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Communication & the Evolution of Society
Some twenty years ago Habermas introduced the idea of analyzing contemporary society from a historical and practical stand point while remaining faithful to the canons of empirical science. Although the general features of this idea are still evident in his mature views, his original conception of critical social theory has undergone considerable development. The five essays translated in this volume provide an overview of the research program that has finally emerged.
239 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1979
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About the author
Jürgen Habermas
378 books698 followersJürgen Habermas is a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and American pragmatism. He is perhaps best known for his work on the concept of the public sphere, the topic of his first book entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. His work focuses on the foundations of social theory and epistemology, the analysis of advanced capitalistic societies and democracy, the rule of law in a critical social-evolutionary context, and contemporary politics—particularly German politics. Habermas's theoretical system is devoted to revealing the possibility of reason, emancipation, and rational-critical communication latent in modern institutions and in the human capacity to deliberate and pursue rational interests.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 10, 2009
A collection of essays which is probably the best introduction to Habermas' work in his own words. The five essays introduce one aspect of his project: his reliance on an interpretation of speech-act theory to provide the normative grounding for his own project (he considers other critical theorists, such as Adorno, to lack normative grounds; that is, he thinks they're more or less forced to be relativists); his use of cognitive developmental theories (which he re-casts in more linguistic terms, as per his first essay) to explain the evolution of societies; two essays deal with his insistence that this is nevertheless a 'materialist' project (thanks to his re-interpretation of historical materialism as explanation of "levels of social integration" rather than modes of production); and his discussion of the modern welfare state.
Easily the best essay is the last one on the welfare state; it might even be more timely now, post GFC, than in the late seventies when it was first published. Basically, he argues that the state takes on the role of guardian for both the economy and the population. If the economy fails, the state loses face; if the population feels the bad effects of a growing economy, the state loses face. More or less, it's a lose lose game for the modern state. The stuff on historical materialism is terrible, as you might expect when someone's trying to theoretically describe not only the shift from pre-modern to modern societies (interesting, possibly doable) but also the shift from pre-human to human societies (not going to happen.) The essay on cognitive development is almost as absurd. And the first essay, on speech act theory and Habermas' 'universal pragmatics' shows us why Habermas will go down in history as the single worst theoretician of the twentieth century as far as displaying his own views goes: he takes an easy to understand, interesting theory (speech act theory) and tweaks it in an easy to understand, interesting way (insisting on the importance of illocutionary force outside of institutional bounds)... but takes 70 pages to do so, and makes the whole thing seem like a mess. Too bad. Anyway, read this rather than his massive tomes. The introduction by McCarthy, too, is excellent.
Easily the best essay is the last one on the welfare state; it might even be more timely now, post GFC, than in the late seventies when it was first published. Basically, he argues that the state takes on the role of guardian for both the economy and the population. If the economy fails, the state loses face; if the population feels the bad effects of a growing economy, the state loses face. More or less, it's a lose lose game for the modern state. The stuff on historical materialism is terrible, as you might expect when someone's trying to theoretically describe not only the shift from pre-modern to modern societies (interesting, possibly doable) but also the shift from pre-human to human societies (not going to happen.) The essay on cognitive development is almost as absurd. And the first essay, on speech act theory and Habermas' 'universal pragmatics' shows us why Habermas will go down in history as the single worst theoretician of the twentieth century as far as displaying his own views goes: he takes an easy to understand, interesting theory (speech act theory) and tweaks it in an easy to understand, interesting way (insisting on the importance of illocutionary force outside of institutional bounds)... but takes 70 pages to do so, and makes the whole thing seem like a mess. Too bad. Anyway, read this rather than his massive tomes. The introduction by McCarthy, too, is excellent.
October 17, 2024
FIVE ESSAYS WHICH OUTLINE HABERMAS’S “CRITICAL THEORY” OF SOCIETY
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School.
He says, “the procedure practiced by [Noam] Chomsky and many others seems to me to be meaningful and adequate. One starts with clear cases, in which the reactions of the subjects converge, in order to develop structural descriptions on this basis and then, in the light of the hypotheses gained, to present less clear cases in such a way that the process of interrogation can lead to an adequate clarification of these cases as well. I do not see anything wrong in this circular procedure; every research process moves in such a circle between theory formation and precise specification of the object domain.” (Pg. 19)
He begins the third essay with the statement, “[In recent years I have made] various attempts to develop a theoretical program that I understand as a reconstruction of historical materialism. The word ‘restoration’ signifies the return to an initial situation that had meanwhile been corrupted; but my interest in Marx and Engels is not dogmatic, nor is it historical-philological. ‘Renaissance’ signifies the renewal of a tradition that has been buried for some time; but Marxism is in no need of this… ‘reconstruction’ signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself. This is the normal way… of dealing with a theory that needs revision in many respects but whose potential for stimulation has still not been exhausted.” (Pg. 95)
In the essay on ‘Historical Materialism,’ he says, “Historical materialism does not need to assume a species-subject that undergoes evolution. The bearers of evolution are rather societies and the acting subjects integrated into them, social evolution can be discerned in those structures that are replaced by more comprehensive structures in accord with a pattern that is to be rationally reconstructed. In the course of the structure-forming process, societies and individuals, together with their ego and group identities, undergo change. Even if social evolution should point in the direction of unified individuals consciously influencing the course of their own evolution, there would not arise any large-scale subjects, but at most self-established, higher-level intersubjective commonalities.” (Pg. 140)
Later, he suggests, “only an analytic answer can explain WHY a society takes an evolutionary step and how we are to understand that social struggles under certain conditions lead to a new level of social development. I would like to propose the following answer: the species learns not only in the dimension of technically useful knowledge decisive for the development of productive forces but also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness decisive for structures of interaction. The rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in doing so they follow their own logic.” (Pg. 147-148)
He concludes this essay with the statement, “I do not regard the choice of the historical-materialist criterion of progress as arbitrary. The development of productive forces, in conjunction with the maturity of the forms of social integration, means progress of learning ability in both dimensions: progress in objectivating knowledge and in moral-practical insight.” (Pg. 177)
In the final essay, he explains, “Let me now briefly summarize the results of our conceptual analysis. By ‘legitimacy’ I understand the worthiness of a political order to be recognized. The ‘claim to legitimacy’ is related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity. ‘Legitimations’ serve to make good this claim, that is, to show how and why existing (or recommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in such a way that the values constitutive for the identity of the society will be realized. Whether legitimations are convincing, whether they are believed, depends naturally on empirical motives; but these motives are not formed independently of the (formally analyzable justificatory force of the legitimations themselves.” (Pg. 182-183)
Not one of Habermas’s “major works,” these essays will nevertheless be helpful to anyone seeking a greater understanding of Habermas and his thought.
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School.
He says, “the procedure practiced by [Noam] Chomsky and many others seems to me to be meaningful and adequate. One starts with clear cases, in which the reactions of the subjects converge, in order to develop structural descriptions on this basis and then, in the light of the hypotheses gained, to present less clear cases in such a way that the process of interrogation can lead to an adequate clarification of these cases as well. I do not see anything wrong in this circular procedure; every research process moves in such a circle between theory formation and precise specification of the object domain.” (Pg. 19)
He begins the third essay with the statement, “[In recent years I have made] various attempts to develop a theoretical program that I understand as a reconstruction of historical materialism. The word ‘restoration’ signifies the return to an initial situation that had meanwhile been corrupted; but my interest in Marx and Engels is not dogmatic, nor is it historical-philological. ‘Renaissance’ signifies the renewal of a tradition that has been buried for some time; but Marxism is in no need of this… ‘reconstruction’ signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself. This is the normal way… of dealing with a theory that needs revision in many respects but whose potential for stimulation has still not been exhausted.” (Pg. 95)
In the essay on ‘Historical Materialism,’ he says, “Historical materialism does not need to assume a species-subject that undergoes evolution. The bearers of evolution are rather societies and the acting subjects integrated into them, social evolution can be discerned in those structures that are replaced by more comprehensive structures in accord with a pattern that is to be rationally reconstructed. In the course of the structure-forming process, societies and individuals, together with their ego and group identities, undergo change. Even if social evolution should point in the direction of unified individuals consciously influencing the course of their own evolution, there would not arise any large-scale subjects, but at most self-established, higher-level intersubjective commonalities.” (Pg. 140)
Later, he suggests, “only an analytic answer can explain WHY a society takes an evolutionary step and how we are to understand that social struggles under certain conditions lead to a new level of social development. I would like to propose the following answer: the species learns not only in the dimension of technically useful knowledge decisive for the development of productive forces but also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness decisive for structures of interaction. The rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in doing so they follow their own logic.” (Pg. 147-148)
He concludes this essay with the statement, “I do not regard the choice of the historical-materialist criterion of progress as arbitrary. The development of productive forces, in conjunction with the maturity of the forms of social integration, means progress of learning ability in both dimensions: progress in objectivating knowledge and in moral-practical insight.” (Pg. 177)
In the final essay, he explains, “Let me now briefly summarize the results of our conceptual analysis. By ‘legitimacy’ I understand the worthiness of a political order to be recognized. The ‘claim to legitimacy’ is related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity. ‘Legitimations’ serve to make good this claim, that is, to show how and why existing (or recommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in such a way that the values constitutive for the identity of the society will be realized. Whether legitimations are convincing, whether they are believed, depends naturally on empirical motives; but these motives are not formed independently of the (formally analyzable justificatory force of the legitimations themselves.” (Pg. 182-183)
Not one of Habermas’s “major works,” these essays will nevertheless be helpful to anyone seeking a greater understanding of Habermas and his thought.
June 1, 2022
Papers on problems of linguistics, psychoanalysis, Marxist philosophy of history, and political science, all shot through with Habermas' approach to communication. Profoundly formulated and well-argued but seldom very entertaining.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews