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Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought
Esteemed American philosopher, Cornel West tackles the ethics of the Marxism agenda
In this fresh, original analysis of Marxist thought, Cornel West makes a significant contribution to today's debates about the relevance of Marxism by putting the issue of ethics squarely on the Marxist agenda. West, professor of religion and director of the Afro-American studies program at Princeton University, shows that not only was ethics an integral part of the development of Marx's own thinking throughout his career, but that this crucial concern has been obscured by such leading and influential interpreters as Engels, Kautsky, Luk?cs, and others who diverted Marx's theory into narrow forms of positivism, economism, and Hegelianism.
In this fresh, original analysis of Marxist thought, Cornel West makes a significant contribution to today's debates about the relevance of Marxism by putting the issue of ethics squarely on the Marxist agenda. West, professor of religion and director of the Afro-American studies program at Princeton University, shows that not only was ethics an integral part of the development of Marx's own thinking throughout his career, but that this crucial concern has been obscured by such leading and influential interpreters as Engels, Kautsky, Luk?cs, and others who diverted Marx's theory into narrow forms of positivism, economism, and Hegelianism.
220 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1991
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700 people want to read
About the author
Cornel West
146 books1,219 followersCornel Ronald West is an American scholar and public intellectual. Formerly at Harvard University, West is currently a professor of Religion at Princeton. West says his intellectual contributions draw from such diverse traditions as the African American Baptist Church, Marxism, pragmatism, transcendentalism, and Anton Chekhov.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 8, 2011
This book was interesting in terms of bringing together Marx's comments on ethics as well of those of a few other key Marxist philosophers.
The central argument, though, that Marx is not concerned with developing a method that can yield knowledge about objective reality, is off the mark. West criticizes Lukacs for arguing that the dialectical method reveals the actual nature of society, or that dialectics are valid because the world is dialectical. He rejects thinking of the Marxist method as a way to understand the world in any scientific sense--according to West, Marx is not concerned with justifying his claims by reference to any objective, stable features of human beings or of the world. He argues that Marx might have been concerned with human nature and species-being for a time, while under the influence of too much Feuerbach, but soon left these notions behind as grounds on which to condemn the state of affairs that human beings are in under capitalism.
He criticizes Engels and Kautsky, as well, on the grounds that they are looking for foundations for knowledge and Marx is not concerned with finding justification for his claims. There are things to criticize in each of these thinkers, but that they aimed to put ethics on a scientific basis and in that way supposedly diverged from Marx, is not one of them.
West consciously makes something of a moral relativist out of Marx, and deprives Marxist theory of the thing that informs its critique of capitalist society and gives it objectivity and validity: that it proceeds from an understanding of what humans are as natural beings.
I don't think it's quite correct to reduce Marxism almost to a version of identity politics, where justification is not about actually accounting for the truth of what one says, but rather is merely a "way of reminding ourselves and others which particular community or set of we-intentions we identify with."
West presents Marx as leaving "philosophy" (a pursuit concerned with objectivity and certainty) to merely criticize the state of affairs. But when Marx says, "philosophers have merely interpreted the world, the point however is to change it," I don't think he means that it's time to stop doing philosophy and just start doing something else. Changing the world requires that we understand it, just as understanding the world requires that we actively intervene to transform it--not merely remind ourselves and others of how we'd like the world to be.
The central argument, though, that Marx is not concerned with developing a method that can yield knowledge about objective reality, is off the mark. West criticizes Lukacs for arguing that the dialectical method reveals the actual nature of society, or that dialectics are valid because the world is dialectical. He rejects thinking of the Marxist method as a way to understand the world in any scientific sense--according to West, Marx is not concerned with justifying his claims by reference to any objective, stable features of human beings or of the world. He argues that Marx might have been concerned with human nature and species-being for a time, while under the influence of too much Feuerbach, but soon left these notions behind as grounds on which to condemn the state of affairs that human beings are in under capitalism.
He criticizes Engels and Kautsky, as well, on the grounds that they are looking for foundations for knowledge and Marx is not concerned with finding justification for his claims. There are things to criticize in each of these thinkers, but that they aimed to put ethics on a scientific basis and in that way supposedly diverged from Marx, is not one of them.
West consciously makes something of a moral relativist out of Marx, and deprives Marxist theory of the thing that informs its critique of capitalist society and gives it objectivity and validity: that it proceeds from an understanding of what humans are as natural beings.
I don't think it's quite correct to reduce Marxism almost to a version of identity politics, where justification is not about actually accounting for the truth of what one says, but rather is merely a "way of reminding ourselves and others which particular community or set of we-intentions we identify with."
West presents Marx as leaving "philosophy" (a pursuit concerned with objectivity and certainty) to merely criticize the state of affairs. But when Marx says, "philosophers have merely interpreted the world, the point however is to change it," I don't think he means that it's time to stop doing philosophy and just start doing something else. Changing the world requires that we understand it, just as understanding the world requires that we actively intervene to transform it--not merely remind ourselves and others of how we'd like the world to be.
March 27, 2015
An interesting read but not as percolated through West's intellect as his later works. Still very engaging though.
Favorite quote in this work on embracing and truly living a full life: "The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence etc. the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor dust will corrupt—your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being."
Favorite quote in this work on embracing and truly living a full life: "The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence etc. the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor dust will corrupt—your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being."
October 9, 2012
For people that really follow the work of Cornel West, it's no surprise that he has Marxist sympathies. This book marks the wrestling of his Marxism with ethical theory. He eventually gave up on being a full-blown Marxist, as he writes in the recently revised preface, because he couldn't square it with his Christianity. One wonder why he doesn't just give up on his Christianity than, or dabble more in liberation theology, or the branch of Marxism Terry Eagleton espouses. Oh well.
This book starts with a bang, but slowly peters out, and that's why it gets four stars. West is nothing if not consistently cunning and shrewd in his analysis of Marx's writings from his dissertation, to The German Ideology. In analyzing these writings West informs us that Marx came up with a Radical Historicist point of view, which is necessarily distinct from Moral Relativism because he rejects the ethical objectivity, which Moral Relativism attempts to distinguish itself from. Radical Historicism has no room for ethical or moral ideals (e.g., Kant's categorical imperative, Mill's greatest happiness, etc), but it does leave room for moral action, within the given confines of particular historical situation.
This is an interesting point of view to take, but I'm not sure Marx actually takes this view, at least not entirely. While it may be true that this is his position by the end of The German Ideology, West never delves into Capital I-III, or any subsequent works. He does have literally one line from The Gotha Program, and one line from the Grundrisse, but they're hardly definitive. Especially when most Marxists concur that Capital is a definitive moment in Marxism and Marx's method. As Lukács points out.
This leads West to reject the ethical positions adopted by Engels and Lukács, because they're too objective regarding a solid foundation: dialectics. West claims Marx never held this view, and it's true he didn't, if one doesn't go beyond The German Ideology...Marx specifically says worker's wages are raised through a "historical moral" struggle. And this struggle has an objective victory/loss, the rise of the wage.
Overall interesting read, but West needed to spend more time analyzing more writings.
This book starts with a bang, but slowly peters out, and that's why it gets four stars. West is nothing if not consistently cunning and shrewd in his analysis of Marx's writings from his dissertation, to The German Ideology. In analyzing these writings West informs us that Marx came up with a Radical Historicist point of view, which is necessarily distinct from Moral Relativism because he rejects the ethical objectivity, which Moral Relativism attempts to distinguish itself from. Radical Historicism has no room for ethical or moral ideals (e.g., Kant's categorical imperative, Mill's greatest happiness, etc), but it does leave room for moral action, within the given confines of particular historical situation.
This is an interesting point of view to take, but I'm not sure Marx actually takes this view, at least not entirely. While it may be true that this is his position by the end of The German Ideology, West never delves into Capital I-III, or any subsequent works. He does have literally one line from The Gotha Program, and one line from the Grundrisse, but they're hardly definitive. Especially when most Marxists concur that Capital is a definitive moment in Marxism and Marx's method. As Lukács points out.
This leads West to reject the ethical positions adopted by Engels and Lukács, because they're too objective regarding a solid foundation: dialectics. West claims Marx never held this view, and it's true he didn't, if one doesn't go beyond The German Ideology...Marx specifically says worker's wages are raised through a "historical moral" struggle. And this struggle has an objective victory/loss, the rise of the wage.
Overall interesting read, but West needed to spend more time analyzing more writings.
November 5, 2024
A SYMPATHETIC BUT CRITICAL VIEW OF MARX AND MARXISM, AND ITS PHILOSOPHERS
Author Cornel West wrote in the Introduction to this 1991 book, “America is in the midst of a massive social breakdown. Never before in U.S. history has national decline and cultural decay so thoroughly shaken peoples’ confidence in their capacity to respond to present-day problems… Cultural decay is pervasive. The erosion of civil society---shattered families, neighborhoods, schools, and voluntary associations---has contributed to a monumental eclipse of hope and to a collapse of meaning across the country… Never before have Americans been so ill-equipped to confront the traumas of despair, dread, and death… In short, there is a growing nihilism and cynicism afoot in the country. This nihilism---the lived experience of meaninglessness, hopelessness, and lovelessness---encourages social anomie (drugs, crime) and therapeutic forms of escape (sports, sex)… the body politic shrugs its shoulders while it waddles in private opulence and public squalor.
“This … occurs at a time of epochal change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe… The collapse of bureaucratic forms of communism… has helped revivify the spirit of revolution in our day. Yet this epochal change warrants both support and suspicion… it rekindles ugly xenophobia (such as anti-Semitism…) and unleashes harsh ‘free market’ forces… This enormous obstacle of cynicism and nihilism is the starting point for freedom fighters who defend and promote egalitarian and democratic possibilities in our time…
“What effective forms of progressive politics can emerge in this new moment of history? The present tasks for the remaking of the left are threefold. First… we should try to understand and support all egalitarian and democratic concerns… that focus on ... jobs, food, shelter, education, child and health care, and ecological balance… Secondly, we must confront candidly the intellectual crisis of the left… Third, we have to specify the kind of credible strategies and tactics for progressive politics in the United States…. This entails a fresh examination of the crisis of leadership, mobilization, and organization of the left.” (Pg. xi-xiv)
He recalls, “As a youth, I resonated with the sincere black militancy of Malcolm X, the defiant rage of the Black Panther Party, and the livid black theology of James Cone. Yet I did not fully agree with them. I always felt that they lacked the self-critical moment of humility I discerned in the grand example of Martin Luther King, Jr.” (Pg. xv)
He clarifies, “I have always shunned the role of theologian because I have little interest in systematizing the dogmas and doctrines, insights and intuitions of the Christian tradition. Nor do I think that they can be rendered coherent and consistent… So I am more of a cultural critic with philosophic training who works out of the Christian tradition who focuses on the systematic coherency or epistemic validity of Christian claims.” (Pg. xxix) Later, he notes, “this essay is primarily concerned with providing an in-house discussion of the historicist approach to ethics in the Marxist tradition.” (Pg. 94)
He observes, “Just as for Feuerbach theological reflections about the religious essence of people are transformed into philosophic formulations about the human essence of people, for Marx these philosophical formulations are dissolved into theoretic ones which probe the socioeconomic circumstances out of which the theological and philosophical claims come. For Feuerbach, anthropology or philosophy of abstract man is the secret of theology; for Marx, a theory of history and a social analysis is the secret of anthropology.” (Pg. 67)
He suggests, “If there is a fundamental problem in ethics for Marx, it consists of the discrepancy between moral ideals and moral practices---or more specifically, the way in which systems of production have hitherto seemed to require a discrepancy between particular interests of a specific class and the claims of universal interests by ideologues of that class.” (Pg. 91-92)
He states, “The major difference between Marx and the Marxist philosophers regarding approaches to ethics is that Marx is not bothered by charges or moral relativism, whereas the philosophers are bothered by such charges. Marx views charges of moral relativism as defensive reflexes of those captive to the vision of philosophy as the quest for certainty, the search for foundations.” (Pg. 167)
He asserts, “In contrast to the Marxist philosophers, Marx discards any notion of philosophic necessity after he adopts the radical historicist viewpoint… Marx’s discarding of any notion of philosophic necessity is a highly conscious and intentional act owing to a metaphilosophical move he believes he is forced to take… [which] consists of rejecting the vision of philosophy as the quest for certainty … and hence dispelling the gravity of charges of relativism… I think it is clear that Engels, Kautsky, and Lukács understood themselves to be emulating Marx… But if this is so, why then do they not make Marx’s crucial metaphilosophical move? In the cases of Engels and Kautsky, I believe the answer to this question is a simple one. Engels and Kautsky were amateur philosophers in the sense that neither had the time to think deeply about the Western philosophical tradition nor the talent to seriously grapple with the assumptions and presuppositions of the dominant vision of philosophy in the West. Therefore their humble attempts to relate Marx’s thought to this tradition result in their viewing Marx’s thoughts as critical of this tradition yet ultimately assimilated into it.” (Pg. 168)
He concludes, “They ultimately view the move as a rejection of one particular kind of philosophic search and an embarkation on another search---more historicist yet still philosophic. It is this misreading of Marx’s metaphilosophical move which separates Marx from the Marxist philosophers, his radical historicist viewpoint from their moderate historicist perspectives, and ultimately his rejection of philosophical aims from their attempts to fulfill philosophic aims. The failure of the Marxist philosophers is that they ultimately remain philosophers, whereas Marx’s radical historicist metaphilosophical vision enables him to stop doing philosophy and to begin to describe, explain, and ultimately change the world.” (Pg. 170)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the development of West’s political ideas.
Author Cornel West wrote in the Introduction to this 1991 book, “America is in the midst of a massive social breakdown. Never before in U.S. history has national decline and cultural decay so thoroughly shaken peoples’ confidence in their capacity to respond to present-day problems… Cultural decay is pervasive. The erosion of civil society---shattered families, neighborhoods, schools, and voluntary associations---has contributed to a monumental eclipse of hope and to a collapse of meaning across the country… Never before have Americans been so ill-equipped to confront the traumas of despair, dread, and death… In short, there is a growing nihilism and cynicism afoot in the country. This nihilism---the lived experience of meaninglessness, hopelessness, and lovelessness---encourages social anomie (drugs, crime) and therapeutic forms of escape (sports, sex)… the body politic shrugs its shoulders while it waddles in private opulence and public squalor.
“This … occurs at a time of epochal change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe… The collapse of bureaucratic forms of communism… has helped revivify the spirit of revolution in our day. Yet this epochal change warrants both support and suspicion… it rekindles ugly xenophobia (such as anti-Semitism…) and unleashes harsh ‘free market’ forces… This enormous obstacle of cynicism and nihilism is the starting point for freedom fighters who defend and promote egalitarian and democratic possibilities in our time…
“What effective forms of progressive politics can emerge in this new moment of history? The present tasks for the remaking of the left are threefold. First… we should try to understand and support all egalitarian and democratic concerns… that focus on ... jobs, food, shelter, education, child and health care, and ecological balance… Secondly, we must confront candidly the intellectual crisis of the left… Third, we have to specify the kind of credible strategies and tactics for progressive politics in the United States…. This entails a fresh examination of the crisis of leadership, mobilization, and organization of the left.” (Pg. xi-xiv)
He recalls, “As a youth, I resonated with the sincere black militancy of Malcolm X, the defiant rage of the Black Panther Party, and the livid black theology of James Cone. Yet I did not fully agree with them. I always felt that they lacked the self-critical moment of humility I discerned in the grand example of Martin Luther King, Jr.” (Pg. xv)
He clarifies, “I have always shunned the role of theologian because I have little interest in systematizing the dogmas and doctrines, insights and intuitions of the Christian tradition. Nor do I think that they can be rendered coherent and consistent… So I am more of a cultural critic with philosophic training who works out of the Christian tradition who focuses on the systematic coherency or epistemic validity of Christian claims.” (Pg. xxix) Later, he notes, “this essay is primarily concerned with providing an in-house discussion of the historicist approach to ethics in the Marxist tradition.” (Pg. 94)
He observes, “Just as for Feuerbach theological reflections about the religious essence of people are transformed into philosophic formulations about the human essence of people, for Marx these philosophical formulations are dissolved into theoretic ones which probe the socioeconomic circumstances out of which the theological and philosophical claims come. For Feuerbach, anthropology or philosophy of abstract man is the secret of theology; for Marx, a theory of history and a social analysis is the secret of anthropology.” (Pg. 67)
He suggests, “If there is a fundamental problem in ethics for Marx, it consists of the discrepancy between moral ideals and moral practices---or more specifically, the way in which systems of production have hitherto seemed to require a discrepancy between particular interests of a specific class and the claims of universal interests by ideologues of that class.” (Pg. 91-92)
He states, “The major difference between Marx and the Marxist philosophers regarding approaches to ethics is that Marx is not bothered by charges or moral relativism, whereas the philosophers are bothered by such charges. Marx views charges of moral relativism as defensive reflexes of those captive to the vision of philosophy as the quest for certainty, the search for foundations.” (Pg. 167)
He asserts, “In contrast to the Marxist philosophers, Marx discards any notion of philosophic necessity after he adopts the radical historicist viewpoint… Marx’s discarding of any notion of philosophic necessity is a highly conscious and intentional act owing to a metaphilosophical move he believes he is forced to take… [which] consists of rejecting the vision of philosophy as the quest for certainty … and hence dispelling the gravity of charges of relativism… I think it is clear that Engels, Kautsky, and Lukács understood themselves to be emulating Marx… But if this is so, why then do they not make Marx’s crucial metaphilosophical move? In the cases of Engels and Kautsky, I believe the answer to this question is a simple one. Engels and Kautsky were amateur philosophers in the sense that neither had the time to think deeply about the Western philosophical tradition nor the talent to seriously grapple with the assumptions and presuppositions of the dominant vision of philosophy in the West. Therefore their humble attempts to relate Marx’s thought to this tradition result in their viewing Marx’s thoughts as critical of this tradition yet ultimately assimilated into it.” (Pg. 168)
He concludes, “They ultimately view the move as a rejection of one particular kind of philosophic search and an embarkation on another search---more historicist yet still philosophic. It is this misreading of Marx’s metaphilosophical move which separates Marx from the Marxist philosophers, his radical historicist viewpoint from their moderate historicist perspectives, and ultimately his rejection of philosophical aims from their attempts to fulfill philosophic aims. The failure of the Marxist philosophers is that they ultimately remain philosophers, whereas Marx’s radical historicist metaphilosophical vision enables him to stop doing philosophy and to begin to describe, explain, and ultimately change the world.” (Pg. 170)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the development of West’s political ideas.
August 25, 2020
This book was not what I hoped it would be. If you go in knowing what to expect, I think you'll get a lot out of this book, which is why I'm still rating it highly. I have two (related?) critiques. One, I wish West would have built upon his discussion of subjectivity and religion in relation to Marxism that West alludes to in the beginning. Two, I wish it was clearer what the point of this project was. It all felt pretty arbitrary, more of an exercise for West than anything else. What does thinking about whether Engels, Kautsky, and Lukács embraced philosophic or theoretic principles in their uptake of Marx do for us? I'm cool with thinking through how Marx gets taken up, but only if that's leading to some larger point about contemporary Marxist thought. Such a larger point seemed absent. Indeed, West gets lost in this book (as exemplified by the vast quantities of block quotes) and West's argument feels rather minor and insignificant by the end, although the project remains thoughtful and coherent.
September 11, 2012
non-Marxist socialist, because he cannot reconcile Marxism with Christianity, and radical democrat, suspicious of all forms of authority.. the passage of radical historicism is great, with radical historicism and moral relativism he discribes the Marx's road to radical historicism.
also you can see compare of Feuerbach and Marx. he said that for Feuerbach antropology or philosophy of abstract man is the secret of theology form marx a theory of history and social analysis is the secret of antropology..
also you can see compare of Feuerbach and Marx. he said that for Feuerbach antropology or philosophy of abstract man is the secret of theology form marx a theory of history and social analysis is the secret of antropology..
December 26, 2011
"Even though the construction of the future and its completion for all times is not out task, what we have to accomplish at this time is all the more clear: relentless criticism of all existing conditions, relentless in the sense that the criticism is not afraid of its findings and just as little afraid of the conflict with the powers that be." --Karl Marx paraphrasing Joel Suarez
May 21, 2023
Lots of confusing jargon
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews