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Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science
Originally published in 1982. Taking a radical interpretation of the Kuhnian concept of paradigm incommensurability, the authors begin by discussing the difficulties of gaining access to the ideas of communities with different rational categories, and then define the subject area of parapsychology, offering a review of the relevant literature. After exploring parapsychology's compatibility with science, physics, psychology and quantum theory, the authors move on from this predominantly theoretical framework, and devote the middle section to an empirical study of metal bending. They conclude with an examination of the results, analyse diverse interpretations and investigate the consequences for the idea of scientific revolution.
- GenresNonfictionSpirituality
212 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 1, 1982
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
December 25, 2015
Solid.
Most of what was novel in this book is now commonly taken for granted in the history of science--in one way or another--but still worth considering.
Here, Collins and Pinch develop the s0-called Bath School's radical interpretation of Kuhn, the so-called Empirical Programme of Relativism. They do so by looking at the battle, in the 1970s, over parapsychology as spurred by Uri Geller's spoon-bending.
Collins and Pinch argue that the divide between orthodox science and parapsychology cannot be attributed to Kuhnian incommensurability. The various groups can understand each other. Nor can parapsychology be dismissed out of hand as pseudoscience. It has the involvement of orthodox science, and it is engaged with orthodox science.
(An important note here is that revolutionary science must be engaged with orthodox science, which rules out a lot of so-called pseudosciences, since they simply go there own way.)
Collins and Pinch, to their credit, do actual research on parapsychology. One can see here the development of Collins's ideas on expertise. More germanely, there is here the beginning of his experiment's regress. Collins and Pinch show that there are no--one might modify this to say rarely--conclusive experiments to prove one version or another of science. Rather, debates are decided through negotiation. (And, as Bohr said a long time ago, by the death of critics.)
All of this is right, and it problematizes greatly the notion of pseudoscience: pseudoscience is not immediately recognizable, but is the product of historical movement.
The Bath School's program developed at the same time as Edinburgh's Strong Program, and one can see here that the Strong Program deals better with some subjects, notably fraud.
Collins and Pinch are greatly troubled by fraud here, and have to try to work around it. The strong program, at least as David Bloor would explain it in response to Latour and his school, simply took fraud as part of the sociological process.
Still, it was worth reading to re-consider the issues dealt with.
Most of what was novel in this book is now commonly taken for granted in the history of science--in one way or another--but still worth considering.
Here, Collins and Pinch develop the s0-called Bath School's radical interpretation of Kuhn, the so-called Empirical Programme of Relativism. They do so by looking at the battle, in the 1970s, over parapsychology as spurred by Uri Geller's spoon-bending.
Collins and Pinch argue that the divide between orthodox science and parapsychology cannot be attributed to Kuhnian incommensurability. The various groups can understand each other. Nor can parapsychology be dismissed out of hand as pseudoscience. It has the involvement of orthodox science, and it is engaged with orthodox science.
(An important note here is that revolutionary science must be engaged with orthodox science, which rules out a lot of so-called pseudosciences, since they simply go there own way.)
Collins and Pinch, to their credit, do actual research on parapsychology. One can see here the development of Collins's ideas on expertise. More germanely, there is here the beginning of his experiment's regress. Collins and Pinch show that there are no--one might modify this to say rarely--conclusive experiments to prove one version or another of science. Rather, debates are decided through negotiation. (And, as Bohr said a long time ago, by the death of critics.)
All of this is right, and it problematizes greatly the notion of pseudoscience: pseudoscience is not immediately recognizable, but is the product of historical movement.
The Bath School's program developed at the same time as Edinburgh's Strong Program, and one can see here that the Strong Program deals better with some subjects, notably fraud.
Collins and Pinch are greatly troubled by fraud here, and have to try to work around it. The strong program, at least as David Bloor would explain it in response to Latour and his school, simply took fraud as part of the sociological process.
Still, it was worth reading to re-consider the issues dealt with.
Displaying 1 of 1 review