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320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2013
As a result of the arduous efforts to expand homeownership, by 2008 about 27 million loans "were subprime or otherwise risky loans"--that is, nontraditional loans. That was half the mortgages in the United States! …. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held 12 million of those loans. FHA and other federal agencies (such as the Veterans Administration and Federal Home Loan Banks) held 5 million, and Community Reinvestment Act and HUD programs held another 2.2. million. That's a total of 19.2 million risky loans held by entities controlled by or within the federal government, leaving 7.8 million for Countrywide, Wall Street, and so forth. Let that fact sink in, because this is the one that shatters all the mythology surrounding the financial crisis. Two-thirds of all risky loans in the system "were held by the government or entities acting under government control," and they existed because of aggressive government housing policy. (160-1)
Do you see the problem? Using APR to express the consumer's cost for any small-dollar loan is misleading and virtually useless. It is like comparing the price per mile on taxi service in Manhattan with the price per mile on a roundtrip flight between New York and Los Angeles. The flight cost $70 per 1,000 miles. The tax will run you over $2,000 for the same distance, and that's if you don't catch any red lights. Thieving taxi drivers! This way of measuring consumer loans' cost makes the cab ride look like a huge rip-off, when it could very well be your best way to get from Battery Park to Eighty-Fifth Street for a job interview. That's why Dr. Harold Black, Professor of Financial Institutions at the University of Tennessee and an expert on APR policy, says that for small, short-term loans, APR is a "terrible metric to use to measure lending costs." (211)
Two main alternatives: (1) the federal government could write rules of incomprehensible detail and complexity to try to account for every possible eventuality and so prevent collapse at Goldman Sachs or rescue it before it collapses; or, (2) the government could clearly and consistently maintain the policy that the companies and executives that take risks in the hope of future benefit get to enjoy those benefits if they succeed, but must bear the weight of the consequences if they fail. The first option would almost certainly destroy the institution being regulated. The second option, however, would create market discipline, which is the greatest regulator, because it aligns incentives correctly. It strengthens and clarifies the key market signal. Any secondary regulations imposed by government should strengthen that key signal--namely, that you gain when your risks pan out, and you pay the consequences if they fail. At the very least, it should not interfere with it. Unfortunately, this commonsense market regulator has been mostly scrambled and subverted by a government preference for option number 1--our old friend, the moral hazard. (225)