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Historical Materialism #1
The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital
This book both argues for, and demonstrates, a new turn to dialectic. Marx's Capital was clearly influenced by Hegel's dialectical here, case by case, the significance of these is clarified. More, it is argued that, instead of the dialectic of the rise and fall of social systems, what is needed is a method of articulating the dialectical relations characterising a given social whole. Marx learnt from Hegel the necessity for a systematic development, and integration, of categories; for example, the category of 'value' can be fully comprehended only in the context of the totality of capitalist relations. These studies thus shed new light on Marx's great work, while going beyond it in many respects.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 22, 2020
say what you will but CJA is one of the GOATs. my man essentially worked up a critique his entire life pinnacling at capitalism as literal hell; ceaseless, purposeless, relentless. as Augustine says, where we forever 'burn without consuming, suffer without dying.'
August 18, 2020
In this book Christopher Arthur offers a strict Hegelian interpretation of several facets of Marx’s Capital from a value form-theoretic perspective. This was an often tough read both because of Arthur’s careful analysis and because of his overly jargon-y presentation. But, that aside, it was illuminating and definitely challenged me to reevaluate many conceptions of Capital, Marx, and Socialist thought I had going in to it. The following is a chapter by chapter summary of the book.
Ch. 1
Gives an introduction to the main theoretical framework Arthur is working with in his interpretation of both Hegel and Marx: something he calls “systematic dialectic”. This form of dialectical thinking “is concerned with the articulation of categories designed to conceptualize an existent whole” as opposed to “historical dialectic” which highlights the temporal evolution of systems out of each other’s contradictions (which Arthur notes is also a valid approach to dialectics and which is used by both Hegel and Marx). The introduction outlines the main gist of the book: to apply a systematic dialectical framework in order to show that there are structural homologies between Hegel’s The Science of Logic and Marx’s Capital…homologies which, once grasped, illuminate Marx’s project. Preliminary examples of these homologies include the self-grounding nature of Capital and of thought; as well as how the real abstraction of exchange is analogous to the conceptual abstraction of the Logic.
Ch. 2
Grapples with some of the issues inherent to a systematic dialectical inquiry. Namely, the choice of a starting point and of the method of advance from the starting point to the full concrete articulation of the system. Arthur answers these questions by way of examples from Capital’s initial chapters which, contrary to Sweezy’s claims of “successive approximation” or Engels’ idea of “simple commodity production”, begins with a sufficiently simple yet historically determinate cell (the commodity) and proceeds by developing a living whole though an explication of simple commodity circulation before moving on to production.
Ch. 3
This chapter is all about the “dialectic of negativity” and focuses on what capital must negate in order to be capital. And like any other category in a dialectical process, capital must negate its “other” which is labor. To the extent that it succeeds in negating labor in the struggle over the working day, it is able to extract surplus-value. Therefore, capital’s realization as the engine of accumulation is a result of the process of negating its negation.
Ch. 4
Here Arthur concretely applies the method of systematic dialectic to 3 case studies in Hegel and Marx. He first notes that systematic dialectic does not proceed by taking some isolated thing and building up a system from it (like neoclassical economics does with its isolated agents acting as mere loci of preferences and constraints which a model of economic activity is then built out of), rather it begins by presupposing that there is a logically coherent whole from which we’ve made a violent abstraction. It then proceeds by showing how each moment requires a larger and more complex set of relationships for the original abstraction to make any sense at all (Marx starts with the wealth of societies as it appears in commodities. He then finds relationships like use and exchange value that concretize the commodity concept). The three case studies Arthur chooses to demonstrate his method of systematic dialectic are: the transition from Abstract Right to Morality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the necessity of money as demonstrated in Capital chapter 3, and the contradiction of capital as presented in Capital chapter 5.
Ch. 5
This is the meat of the book where Arthur draws convincing structural parallels between Capital and The Logic. The main points of this section are (1) that capital is a structure of estrangement founded on the inversion of the form/content and universal/particular relations due to the real abstraction of exchange (2) the logic of value just is Hegel’s logic but in social terms (3) that in order to be self-grounding capital must subsume what it feeds off of under its own accumulative logic…ie. it must output its own inputs and (4) capitalism is an inverted world where pure forms gain objective reality in the material realm. The chapter appendix contains an incredible table of categories mapping the presentation of economic/social concepts in Capital onto the order of pure categories of thought as they unfold in The Logic.
