؟
آیا نسبی‌انگاری انتخاب ترسوهاست؟ البته کتاب به این مسائل اشاره نکرده. اینا تراوشات ذهن یه خواننده‌ی عامه که هر کتابی که می‌خونه رو در قالب زندگی خودش در می‌آره.
خب، طوری که این کتاب توضیح داده، اون راهی که ما (برای اجتناب از کتک خوردن) اتخاذ کردیم و اسمش رو گذاشتیم نسبی‌انگاری، درواقع نسبی‌انگاری نیست و یک جور مداراست؛
مدارا با پیچیدگی‌های وجودی ذهن بشری، جدا از هر جا و مکانی که توش زندگی می‌کنیم.
نسبی‌انگار اخلاق چی می‌گه؟
از خود کتاب نقل قول می‌کنم:
«نسبی‌انگاران به وجود حقایق اخلاقی و صدق و کذب‌پذیری داوری‌های اخلاقی باور دارند. از آن سو، هیچ‌انگاران اخلاق می‌گویند حقایق اخلاقی وجود ندارد و داوری‌های اخلاقی ما چیزی جز فرافکنی احساسات و عواطف ما نیست، در نتیجه داوری‌های اخلاقی ما صدق یا کذب‌پذیر نیست»
از یه طرف، آدمی که مداراگره اتفاقاً به وجود حقایق اخلاقی (و اغلب مطلق) باور داره، اما از اون طرف هم باور داره که خیلی جاها باید با هم‌نوعش مدارا کنه؛ حتی اگه باورهاش خلاف این رو بهش گوشزد کنه.
اما آیا نسبی‌انگاری به طور کلی درسته یا نه؟ هیچ‌انگاری چطور؟ برای زندگی مسالمت‌آمیز توی این کره‌ی خاکی کدومش رو باید انتخاب کنیم؟ عنوان کتاب "در نقد نسبی‌انگاری"ه، اما کتاب می‌آد در وهله‌ی اول یک سری استدلال به نفع نسبی‌انگاری می‌ده و بعدش میاد یک سری حقایق در مخالفت باهاش اعلام می‌کنه!
در کل باید بگم که من توی این کتاب به دنبال جواب می‌گشتم، و در عوض فقط سوال‌های بیشتری برام به وجود اومد! با این‌حال، سوال‌هام وضوح و روشنی بیشتری پیدا کردن و به این قضیه‌ی پیچیده و عجیب و غریب توی ذهنم یه نظم کوچیکی داده شد. البته کتاب فقط درباره‌ی نسبی‌انگاری اخلاقیات نیست و درباره‌ی نسبی انگاری معرفت به طور کلی صحبت می‌کنه. من این کتاب رو به هر کسی که دغدغه‌ای در این زمینه داره پیشنهاد می‌کنم. اما توی این کتاب به دنبال جواب نباشید، فقط آماده باشید که کیفیت سوال‌هاتون بالاتر بره :))

[Anita · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fear of Knowledge is a work that scrutinizes the claims held by constructivists and relativists
in the domain of epistemology, and presents arguments against them. Boghossian’s sustained
critique is directed towards the epistemic relativism in which the relativizing parameter is an
epistemic system. In the following paragraphs, I shall summarize his concerns and
his rejection of Epistemic Relativism, specifically relationalism and pluralism.

According to Boghossian, the relativist model is built on the fundamental doctrine of
non-absolutism. From this follows the doctrine of epistemic relationalism and, consequently,
the doctrine of epistemic pluralism. To illustrate them, and his criticism of each, Boghossian
retells a historical conflict instance that the relativists use to encourage the questioning of
objectivist dogma. This is the story of Cardinal Bellarmine and Galileo, the two opposed belief
holders, each claiming truth to belong to their side.

The conflict centered on whether the word of the Bible or observation through a telescope
should be considered as the better source of evidence for what we ought to believe about the
structure of the heavens. Bellarmine justifies geocentrism using the Revelation as the
epistemic principle . Galileo, contrarily, justifies heliocentrism using Observation as the
epistemic principle. Rorty argues that either side cannot claim truth because there are no
absolute facts to justify either.

Furthermore, Rorty goes on, since Bellarmine and Galileo rely on different epistemic
principles, then, they are operating with different epistemic systems , different ‘‘grids’’ for
determining ‘‘what sorts of evidence there could be for statements about the movements of planets.’’ So, when either of the two confronting practices attempts to demonstrate the
correctness of their principles the most they will be able to say is norm-circular, that theirs is
correct by its own light. One practice cannot be superior to the other since each side will only
provide norm circular justification. They are, thus, equally valid .

From this and similar conflicts, Boghossian characterizes epistemic relativism as the
conjunction of three doctrines:

A. There are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item of information justifies.
(Epistemic non-absolutism)
B. If a person, S’s, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of being true, we must not
construe his utterances of the form ‘‘E justifies belief B’’ as expressing the claim E justifies
belief B but rather as expressing the claim: According to the epistemic system C, that I, S,
accept, information E justifies belief B. (Epistemic relationism)
C. There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no
facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others.
(Epistemic pluralism)

In Epistemic Relativism Rejected, Boghossian argues from the view that facts about the
justification of a belief by a given piece of evidence are to be thought as absolute facts,
independent of social context.

First, Boghossian starts by tackling the norm-circularity issue. He begins with Nagel's
defense of the norm-circular defense of reason. Nagel argues that norm-circularity is not a
challenge to reason per se, since, “any considerations against the objective validity of a type
of reasoning are inevitable attempts to offer reasons against it, and these must be rationally
assessed.” Thus, any rational system that uses rationality is legitimated, according to Nagel.
However, the norm-circularity’s stronger challenge is to “the objective validity of specific
forms of reasoning.” Nagel in The Last Word argues that the issue of norm-circularity holds
for any epistemic system, not just the rationalists’. Following is the example he uses to
illustrate his point:

The Holy Book reader (Ballarme) need not be presented as an irrationalist, repudiating
reason as such, but rather as offering an alternative form of reasoning. If we maintain that
this alternative form of reasoning does not in fact provide genuine justifications for its
conclusions, we must explain in what the superiority of our (Galileo’s) own methods
consists. If, however, the most we can say in their support is something norm-circular,
wouldn’t that be equally available to the Holy Book reader?(To fit the illustration story used in this essay, I have switched the subject Nagel uses, the tea-leaf reader, to the
Holy Book reader).

Thus, the relativist himself is bogged down. Their insistence on epistemic judgements
following strictly from the epistemic system we use, makes them susceptible to incoherence.
Since for the rationalist all particular epistemic judgements (such as, If E is the case, then
belief B is justified) are false unless they are replaced by judgements that belong to our
epistemic system (such as, According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information
E justifies belief B), then it follows that the epistemic principles are false as well since they
are the same, except for being generalized. In other words, since the latter judgement includes
the former judgement which is deemed as false by the second doctrine, then the replacing
judgement is false as well, thus epistemic relationalism is incoherent, argues Boghossian.

Apart from that, reliabilism does not hold even when claims for the incompleteness of
propositions. According to the claim, if epistemic systems are conceived of as composed of
general principles that state what epistemic methods lead to justified or unjustified belief,
they themselves will be incomplete. That is, if it is not true that

(1) Galileo is justified to believe heliocentrism
it is equally untrue that
(2) Beliefs formed on the basis of Science are unjustified
or that
(3) Beliefs formed on the basis of Revelation are justified

Rather, both (2) and (3) are only true relative to a specific epistemic system, which, in turn, is
not true on its own, but only relative to an epistemic system, and so on ad infinitum. Thus,
Boghossian concludes “...we would seem to have embarked on a vicious regress in which we
never succeed in specifying the conception of epistemic justification which is supposed to
constitute a particular community’s epistemic system.”

Since the relativist endorses that judgements are relative to the epistemic system, he
consequently admits that the truth that he arrives at from his own epistemic system is no more valid than any other system’s truth. This doctrine of Pluralism, as Boghossian shows, is
incoherent as well. In cases similar to Galileo’s and Ballarme’s, where a pair of alternatives
directly contradict each other, if one is claimed to be true, then the other is consequently
false, or vice versa. In order to illustrate it, let’s take two epistemic systems, Science and
Revelation. According to Science, If observation is the case, then heliocentrism is justified. In
contrast, according to revelation, It is not the case that if observation is the case, then
heliocentrism is justified. Therefore, observation either justifies heliocentrism or does not. If
non-absolutism stands, then, Observation is not sufficient for heliocentrism, thus Science is
not true, Revelation has replaced that with a truth. Consequently, this implies that one
epistemic system, in this case Revelation, is more correct than Science and goes against the
claim of the third doctrine.

Finally, Boghossian challenges the relativists take on epistemic systems being a set of
imperatives. To exemplify, if science is your epistemic system and you accept it as a set of
imperatives, then if one such imperative tells you to believe P if observation supports it and
that if P is not supported, then you ought not to believe it. According to Boghossian, since
judgement of the justification of a belief necessitates a normative statement, sets of
imperatives cannot be employed.

In the Epilogue of Fear of Knowledge, Boghossian states that “...in the case of a relativism
about justification, what appears initially to be a seductive argument fails to hold up under
scrutiny.” His critiques to the doctrines of epistemic relativism have shown that the
relativistic conception of epistemic justification is unstable. Since both epistemic doctrines,
relationalism and pluralism, are incoherent options, Boghossian denies the non-absolutism
doctrine, thus, shaking the very foundation of epistemic relativism.

[Shahram Shahryari · Rating 4 out of 5]

متن اصلی کتاب را ۴-۵ سال پیش خوانده بودم. امسال یک‌بار دیگر کتاب را با ترجمهٔ فارسی یاسر میردامادی خواندم. با شناخت بیشتری که از این موضوعات پیدا کرده‌ام، ارزیابی‌ام از کتاب بهتر شد و بنابراین لازم دیدم معرفی قبلی‌ام از کتاب را تغییر دهم۰

بوغوسیان حمله به نسبی‌انگاری و برساخت‌انگاری را در سه بخش آورده است: بخش نخست (فصل‌های ۳ و ۴) برساخت‌انگاری درباب واقعیات (که جای دیگری «نسبی‌انگاری درباب صدق» هم خوانده شده است)، بخش دوم (فصل‌های ۴ و ۵ و ۶) برساخت‌انگاری درباب توجیه معرفتی و بخش سوم (فصل ۸) برساخت‌انگاری درباب تبیین و پذیرش باورها۰
نویسنده در هر بخشی تلاش کرده است تا نخست استدلال‌هایی را که در دفاع از این آراء می‌توان یافت بیاورد و بعد آن‌ها را رد کند. اما آن نکتهٔ مرور قبلی‌ام را باید تکرار کنم: به نظرم می‌رسد بوغوسیان با برخی آراء و نظراتی که نقد کرده به دقت آشنا نبوده است. برای نمونه، در فصل نه که موضوعش نقد برساخت‌انگاری تبیین عقلانی است، تفسیری از برنامهٔ قوی داده که حامیان این برنامه طرفدارش نبوده‌اند۰
دیگر اینکه، کتاب آراء بسیاری را در حجمی اندک مطرح کرده و از همین رو گاهی فهم دقیق دیدگاه‌های مورد انتقاد و حتی آراء خود بوغوسیان هم دشوار شده است. این نکته در یادداشتی از جان سرل در پشت جلد ترجمهٔ فارسی کتاب آمده است. سرل در ضمن تحسین کتاب می‌گوید: «هراس از معرفت کتابی فشرده است و خواندن آن همیشه آسان نیست». (البته همان پشت جلد، یادداشت دیگری هم از زیمرمان هست که می‌گوید خواندش ساده است!) ۱۵۰ صفحه برای توضیح و بررسی همهٔ دیدگاه‌های مطرح در این موضوع واقعاً کم است. به گمان من، اگر بوغوسیان می‌خواست چنین ایجازی به خرج ندهد و حجم متناسبی به توضیح دیدگاه‌های مورد نقد و نیز انتقادهای خودش اختصاص دهد، دست‌کم باید ۷۰-۸۰ صفحه‌ای به حجم کتاب می‌افزود. بنابراین، کتاب به گونه‌ای سهل و ممنتع است: هرچند شاید به نظر برسد متنی ساده است و فهم آن نیازمند آشنایی تخصصی با فلسفه نیست، گمان نمی‌کنم کسی که شناخت چندانی با این موضوعات نداشته باشد، بتواند همهٔ استدلال‌ها و نقدها را بفهمد. البته بوغوسیان هر رأی فلسفی‌ای را که مطرح کرده به اختصار توضیح داده ولی این توضیح برای کسی که پیش‌تر چیزی از آن نمی‌دانسته است کفایت نمی‌کند۰
نقدی هم به شیوهٔ نگارش کتاب دارم: برخلاف شیوه‌ای که در بسیاری از کتاب‌های غربیان می‌بینیم، بوغوسیان ابتدا ساختار بحث را روشن نمی‌کند؛ خواننده گاهی باید تا اواسط یا اواخر فصل کورمال پیش برود تا بفهمد چه اتفاقی در جریان است۰
بخشی از اهمیت کتاب مرهون تأثیری است که بر ادبیات بحث نسبی‌انگاری و برساخت‌انگاری پس از خود نهاده است؛ ارجاعات بسیار به این کتاب نشان می‌دهد که گویی هر کسی قصد دفاع از این آراء را دارد، حتماً باید به استدلال‌های بوغوسیان پاسخ دهد۰

دربارهٔ ترجمهٔ فارسی

نسخهٔ فارسی کتاب، علاوه بر یادداشتی از سوی ناشر چند بخش اضافه هم دارد: یکی معرفی کتاب به قلم محسن زمانی؛ دوم مقالهٔ کوتاهی از بوغوسیان در نقد نسبی‌انگاری اخلاق و سوم مؤخره‌ای از مترجم در توجیه اقدام به ترجمهٔ چنین کتابی. مترجم در این یادداشت سعی دارد نشان دهد که برخلاف تصور اولیه، نسبی‌انگاری با مدارا ناسازگار است۰
ترجمهٔ فارسی کتاب خوب و روان است؛ مترجم از معادل‌های جاافتاده استفاده کرده و در ترجمهٔ اکثر جملات پیچیده موفق بوده است ــ ولی نه در همهٔ موارد؛ من با تطبیق ترجمه با متن، در نیمهٔ دوم کتاب اشتباهاتی یافتم۰

[Kristopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

I wish that I could give this a 3.5. It's clear, and really pretty fair. I would use parts of it in the introductory section to my intro to philosophy class just to help motivate what I take to be basic assumptions that are central to analytic philosophy. That said, even though I'm wholly on board with his conclusions, I think that the arguments go pretty quickly, and so if one were committed to a social constructivist position, and was so committed in a sophisticated way, I don't think they would be swayed. For intro students or the unthinking relativists in your life, this is a fine work.

[Justin Rock · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wish I could give this book two ratings. 1: Intro to Epistemology Rating = 4 stars / 2. Philosophical Insight = 2 stars. Ultimately, I decided to rate it from my subjective situation, ironically.

Boghossian does a fantastic job laying out the position of the constructivism and relativism (epistemic, moral, etc.), giving every consideration to the opposing side in which he is critiquing. The problem with this book, which is unfortunately not unique to this book, is the reductionist tendencies of the analytic tradition, which Boghossian seems completely unaware of throughout the book.

Overall, this book is a great introductory book for freshman college students (or people just venturing into issues of epistemology, rationality and relativism). For those engaged in this debate already, this book adds very little.

[Siu Hong · Rating 5 out of 5]

Clear and rigorous critique on Rorty's relativism and Kuhn's theory of paradigm change in science. A very enjoyable reading experience.

[IWB · Rating 3 out of 5]

Boghossian argues that constructivism has 3 defects. To maintain constructivism, one must adopt relativism; but relativism is defective. He discusses constructivism/relativism in the domains of facts, justification, & explanation. Since constructivism/relativism is defective, realism is the best bet.
The book's tone is a bit unprofessional & dogmatic. He doesn't do a great job of offering objections to his own views; he argues against weak formulations & omits good replies available to his opposition. Absent is any account of fictionalism, which purports to avoid the pitfalls of constructivism & realism. This leaves the book incomplete.

Boghossian says a social construction is something that is built. What is built, if it is to qualify as socially built, is done so by a group of people organized in a certain way, with certain values, interests & needs. The things built are not the objects of everyday life, like coins. Facts are built. A fact is constructed just in case it could only have been brought about by the intentional activity of a group. Fact construction reflects society’s contingent needs & interests: had society not had those needs & interests, it might not have created the fact in question.
Boghossian gives a cursory account of objectivity. If a belief is true, the corresponding fact of that belief holds for everyone. My belief that the earth is spherical is not only true for me, but also for everyone whether this belief is shared or not. Fact objectivity is universal, invariant among persons & communities. Facts are mind-independent. If no human had ever existed, it remains a fact that the earth is spherical. True beliefs have a corresponding fact in virtue of which our belief is true, & these facts are universal & mind-independent. When beliefs are false, it is b/c they don't correspond to any fact in the world.
This view is problematic. It’s unclear how facts are mind-independent & how they correspond to the world. He also assumes that our beliefs are either true or false. But it’s not always clear that our words apply to facts. Much of the vocabulary of everyday discourse is vague, seemingly neither true nor false. Boghossian doesn’t address this possibility. He thinks facts are related to beliefs b/c facts are the objects to which true beliefs correspond. But we understand facts b/c of concepts. If facts consist of concepts, & some concepts are contingent aspects of society’s needs & interests, then much of what it is to be a fact is constructed by us. If you think that our concepts mediate descriptions of the world, then what it means to have a true belief differs from Boghossian’s view. He fails to give a robust account of facts & their relation to concepts, what mind-independency is, & how all this relates to truth.

Boghossian claims constructivism has 3 defects. They are the problems of causation, of conceptual competence, & of disagreement. He says that these 3 defects decisively count against the coherence of constructivism. Let’s consider each.
It is a truism that the objects & facts we talk about, such as mountains, dinosaurs, etc., existed before we did. If their existence antedates our own, their existence cannot depend on us. He says that constructivism entails backward causation. If the fact that dinosaurs existed is a social construct, then our constructing it so makes it so; i.e., we presently cause the past existence of dinosaurs. This is the problem of causation.

The second is that of conceptual coherence. Suppose backward causation were a coherent notion. Boghossian says we still can’t explain how it is that we don’t utter falsehoods when speaking about, say, dinosaurs. It is part of the concept of a mountain or dinosaur, he claims, that these things were not constructed. If it is part of the concept of these things that they are not constructed, then it is either false or incoherent to say that they are constructed.

The last problem for the constructivist is that of disagreement. Suppose that we construct some fact that P, & that the construction of P is contingent. It follows that it is possible that some other society should concurrently construct the fact that ~P. Boghossian says that the constructivist must then face the following argument: Since we constructed the fact that P, then P. It is possible that another community should construct the fact that ~P, so possibly ~P. Ergo, it is possible that both P & ~P.
Boghossian says this shows that constructivism violates the law of non-contradiction: Necessarily: ~ (P & ~P). He says that these 3 problems devastate constructivism so that the only way to maintain the thesis is to adopt some form of relativism.

I think that the fact-constructivist can answer the 3 problems w/o having to resort to relativism.

Boghossian’s claims the constructivist is committed to backward causation. The constructivist need not be committed to this view. Boghossian’s charge is an historical claim that when there was no concept of a dinosaur, there were no dinosaurs. The constructivist is making a different claim, a counterfactual claim that if there were no concept of a dinosaur, there would be no dinosaurs. Once the concept of dinosaur is in place, it applies to all members of its extension, past, present, or future members. Boghossian’s argument against the constructivist presupposes the concept of dinosaur as it is presently used. Our present use permits us to distinguish between kinds & delineates the criteria for what counts as a dinosaur, what changes something can undergo & remain a dinosaur, etc. Apart from such criteria, what counts as a dinosaur is indeterminate. When he speaks of dinosaurs antedating our constructions of them, he helps himself to the very construction he says commits one to backward causation. The concept dinosaur is utterly dependent upon us; moreover, this concept does the work of applying to the objects in question timelessly: past, present, & future dinosaurs fall within its designative scope. So the constructivist is not committed to backward causation b/c he is not making an historical claim, but a counterfactual claim. The counterfactual claim takes concepts as applying to their objects timelessly, & any notion of a kind existing apart from a concept of it is indeterminate as to what constitutes the kind. Boghossian’s claim is self-stultifying.

The constructivist can avoid the problem of conceptual competence. Since our ordinary use of terms as “dinosaur” & “mountain” involve the concept of not having been constructed, it seems that we are using language wrongly when we say that facts about such things are socially constructed. Thus, the constructivist must explain how our ordinary use of these terms does not riddle our everyday discourse with falsehoods. But the constructivist need not accept this as part of ordinary use. An alternative is to suggest that our ordinary use of dinosaur doesn’t involve the concept of not having been constructed; instead the concept involved could be that of having existed millions of years before us. Thus we coherently speak of things in the world antedating our existence w/o stating their category of kind. Our ordinary use does not yield falsehoods b/c we are still talking about things existing, & it is our concept that designates timelessly what that existence entails. But suppose our ordinary use does involve the concept of not having been socially constructed. Since the concept of a dinosaur has been formulated, it designates timelessly. Saying that dinosaurs have not been constructed presupposes the present concept in a world in which there are no concepts. That is, if our ordinary usage involves the concept of dinosaurs not having been socially constructed, then when one speaks ordinarily one imagines that a transporting has taken place to a world in which no one has devised the concept of a dinosaur, but yet speaks of such concepts. If there is no concept for the term, then one cannot meaningfully speak about it. Our ordinary use of “dinosaur” agrees with it being the case that socially constructed concepts designate timelessly. It fits our conceptual competence b/c the concept involved is that something existed before us, which does not commit the speaker to imply that dinosaurs have been constructed & hence existed before our concept of them. Even if our ordinary use did involve the concept of not having been a construction, this is solved by recognizing that once a concept is in place, it designates the members of its extension timelessly. The counterfactual claim is if there were no concept of dinosaur, there would have been no dinosaurs. Boghossian’s view that dinosaurs are not social constructions involves the concept of a dinosaur, so our ordinary use is fine b/c of timeless designation.

