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Animals Like Us
Foot and Mouth and Mad Cow Disease are but two of the results of treating animals as commodities, subject only to commercial constraints and ignoring all natural and moral considerations. Chickens hanging by their necks on conveyor belts, caged pigs covered in sores, bloated dead sheep with their legs in the air, mutilated dogs waiting to die after undergoing horrendous experiments in the name of science or just product testing—these are some of the images that illustrate the indifference of a consumerist society to the suffering of animals. Few are willing to recognize that the packaged sanitized supermarket meat that materializes on their dinner tables every day is the result of an industrial process involving unimaginable pain and suffering. We would be horrified if our pets were harmed, yet every day we eat animals that have been tortured and executed.
Mark Rowlands claims that it is simply unjust to harm animals. A conscious sentient beings, biologically continuous with humans, they have interests that cannot simply be disregarded. Using simple principles of justice, he argues that animals have moral rights, and examines the consequences of this claim in the contexts of vegetarianism, animal experimentation, zoos and hunting, and animal rights activism.
Mark Rowlands claims that it is simply unjust to harm animals. A conscious sentient beings, biologically continuous with humans, they have interests that cannot simply be disregarded. Using simple principles of justice, he argues that animals have moral rights, and examines the consequences of this claim in the contexts of vegetarianism, animal experimentation, zoos and hunting, and animal rights activism.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
222 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 2002
5 people are currently reading
158 people want to read
About the author
Mark Rowlands
36 books154 followersMark Rowlands was born in Newport, Wales and began his undergraduate degree at Manchester University in engineering before changing to philosophy. He took his doctorate in philosophy from Oxford University and has held various academic positions in philosophy in universities in Britain, Ireland and the US.
His best known work is the book The Philosopher and the Wolf about a decade of his life he spent living and travelling with a wolf. As The Guardian described it in its review, "it is perhaps best described as the autobiography of an idea, or rather a set of related ideas, about the relationship between human and non-human animals." Reviews were very positive, the Financial Times said it was "a remarkable portrait of the bond that can exist between a human being and a beast,". Mark Vernon writing in The Times Literary Supplement "found the lessons on consciousness, animals and knowledge as engaging as the main current of the memoir," and added that it "could become a philosophical cult classic", while John Gray in the Literary Review thought it "a powerfully subversive critique of the unexamined assumptions that shape the way most philosophers - along with most people - think about animals and themselves." However, Alexander Fiske-Harrison for Prospect warned that "if you combine misanthropy and lycophilia, the resulting hybrid, lycanthropy, is indeed interesting, but philosophically quite sterile" and that, although Rowlands "acknowledges at the beginning of the book that he cannot think like a wolf... for such a capable philosopher and readable author not to have made the attempt is indeed an opportunity missed."
As a professional philosopher, Rowlands is known as one of the principal architects of the view known as vehicle externalism or the extended mind, and also for his work on the moral status of animals.
His best known work is the book The Philosopher and the Wolf about a decade of his life he spent living and travelling with a wolf. As The Guardian described it in its review, "it is perhaps best described as the autobiography of an idea, or rather a set of related ideas, about the relationship between human and non-human animals." Reviews were very positive, the Financial Times said it was "a remarkable portrait of the bond that can exist between a human being and a beast,". Mark Vernon writing in The Times Literary Supplement "found the lessons on consciousness, animals and knowledge as engaging as the main current of the memoir," and added that it "could become a philosophical cult classic", while John Gray in the Literary Review thought it "a powerfully subversive critique of the unexamined assumptions that shape the way most philosophers - along with most people - think about animals and themselves." However, Alexander Fiske-Harrison for Prospect warned that "if you combine misanthropy and lycophilia, the resulting hybrid, lycanthropy, is indeed interesting, but philosophically quite sterile" and that, although Rowlands "acknowledges at the beginning of the book that he cannot think like a wolf... for such a capable philosopher and readable author not to have made the attempt is indeed an opportunity missed."
As a professional philosopher, Rowlands is known as one of the principal architects of the view known as vehicle externalism or the extended mind, and also for his work on the moral status of animals.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
May 30, 2022
A very well structured argument that Rowland lays out patiently. If anything, it gets a bit repetitive, because things are often restated to refresh the readers memory. It’s not a huge issue though. I found the argument ultimately convincing even if there are some points I definitely still disagree with (specifically the part on hunting).
