I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.
My main research area is the philosophy of cognitive science, and in my work I have mostly focused on the limitations of human cognition and human agency including faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, self deception, implicit bias, inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour, unrealistic optimism and positive illusions.
I am also interested in the relationship between science and society and in the ethical issues emerging from biomedical research, psychiatry, reproduction, parenting, and the treatment of nonhuman animals.
I currently lead a 5-year project on Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT), funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (2014-2019).
My latest book is Irrationality (Polity Press, 2014). I am currently writing a new research monograph provisionally entitled The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions.
This is a solid review of the current debates surrounding the irrationality/rationality distinction. The writing could use a little work but, in all, I'm glad I read it. Bortolotti divides the short book into four main chapters, one each on interpretation, mental health, freedom, and the world. The first deals largely with Davidson and Dennett, the second is a response to, in part, the criticisms of the anti-psychiatry movement while the other two chapters are on the difference between scientific knowledge and everyday action. Throughout, Bortolotti argues that clear distinctions between rationality and emotion, irrationality and mental health, as well as rationality and failure are too simplistic. Studies show that human beings don't consistently reason according to logical laws and often confabulate reasons or explanations after acting or making a decision.
Now, I know this probably wouldn't fit in a more scientifically minded overview but I would have liked a treatment, however sparse, of movements that endorse irrationality to some extent - dada or surrealism, for example.