The constructivist also avoids the problem of accommodating concurrent contradictory views among societies. The constructivist can admit both P & ~P in explanations, while holding that causal relations in the world are objective. Another approach is to appeal to the virtues of theories embedded in the societies. Suppose society A claims that P, & society B claims that Q which entails ~P. Appealing to the various explanatory virtues of one theory over those of another, the constructivist can say that one is better than another. One appeals to the fact that the theory of society A explains more of the phenomena in question, has simpler mechanics, & greater predictive value. So there is no admitting of both P & ~P concurrently, since one fails to have the theoretical virtues of the other. Thus there is a way the world is, which holds universally, but is not explained independently of certain contingent facts.

All and all, even if its not Boghossian's strongest work, the subject itself is sufficiently interesting and the basic arguments he treats in this book are still worthy of attention.

[Alex Birchall · Rating 4 out of 5]

Relativism is the quaint belief that there are no truths in the world, only 'understandings' from either different individual or cultural points of view. Different groups have different epistemic frames and all should be respected. It is an argument of what Meera Nanda describes as 'epistemic charity.' This mode of thinking is rife today despite its incoherence. Boghossian aims to interrogate its central claims as well as its partner claim that knowledge is 'socially constructed' - i.e. it is created by different groups and its essential inauthenticity needs to be exposed or its illusion of meaning debunked.

Brilliant rejoinders to relativism have been advanced by sociologists of education such as Rob Moore. The simplest is that relativism is self-refuting - the claim 'there are no truths' is itself a claim to truth. It is a claim to radical particularism that disposes of its own particularity. Boghossian doesn't accept this claim however, as relativists would say 'our claim is true relative to a theory X' - of what the relativists 'find agreeable to say' but based on principles held by relativists and non-relativists alike. But this argument equally could be rejected as it creates a problem of infinite regress - the claim is true relative to a theory X which itself needs to be true relative to a theory Y, which that claim itself needs to be true relative to a theory Z, and so on. The 'theory' explanation becomes increasingly more difficult to sustain.

The relativist argument seems to stem from a denial that an independently existing reality in fact exists. In that respect relativism is opposed to realism (my tendency is towards Bhaskar & Norrie's dialectical critical realism). There are several facets to anti-realist argument:
1. That of Bruno Latour where it is claimed that categories such as diseases and technologies only exist once they are named (a kind of constructo-nominalism), also seen in Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality when he says there were no 'homosexuals' before the category of homosexuality existed, only men who preferred to have sex with other men. (I think Foucault's claim may have greater force, however, than Latour's.)
2. Richard Rorty's postmodern pragmatism. Using the example of Galileo, he claims that the move from an Earth-centric to a heliocentric model of the solar system was simply an expression of preference for a particular scientific model over others. There is no objective basis for selecting one over the other according to Rorty. This appears to be a mistranslation of Thomas Kuhn's argument in relation to 'paradigm shifts'.
3. The claim of 'epistemic charity' or cultural relativism made by Wittgenstein and others that it is unacceptable to judge others' epistemic frames of reference. Hence science becomes equalised with the witchcraft systems of the Azande. Such claims only seem to be made in defence of seemingly benign alternative systems. But in fact this also means that cultural relativists must be prepared to defend problematic positions such as creationism, caste structures in Hinduism and Calvinist theories of predestination, etc... as legitimate systems of epistemic knowledge production, by the same logic. This problem has particularly beset anthropologists in their ethnographic medium of study, and, increasingly, sociologists as they too adopt its form.
4. The claim made by identity-based particularists in the new identity politics, that knowledge is reflective of a particular standpoint mandated by group membership and/or subjective experience. It is impossible, claims this group, for men to know how women experience the world due to an essentialist border between genders. This explanation is proliferated along lines of race, sexuality.... etc.

The conclusion Boghossian arrives at is that constructivism about truth is incoherent and constructivism about justification is hardly preferable. This is achieved using arguments from analytic philosophers such as Thomas Nagel. Constructivism, however, has its uses. I agree with Boghossian that works by feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler and others as well as anti-race scholars such as Kwame Anthony Appiah demonstrate the power of sociological constructivism in debunking naturalised assumptions about those ascriptive categories. This is because they are liberating of those categories in a way that is based on reason and analysis.

Relativism however is based on neither. It is incompatible with the democratic, anti-capitalist Left despite claims from radical Left postmodernists. It throws reason to the winds and instead often lapses into arguments of authority. We are inclined to believe something is true based on what people say. The creation of different cultural 'knowledges' has led to new cultural elites emerge that lead by authoritarian example and have often promoted irrationalist ideas that threaten the challenge of democracy to capitalism. Essentialism in this vein reinscribes and traps people within the same categories from which reason promises escape. Boghossian indeed emphasises this claim I have repeated over and over - with immense backlash and accusations that I am an 'assimilationist' - that arguments from authority are more damaging to the oppressed than they are to elites already in possession of that authority.

[Armin · Rating 4 out of 5]

در حد خودش با در نظر گرفتن محدودیت‌های کتاب، به خوبی با انگاره‌ی نسبی‌انگاری و برساخت نسبی بودن واقعیت دست و پنجه نرم می‌کند و این عقیده‌ی غیرعقلانی را به خوبی به چالش می‌کشد.

[Aref Ashoori · Rating 4 out of 5]

"بوغوسيان كتابى عالى نگاشته است. هراس از معرفت كتابى فشرده است و خواندن آن هميشه آسان نيست. با اين حال، اين كتاب تشت رسوايى سردرگمی‌ها، اباطيل و تهافت‌هاى نسبى‌انگارى را از بام می‌افكند‌."
- جان سرل، دانشگاه كاليفرنيا، بركلى

"اگر تنها خواندن همين كتاب مستدل و برجسته براى همه دانشجويان جديدالورود رشته‌هاى علوم انسانى الزامى شود، نسل آينده از تكرار تكيه‌کلام‌های نامفهوم نسبی‌انگارانه نجات خواهد يافت و دانشوران نسل آينده دفاع‌هاى پرطمطراق و بی‌حاصل از نسبى‌انگارى را كنار خواهند نهاد. هراس از معرفت خواننده را درگير می‌کند، خواندن آن آسان است و رد كردن آن دشوار."
- ارون زيمرمان، دانشگاه كاليفرنيا، سانتاباربارا

تا پیش از خوندن این کتاب شخصا به نسخه‌های مختلفی از نسبی‌انگاری قائل بودم بدون اینکه توجیه یا استدلال روشنی براش داشته باشم. شاید نسبی‌انگاری به جانم نشسته بود چون راه رسیدن به فضیلت مدارا و چندصدایی و مبارزه با رذیلت تعصب رو در نسبی‌انگاری می‌دیدم. الان در نتیجه‌ی خوندن این کتاب فکر می‌کنم که واقعا اشتباه می‌کردم. اگرچه لابد نسبی‌انگاران زیادی به این کتاب و استدلال‌های جناب آقای بوغوسیان - رضی الله‌ عنه- پاسخ داده‌اند که باید رفت و اونهارو هم دید. به شما هم توصیه می‌کنم یه دور جدی‌تر بررسی کنید این مسائل رو. گاهی وقتا از خودمون می‌پرسیم اون شوق و ذوقی که اوایل آشنایی با فلسفه برای کشف حقیقت داشتیم کجا رفت؟ چی شد که شعله‌اش سرد و خاموش شد؟ بنظرم یکی از پاسخ‌ها ممکنه همین پذیرفتن آگاهانه یا ناآگاهانه نسبی‌انگاری بوده باشه.

[Martin Jaramillo L · Rating 5 out of 5]

Es un gran libro con una tesis central muy acotada. Es una crítica al relativismo y constructivismo. A la idea de que cada quien puede tener una idea particular sobre el mundo y que la validez de lo que decimos depende en nuestras creencias. La discusión epistemica tiene mejores defensas de las que uno cree, pero el autor también tiene críticas a las defensas, que expone lucidamente. Mi parte favorita de este texto es que expone como gran filósofo plasma en un libro una de las mejores cosas que tiene la filosofía: la capacidad de tomarse una idea muy en serio y llevarla a sus máximas consecuencias lógicas para determinar su validez interna.

[Joshua Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

Boghossian's book is thoughtful, carefully argued, and concise. He notes that it was difficult to put together a project that covers these challenging arguments in a way that is accessible. I think there's something to be said for how important it is to do that well, as a professor, and I'll acknowledge that if there's one major part of this writing, it is keeping the conversation accessible. It does require some familiarity with the way analytic philosophers approach problems, and some comfort with those methods.

The book addresses one of the most frustrating movements in contemporary social sciences, the constructivist/relativist movement as it talks about science. Boghossian subjects social scientists, in the beginning, to some seriously rigorous epistemology, but then smartly moves on and notes that the more important thing is to address the actual philosophers who are sympathetic to this view, and so he spends the majority of the book dealing with Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, and the arguments for epistemic relativism, and explores the implications that way.

The worst thing that a philosopher can do in a critique is misrepresent his opponents, and as a serious veteran of philosophy Boghossian takes great pains to show that he is not doing this, often splitting up interpretations of positions and showing weak and strong readings of views, acknowledging that these weak and strong positions both exist, and then dedicating them both to exploring them both at length. This makes it understandable when he talks in the beginning about how hard the text was to write.

Is Boghossian's attack on relativism and constructivism successful? It is hard to say. Ultimately, I think that some of the volleys are more interesting and devastating than others, but that may have a lot to do with the changes in my sympathies to certain positions. I'm more sympathetic to the views of Quine and Duhem than I am to those of Rorty and Putnam, and so I'm suspicious of my feeling that his critique of the former is somehow weaker than his critique of the latter. But I think that, by and large, the arguments that Boghossian presents are interesting and important in coming to an understanding of why these positions are deeply problematic.

At any rate, for those interested in the major epistemological problems that the relativists like Rorty present, I strongly recommend the book. It is a very short read, only around 140-or-so pages of text and so, even if you don't think that you have the level of proficiency to work through serious analytic philosophy, the book is short enough that you can parse it out and take your time and not feel that the task ahead of you is daunting.

[Tyler · Rating 3 out of 5]

Boghossian uses Fear of Knowledge to distinguish between true or false ideas and justified or unjustified beliefs. This book looks at constructivism and relativism as they relate to the latter, so the author focuses on epistemology.

Constructivism, the argument for the equal validity of claims, contrasts with a classical view of the problem of justification. The author notes, among other problems, that constructivism confuses the idea of the description dependence of facts with another idea, the social relativity of descriptions.

Relativism, he tells us, is the proposition that there are no absolute facts about justification. This claim is vulnerable to the fact that it cannot be made without reference to some epistemic system, plus the fact that the general claim cannot be true unless it follows that all particular epistemological justifications are likewise ungrounded.

Boghossian raises the points that observation and self-evidency both factor into justifications and cannot easily be set aside. A refutation of the application of relativism, whatever the merits of relativism to other fields, is comparatively simple in philosophy.

The book is easy for anyone with a basic understanding of philosophy to follow. The arguments are spare, but the audience is the reading public, so it works for me. The author’s discussion of underdetermination late in the book is an excellent explanation of the concept for non-philosophers. The book is an accessible, worthwhile read.

Interesting side note: The photograph on the cover is of the Bibliotheque Nationale de France. W.G. Sebald savages that stucture in Austerlitz, noting that everything about it is antithetical to the idea of a library as an accessible repositiory of knowledge. Boghossian must share the same opinion. The photo is perfect for the book.

[Jurij Fedorov · Rating 3 out of 5]

I would definitely recommend The Blank Slate over this book.

He seems to make his case and arguments much more complicated than he could have made them. This makes this book a hard read at times. He certainly need to rewrite his ideas as I think he could have written a much better book if he tried. It's lazy writing that undermines some great insight and some great ideas. While The Blank Slate is one of the most interesting books I have ever read this book will be forgotten by me in a months time. To bad, I think philosophy has a lot to offer if the ideas are clearly understood and explained.

[John Reis · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the very few books written in the last two decades which takes on relativism and social construction. These two doctrines are very attractive to people for they seem to provide ammunition to support the notion that there are no absolute moral standards.

Boghossian takes on relativist arguments from Goodman, Rorty, Duhem, Wittgenstein and Quine. He concludes that relativistic arguments are often incoherent.

They have been powerful weapons in the post-colonialist and multicultural fight. However, if the dominant culture cannot legitimately criticize a “lesser” culture, then so too, the lesser culture cannot criticize its “betters.”

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Boghossian argues with clarity and concision that knowledge systems and their facts cannot be relative and that relativism is therefore unfounded as a view. Also, he demonstrates why constructivist understandings of knowledge are untenable. This book will show you why it is most reasonable to be a Realist (in the technical sense of the word). The best book on the subject and easily accessible by laypersons.

[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

Paul Boghossian is concerned with the widespread acceptance across the academic world of what he calls The Doctrine of Equal Validity: “There are many radically different yet “equally valid” ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them.” [p2]

He finds serious scientists as willing as academics in the humanities to accept these ideas and suggests [p130] that their appeal is political, notably in “progressive” fields like post-colonialism and multiculturalism, because they can be deployed to protect oppressed cultures from the charge of holding false or unjustified views. The logical corollary, however, is that the oppressed are deprived of criteria to criticise their oppressors; they have none. The political futility of such an approach ought to be obvious.

Boghossian’s book sets out three strands to the doctrine of equal validity, concerning ideas about truth, about justification and about epistemology, and investigates each in turn. These can be contrasted with, or seen as opposed to, “the classical picture of knowledge” [p19], which he describes as follows. “There has been a broad consensus among philosophers, from Aristotle to the present day, on the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the contingent social circumstances in which it is produced…“ [p19] This picture makes three claims. First,… that many facts about the world are independent of our social values and interests… The second is our justification for believing that something is true; for example, that we have discovered fossil evidence for dinosaurs may not be independent of our social context, but what is independent is that this is evidence. Thirdly, we do not need to invoke contingent social values or interests to explain what we believe; we can justify our belief on its merits. [pp20-21]

“Fact constructivism” has three problems. The existence of objects and facts antedates any description and we do not cause them by describing them. It is conceptually incoherent to argue that we construct the macroscopic objects with which we interact – including our own bodies. Finally, impossible contradictions are unavoidable if I construct one set of facts while you construct a radically different set of facts, so that some things are simultaneously true and false, real and unreal, possible and impossible.

Historically, the most influential relativistic theses have been directed at specific domains, at truth in morality, for example, or aesthetics, or etiquette. [p49] They include moral non-absolutism: there are no absolute moral facts which can confirm absolute moral judgements; moral relativism, in which judgements require acceptance of a particular moral code; moral pluralism: there are many alternative moral frameworks but no facts by virtue of which one of them is more correct than any of the others. This type of local relativism in a specific domain may be coherent, if not very plausible, but a global relativism, asserting there are no absolute truths at all, is bound to be incoherent. [p52]

Epistemic relativism argues that different people may rationally arrive at opposed conclusions, even as they acknowledge all the same data. If we wish to demonstrate that one system is superior or even right, that requires us to use an epistemic system to do so, and we are driven in a circle. Wittgenstein says: “aren’t we using our language game as a base from which to combat theirs?” This may indeed be dialectically ineffective: it won’t persuade our opponents.

Thomas Nagel thinks that epistemic relativism is not a tenable view. A challenge to defend the use of reason in fact is a demand for reasons, which can only be handled by an exercise in reasoning. The only plausible avenue is for the sceptic to offer reasons for doubting the effectiveness of reason. [p81,82]

…if no one is entitled to use an epistemic system without first justifying it, then no one could be entitled to use an epistemic system, for any attempt by the thinker to justify it will depend on his being entitled to use some epistemic system of other. [p99]

Boghossian suggests that people are often not arguing from different epistemic systems at all, but rather have conflicting priorities; at the most basic level, they may simply not care. [p107-110]

A different argument is that exposure to evidence is never sufficient to explain why we believe what we do; for example, to explain why Christianity has such strong support in the Southern states of the USA but not in Iran. By asserting that all scientific belief should be explained in terms of the goals, interests and prejudices of the scientist, and denying any role whatever for the recalcitrance of nature, it [strong constructivism] leaves no space for the criticism of specific scientific beliefs on the grounds that they do reflect such prejudices rather than being plausibly grounded in fact. [p118]

Strong constructivism is self-refuting: it reflects the prejudices of its advocates [and indeed Boghossian elsewhere gives political reasons why academics support constructivism].

There are some effectively self-evident beliefs, or beliefs we can reasonably hold without evidence: an example is that we are conscious.

Our epistemic reasoning does sometimes sufficiently cause us to believe some implication to be the case. It is not credible to argue that this is not so; one can only argue about the extent to which it applies or the exceptions when it may not.

We need to be able to make a distinction between a belief that is appropriately grounded in a consideration which justifies it, versus one that is merely grounded in prejudice or that has no grounding. Social constructivism cannot offer this.

There are also weak forms of social constructivism, notably the theories of Kuhn. “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” Boghossian suggests it is untenable. “Not even Kuhn denies that one paradigm often replaces another because it is better at solving the problems that causes the crisis for the previous theory.” For example, the Copernican paradigm is better than the Ptolemaic at predicting the positions of stars and planets.

He also examines the so called “Quine – Duhem” thesis [which neither Quine nor Duhem would strictly accept], that it is impossible to test a hypothesis in isolation, without taking into account a range of background assumptions: “a bundle of hypotheses.” For example. what Galileo saw through his telescope might be mountains on the moon but might equally be an optical defect in his telescope creating a false belief, and either explanation is reasonable. So Duhem argues that reason alone cannot decide; something else must be at work. Boghossian responds that it this not a plausible argument. We have no good reason to doubt the optics of our telescope and can easily check if that is in question. [He might have mentioned that Galileo did check, by pointing his telescope at a nearby building.]

The book therefore dismisses constructivist arguments about truth, justification and the idea that we cannot explain belief in terms of epistemic reasons alone. [p129] “The intuitive belief is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at a belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective.[p131]

[Terese · Rating 4 out of 5]

Väldigt bra bok, uppfriskande till och med, i synnerhet om man behövt läsa Rorty et al i längre utsträckning.

Den svenska översättningen är dock lite halvdan, för svengelsk för att bli godkänd som allmän skoluppsats (ex. "Han kan ge upp idén"... 'give up' skär i ögonen vid en sådan direkt översättning. Samma sak med bruket av ordet "opererar" vid senare tillfälle, det funkar inte med en direkt översättning av "we're operating with concept X", det framstod som en blandning av lathet och lite inkompetens om jag ska vara ärlig)

Skönt att den finns i översättning dock, hoppas att många kommer att läsa den, även om den ibland är lite väl analytisk för allmän publik.

[Lisa Wen · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author mainly used formal logic to illustrate that constructivism does not conform to the main logic system we employ, and there’s no fundamental differences between the so-called genuinely different epistemic systems claimed by the constructivists. It’s a good read, definitely laid out a good philosophical groundwork for casual readers regarding the theories and opinions of different groups in the conversation. I found it really helpful formulating a good deal of questions I have in mind. But beware, it’ll probably not be a good one if anyone is looking for a specific answer to the problem.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

For being the book my Philosophy professor tried to use to dunk on our class with about moral philosophy, the books not too bad at only taking a Analytical Philosophy approach. This book is a good introduction into why people are so dead set on holding on to the sciences. He is nothing if not stubborn. He did quote Richard Rorty a lot, which is nice.

Good intro into the topic, short read that doesn't get very heady, for better or worse.

[كمال العنزي · Rating 3 out of 5]

He argues forcefully for the intuitive, common-sense view-that the world exists independent of human opinion and that there is a way to arrive at beliefs about the world that are objectively reasonable to anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. This short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists; it is provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.

[Guillermo Linares · Rating 3 out of 5]

Es una excelente lectura para poder limpiarse muchos prejuicios epistemologicos al momento de querer hacer filosofía en cualquiera de sus ramas.

En lo personal, considero que es un muy buen libro para entender las inconsistencias lógicas de la relatividad de una forma sobria y simple.

No obstante, no hay mucha rigurosidad en la demostración de dichas inconsistencias, pero sirven para poder echar a volar la mente de cualquier entisiasta en la lógica y en la filosofía empírica

[Melvin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Although I find the argument fascinating, Boghossian could not convince me in the end. His main claim is that relativism and constructivism (even in the weak form) leads to an infinite regression. While for some claims this might not be sustainable, I think for humanistic concerns, it is often moving target that needs to be constantly discussed and assessed. Still, worth the read.

[Sara · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great example about how we as a society cannot agree on what a "fact" is. Is a fact "mind-independent" or "socially constructed". These are two very different views that are the foundation of why our country is divided on social issues. Book does a great example of showing the strengths of the "socially constructed" side but ultimately how it fails.

[Kasper · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a short and readable philosophical argument against relativism. The first part is outstandingly clear, but I had a harder time following the last part. Overall, it's still a great take on a problem that is central to surprisingly many areas of scholarship.

[Vladimir · Rating 1 out of 5]

Reductionist and misguided view of constructivism.

[Antonio Jiménez · Rating 5 out of 5]

copie des dieux

[Melissa]

Sex and gender