May 1, 2019
A brilliant book that puts forth a persuasive case that there is a rational basis for considering the interests of animals when deciding what kind of world we want to live in. Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the author’s argument is the empirical claim that animals - vertebrates in particular - are continuous with humans regarding those aspects that make us deserving of a just life. This book deserves re- reading, such is it’s clear and carefully constructed explanations of how to think about equality and justice, and why the mere fact of being a species other than human does not necessarily mean you are not due ethical consideration.
April 8, 2020
A good account of a contractualist argument against societies current harm to animals, but not as convincing as Carruthers' arguments in the Animal Issue. If I recall correctly the argument even skips over the central question to animal ethics qua contractualism: what distinguishes moral agents.
May 13, 2022
Brilliant
December 28, 2012
Overall, this book is a powerful argument in favor of animal rights and animal welfare. I would unhesitatingly recommend it to friends, meat-eaters, the general public, etc. The Rawslian veil of ignorance, which Rawls termed the "original position" (already a powerful idea), is refined by Rowlands into the "impartial position," and it works marvelously. In a nutshell, it amounts to imagining that you are creating a society, but that you do not even know what species of animal you will end up being in that society. What choices would you then make as to the make-up of that society? However, while the first half of the book is excellent, it begins to falter in the second half.
Here are the main problems I see with the book:
In the chapter titled "Killing Animals," Rowlands argues that it would be morally correct to save a baby over an 80-year-old in a lifeboat scenario and to save a dog over a human who has 15 minutes to live. I agree with the latter, but the former I'm not so sure about. In the discussion, Rowlands seems to forget (or at least de-emphasize) that a baby has a future in only the weak sense, and he conveniently sort of brushes this fact under the rug. Nor does he tackle the more difficult issue of whether to save a baby or, say, a 20-year-old. Basically, it seems like he's at a loss to say just when the potential value a life may acquire in the future, as potentially acquired by a being currently only having a future in the weak sense, overrides the interests of a person who already possesses a future in the strong sense.
Second, his discussion of animals in experiments is lifted, virtually example for example, out of Singer's Animal Liberation. It's interesting to note that, in this chapter, he even concedes that there may be some animal experiments that were absolutely necessary to medical advancements that benefited the vital interests of humans. But, he goes on, the end does not justify the means--which is a strange thing to say because 1.) He’s a self-identifying consequentialist and 2.) He states in the chapter "Animal Rights Activism" (in a general vein unrelated to specifically animal rights issues) that it's widely accepted, and he agrees, that violence can be justified if it serves the greater good. So there's a pretty big inconsistency here.
Third, his brief discussion on zoos talks about what animals lose from being kept in zoos, and what humans potentially gain by keeping animals in zoos, but it does not mention anything at all about what animals may gain by being kept in zoos. He also doesn't make a distinction between the moral acceptability of keeping certain animals in zoos versus certain other sorts of animals based on their differing behavioral tendencies and differing needs. Furthermore, his entire discussion presupposes that all animals necessarily value autonomy in the exact same sense that humans value autonomy.
Finally, to take an example from his discussion on hunting: He states, correctly, that the deer population in many areas of the United States is only out of control because we have exterminated many of their natural predators (wolves). He implies that the deer population should be kept under control by re-introducing the wolf. Therefore, he says, arguments that say that hunting is morally valid because it keeps the deer population under control are completely wrong, because the only reason why hunting is necessary is because we killed off a lot of the wolves. Yes okay, but this is an oddly idealistic position. The more interesting, and difficult, question is: Assuming people won't re-introduce the wolf, can hunting be justified in our current context, at all?
Now, none of these criticisms are to imply that Rowlands is necessarily wrong about anything he's said, but I only want to point out some of the shortcomings that, to me, seem very relevant to the discussion and appear to be neglected solely due to their greater difficulty.
Here are the main problems I see with the book:
In the chapter titled "Killing Animals," Rowlands argues that it would be morally correct to save a baby over an 80-year-old in a lifeboat scenario and to save a dog over a human who has 15 minutes to live. I agree with the latter, but the former I'm not so sure about. In the discussion, Rowlands seems to forget (or at least de-emphasize) that a baby has a future in only the weak sense, and he conveniently sort of brushes this fact under the rug. Nor does he tackle the more difficult issue of whether to save a baby or, say, a 20-year-old. Basically, it seems like he's at a loss to say just when the potential value a life may acquire in the future, as potentially acquired by a being currently only having a future in the weak sense, overrides the interests of a person who already possesses a future in the strong sense.
Second, his discussion of animals in experiments is lifted, virtually example for example, out of Singer's Animal Liberation. It's interesting to note that, in this chapter, he even concedes that there may be some animal experiments that were absolutely necessary to medical advancements that benefited the vital interests of humans. But, he goes on, the end does not justify the means--which is a strange thing to say because 1.) He’s a self-identifying consequentialist and 2.) He states in the chapter "Animal Rights Activism" (in a general vein unrelated to specifically animal rights issues) that it's widely accepted, and he agrees, that violence can be justified if it serves the greater good. So there's a pretty big inconsistency here.
Third, his brief discussion on zoos talks about what animals lose from being kept in zoos, and what humans potentially gain by keeping animals in zoos, but it does not mention anything at all about what animals may gain by being kept in zoos. He also doesn't make a distinction between the moral acceptability of keeping certain animals in zoos versus certain other sorts of animals based on their differing behavioral tendencies and differing needs. Furthermore, his entire discussion presupposes that all animals necessarily value autonomy in the exact same sense that humans value autonomy.
Finally, to take an example from his discussion on hunting: He states, correctly, that the deer population in many areas of the United States is only out of control because we have exterminated many of their natural predators (wolves). He implies that the deer population should be kept under control by re-introducing the wolf. Therefore, he says, arguments that say that hunting is morally valid because it keeps the deer population under control are completely wrong, because the only reason why hunting is necessary is because we killed off a lot of the wolves. Yes okay, but this is an oddly idealistic position. The more interesting, and difficult, question is: Assuming people won't re-introduce the wolf, can hunting be justified in our current context, at all?
Now, none of these criticisms are to imply that Rowlands is necessarily wrong about anything he's said, but I only want to point out some of the shortcomings that, to me, seem very relevant to the discussion and appear to be neglected solely due to their greater difficulty.
May 28, 2013
Mark Rowlands develops moral principles for animal rights using a modified version of Rawls' Original Position, which he calls the impartial position. Basically, it's a thought experiment where you think about what way you would act and what rules you would want if you had no idea if you were a sentient nonhuman animal or a human.
Overall, I really enjoyed this book, there were, however, a few places where I was let down.
Firstly, the long discussion on the Lifeboat Scenario. Lifeboat scenarios are something which most of us never have to face. The outcome of Rowlands' theorising is that a nonhuman animal dying is probably less of a harm than a fully aware adult human dying. This is difficult to substantiate and may be somewhat speciesist to presume. I find this type of weighing up whose loss is more tragic in a completely fictional scenario to be entirely sickening and useless for everyday moral action. Rowlands' conclusions however, are less noxious than Regan's.
Secondly, the chapter on pets is entirely underdeveloped and fails to make the distinction between purchasing an animal from a breeder and rescuing an animal. Had this distinction been introduced, the chapter would have been far better. Also, Rowlands doesn't question why we have pets and whether it is a morally legitimate desire in the first place. There is a world of difference between rescuing an animal for *its sake* and purchasing an animal for your own pleasure.
Finally, the last section of the book introduces a wholly new idea in the last 18 pages of the book - namely Heidegger's "darkened of the world" and the way in which our current gestell (framework, matrix) trains us to see everything - humans included - as resources. There is just not enough time dedicated to either of these concepts and it feels as if they are just tacked onto the end of a very meticulous piece of moral theory. I would personally have loved to see these ideas developed more fully rather than being glossed over. Rowlands is usually very thorough at explaining and reiterating concepts (possibly ad nauseum for some) and this ending just felt underdeveloped. The book would have stood well on its own without introducing the concept of the "darkened of the world" and gestell at the very end.
Overall I enjoyed Animals Like Us, in spite of my disagreements with it. It's an important work in animal rights philosophy.
Overall, I really enjoyed this book, there were, however, a few places where I was let down.
Firstly, the long discussion on the Lifeboat Scenario. Lifeboat scenarios are something which most of us never have to face. The outcome of Rowlands' theorising is that a nonhuman animal dying is probably less of a harm than a fully aware adult human dying. This is difficult to substantiate and may be somewhat speciesist to presume. I find this type of weighing up whose loss is more tragic in a completely fictional scenario to be entirely sickening and useless for everyday moral action. Rowlands' conclusions however, are less noxious than Regan's.
Secondly, the chapter on pets is entirely underdeveloped and fails to make the distinction between purchasing an animal from a breeder and rescuing an animal. Had this distinction been introduced, the chapter would have been far better. Also, Rowlands doesn't question why we have pets and whether it is a morally legitimate desire in the first place. There is a world of difference between rescuing an animal for *its sake* and purchasing an animal for your own pleasure.
Finally, the last section of the book introduces a wholly new idea in the last 18 pages of the book - namely Heidegger's "darkened of the world" and the way in which our current gestell (framework, matrix) trains us to see everything - humans included - as resources. There is just not enough time dedicated to either of these concepts and it feels as if they are just tacked onto the end of a very meticulous piece of moral theory. I would personally have loved to see these ideas developed more fully rather than being glossed over. Rowlands is usually very thorough at explaining and reiterating concepts (possibly ad nauseum for some) and this ending just felt underdeveloped. The book would have stood well on its own without introducing the concept of the "darkened of the world" and gestell at the very end.
Overall I enjoyed Animals Like Us, in spite of my disagreements with it. It's an important work in animal rights philosophy.
March 29, 2014
The core claims* in this book are, or should be, common sense but it is handy to have them stated and defended so clearly.
The detail is likely to be unsatisfying for the philosophical specialist but too technical for the philosophical initiate. Rowlands does write beautifully, though:
"Tennis balls are small and round and furry. So too are baby rabbits. Yet those of a non-psychopathic persuasion would be horrified at the thought of playing tennis with a baby rabbit. And this is not just because rabbits don't bounce properly...Having knocked all the balls over the net, we can't just pick up the nearest baby rabbit and start serving with that. That would be morally outrageous. We all know this."
*1. Animals' interests deserve equal consideration to humans' 2. Killing animals for food is almost always wrong 3. Experimenting on animals, whatever the purpose, is almost always wrong 3. Operating and visiting zoos is wrong 4. Hunting is almost always wrong 5. By 1-4, humans perpetrate massive injustice against animals.
In response to 5, Elizabeth Costello's meditation in "The Lives of Animals" is particularly a propos (as Rowlands notes in Chapter 11)
"I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet everyday I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it and offer it to me. Fragments of corpses they have bought for money."
The detail is likely to be unsatisfying for the philosophical specialist but too technical for the philosophical initiate. Rowlands does write beautifully, though:
"Tennis balls are small and round and furry. So too are baby rabbits. Yet those of a non-psychopathic persuasion would be horrified at the thought of playing tennis with a baby rabbit. And this is not just because rabbits don't bounce properly...Having knocked all the balls over the net, we can't just pick up the nearest baby rabbit and start serving with that. That would be morally outrageous. We all know this."
*1. Animals' interests deserve equal consideration to humans' 2. Killing animals for food is almost always wrong 3. Experimenting on animals, whatever the purpose, is almost always wrong 3. Operating and visiting zoos is wrong 4. Hunting is almost always wrong 5. By 1-4, humans perpetrate massive injustice against animals.
In response to 5, Elizabeth Costello's meditation in "The Lives of Animals" is particularly a propos (as Rowlands notes in Chapter 11)
"I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet everyday I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it and offer it to me. Fragments of corpses they have bought for money."
October 31, 2013
This book blew my mind. Another fantastic read from Mark Rowlands. After being vegetarian for 6 years this book made me decide to give being vegan a really good go for all the moral reasons. Definitely a must read for anyone who cares about animal rights and environmental rights
Read
July 30, 2014Very keen to read this which is described as an extension of the veil of ignorance to cover species!
October 31, 2011
Rowlands exhaustively sets forth the case for animal rights from a Rawlsian and Justice as Fairness perspective.
Want to read
January 16, 2013Thanks to Jonathan for giving me this for Christmas
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews