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Fighting to Lose: How the German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second World War
It has long been accepted that there were no German spies at large in Britain during the Second World War, but captured German documents and newly released MI5 files reveal that the famed double-cross system was, in fact, a German triple-cross and that the Soviets had also penetrated the Security Service. When British Intelligence discovered this information, it secretly turned the situation to its advantage during the Battle of Britain. The newly released documents also show that the German Secret Intelligence chief contrived to keep Britain in the war and may have had a direct hand in helping to lure the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor.
These revelations and others like them make Fighting to Lose the most fascinating new book about the Second World War to be published for many years. Based mainly on primary source research, Bryden reveals that German Intelligence knew about Britain's radar network before the Battle of Britain and presents new evidence that President Roosevelt deliberately left the U.S. Pacific Fleet open to Japanese attack in order to get America into the war.
These revelations and others like them make Fighting to Lose the most fascinating new book about the Second World War to be published for many years. Based mainly on primary source research, Bryden reveals that German Intelligence knew about Britain's radar network before the Battle of Britain and presents new evidence that President Roosevelt deliberately left the U.S. Pacific Fleet open to Japanese attack in order to get America into the war.
416 pages, Paperback
First published November 9, 2013
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 25, 2015
This book should carry a warning, its like reading a newspaper report of something you already know about, its never quite right. I have studied the subject and there are many areas that are simply misinterpreted to suit the authors theory. It has been known for many years that Canaris didn't like Hitler and did as little as he could to help him, but when you research the details the failings of the Abwehr was mostly lazyness, ineptitude and often dishonesty. They certainly didn't fight to lose when it came to our agents, they hunted them down with great efficiency. His claim that the Abwehr hand codes used were so simple that nothing of importance would be sent by that method isnt true either. Some of the hand codes were so good they have never been broken. The Canadian cypher bureau had so much trouble with them that Bletchly Park had to send their main expert over to help them. He claims that RSS interceptors were only amateurs and tha MI6 operators were better. Almost all MI6 operators were radio Amateurs, they even had their own amateur radio club. Amateurs were found to be the best at finding and copying weak morse signals, its what they had always done as part of their hobby. Read this book with caution!
December 17, 2019
There have been many books written about the triumph of the British double-cross system run by MI5 during World War II. The inept German Abwehr (German Secret Intelligence Service) sent poorly trained spies to Britain who were then turned into double agents by MI5. These double-agents sent incorrect information back to Germany and helped win the war.
So goes the story. But even within MI5 at the time, there was head-scratching over the clumsiness of the Abwehr. Could they really be that stupid? That inefficient? The Germans, who were the paragon of efficiency?
Shoulders were shrugged and the story persisted that the Germans were inept and inexperienced at espionage and that the British were sly and successful. But is that the real story? I had never questioned that story until I read this book.
Bryden builds on the work of several other authors who, as early as the 1950s, suggested that the Abwehr was a nest of anti-Nazi officers who actively worked to undermine the Nazi war effort, particularly in regards to Hitler's plans to invade England.
The invasion of England was widely seen as folly by the officers of the German Army and Navy. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, ensured that the various offices of the Abwehr (Asts) were staffed by anti-Nazi officers who were loyal to Canaris. When orders came to prepare for the invasion of England in 1940, these officers ensured that espionage efforts against England were doomed to failure.
Bryden suggests that the Abwehr was not as dumb as it appeared. Canaris got extremely high marks for intelligence operations that ensured that the invasion of France and the Low Countries was a success. There was also evidence that the Abwehr knew that their agent JOHNNY, known as SNOW to the English, was working for MI5. And since SNOW was connected with several other double-agents, including TATE and TRICYCLE, MI5s double-cross system was likely blown.
On top of all that, there is strong evidence that the spies sent to England by the Abwehr, particularly in 1940 and 1941 were sacrificial agents. They were meant to be caught. On a whole, they were poorly trained, lacked English skills and their identity papers and ration cards were full of glaring errors and omissions. For example, some identity cards had a continental "1" written on them (a 1 with a tail on it). The Abwehr documents division could imitate every ink, piece of paper, stamp or seal, and yet the papers on the spies sent to England were flawed in so many ways.
Finally, the author suggests that there was communication between Canaris and the head of MI6, Stewart Menzies. This has been suggested by several other authors.
In the end, Canaris was removed as head of the Abwehr in 1944 and executed as a traitor in April 1945, a few short weeks before the end of the war.
I found this book to be very readable. The material presented was eye-opening and the author made a compelling argument for his premise that the Abwehr was fighting to lose, at least against Britain. The book is not without its flaws and some have accused the author of revisionist history and yet... if even a portion of the material in this book is accurate, it makes one rethink that period of history.
So goes the story. But even within MI5 at the time, there was head-scratching over the clumsiness of the Abwehr. Could they really be that stupid? That inefficient? The Germans, who were the paragon of efficiency?
Shoulders were shrugged and the story persisted that the Germans were inept and inexperienced at espionage and that the British were sly and successful. But is that the real story? I had never questioned that story until I read this book.
Bryden builds on the work of several other authors who, as early as the 1950s, suggested that the Abwehr was a nest of anti-Nazi officers who actively worked to undermine the Nazi war effort, particularly in regards to Hitler's plans to invade England.
The invasion of England was widely seen as folly by the officers of the German Army and Navy. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, ensured that the various offices of the Abwehr (Asts) were staffed by anti-Nazi officers who were loyal to Canaris. When orders came to prepare for the invasion of England in 1940, these officers ensured that espionage efforts against England were doomed to failure.
Bryden suggests that the Abwehr was not as dumb as it appeared. Canaris got extremely high marks for intelligence operations that ensured that the invasion of France and the Low Countries was a success. There was also evidence that the Abwehr knew that their agent JOHNNY, known as SNOW to the English, was working for MI5. And since SNOW was connected with several other double-agents, including TATE and TRICYCLE, MI5s double-cross system was likely blown.
On top of all that, there is strong evidence that the spies sent to England by the Abwehr, particularly in 1940 and 1941 were sacrificial agents. They were meant to be caught. On a whole, they were poorly trained, lacked English skills and their identity papers and ration cards were full of glaring errors and omissions. For example, some identity cards had a continental "1" written on them (a 1 with a tail on it). The Abwehr documents division could imitate every ink, piece of paper, stamp or seal, and yet the papers on the spies sent to England were flawed in so many ways.
Finally, the author suggests that there was communication between Canaris and the head of MI6, Stewart Menzies. This has been suggested by several other authors.
In the end, Canaris was removed as head of the Abwehr in 1944 and executed as a traitor in April 1945, a few short weeks before the end of the war.
I found this book to be very readable. The material presented was eye-opening and the author made a compelling argument for his premise that the Abwehr was fighting to lose, at least against Britain. The book is not without its flaws and some have accused the author of revisionist history and yet... if even a portion of the material in this book is accurate, it makes one rethink that period of history.
February 22, 2019
It's hard to know who or what to believe. Before reading this book, I had read Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies by Ben MacIntyre. (It's not in John Bryden's bibliography, by the way) Mr. MacIntyre wrote that the XX Cross Committee and the double agents like Tricycle (Dusko Popov) and Garbo (Juan Pujol) were great and their German spymasters were incompetent, lazy, venial men who swallowed their half-erroneous reports and passed them on to Berlin. John Bryden turned that inside out and upside down, saying that those German spymasters were smart and saavy, hand-picked by Admiral Canaris to their positions in Lisbon and Hamburg because they were anti-Hitler and that they were supposed to act dumb so that the British would not twig that their spies were triple agents. It may not be so far-fetched that Churchill and Roosevelt manipulated the intercepted information about Japanese intentions toward Pearl Harbor so that the naval commanders at that base were made unaware of the coming attack. (The aircraft carriers were sent out of Pearl a few days before. Apparently, according to Bryden, Roosevelt and his top naval staff in Washington considered Japan would fight the war over the Pacific Ocean in the air, not on the sea, so the carriers were too valuable to be lost, while the battleships would be expendable. In MacIntyre's book, J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI did not take Pujol and his microdotted questionaire about Pearl Harbor from the Germans seriously. In Bryden's book, Mr. Hoover did take the questionaire seriously, but he was not "in the privileged circle" so his reports to those who were were fobbed off. Bryden also hinted that Canaris and Churchill had, between themselves, produced the questionaire.
Well, I repeat I don't know what to believe. Canaris was a smart man because it took brains, imagination and guts to be a German admiral and spy chief, and he would have had to be smart and sly to maneuver the Wehrmacht into a loss - but not too great a loss. After all, he wanted to get rid of Hitler and negotiate a good peace with the Western Allies, not demolish his country - and not make it obvious. I'll leave it to the professional historians of World War II espionage to battle it out and report the result. "Fighting to Lose" is an interesting version of what might have happened.
Well, I repeat I don't know what to believe. Canaris was a smart man because it took brains, imagination and guts to be a German admiral and spy chief, and he would have had to be smart and sly to maneuver the Wehrmacht into a loss - but not too great a loss. After all, he wanted to get rid of Hitler and negotiate a good peace with the Western Allies, not demolish his country - and not make it obvious. I'll leave it to the professional historians of World War II espionage to battle it out and report the result. "Fighting to Lose" is an interesting version of what might have happened.
July 20, 2014
t has long been accepted that there were no German spies at large in Britain during the Second World War, but captured German documents and newly released MI5 files reveal that the famed double-cross system was, in fact, a German triple-cross and that the Soviets had also penetrated the Security Service. When British Intelligence discovered this information, it secretly turned the situation to its advantage during the Battle of Britain. The newly released documents also show that the German Secret Intelligence chief contrived to keep Britain in the war and may have had a direct hand in helping to lure the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor.
These revelations and others like them make Fighting to Lose the most fascinating new book about the Second World War to be published for many years. Based mainly on primary source research, Bryden reveals that German Intelligence knew about Britain's radar network before the Battle of Britain and presents new evidence that President Roosevelt deliberately left the U.S. Pacific Fleet open to Japanese attack in order to get America into the war.
I Got an ARC from Netgalley.com to Review.
I really enjoyed this book it is a book that I will be recommending for any one who is interested in the war it is a must read 5 out of 5 I would give more stars If it were possible.
These revelations and others like them make Fighting to Lose the most fascinating new book about the Second World War to be published for many years. Based mainly on primary source research, Bryden reveals that German Intelligence knew about Britain's radar network before the Battle of Britain and presents new evidence that President Roosevelt deliberately left the U.S. Pacific Fleet open to Japanese attack in order to get America into the war.
I Got an ARC from Netgalley.com to Review.
I really enjoyed this book it is a book that I will be recommending for any one who is interested in the war it is a must read 5 out of 5 I would give more stars If it were possible.
April 25, 2014
Although it was accepted in the second world war that no German spies were at large, German documents and some MI5 files now show that there was a triple cross in place between the Germans, soviets and the security forces.
Its a fascinating book,. I chose it because my parent lived thorough the second world war and I had to rely on either books or their memories .
Its a fascinating book,. I chose it because my parent lived thorough the second world war and I had to rely on either books or their memories .
September 19, 2025
A truly interesting book. Unveiling many of the inter-Service, inter-Agency and inter-office rivalries that plagued both the U.S. and British Intelligence organizations during the early years of WWII. More troubling is the perceived sabotage of U.S., British and even German agents, double-Agents, even triple-Agents by their own countries. It was difficult to keep up with the proliferation of Committees, Commissions & Boards, and what their responsibilities were, or were not. This book requires certain mental elasticity in that sometimes (or often) things are not as they appear.
Certain well-known Intelligence personalities appear: Cummings, Hoover & Canaris of course, but also Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, GARBO & TRICYCLE. And their effect, both positive and negative upon the course of the war.
Bottom line - I recommend this book.
Certain well-known Intelligence personalities appear: Cummings, Hoover & Canaris of course, but also Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, GARBO & TRICYCLE. And their effect, both positive and negative upon the course of the war.
Bottom line - I recommend this book.
March 8, 2015
The author cherry-picks and distorts data to support his (extremely weird) thesis. This would be forgivable if the book was at least a fun read, but the pompous pseudoseriousness of the writing just makes it boring as well as untrue.
October 5, 2015
Fascinating in what it reveals. Gives an entirely new picture on the background behind certain events during the war.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews