China's Political System is a comprehensive text analyzing the details of China's political systems. This book is written and compiled by the MERICS (Mercator Institute for China Studies) in Germany, and features multiple co-authors covering various topics, from social policy, to economic policy and so on. The book begins by analyzing the desire in China to maintain legitimacy through the CCP organs of the state, and the system of loyalty and party discipline that has made China one of the few successful (so far) one party states in the world today. The CCP (Communist Party of China) is the all powerful party in the state, and most if not all extensions of political administration, from the military and security systems, to political decision making, the judiciary, local governing bodies and so on, are somehow subordinate or connected to the CCP.
The CCP in China boasts of over 80 million members - more than the entire population of most countries in the world. This makes administrating and controlling such a vast apparatus a challenge. China does so by building systems of political patronage (called the cadre system) into the personnel and staffing models of governance. China's cadre system is a closely kept state secret. Lists of potential candidates for positions is considered top secret information (called a nomenklatura system) to reduce the impact of foreign political influencing. The CCP then branches out into subcommittees that examine and create policy for every aspect of Chinese society. These groups cover policies ranging from internal security, to economic development, managing interest rates, funding and procuring at various administrative levels, and so on. The trend since the opening up period beginning in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping has been a gradual decentralization of political power from the centre to the periphery - however this trend has been altered under current leader Xi Jinping. Under Xi, a re-centralization of political power has occurred, seemingly to combat graft and corruption in the highest organs of the CCP. This centralization has taken the form of creating Leading Small Groups which have become the ultimate authority over some sphere's of Chinese society - namely economic growth, wealth management, administration and staffing and defence.
China's political system under the CCP is remarkably robust. It is interesting to examine why and how China has been able to achieve massive growth rates with seemingly no internal political conflicts or calls for greater personal representation by the average Chinese citizen. Western economic logic posits that greater economic mobility and freedom is followed by the desire for greater political rights. This has not been the case in China so far. Aside from the Tiananmen Square tragedy in the late 1980's, calls for democratic reform in China have been mute. Most conflicts seem to take place at a local level, and China has tackled this problem both by expanding the scope of local administration and encouraging quicker resolutions to conflicts at the local level, and by expanding the state security apparatus to tackle issues that cannot be solved this way. The CCP also seemingly has models for political control at the central level to combat crises. One such model encourages two forms of control; one for crisis mode characterized by centralized control by higher level CCP bodies (such as now under Xi Jinping), and one for more calm political moments, characterized by decentralization of power (the previous two administrations). Another model is the "dual track" system of growth. China has been adept at political and economic experimentation, but has had difficulties with dogmatic/conservative elements of its own party. This has been deftly handled by creating "two tracks." One is the old way of doing things, one the new way. This ensures that successful thinking on the new track is slowly examined and adopted at all levels and replaces the old track way of thinking.
Under the CCP, China has experienced remarkable levels of growth since the late 1970's. This growth has led to massive levels of poverty reduction in China, and has seen a nearly total alteration of the traditional methods of economic planning and administration in China. Growth has been characterized first in the coastal trading hubs (Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong etc.). This led to an extension of growth policies to internal provinces. Subsequently, many internal provinces and autonomous regions (such as Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang etc.) have also experienced rapid growth led by resource extraction and manufacturing. Even so, a massive shift into tertiary sectors has begun in China as the cost of labour in China has risen to more competitive levels in recent years. This has been characterized by policies of economic liberalization in China, and the creation of many companies both as State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) for industries necessary to China's internal security (for example, development banks, energy firms, infrastructure firms etc.) and private firms. However, the trend of SOE involvement in the Chinese economy is on the wane in recent years. China has seen a reduction of a majority of SOE's, as many have been sold off, reorganized or combined to promote productivity and efficiency in various fields.
China's economy has been largely commodified as it seeks integration into global marketplaces and looks to change its economy from a centrally planned one, to one based on market forces. This has been a slow and dangerous path for China, but one it has been carefully and skillfully navigating. China has maintained autocratic control over its market forces - seemingly a contradiction. While China's economy is vastly more liberalized than that under Mao, it is certainly still largely controlled by the CCP. The CCP and its organs maintain interest rates, have sway (though less so) over currency values, staff economic administrative posts directly, and closely monitor the fairly new stock exchanges in China. However, China has also begun to liberalize its currency, joined the WTO (with subsequent policy changes), expanded the sway of the private sector, and has encouraged greater participation in the market for its average citizenry. These moves adhere to the long term strategic plan China has for its domestic economy. It seems China would like to move to a more consumer orientated economy, transitioning from its curretn status as an export economy. China has the largest domestic market in the world, and many multi-billion dollar consumer companies thrive just within the Chinese market for consumer goods. Transitions in economic planning, administration, financing and so on all point toward this trend of slowly transforming the Chinese economy.
On the home front, Chinese political adminstration is complex due to the size and scope of the nation. 1.6 billion+ people, 80 million members of the CCP, millions of soldiers and police, hundreds of millions of local administrators, service people and local government workers - all in need of management in a top down autocratic society. The staffing and personnel issues alone are almost baffling, and China indeed struggles from many internal pressures in regards to its political organization. The CCP seems to try and delegate as many issues as possible to the local level, while maintaining control of larger "big picture" categories like economic development, internal and external security, and staffing/HR practices. These bigger categories are characterized by a focus on party discipline, strict doctrine, and technocratic training - seemingly contradictory, but very useful in both promoting and encouraging change and growth, while maintaining overall political control. As the authors mention, power becomes more decentralized as one moves to lower administrative levels, sheerly because of the massive scale of the Chinese bureacracy. This means issues are often able to be resolved at lower levels - a plus, but also that corruption issues at the local level are hard to police. This issue has become a focus of the Xi governmnet - and steps to incorporate aspects of the judiciary, open up the legal system to greater liberalizations through the legalization of private law practices, and the reintroduction of more overt state security and monitoring practices are all steps being taken to curb local corruption. This issue also exists at higher levels due to the cadre system of political patronage incorporated into Chinese staffing models. This means powerful politicians often build large followings of subordinates directly reliant on the "big cheese" for political survival. It also encourages politicians to see payments in kind as part of doing business. This form of corruption is often called "dividend collection" and has upsides and downsides. On the one hand, it increases the speed that transactions can take place - useful in an economy trying to change and reorganize. It can help protect certain sectors from foreign takeover, and can reduce predatory corruption by institutionalizing graft and heavily punishing those who step out of bounds (ie. with capital punishment). However, the downsides of this form of corruption are obvious, and this is a systemic problem in China that the government seems willing to combat with extreme prejudice.
This book contains numerous other interesting tidbits, such as China's informal federalism in terms of devolving political control, the United Front of non-CCP parties aligned with the CCP, China's seemingly apolitical middle class, the organization of the Chinese military and police services, the governing of special administrative regions, autonomous regions, "municipalities" (four large cities direclty controlled by the national government) and so on. This was an authoritatve read on the subject of China's political system, and offers loads of detail, facts and figures on how China is governed, how funding systems work, and the organization and administration of the nation. The book is heavily sourced without being cumbersome, and features a fantastic source list for further study. This is probably the best broad scope overview of the Chinese system currently available in print, and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the subject of Chinese politics. It is unbiased, critical and fascinating, and I would recommend a read if you have gotten this far and like what you are reading.