Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction

by Gillian Barker, Philip Kitcher

Offering an engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction shows students how to think philosophically about science and why it is both essential and fascinating to do so. Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher reconsider the core questions in philosophy of science in light of the multitude of changes that have taken place in the decades since the publication of C.G. Hempel's classic work, Philosophy of Natural Science (1966)--both in the field and also in history and sociology of science and the sciences themselves. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates--including climate change, science and religion, race, intellectual property rights, and medical research priorities--showing how these questions, and philosophers' attempts to answer them, matter in the real world.

Featuring numerous illustrative examples and extensive further reading lists, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction is ideal for courses in philosophy of science, history and philosophy of science, and epistemology/theory of knowledge. It is also compelling and illuminating reading for scientists, science students, and anyone interested in the natural sciences and in their place in global society today.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction

192 pages, Paperback

First published August 1, 2013

Reviews

[Samuel Massicotte · Rating 5 out of 5]

Having taken Deductive Logic as a course, and now currently taking Philosophy of Science as a course, I can definitely say that this book has been very relevant to me when it comes to how I perceive the world and how it functions. It feels like I had all the pieces already to create a proper representation of the functioning of science, and this book simply put all the pieces together. The epistemological line between Deduction and Induction is clear in my head. This book creates an amazing feat by representing how the foundations of science were built, describing which assumptions were necessary to be agreed upon before embarking on the quest of inductive knowledge. Going through seminal authors like Hume, Duhem, Carnap, Fraassen, Hobbes, Kuhn, this book synthesizes the obstacles and criticisms that have been levied against the many assumptions of science. The uniformity of nature has to first be assumed, in that you have to take for granted that induction is a proper method to achieve properly justified knowledge. But not only that, to create a theory, you have to assume many things all at once, including the uniformity of nature, such that your scientific instruments are sufficiently accurate to allow yourself to achieve conclusions based on them. The battle between theories can be hard fought, especially when they are incommensurable, in the sense that the tools provided measure different aspects of the same phenomenon, at a different scale and with different priorities. Any auxiliary assumption can be modified when experiments fail, giving and underdetermined account of any hypothesis, as Duhem points out. This can lead to many problems, one of them being the impossibility of having crucial experiments determining which theory is correct. In addition, as Kuhn points out, converting yourself from one theory to another is more akin to a religious conversion than a rational, empirical decision. To disturbingly conclude from Kuhn’s account, the success of theory is not necessarily correlated with its accuracy, in that there were long periods of time where theories were deemed successful, despite being proven eventually wrong. The foundational grounds having been shook by Kuhn, many scientists are still disturbed by the incommensurability of different paradigms. But that is far from being all. Even if a theory is predictive, it does not necessarily mean that it is right, as Popper adds in. In actuality, the more predictive a theory is, the less you can expect it to be accurate, in the sense that the more all-encompassing it is of different possible results, the less it is scientific. Delineating between pseudoscience (theories that claim to be scientific but that cannot allow themselves to be put to the test in risky experiments), and actual science is absolutely fascinating in itself. I do not have a good relationship with psychoanalysis, even less so with its supposed scientific grounding. I do not like Freud, having gone through phases of admiring him, and liking him less and less the more I learned about his interactions with the scientific community, with other adherants of his theories, his critics and fans. I found it frustrating how it would respond to absolutely any claim by incorporating any result into its own framework. Popper allowed me to articulate and find the words for the apparent unscientificness of Freud’s Psychoanalysis as a theory, to delineate between philosophy and psychology, metaphysical claims and scientific claims. When you start to observe these pseudoscientific theories, you start realizing that there are strong correlation between the extent to which they are a pseudoscience with how much of a cult they are. The less scientific they are, the more convinced the people are of its effectiveness or accuracy, which is very reminiscent of Shacter’s work on cognitive dissonance in cults.
In that aspect, this book has given me the many tools I need to evaluate scientific claims, as well as philosophical claims. It has allowed me to develop my critical thinking skills in a way I would never have expected before.

[Valentín Serrano García · Rating 3 out of 5]

7/10 A light and accessible essay, occasionally dry, but particularly useful for individuals in the scientific-technological field. Citing renowned authors such as Geoffrey-Smith, Dupré, Hacking, Laudan, Putnam, Quine, Rorty, and Kuhn, the authors focus on social, ideological, and cultural aspects that the humanities—especially philosophy—have been addressing for over a century. Unfortunately, these ideas only began to influence the so-called philosophy of science in the last two decades, even though the topics discussed should be somewhat obvious to those familiar with sociology or philosophy in a broader sense. For this reason alone, this introductory pamphlet—highly introductory—is worth celebrating, especially as it distances itself from the rigid—sometimes fanatical—epistemology of figures like Mario Bunge, who was notoriously opposed to anything that hinted at non-reified subjectivity.

As with Steven Pinker or Lee McIntyre, the authors are careful when discussing biology or physics, but when they touch, even tangentially, on therapeutic psychology or anthropology—fields that are more interdisciplinary—their level drops to that of preschool. It is unfortunate that they (even if indirectly) undervalue the social sciences or the humanities with caricature-like (even childish) jabs at their "ethereal" nature, citing a "Freudian" psychoanalysis (from the 1920s!) or Hegel in a superficial way. Fortunately, this happens only marginally, as the authors manage to moderate and refine their approach, remaining more respectful than Pinker or McIntyre and staying focused on what they know well.

It is regrettable, however, that this tendency is so common in works with a scientistic bent, implicitly denigrating other areas of knowledge, misunderstanding, or undervaluing them. There are plenty of external enemies (astrology, superstitions, flat-earthism, psychotic delusions, capitalist interests...) to justify avoiding further division between the sciences and the humanities. Their complementarity, in both directions, should be embraced, acknowledging that each has its own methods and domains. Without a doubt, there is an urgent need for an "introduction to the philosophy of art, history... the humanities." Yet, such an introduction already exists, albeit more difficult to assimilate, in the lessons of Cervantes, Lacan, or Proust, or in those of Haydn, Goya, or Wittgenstein.

The "reality" of human creations, with their metaphors and fictions, and their interrelation with our lives—as well as individual symptoms, ideologies, and identity structures—cannot be ignored. Science must take note that its methods and objectives cannot serve as an escape from the most intimately human and irreducible problems, those that can be explored in a work of art, for example, but not in the graph of a statistic. This is a central aspect that is still forgotten, overlooked, or avoided in the philosophy of science. But fortunately, not in philosophy itself.

In conclusion, the essay is rather simple, though useful as an introduction (to reiterate: particularly for "scientists"). Its strokes are overly broad, for better or worse. Hopefully, it will serve to spark interest in further reading: it’s not a bad starting point for those who believe science is purely objective technique. For deeper insights available in Spanish, we would recommend works like "Ciencia y pseudociencia en psicología y psiquiatría" (Marino Pérez Álvarez), "Crónica de una sociedad intoxicada" (Joan Ramon Laporte), "El autoritarismo científico" (Javier Peteiro), "Las ciencias inhumanas" (Gustavo Dessal), and many others.

[Calvin Fletcher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mixed feelings upon finishing. I read this book on my own accord as I am writing a paper on a related topic and wanted a good overview of the subject before commencing. The opening few chapters (2,3) were very helpful for understanding the historical development of the relationship between "knowledge" and science and the authors present a reasonably robust defense of a naturalism, though a slightly different shade of it. Chapter 4 was my favorite chapter, the chief question being: can progress without truth be considered progress? The book could have done without chapter 5. It felt like quite a few views were labelled as antiscience in an attempt not to go into specifics, which I suppose for the purposes of keeping the book short makes sense but it was a pity. Chapter 6 presents the authors views on an approach to "science" though calling it science was a little misleading as if you were to conduct ALL science with that approach you would put the entire theoretical physics department out of work. Overall, helpful introduction and extensive recommended reading lists at the end of each chapter provide the reader with the ability to intelligently continue on the conversation.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book addresses many topics within the philosophy of science that other books ignore.

However, it is written in needlessly complicated language. I read several scientific papers every week, and I have read several other philosophy texts. This one was more flowery. I found myself looking up rare words several times a chapter.

It is definitely worth a read anyway but I am open to the possibility that there are better texts out there.

[Chanda Prescod-weinstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this a bit dry and I think actually it could have been longer and easier to read but it’s a good overview that is judicious in its rendering of feminist philosophy of science. It takes a definite standpoint on various matters, rather than pretending to be objective or detached. Rather self-consistent.

[Rick Harrison]

This was heavy sledding for me. Took an inordinately long time to get through. Just wasn't motivated to finish, I guess.

[Caleb Cook · Rating 3 out of 5]

A reasonable summary for a secular survey, though the habitual obfuscation of core naturalistic assumptions is frustrating.