Ch. 6
Is an investigation into the Hegelian notion of the “negation of negation” in Marx with respect to the one passage in which it explicitly comes up in Capital. The formal plan of dialectical progression (immediacy-->negation-->negation of negation) concretely proceeds in Marx’s thought as follows: the unity of labor and its product-->capitalism which negates this unity-->socialism which negates this negation of unity. Arthur then compares the theoretical work “negation of negation” does in systematic vs historical dialectics. Arthur argues in favor of a systematic framework and notes its fundamental role in explaining historical transitions even if it is “underdetermining” in this respect.
Ch. 7
In this chapter, Arthur argues that Marx’s concept of capital embodies Hegel’s concepts of both the “spurious” and “true” Infinite. Essentially, it is the True Infinite because it is a self-positing circular flow in which the beginning is the end is the beginning and so on. It is a spurious infinite in that it is always striving to actualize its concept of “absolute wealth” by means of incremental quantitative increases. Arthur points to the contradiction inherent to the money-form as the source of this accumulative directive of capital. He cites Marx who wrote in the Grundrisse that it is the contradiction between the quantitative limitation (of any actual sum of money) and its qualitative lack of limitation (as implied by its concept as absolute wealth) that keeps driving the hoarder back to his Sisyphean task of accumulation.
Ch. 8
This was probably the most difficult chapter for me and, in my opinion, the most philosophically dense. It concerns the metaphysical dimension of value. It basically argues that Hegel’s dialectic of Being in The Logic can run in the opposite direction and dialectically concretize the concept of Nothing (as opposed to Being). Arthur puts this negative dialectic into practice by analyzing the “nothing” of value, which is use-value.
Ch. 9
Possibly my favorite chapter as it covered the political economy of Hegel’s thought which can be broken up into two distinct phases: the Jena system and the system as presented in the Philosophy of Right. Arthur argues that the Jena system was much more critical and materialist which saw Hegel investigating the form of value but always from the bourgeois perspective of subjects recognizing each other as property owners. He was therefore unable to reconcile this standpoint with his “incipient materialism” leading Hegel to abandon any materialist approach for the idealism of the later Philosophy of Right. In that work, instead of property being the expression of relations of production as it is in Marx, for Hegel they are expressions and externalizations of will. Value for Hegel, therefore, becomes rooted in utility and the value abstraction is treated as one made by consciousness in the course of subjectively evaluating terms of a contract—contrary to Marx, for whom, the value abstraction was a “real” abstraction made by a social institution: regular exchange relations.
Ch. 10
Here Arthur treats the issue of post-capitalist production through the lens of the USSR’s failure to transcend capitalism. The first half of the chapter is an evaluation of the Soviet failure rooted in its inability to move beyond capitalist forms. That is, it retained the forms of appearance of capitalist categories (prices, wages, etc.) without any of the content that made those categories stable (a value system, competition between producers, etc.). This resulted in an unstable quasi-mode of production that never attained organic coherence and therefore fell apart once the external pressures of war and coercion, which incentivized production, faded. The second half is a review of Meszaros’s book “Beyond Capital” in which Arthur criticizes the thesis that capitalism is a form of a more general “capital system.” Arthur contends that the distinction is untenable.
Ch. 11
The penultimate chapter is concerned with practical reasoning from the standpoint of class about the social totality. This he distinguishes from individuals practically reasoning about particular actions. The argument goes that only through class consciousness can we rationally evaluate the capitalist totality in a “concrete” way because only the class can link thought with action on this level of generality. Anything else is abstract moralizing.
The final chapter is a short summary of major themes.
Ch. 1
Gives an introduction to the main theoretical framework Arthur is working with in his interpretation of both Hegel and Marx: something he calls “systematic dialectic”. This form of dialectical thinking “is concerned with the articulation of categories designed to conceptualize an existent whole” as opposed to “historical dialectic” which highlights the temporal evolution of systems out of each other’s contradictions (which Arthur notes is also a valid approach to dialectics and which is used by both Hegel and Marx). The introduction outlines the main gist of the book: to apply a systematic dialectical framework in order to show that there are structural homologies between Hegel’s The Science of Logic and Marx’s Capital…homologies which, once grasped, illuminate Marx’s project. Preliminary examples of these homologies include the self-grounding nature of Capital and of thought; as well as how the real abstraction of exchange is analogous to the conceptual abstraction of the Logic.
Ch. 2
Grapples with some of the issues inherent to a systematic dialectical inquiry. Namely, the choice of a starting point and of the method of advance from the starting point to the full concrete articulation of the system. Arthur answers these questions by way of examples from Capital’s initial chapters which, contrary to Sweezy’s claims of “successive approximation” or Engels’ idea of “simple commodity production”, begins with a sufficiently simple yet historically determinate cell (the commodity) and proceeds by developing a living whole though an explication of simple commodity circulation before moving on to production.
Ch. 3
This chapter is all about the “dialectic of negativity” and focuses on what capital must negate in order to be capital. And like any other category in a dialectical process, capital must negate its “other” which is labor. To the extent that it succeeds in negating labor in the struggle over the working day, it is able to extract surplus-value. Therefore, capital’s realization as the engine of accumulation is a result of the process of negating its negation.
Ch. 4
Here Arthur concretely applies the method of systematic dialectic to 3 case studies in Hegel and Marx. He first notes that systematic dialectic does not proceed by taking some isolated thing and building up a system from it (like neoclassical economics does with its isolated agents acting as mere loci of preferences and constraints which a model of economic activity is then built out of), rather it begins by presupposing that there is a logically coherent whole from which we’ve made a violent abstraction. It then proceeds by showing how each moment requires a larger and more complex set of relationships for the original abstraction to make any sense at all (Marx starts with the wealth of societies as it appears in commodities. He then finds relationships like use and exchange value that concretize the commodity concept). The three case studies Arthur chooses to demonstrate his method of systematic dialectic are: the transition from Abstract Right to Morality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the necessity of money as demonstrated in Capital chapter 3, and the contradiction of capital as presented in Capital chapter 5.
Ch. 5
This is the meat of the book where Arthur draws convincing structural parallels between Capital and The Logic. The main points of this section are (1) that capital is a structure of estrangement founded on the inversion of the form/content and universal/particular relations due to the real abstraction of exchange (2) the logic of value just is Hegel’s logic but in social terms (3) that in order to be self-grounding capital must subsume what it feeds off of under its own accumulative logic…ie. it must output its own inputs and (4) capitalism is an inverted world where pure forms gain objective reality in the material realm. The chapter appendix contains an incredible table of categories mapping the presentation of economic/social concepts in Capital onto the order of pure categories of thought as they unfold in The Logic.
Ch. 6
Is an investigation into the Hegelian notion of the “negation of negation” in Marx with respect to the one passage in which it explicitly comes up in Capital. The formal plan of dialectical progression (immediacy-->negation-->negation of negation) concretely proceeds in Marx’s thought as follows: the unity of labor and its product-->capitalism which negates this unity-->socialism which negates this negation of unity. Arthur then compares the theoretical work “negation of negation” does in systematic vs historical dialectics. Arthur argues in favor of a systematic framework and notes its fundamental role in explaining historical transitions even if it is “underdetermining” in this respect.
Ch. 7
In this chapter, Arthur argues that Marx’s concept of capital embodies Hegel’s concepts of both the “spurious” and “true” Infinite. Essentially, it is the True Infinite because it is a self-positing circular flow in which the beginning is the end is the beginning and so on. It is a spurious infinite in that it is always striving to actualize its concept of “absolute wealth” by means of incremental quantitative increases. Arthur points to the contradiction inherent to the money-form as the source of this accumulative directive of capital. He cites Marx who wrote in the Grundrisse that it is the contradiction between the quantitative limitation (of any actual sum of money) and its qualitative lack of limitation (as implied by its concept as absolute wealth) that keeps driving the hoarder back to his Sisyphean task of accumulation.
Ch. 8
This was probably the most difficult chapter for me and, in my opinion, the most philosophically dense. It concerns the metaphysical dimension of value. It basically argues that Hegel’s dialectic of Being in The Logic can run in the opposite direction and dialectically concretize the concept of Nothing (as opposed to Being). Arthur puts this negative dialectic into practice by analyzing the “nothing” of value, which is use-value.
Ch. 9
Possibly my favorite chapter as it covered the political economy of Hegel’s thought which can be broken up into two distinct phases: the Jena system and the system as presented in the Philosophy of Right. Arthur argues that the Jena system was much more critical and materialist which saw Hegel investigating the form of value but always from the bourgeois perspective of subjects recognizing each other as property owners. He was therefore unable to reconcile this standpoint with his “incipient materialism” leading Hegel to abandon any materialist approach for the idealism of the later Philosophy of Right. In that work, instead of property being the expression of relations of production as it is in Marx, for Hegel they are expressions and externalizations of will. Value for Hegel, therefore, becomes rooted in utility and the value abstraction is treated as one made by consciousness in the course of subjectively evaluating terms of a contract—contrary to Marx, for whom, the value abstraction was a “real” abstraction made by a social institution: regular exchange relations.
Ch. 10
Here Arthur treats the issue of post-capitalist production through the lens of the USSR’s failure to transcend capitalism. The first half of the chapter is an evaluation of the Soviet failure rooted in its inability to move beyond capitalist forms. That is, it retained the forms of appearance of capitalist categories (prices, wages, etc.) without any of the content that made those categories stable (a value system, competition between producers, etc.). This resulted in an unstable quasi-mode of production that never attained organic coherence and therefore fell apart once the external pressures of war and coercion, which incentivized production, faded. The second half is a review of Meszaros’s book “Beyond Capital” in which Arthur criticizes the thesis that capitalism is a form of a more general “capital system.” Arthur contends that the distinction is untenable.
Ch. 11
The penultimate chapter is concerned with practical reasoning from the standpoint of class about the social totality. This he distinguishes from individuals practically reasoning about particular actions. The argument goes that only through class consciousness can we rationally evaluate the capitalist totality in a “concrete” way because only the class can link thought with action on this level of generality. Anything else is abstract moralizing.
The final chapter is a short summary of major themes.
July 20, 2020
This is the best reading of Marx's "Capital" I've personally ever read, or at least, the closest to my own at this point. I'm so, so glad I reread this, Arthur hits so many of the concepts I agree with. I think towards the end, his analysis of the USSR plays defense for it a bit too much, but apart from that and some disagreements about the role of the proletariat in the dialectic of capital, it's perfect. Which, quantifying that: that's as much a problem in Marx as in Arthur's reading of Marx, for me. It is, overall, an incredible work I highly, highly recommend to anyone interested in a deep-dive and really learning about Marx's ideas. That said, this will be a bit hard if you're not familiar with 1) the history of Marxist thought, and 2) nineteenth century German philosophy from about Immanuel Kant to Karl Marx. I'd mark this as an intermediate text; short, fantastic, and a great intro to further deepening one's study, though I think its linguistic and terminological quirks make it difficult to recommend as an "introduction to Capital" or anything. Overall, however, once one gets past that, it is a fantastic, fantastic read.
September 22, 2022
Vulgar understanding of dialectics (it is so bad that it ignores the natural writings of Engels despite citing ‘Dialectics of Nature’!).
Also anti-Soviet and anti-Althusser: avoid this idealist take of dialectics at all costs.
Also anti-Soviet and anti-Althusser: avoid this idealist take of dialectics at all costs.
January 11, 2026
Generally fine but I think it could use a bit better structuring as he reiterates some ideas a painful amount of times. I think his reading of Marx is most likely correct (for example, see first edition of the original German vol 1). Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7 are all worth reading; the rest are just fine. The Hegelianism is a bit excessive at points (particularity chapter 8). This could have been structured as just an in depth reading of Marx (with elucidations on Hegel) as the most interesting parts were the commentaries on Capital (if you have read him attentively, Marx should do the heavy lifting).
Value-form theory is quite nice.
Value-form theory is quite nice.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews