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Philosophical Papers, Volume 1: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.
260 pages, Paperback
First published May 18, 1978
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About the author
Imre Lakatos
29 books94 followersPhilosopher of mathematics and science, known for his thesis of the fallibility of mathematics and its 'methodology of proofs and refutations' in its pre-axiomatic stages of development, and also for introducing the concept of the 'research programme' in his methodology of scientific research programmes.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
April 20, 2016
A brilliant synthesis of Popper and Kuhn's ideas.
Five essays are contained within (plus a short introduction on science and pseudoscience). The essays are:
1. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes
2. History of science and its rational reconstructions
3. Popper on demarcation and induction
4. (with Elie Zahar) Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?
5. Newton's effect on scientific standards
(Edit: I now realize that there are interpretations of Lakatos' theory that assert it leads to relativism. For example, Laudan's book, Science and Relativism, which I'm currently reading, makes such an assertion. I accept some of Laudan's criticisms of Lakatos, and now see certain parts of Lakatos' position as problematic, but I would deny that it leads to relativism.)
Five essays are contained within (plus a short introduction on science and pseudoscience). The essays are:
1. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes
2. History of science and its rational reconstructions
3. Popper on demarcation and induction
4. (with Elie Zahar) Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?
5. Newton's effect on scientific standards
(Edit: I now realize that there are interpretations of Lakatos' theory that assert it leads to relativism. For example, Laudan's book, Science and Relativism, which I'm currently reading, makes such an assertion. I accept some of Laudan's criticisms of Lakatos, and now see certain parts of Lakatos' position as problematic, but I would deny that it leads to relativism.)
September 17, 2015
After the enlightenment, people started to seriously make a distinction that how they distinguished what they really knew from what was really going on around them. The actual knowledge, epistemes, were favored over "opinions" or doxa. The debate that surrounded that distinction amid the turmoil of increasing technology and religious unrest eventually flipped around: doxa became the norm with epistemes being questioned as being attainable. With this flip, after the revolution of special and general relativity, scientific theory became the norm rather than dogmatic scientific truth.
The examination of the flip, and the proper aesthetic form that scientific theory can be generated -- namely via scientific method -- is the subject of inquiry in this short but very very dense book. Lakatos examines how different critiques determine how the line should be drawn, be the line negative through the lack of connection between phenomenon or should it be drawn through what degree of unfitting the phenomenon before we should consider the distinction wrong... the distinction that this piece of theory is justifiably an episteme and not doxa? Lakatos basically asks the question, through scientific inquiry: Can we know anything? And if we can, how can we think we know it (or at least feel justified that this is the best we can do)?
In short, this book is pretty packed with terminology and illustrations of those terminologies. To be clear, Lakatos highlights what moves thinkers and scientists made and perhaps why, and what moves they could have made and what meaning they generated distinguished from the meaning they didn't generate. You can imagine how much thinking, research and effort this must have taken. Lakatos also challenges other thinkers of scientific history, naming how their different explanations of scientific movement falls short, miss-explains theories and massages meanings and histories in service of their pet theory. He also explains how his teacher Popper formulated the scientific method through language rather than classical induction and why we should consider science as being more than formulations in language although Popper disagrees -- that scientific theories are only different consistencies in language (surprisingly much like Deleuze and Guattari's plateaus).
At times, Lakatos also slips into the terminology he uses, applies them to other scientific philosophers, although that is dependent on what other researchers think and find and eventually collaborate as well. Lol.
See, really, how we know things is pretty important, and why we should know one it through one theory vs another theory changes how we can coexist together in the final context, to best get along with one another. This is a sophistication far from what people are taught in school as being what a justifiable belief is. In a way, this book is more philosophical than metaphysics, or doxa or opinions... Lakatos is talking about how we might construct a view of the world around us that is reasonable, the most accurate view. Objects of science are assumed to have an existence and consistency independent of what we observe of them. People are also assumed to have an existence and will independent of what we observe of them. So in a way, this too is applicable to people, although we shouldn't experiment on them. What I mean to point out is that the forms of this book can be worked through a variety of life situations, as a kind of guide to how to understand what is going on. Simultaneously, this kind of deep examination is kind of a paranoia, where we need to look into every detail and possibility while also being a kind of hysteria, where we don't know what we are looking at/for... because of course, we deal with the limits of knowability, making it up as we go along... though if Lakatos is right, we only need to follow his general methods.
Really Lakatos falls into the idealist who believes that we can know everything (a positive maybe for Lakatos)... while he can't do science, or at least doesn't in this volume, he can help smoothen the irregularities of how scientific truth can be found out...through a kind of sophisticated justifiability... so we don't waste our time on distinctions that don't make any knowable difference, such as religion or critical theory... but that's really his opinion or doxa... although he hopes you'll find it to be as solid as an episteme. ;).
The examination of the flip, and the proper aesthetic form that scientific theory can be generated -- namely via scientific method -- is the subject of inquiry in this short but very very dense book. Lakatos examines how different critiques determine how the line should be drawn, be the line negative through the lack of connection between phenomenon or should it be drawn through what degree of unfitting the phenomenon before we should consider the distinction wrong... the distinction that this piece of theory is justifiably an episteme and not doxa? Lakatos basically asks the question, through scientific inquiry: Can we know anything? And if we can, how can we think we know it (or at least feel justified that this is the best we can do)?
In short, this book is pretty packed with terminology and illustrations of those terminologies. To be clear, Lakatos highlights what moves thinkers and scientists made and perhaps why, and what moves they could have made and what meaning they generated distinguished from the meaning they didn't generate. You can imagine how much thinking, research and effort this must have taken. Lakatos also challenges other thinkers of scientific history, naming how their different explanations of scientific movement falls short, miss-explains theories and massages meanings and histories in service of their pet theory. He also explains how his teacher Popper formulated the scientific method through language rather than classical induction and why we should consider science as being more than formulations in language although Popper disagrees -- that scientific theories are only different consistencies in language (surprisingly much like Deleuze and Guattari's plateaus).
At times, Lakatos also slips into the terminology he uses, applies them to other scientific philosophers, although that is dependent on what other researchers think and find and eventually collaborate as well. Lol.
See, really, how we know things is pretty important, and why we should know one it through one theory vs another theory changes how we can coexist together in the final context, to best get along with one another. This is a sophistication far from what people are taught in school as being what a justifiable belief is. In a way, this book is more philosophical than metaphysics, or doxa or opinions... Lakatos is talking about how we might construct a view of the world around us that is reasonable, the most accurate view. Objects of science are assumed to have an existence and consistency independent of what we observe of them. People are also assumed to have an existence and will independent of what we observe of them. So in a way, this too is applicable to people, although we shouldn't experiment on them. What I mean to point out is that the forms of this book can be worked through a variety of life situations, as a kind of guide to how to understand what is going on. Simultaneously, this kind of deep examination is kind of a paranoia, where we need to look into every detail and possibility while also being a kind of hysteria, where we don't know what we are looking at/for... because of course, we deal with the limits of knowability, making it up as we go along... though if Lakatos is right, we only need to follow his general methods.
Really Lakatos falls into the idealist who believes that we can know everything (a positive maybe for Lakatos)... while he can't do science, or at least doesn't in this volume, he can help smoothen the irregularities of how scientific truth can be found out...through a kind of sophisticated justifiability... so we don't waste our time on distinctions that don't make any knowable difference, such as religion or critical theory... but that's really his opinion or doxa... although he hopes you'll find it to be as solid as an episteme. ;).
April 26, 2016
Research by Joaquin Sorolla y Bastida
Reading this book gave me the impression of re-reading Karl Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, or a sequel to it. Lakatos is a student of Popper and the latter's influence on him can be surmised on this book. The title can be misleading as this book is about the philosophy of science, and it synthesizes highlights of history on the development of the physical sciences, how theories are built, replaced or modified, and the surrounding nuances on the scientific establishment.
Whereas the significant differences on the Kuhn-Popper discourse were discussed, Lakatos provides an alternative model by proposing the presence of Scientific Research Programs - which are actually metaphysical in nature and that which guides practitioners on how they carry out their tasks on their respective fields, hence, the fate of theories.
For me, his proposal of Research Programs are part sociopsychological, cultural and part epistemological that enables science practitioners develop theories that build and guide them on their respective specializations. This book is a part of a two-volume series, the second however deals with philosophy of mathematics.
October 9, 2024
ONE OF THE GREATEST PHILOSOPHERS OF SCIENCE OF THE 20TH CENTURY
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) was a Hungarian philosopher of mathematics and science; the companion volume to this book is 'Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Volume 2, Philosophical Papers.'
The Editor’s Introduction states, “When Imre Lakatos died in 1974, many friends and colleagues expressed the hope that his unpublished papers would be made available. Some were also interested in seeing his contributions to journals and conference proceedings collected together in a book… we have prepared two volumes of selected papers which we hope will meet these demands. None of the papers published here for the first time was regarded by Lakatos as entirely satisfactory… Volume 1 is a collection of Lakatos’s best known articles developing the methodology of scientific research programmes…”
He rejects “dogmatic falsificationism” [e.g., Karl Popper]: “For the truth-value of the ‘observational’ propositions cannot be indubitably decided: no factual proposition can ever be proved from an experiment. Propositions can only be derived from other propositions, they cannot be derived from facts; one cannot prove statements from experiences… This is one of the basic points of elementary logic, but one which is understood by relatively few people even today.” (Pg. 15-16)
He then explains “scientific/progressive” explanations: “If we put forward a theory to resolve a contradiction between a previous theory and a counterexample in such a way that the new theory, instead of offering a content-increasing (scientific) explanation, only offers a content-decreasing (linguistic) explanation, the contradiction is resolved in a merely semantical, unscientific way. A given fact is established scientifically only if a new fact is also explained with it. Sophisticated falsificationism thus shifts the problem of how to appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise series of theories. Not an isolated theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to apply the term ‘scientific’ to one single theory is a category mistake.” (Pg. 34)
He observes, “It is very difficult to defeat a research programme supported by talented, imaginative scientists. Alternatively, stubborn defenders of the defeated programme may offer ad hoc explanations of the experiments or a shrewd ad hoc ‘reduction’ of the victorious programme to the defeated one. But such efforts we should reject as unscientific. Our considerations explain why crucial experiments are seen to be crucial only decades later.” (Pg. 72)
He states, “The direction of science is determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by the universe of facts which surrounds us. Creative imagination is likely to find corroborating novel evidence even for the most ‘absurd’ programme, if the search has sufficient drive. This look-out for new confirming evidence is perfectly permissible. Scientists dream up phantasies and then pursue a highly selective hunt for new facts which fit these phantasies. This process may be described as ‘science creating its own universe’… A brilliant school of scholars (backed by a rich society to finance a few well-planned tests) might succeed in pushing any fantastic programme ahead, or, alternatively, if so inclined, in overthrowing any arbitrarily chosen pillar of ‘established knowledge.’” (Pg. 99-100)
He argues, “The methodology of research programmes… must be supplemented by empirical-external history. No rationality theory will ever solve problems like why Mendelian genetics disappeared in Soviet Russia in the 1950s, or why certain schools of research into genetic racial differences or into the economics of foreign aid came into disrepute in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1960s. Moreover, to explain different speeds of development of different research programmes we may need to invoke external history. Rational reconstruction of science … cannot be comprehensive since human beings are not COMPLETELY rational animals; and even when they act rationally they may have a false theory of their own rational actions.” (Pg. 114)
Though far less well-known than Popper or Thomas Kuhn, Lakatos was one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, and his writings are “must reading” for anyone studying the philosophy of science.
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) was a Hungarian philosopher of mathematics and science; the companion volume to this book is 'Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Volume 2, Philosophical Papers.'
The Editor’s Introduction states, “When Imre Lakatos died in 1974, many friends and colleagues expressed the hope that his unpublished papers would be made available. Some were also interested in seeing his contributions to journals and conference proceedings collected together in a book… we have prepared two volumes of selected papers which we hope will meet these demands. None of the papers published here for the first time was regarded by Lakatos as entirely satisfactory… Volume 1 is a collection of Lakatos’s best known articles developing the methodology of scientific research programmes…”
He rejects “dogmatic falsificationism” [e.g., Karl Popper]: “For the truth-value of the ‘observational’ propositions cannot be indubitably decided: no factual proposition can ever be proved from an experiment. Propositions can only be derived from other propositions, they cannot be derived from facts; one cannot prove statements from experiences… This is one of the basic points of elementary logic, but one which is understood by relatively few people even today.” (Pg. 15-16)
He then explains “scientific/progressive” explanations: “If we put forward a theory to resolve a contradiction between a previous theory and a counterexample in such a way that the new theory, instead of offering a content-increasing (scientific) explanation, only offers a content-decreasing (linguistic) explanation, the contradiction is resolved in a merely semantical, unscientific way. A given fact is established scientifically only if a new fact is also explained with it. Sophisticated falsificationism thus shifts the problem of how to appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise series of theories. Not an isolated theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to apply the term ‘scientific’ to one single theory is a category mistake.” (Pg. 34)
He observes, “It is very difficult to defeat a research programme supported by talented, imaginative scientists. Alternatively, stubborn defenders of the defeated programme may offer ad hoc explanations of the experiments or a shrewd ad hoc ‘reduction’ of the victorious programme to the defeated one. But such efforts we should reject as unscientific. Our considerations explain why crucial experiments are seen to be crucial only decades later.” (Pg. 72)
He states, “The direction of science is determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by the universe of facts which surrounds us. Creative imagination is likely to find corroborating novel evidence even for the most ‘absurd’ programme, if the search has sufficient drive. This look-out for new confirming evidence is perfectly permissible. Scientists dream up phantasies and then pursue a highly selective hunt for new facts which fit these phantasies. This process may be described as ‘science creating its own universe’… A brilliant school of scholars (backed by a rich society to finance a few well-planned tests) might succeed in pushing any fantastic programme ahead, or, alternatively, if so inclined, in overthrowing any arbitrarily chosen pillar of ‘established knowledge.’” (Pg. 99-100)
He argues, “The methodology of research programmes… must be supplemented by empirical-external history. No rationality theory will ever solve problems like why Mendelian genetics disappeared in Soviet Russia in the 1950s, or why certain schools of research into genetic racial differences or into the economics of foreign aid came into disrepute in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1960s. Moreover, to explain different speeds of development of different research programmes we may need to invoke external history. Rational reconstruction of science … cannot be comprehensive since human beings are not COMPLETELY rational animals; and even when they act rationally they may have a false theory of their own rational actions.” (Pg. 114)
Though far less well-known than Popper or Thomas Kuhn, Lakatos was one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, and his writings are “must reading” for anyone studying the philosophy of science.
July 6, 2022
I read the 1969-1970ish version of Imre Lakatos’ paper “Falsification and the Methodolgy of Scientific Research Programmes” available for free online at: https://www.csun.edu/~vcsoc00i/classe...
If you have read Popper and Kuhn and feel they have failed to tell the story adequately this paper takes their ideas and moves them forward. So happy I read it.
If you have read Popper and Kuhn and feel they have failed to tell the story adequately this paper takes their ideas and moves them forward. So happy I read it.
June 10, 2024
El libro se compone de trabajos más pequeños, los cuales terminan por completar cada aspecto de la teoría de Lakatos sobre los programas de investigación y el criterio de ciencia que se puede trabajar a través de ellos. El primero de ellos nos sitúa en el centro de la discusión acerca de los criterios de demarcación, exponiendo cual ha sido la progresión de este enfoque a través de las distintas escuelas o teorías que lo han marcado a través del tiempo. De igual manera, expone cuál es la discusión que se estaba presentando en su tiempo, que, sin duda, el exponente que marcó la pauta de la misma fue Popper, seguido por Kuhn y Feyerabend. Estos son los tres autores que más resaltan dentro del tratamiento de la temática de ciencia y la evolución de ésta. Y es desde el comienzo del libro en el que Lakatos termina por fijar su postura como la continuación de la investigación empezada por Popper, por lo que podemos ver cuál era la discusión que éste mantenía con Kuhn y Feyerabend.
Ahora, los criterios del primer ensayo se verán asentado aún más al ponerse en práctica los mismos, como si de una evidencia se tratara, pues Lakatos trata de aplicar su tesis de los programas de investigación dentro de la histografía que, como veremos, es uno de los criterios que se utilizan, en últimas, para demarcar el aspecto de curso racional de la evolución científica de manera diacrónica y retrospectiva. Así, podemos ver que a los falsacionistas les corresponde un método específico de investigación historiográfica; a los escépticos otro y así.
El tratamiento que hace Lakatos al momento de considerar que es ciencia es definido por el enfoque teórico que sobre los objetos se realiza por parte de los científicos; es decir, como estos establecen, a manera de consenso y comunidad, qué es ciencia y que no, definiendo metodologías dentro de programas; de tribunales de decisión. Yo sé que se me podrá decir que es una tergiversación de los postulados de Lakatos, sin embargo, éste es consciente de dicha posición y su falta de tratamiento o de ahondar en tales criterios se releva por el hecho de discutir este aspecto en otros autores, especialmente en Feyerabend. Pese a ello, Lakatos salva esta arbitrariedad a través del principio de racionalidad que debe acompañar la decisión que se tomen dentro de la comunidad científica. Esto que estoy diciendo no está explícitamente tratado en libro, pero se permite asomar una muestra, y de estos es ejemplo el hecho de que Lakatos establezca los criterios de apelación de las hipótesis o teorías que se refutan, pues no solo basta con refutar una teoría para que ésta desaparezca, sino que es necesario para el avance de la ciencia que ésta teoría prevalezca para dar vida a las teorías que se desarrollan dentro de otro programa de investigación.
Como lo hemos mencionado, Lakatos es el file discípulo de Popper, es un continuador de su programa de investigación, en términos de Lakatos, que se erige dentro de los terrenos de la filosofía de la ciencia. Por esta razón, Lakatos resalta que el criterio de demarcación, es decir de la forma en qué algo es ciencia o no, depende de las refutaciones sobre teorías que se vayan acumulando en los anales de la historia, así, podemos explicar cómo pasamos de un modelo ptolemaico a un modelo copernicano, o de un modelo copernicano a un modelo newtoniano.
En resumen, Lakatos manifiesta que los programas de investigación son una serie de teorías que se desarrollan aparejadas y que entre sí interactúan, sin embargo, el programa de investigación se diferencia en el hecho de que éste debe estar compuesto por un centro/núcleo duro, es decir, formado de tesis inamovibles que se deben salvar sobre todo el programa, para lo cual, se debe construir un cinturón de teorías protector. Las teorías que componen el núcleo duro del programa y las teorías que componen el cinturón protector se diferencian en el hecho de su aceptación o no por parte de las convenciones que se generen dentro de la comunidad científica, para lo cual, dentro de ambos procesos, por términos de especialidad, se aplican criterios de demarcación diferentes, siendo las teorías del núcleo mucho más difícil de refutar, pues, como Lakatos nos itera en su trabajo, que en caso de que un fenómeno anómalo contradiga los postulados de éstas teorías, estos fenómenos simplemente son dejados de lado, aguardando el momento en que la teoría los absorba y explique, ya sea que en últimas sean explicadas por teorías ad-hoc. Es fácil, pues, hacer un símil con dichas actuaciones dentro de la comunidad con los procesos judiciales que se establecen para hacer frente a diferentes problemáticas dentro de la vida social, y así, Lakatos refiere que debe existir un tribunal de arbitramiento, para que estas teorías no sean simplemente desechadas, sino que deban persistir y vivir, ya que hacen parte de la heurística que compone al programa.
En ese sentido, se va desarrollando el libro, explicando en casos particulares como funciona un programa de investigación, finalizando, por ello, con la defensa de la teoría de Lakatos frente a las demás que considera son un enfoque que no da cuenta de los fenómenos que se suceden dentro del ámbito de la ciencia.
Uno de los capítulos que más me llamó la atención es el que refiere cómo se dio el tránsito de la teoría ptolemaica a la teoría de Newton, demostrando cuales habían sido las virtudes de éste último y cuales, en últimas, habían sido sus vicisitudes, los cuales salen a la luz de la Historia. Pues, como he manifestado, es en este punto donde podemos ver con mayor claridad la postura de Lakatos en relación a su maestro Popper, en tanto se expresa la máxima de que una teoría nace refutada.
Este libro presenta una herramienta invaluable al momento de hacer frente a esas cuestiones que nos invitan a replantearnos si nos encontramos frente a una teoría del orbe científico o, por el contrario, se trata de mera charlatanería. Considero, por ello, a título personal, que ésta filosofía de la ciencia nos pueda vindicar el hecho de que el psicoanálisis se trata de una verdadera ciencia, así el mismo Lakatos le haya negado tal categoría, pues, a fin de cuentas, éste no conoció el desarrollo ulterior que ésta teoría ha tenido; de igual manera, podemos hablar de una ciencia penal. Para poder arribar a estas conclusiones fantasiosas considero solo se puede llevar a través del método historiográfico que nos expone Lakatos en su obra.
Me sorprende ver la poca recepción de éste trabajo por parte del público, pues si bien podemos echar de menos un análisis sociológico, que lo encontramos en Kuhn por ejemplo, el libro sin duda representa un argumento sólido y digno de análisis por parte del público contemporáneo. Recomendar su lectura resulta redundante, pero si se busca conocer los fundamentos que cimientan la institución científica, su lectura resulta obligatoria, pues nos pone al día de las discusiones que se han dado en torno a este tema tan importante e interesante.
Ahora, los criterios del primer ensayo se verán asentado aún más al ponerse en práctica los mismos, como si de una evidencia se tratara, pues Lakatos trata de aplicar su tesis de los programas de investigación dentro de la histografía que, como veremos, es uno de los criterios que se utilizan, en últimas, para demarcar el aspecto de curso racional de la evolución científica de manera diacrónica y retrospectiva. Así, podemos ver que a los falsacionistas les corresponde un método específico de investigación historiográfica; a los escépticos otro y así.
El tratamiento que hace Lakatos al momento de considerar que es ciencia es definido por el enfoque teórico que sobre los objetos se realiza por parte de los científicos; es decir, como estos establecen, a manera de consenso y comunidad, qué es ciencia y que no, definiendo metodologías dentro de programas; de tribunales de decisión. Yo sé que se me podrá decir que es una tergiversación de los postulados de Lakatos, sin embargo, éste es consciente de dicha posición y su falta de tratamiento o de ahondar en tales criterios se releva por el hecho de discutir este aspecto en otros autores, especialmente en Feyerabend. Pese a ello, Lakatos salva esta arbitrariedad a través del principio de racionalidad que debe acompañar la decisión que se tomen dentro de la comunidad científica. Esto que estoy diciendo no está explícitamente tratado en libro, pero se permite asomar una muestra, y de estos es ejemplo el hecho de que Lakatos establezca los criterios de apelación de las hipótesis o teorías que se refutan, pues no solo basta con refutar una teoría para que ésta desaparezca, sino que es necesario para el avance de la ciencia que ésta teoría prevalezca para dar vida a las teorías que se desarrollan dentro de otro programa de investigación.
Como lo hemos mencionado, Lakatos es el file discípulo de Popper, es un continuador de su programa de investigación, en términos de Lakatos, que se erige dentro de los terrenos de la filosofía de la ciencia. Por esta razón, Lakatos resalta que el criterio de demarcación, es decir de la forma en qué algo es ciencia o no, depende de las refutaciones sobre teorías que se vayan acumulando en los anales de la historia, así, podemos explicar cómo pasamos de un modelo ptolemaico a un modelo copernicano, o de un modelo copernicano a un modelo newtoniano.
En resumen, Lakatos manifiesta que los programas de investigación son una serie de teorías que se desarrollan aparejadas y que entre sí interactúan, sin embargo, el programa de investigación se diferencia en el hecho de que éste debe estar compuesto por un centro/núcleo duro, es decir, formado de tesis inamovibles que se deben salvar sobre todo el programa, para lo cual, se debe construir un cinturón de teorías protector. Las teorías que componen el núcleo duro del programa y las teorías que componen el cinturón protector se diferencian en el hecho de su aceptación o no por parte de las convenciones que se generen dentro de la comunidad científica, para lo cual, dentro de ambos procesos, por términos de especialidad, se aplican criterios de demarcación diferentes, siendo las teorías del núcleo mucho más difícil de refutar, pues, como Lakatos nos itera en su trabajo, que en caso de que un fenómeno anómalo contradiga los postulados de éstas teorías, estos fenómenos simplemente son dejados de lado, aguardando el momento en que la teoría los absorba y explique, ya sea que en últimas sean explicadas por teorías ad-hoc. Es fácil, pues, hacer un símil con dichas actuaciones dentro de la comunidad con los procesos judiciales que se establecen para hacer frente a diferentes problemáticas dentro de la vida social, y así, Lakatos refiere que debe existir un tribunal de arbitramiento, para que estas teorías no sean simplemente desechadas, sino que deban persistir y vivir, ya que hacen parte de la heurística que compone al programa.
En ese sentido, se va desarrollando el libro, explicando en casos particulares como funciona un programa de investigación, finalizando, por ello, con la defensa de la teoría de Lakatos frente a las demás que considera son un enfoque que no da cuenta de los fenómenos que se suceden dentro del ámbito de la ciencia.
Uno de los capítulos que más me llamó la atención es el que refiere cómo se dio el tránsito de la teoría ptolemaica a la teoría de Newton, demostrando cuales habían sido las virtudes de éste último y cuales, en últimas, habían sido sus vicisitudes, los cuales salen a la luz de la Historia. Pues, como he manifestado, es en este punto donde podemos ver con mayor claridad la postura de Lakatos en relación a su maestro Popper, en tanto se expresa la máxima de que una teoría nace refutada.
Este libro presenta una herramienta invaluable al momento de hacer frente a esas cuestiones que nos invitan a replantearnos si nos encontramos frente a una teoría del orbe científico o, por el contrario, se trata de mera charlatanería. Considero, por ello, a título personal, que ésta filosofía de la ciencia nos pueda vindicar el hecho de que el psicoanálisis se trata de una verdadera ciencia, así el mismo Lakatos le haya negado tal categoría, pues, a fin de cuentas, éste no conoció el desarrollo ulterior que ésta teoría ha tenido; de igual manera, podemos hablar de una ciencia penal. Para poder arribar a estas conclusiones fantasiosas considero solo se puede llevar a través del método historiográfico que nos expone Lakatos en su obra.
Me sorprende ver la poca recepción de éste trabajo por parte del público, pues si bien podemos echar de menos un análisis sociológico, que lo encontramos en Kuhn por ejemplo, el libro sin duda representa un argumento sólido y digno de análisis por parte del público contemporáneo. Recomendar su lectura resulta redundante, pero si se busca conocer los fundamentos que cimientan la institución científica, su lectura resulta obligatoria, pues nos pone al día de las discusiones que se han dado en torno a este tema tan importante e interesante.
January 30, 2018
Non è dunque vero che proponiamo una teoria e la natura può gridarci il suo NO; proponiamo, piuttosto, un labirinto di teorie e la natura può gridarci INCOMPATIBILI. (La falsificazione e la metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici - 2. Fallibilismo e falsificazionismo - c) Il falsificazionismo metodologico sofisticato e il falsificazionismo ingenuo. Slittamenti di problema progressivi e regressivi., p.55)
Il testo è un'edizione italiana del primo dei due volumi che raccolgono i saggi più significativi scritti da Lakatos relativamente ai problemi della filosofia della matematica, della scienza e dell'epistemologia.
Lakatos affronta principalmente il dissidio creatosi tra il falsificazionismo di Popper e il fideismo di Kuhn, proponendo come elemento riconciliatore di due teorie così differenti una nuova metodologia: essa assume come base un forte nucleo di teorie, è dotata di un'euristica ben precisa per la risoluzione di anomalie o di slittamenti di problemi, ed è infine circondato da un'ampia cintura protettiva di ipotesi ausiliarie. Molti saggi qui presenti non sono altro che il tentativo da parte di Lakatos di confrontare la propria metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici con le varie concezioni della scienza elaboratesi a partire dal Seicento/Settecento fino a giungere al dibattito moderno iniziato da Popper, da Einstein, da Bohr e da altri epistemologi e scienziati del XX secolo.
All'interno del complesso dibattito sulla ricerca di criteri per stabilire quale conoscenza possa effettivamente definirsi scientifica, Lakatos difende vivacemente la posizione "demarcazionista", la quale separa ciò che è scienza da ciò che invece passa sotto il nome di "pseudo-scienza", elaborando una feroce critica nei confronti dello scetticismo in senso lato, non mancando di lanciare provocanti frecciatine all'amico Feyerabend, il quale sosteneva che lo stesso Lakatos fosse uno spirito anarchico nel suo sentito tentativo di risolvere la scienza in un criterio razionale.
Infatti, a detta di Lakatos, la storia della scienza necessita per forza di una ricostruzione razionale, nonostante al suo interno siano disseminate una serie di episodi in cui la ricerca sembri procedere secondo ipotesi ad hoc, comunque contemplate dai programmi di ricerca ma avverse agli scienziati stessi che le hanno elaborate, oppure secondo intuizioni appartenenti teorie rivali: uno dei saggi, in particolar modo, tenta di ricostruire le ragioni per cui il sistema tolemaico, ad un certo punto, sia stato superato e sostituito da quello copernicano.
Tutti i saggi contenuti in questo volume sono particolarmente interessanti e chiari per l'approccio attento e metodologico adottato dal filosofo nella sua esposizione e permettono anche al lettore neofita di addentrarsi in un dibattito che tutt'oggi non si è esaurito e non ha perso per niente la sua carica attuale. In particolare spicca il brevissimo La responsabilità sociale della scienza, in cui Lakatos sostiene che la scienza debba avere una propria vita interna all'interno della società, e che sia quest'ultima a godere, invece, di una responsabilità cruciale nei confronti della prima. Particolarmente interessante il seguente paragrafo:
I romantici, da Rousseau attraverso Fichte, Coleridge ed Hegel fino a Hitler, Stalin, Sartre, Heidegger e Marcuse hanno visto la scienza con occhi diversi da quelli degli scienziati. Il loro problema non era stabilire quale teoria fosse più vicina alla verità. Hegel pensava che l'inglese Newton avesse pervertito la profonda e ineffabile visione del suo eroe Kepler, il mistico tedesco, forzandola nel letto di Procuste di vuote formule matematiche. Hitler distingueva la scienza tedesca da quella ebrea; non gli sarebbe mai neppure venuto in mente di chiedersi quale fosse più vicina alla verità. Stalin pensava che la scienza proletaria, socialista, fosse superiore a quella borghese: pensava che la scienza borghese servisse la borghesia, e la scienza socialista il proletariato, così mandò i genetisti borghesi a morire nei campi di concentramento.[...] (La responsabilità sociale della scienza, p.318)
Probabilmente Feyerabend vide in Lakatos uno spirito anarchico per via del suo inneggiare ad una scienza libera che progredisse lontana dagli eventi sociali e politici, vicina, invece, a quelli della natura, l'unica che potesse giudicare le teorie degli scienziati. Tuttavia, è necessario sottolineare che il filosofo ungherese vide nella scienza un campo dal sapere fallibile, e per questo propose un metodo che poneva l'accento su questo aspetto: non a caso, ricostruire la storia della scienza equivale a misurarsi con una vera e propria dialettica di dimostrazioni e confutazioni tra programmi di ricerca rivali, oltreché a scontrarsi con la realtà effettiva della natura, la quale è sempre pronta a gridare il suo "INCOMPATIBILI".
Il testo è un'edizione italiana del primo dei due volumi che raccolgono i saggi più significativi scritti da Lakatos relativamente ai problemi della filosofia della matematica, della scienza e dell'epistemologia.
Lakatos affronta principalmente il dissidio creatosi tra il falsificazionismo di Popper e il fideismo di Kuhn, proponendo come elemento riconciliatore di due teorie così differenti una nuova metodologia: essa assume come base un forte nucleo di teorie, è dotata di un'euristica ben precisa per la risoluzione di anomalie o di slittamenti di problemi, ed è infine circondato da un'ampia cintura protettiva di ipotesi ausiliarie. Molti saggi qui presenti non sono altro che il tentativo da parte di Lakatos di confrontare la propria metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici con le varie concezioni della scienza elaboratesi a partire dal Seicento/Settecento fino a giungere al dibattito moderno iniziato da Popper, da Einstein, da Bohr e da altri epistemologi e scienziati del XX secolo.
All'interno del complesso dibattito sulla ricerca di criteri per stabilire quale conoscenza possa effettivamente definirsi scientifica, Lakatos difende vivacemente la posizione "demarcazionista", la quale separa ciò che è scienza da ciò che invece passa sotto il nome di "pseudo-scienza", elaborando una feroce critica nei confronti dello scetticismo in senso lato, non mancando di lanciare provocanti frecciatine all'amico Feyerabend, il quale sosteneva che lo stesso Lakatos fosse uno spirito anarchico nel suo sentito tentativo di risolvere la scienza in un criterio razionale.
Infatti, a detta di Lakatos, la storia della scienza necessita per forza di una ricostruzione razionale, nonostante al suo interno siano disseminate una serie di episodi in cui la ricerca sembri procedere secondo ipotesi ad hoc, comunque contemplate dai programmi di ricerca ma avverse agli scienziati stessi che le hanno elaborate, oppure secondo intuizioni appartenenti teorie rivali: uno dei saggi, in particolar modo, tenta di ricostruire le ragioni per cui il sistema tolemaico, ad un certo punto, sia stato superato e sostituito da quello copernicano.
Tutti i saggi contenuti in questo volume sono particolarmente interessanti e chiari per l'approccio attento e metodologico adottato dal filosofo nella sua esposizione e permettono anche al lettore neofita di addentrarsi in un dibattito che tutt'oggi non si è esaurito e non ha perso per niente la sua carica attuale. In particolare spicca il brevissimo La responsabilità sociale della scienza, in cui Lakatos sostiene che la scienza debba avere una propria vita interna all'interno della società, e che sia quest'ultima a godere, invece, di una responsabilità cruciale nei confronti della prima. Particolarmente interessante il seguente paragrafo:
I romantici, da Rousseau attraverso Fichte, Coleridge ed Hegel fino a Hitler, Stalin, Sartre, Heidegger e Marcuse hanno visto la scienza con occhi diversi da quelli degli scienziati. Il loro problema non era stabilire quale teoria fosse più vicina alla verità. Hegel pensava che l'inglese Newton avesse pervertito la profonda e ineffabile visione del suo eroe Kepler, il mistico tedesco, forzandola nel letto di Procuste di vuote formule matematiche. Hitler distingueva la scienza tedesca da quella ebrea; non gli sarebbe mai neppure venuto in mente di chiedersi quale fosse più vicina alla verità. Stalin pensava che la scienza proletaria, socialista, fosse superiore a quella borghese: pensava che la scienza borghese servisse la borghesia, e la scienza socialista il proletariato, così mandò i genetisti borghesi a morire nei campi di concentramento.[...] (La responsabilità sociale della scienza, p.318)
Probabilmente Feyerabend vide in Lakatos uno spirito anarchico per via del suo inneggiare ad una scienza libera che progredisse lontana dagli eventi sociali e politici, vicina, invece, a quelli della natura, l'unica che potesse giudicare le teorie degli scienziati. Tuttavia, è necessario sottolineare che il filosofo ungherese vide nella scienza un campo dal sapere fallibile, e per questo propose un metodo che poneva l'accento su questo aspetto: non a caso, ricostruire la storia della scienza equivale a misurarsi con una vera e propria dialettica di dimostrazioni e confutazioni tra programmi di ricerca rivali, oltreché a scontrarsi con la realtà effettiva della natura, la quale è sempre pronta a gridare il suo "INCOMPATIBILI".
October 27, 2025
Imre Lakatos – Ein Leben zwischen Revolution und Rationalität
Imre Lakatos wurde am 9. November 1922 in Debrecen geboren – als Imre Lipschitz, in eine ungarisch-jüdische Familie. Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, den er nur knapp überlebte, änderte er seinen Namen zunächst in Molnár, um seine Herkunft zu verbergen, und später in Lakatos (ungarisch für „Schlosser“), um seine Initialen zu wahren. Schon früh verbanden sich in ihm politische Leidenschaft und intellektuelle Neugier. Nach Studien der Mathematik, Physik und Philosophie an der Universität Debrecen schloss er sich kommunistischen Kreisen an – überzeugt davon, dass Wissenschaft und politische Emanzipation ein gemeinsames Ziel teilen könnten.
In den Ereignissen von 1956, der Ungarischen Revolution, engagierte sich Lakatos aktiv auf Seiten der Reformbewegung. Nach der gewaltsamen Niederschlagung durch sowjetische Truppen floh er über Wien nach England. Dort begann eine zweite intellektuelle Existenz – eine, die ihn zu einem der einflussreichsten Wissenschaftstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts machen sollte.
An der University of Cambridge promovierte Lakatos 1961 mit der Arbeit „Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery“ und wurde kurz darauf Professor an der London School of Economics (LSE), wo er in engem Austausch mit Karl Popper stand, dessen Kritischer Rationalismus für ihn zugleich Ausgangspunkt und Gegenstand der Weiterentwicklung wurde. Ebenso prägend war die Begegnung mit George Pólya, dessen Denken über heuristische Prozesse den Grundstein für Lakatos’ eigene Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme legte.
Trotz seiner akademischen Erfolge blieb sein Leben von politischer Ambivalenz gezeichnet. Die britische Regierung verweigerte ihm zweimal die Einbürgerung– ein Nachklang der Verdächtigungen seiner kommunistischen Vergangenheit. Lakatos starb 1974 in London, mit nur 51 Jahren, als Staatenloser, aber mit einem Werk, das die Philosophie der Wissenschaft dauerhaft veränderte. Seine intellektuelle Biographie bleibt die eines Menschen, der zwischen den Extremen von Ideologie und Rationalität, von Revolution und Methode nach einer Form von Erkenntnis suchte, die dem menschlichen Denken selbst gerecht wird.
Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme
Die Philosophischen Schriften Imre Lakatos’ – insbesondere „Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme“ – gehören zu den eindrucksvollsten Beiträgen der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie. In diesem Werk entwickelt Lakatos seine berühmte Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme (MRP) als Alternative sowohl zum klassischen Induktivismus als auch zu den verschiedenen Varianten des Falsifikationismus, insbesondere jenem von Karl Popper, mit dem er über Jahre hinweg im produktiven intellektuellen Austausch stand.
Mit beeindruckender analytischer Schärfe und historischer Sensibilität untersucht Lakatos die Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und Pseudowissenschaft und schlägt eine neue Art rationaler Beurteilung wissenschaftlicher Theorien vor: Nicht die einzelne Hypothese, sondern das Wachstum ganzer Theorienreihen, ihre innere Kohärenz und ihr heuristisches Potenzial, sollen den Maßstab wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts bilden.
Zur Illustration zieht Lakatos exemplarisch die großen Etappen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte heran – von der kopernikanischen Revolution bis hin zu Newtons Einfluss auf die Physik – und macht deutlich, dass sich wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis stets in einem Spannungsfeld von Tradition und Innovation bewegt.
Seine Überlegungen würdigen Popper als einen Wegbereiter kritischen Denkens, gehen jedoch zugleich darüber hinaus: Lakatos gelingt es, eine verfeinerte, dynamische Sicht des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts zu entwerfen, die historische Komplexität mit logischer Strenge verbindet. So steht Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme nicht nur als eine Weiterentwicklung der Popper’schen Philosophie, sondern als ein bleibendes Meisterwerk rationaler Selbstreflexion der Wissenschaft.
Die Aktualität von Lakatos’ Denken
Die bleibende Bedeutung von Lakatos’ Denken zeigt sich vielleicht gerade heute besonders deutlich – in einer Zeit, in der wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis unter dem Druck ökonomischer Interessen, politischer Ideologien und öffentlicher Skepsis steht. Seine Idee, wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt nicht an isolierten Theorien, sondern an der Fruchtbarkeit ganzer Forschungsprogramme zu messen, eröffnet ein tiefes Verständnis für die Dynamik moderner Forschung: für ihr Scheitern, ihre Selbstkorrektur und ihre schöpferische Unruhe.
Persönlich begegnete mir Imre Lakatos zum ersten Mal in jenem monumentalen Werk Wolfgang Stegmüllers, „Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie“. Stegmüller (1923–1991), der unermüdliche Vermittler zwischen angelsächsischer und kontinentaler Philosophie, verstand es, Lakatos’ Denken mit seltener Klarheit zu präsentieren – und zugleich dessen Spannungen und Ambitionen sichtbar zu machen. Erst durch diese Begegnung erschloss sich mir die intellektuelle Radikalität eines Ansatzes, der Wissenschaft nicht als starres Gebäude, sondern als ein offenes System rationaler Revolutionen begreift.
So liest sich „Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme“ auch heute nicht als historisches Dokument, sondern als lebendiger Aufruf zur kritischen Vernunft – ein Plädoyer dafür, dass Fortschritt nur dort möglich ist, wo Theorien sich wandeln dürfen, ohne dass die Idee der Rationalität verloren geht.
Imre Lakatos wurde am 9. November 1922 in Debrecen geboren – als Imre Lipschitz, in eine ungarisch-jüdische Familie. Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, den er nur knapp überlebte, änderte er seinen Namen zunächst in Molnár, um seine Herkunft zu verbergen, und später in Lakatos (ungarisch für „Schlosser“), um seine Initialen zu wahren. Schon früh verbanden sich in ihm politische Leidenschaft und intellektuelle Neugier. Nach Studien der Mathematik, Physik und Philosophie an der Universität Debrecen schloss er sich kommunistischen Kreisen an – überzeugt davon, dass Wissenschaft und politische Emanzipation ein gemeinsames Ziel teilen könnten.
In den Ereignissen von 1956, der Ungarischen Revolution, engagierte sich Lakatos aktiv auf Seiten der Reformbewegung. Nach der gewaltsamen Niederschlagung durch sowjetische Truppen floh er über Wien nach England. Dort begann eine zweite intellektuelle Existenz – eine, die ihn zu einem der einflussreichsten Wissenschaftstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts machen sollte.
An der University of Cambridge promovierte Lakatos 1961 mit der Arbeit „Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery“ und wurde kurz darauf Professor an der London School of Economics (LSE), wo er in engem Austausch mit Karl Popper stand, dessen Kritischer Rationalismus für ihn zugleich Ausgangspunkt und Gegenstand der Weiterentwicklung wurde. Ebenso prägend war die Begegnung mit George Pólya, dessen Denken über heuristische Prozesse den Grundstein für Lakatos’ eigene Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme legte.
Trotz seiner akademischen Erfolge blieb sein Leben von politischer Ambivalenz gezeichnet. Die britische Regierung verweigerte ihm zweimal die Einbürgerung– ein Nachklang der Verdächtigungen seiner kommunistischen Vergangenheit. Lakatos starb 1974 in London, mit nur 51 Jahren, als Staatenloser, aber mit einem Werk, das die Philosophie der Wissenschaft dauerhaft veränderte. Seine intellektuelle Biographie bleibt die eines Menschen, der zwischen den Extremen von Ideologie und Rationalität, von Revolution und Methode nach einer Form von Erkenntnis suchte, die dem menschlichen Denken selbst gerecht wird.
Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme
Die Philosophischen Schriften Imre Lakatos’ – insbesondere „Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme“ – gehören zu den eindrucksvollsten Beiträgen der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie. In diesem Werk entwickelt Lakatos seine berühmte Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme (MRP) als Alternative sowohl zum klassischen Induktivismus als auch zu den verschiedenen Varianten des Falsifikationismus, insbesondere jenem von Karl Popper, mit dem er über Jahre hinweg im produktiven intellektuellen Austausch stand.
Mit beeindruckender analytischer Schärfe und historischer Sensibilität untersucht Lakatos die Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und Pseudowissenschaft und schlägt eine neue Art rationaler Beurteilung wissenschaftlicher Theorien vor: Nicht die einzelne Hypothese, sondern das Wachstum ganzer Theorienreihen, ihre innere Kohärenz und ihr heuristisches Potenzial, sollen den Maßstab wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts bilden.
Zur Illustration zieht Lakatos exemplarisch die großen Etappen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte heran – von der kopernikanischen Revolution bis hin zu Newtons Einfluss auf die Physik – und macht deutlich, dass sich wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis stets in einem Spannungsfeld von Tradition und Innovation bewegt.
Seine Überlegungen würdigen Popper als einen Wegbereiter kritischen Denkens, gehen jedoch zugleich darüber hinaus: Lakatos gelingt es, eine verfeinerte, dynamische Sicht des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts zu entwerfen, die historische Komplexität mit logischer Strenge verbindet. So steht Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme nicht nur als eine Weiterentwicklung der Popper’schen Philosophie, sondern als ein bleibendes Meisterwerk rationaler Selbstreflexion der Wissenschaft.
Die Aktualität von Lakatos’ Denken
Die bleibende Bedeutung von Lakatos’ Denken zeigt sich vielleicht gerade heute besonders deutlich – in einer Zeit, in der wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis unter dem Druck ökonomischer Interessen, politischer Ideologien und öffentlicher Skepsis steht. Seine Idee, wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt nicht an isolierten Theorien, sondern an der Fruchtbarkeit ganzer Forschungsprogramme zu messen, eröffnet ein tiefes Verständnis für die Dynamik moderner Forschung: für ihr Scheitern, ihre Selbstkorrektur und ihre schöpferische Unruhe.
Persönlich begegnete mir Imre Lakatos zum ersten Mal in jenem monumentalen Werk Wolfgang Stegmüllers, „Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie“. Stegmüller (1923–1991), der unermüdliche Vermittler zwischen angelsächsischer und kontinentaler Philosophie, verstand es, Lakatos’ Denken mit seltener Klarheit zu präsentieren – und zugleich dessen Spannungen und Ambitionen sichtbar zu machen. Erst durch diese Begegnung erschloss sich mir die intellektuelle Radikalität eines Ansatzes, der Wissenschaft nicht als starres Gebäude, sondern als ein offenes System rationaler Revolutionen begreift.
So liest sich „Die Methodologie der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramme“ auch heute nicht als historisches Dokument, sondern als lebendiger Aufruf zur kritischen Vernunft – ein Plädoyer dafür, dass Fortschritt nur dort möglich ist, wo Theorien sich wandeln dürfen, ohne dass die Idee der Rationalität verloren geht.
July 9, 2025
【Imre Lakatos / The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes / 1978, Cambridge University Press】
--...the list of 'accepted' falsifiers is provided by the verdict of the experimental scientists. (P24, Chapter 1)
According to Lakatos, that's what Popper was based on. If so, I do not know why he even cared about social sciences, as if he was calling out for experiments on human beings - and even more detailed explanations is dubious, provided Popper thought that social science that can't have "certain well-defined conditions" (P33) can be scientific at all.
This great bending (or flexibility) certainly reminds me of Roland Barthes and Jacque Derrida as well as its focus-less style which mixes the discussions on actual examples, his reflections on them, how history of science took its turns etc.
--'Thorerical pluralism' is better than 'theoretical monism' (P69)
Please be monistic when you write something unless you're Derrida, Barthes or Nietzsche - and don't bring extremely postmodern-sounding "split of an individual" like Popper 0, 1, 2 (Popper 2 is the most sophisticated, PP93-94) or splitting the whole discussion into some categories without actually showing the standard (like four theories of rationality of scientific progress in P118).
I must confess that I skipped the last two rather short essays on Copernicus and Newton: not because I am intellectually dishonest, but because my brain was fried after thinking too much about Popper: he's actually very energy-consuming.
--...the list of 'accepted' falsifiers is provided by the verdict of the experimental scientists. (P24, Chapter 1)
According to Lakatos, that's what Popper was based on. If so, I do not know why he even cared about social sciences, as if he was calling out for experiments on human beings - and even more detailed explanations is dubious, provided Popper thought that social science that can't have "certain well-defined conditions" (P33) can be scientific at all.
This great bending (or flexibility) certainly reminds me of Roland Barthes and Jacque Derrida as well as its focus-less style which mixes the discussions on actual examples, his reflections on them, how history of science took its turns etc.
--'Thorerical pluralism' is better than 'theoretical monism' (P69)
Please be monistic when you write something unless you're Derrida, Barthes or Nietzsche - and don't bring extremely postmodern-sounding "split of an individual" like Popper 0, 1, 2 (Popper 2 is the most sophisticated, PP93-94) or splitting the whole discussion into some categories without actually showing the standard (like four theories of rationality of scientific progress in P118).
I must confess that I skipped the last two rather short essays on Copernicus and Newton: not because I am intellectually dishonest, but because my brain was fried after thinking too much about Popper: he's actually very energy-consuming.
October 13, 2021
Lakatos' wit and brilliance shines though in even the most dense and technical sections of this collection of essays written by him on the Philosophy of Science. His main thesis being that specific theories or notions of paradigms do not adequately explain the actual functioning and history of science, and that science can be better understood as a competition between research programmes in various states of degeneration or progression, with scientific progress being tied to an increase in the novel content of scientific theories and what Lakatos refers to as a "progressive problemshift," or the shifting of a scientific issue towards a higher understanding, without assuming this process will eventually terminate with absolute, unerring Truth.
He is primarily in conversation with Popper and Freyerabend throughout the text, though he cites numerous other philosophers and scientists. It can be said that he deftly moves beyond Popper's falsificationist framework, though it is less certain he adequately answers Freyerabend's critique. It seems to me that Lakatos is generally correct in his reasoning, and his historical and theoretical considerations on Science are of a quality unmatched by anyone else I've read. He has a depth of understanding that should not be ignored, and I highly recommend reading this if you have an interest in the History and/or Philosophy of Science.
He is primarily in conversation with Popper and Freyerabend throughout the text, though he cites numerous other philosophers and scientists. It can be said that he deftly moves beyond Popper's falsificationist framework, though it is less certain he adequately answers Freyerabend's critique. It seems to me that Lakatos is generally correct in his reasoning, and his historical and theoretical considerations on Science are of a quality unmatched by anyone else I've read. He has a depth of understanding that should not be ignored, and I highly recommend reading this if you have an interest in the History and/or Philosophy of Science.
July 29, 2022
This volume contains a quintet of papers by Lakatos covering and applying basic ideas from his account of scientific research programs. The papers are accessible to those without any great amount of background knowledge on the history of science, or even the philosophy of science in the twentieth century -- although one must wade, at least in the first paper, through the variety of contesting historical views which Lakatos distinguishes in order to frame Popper's work.
Lakatos's proposal is a rather sophisticated development on (or alternative to, if you like) Popperian falsificationism, as well as an alternative to those positions developed especially by Kuhn and Feyerabend. Perhaps the only weakness is that Lakatos takes for granted the "problem of induction" as Popper criticized it, in such a way as to overlook the older Aristotelian-Platonist understandings of first principles and induction, which seek to combine dialectic and scientific insight.
Overall, this is valuable work from an astute thinker.
I have no substantial comments on the edition, which was fine; the editorial remarks were generally non-invasive, and one frequently finds clarificatory footnotes directing the reader from otherwise obscure remarks to the germane primary sources.
Lakatos's proposal is a rather sophisticated development on (or alternative to, if you like) Popperian falsificationism, as well as an alternative to those positions developed especially by Kuhn and Feyerabend. Perhaps the only weakness is that Lakatos takes for granted the "problem of induction" as Popper criticized it, in such a way as to overlook the older Aristotelian-Platonist understandings of first principles and induction, which seek to combine dialectic and scientific insight.
Overall, this is valuable work from an astute thinker.
I have no substantial comments on the edition, which was fine; the editorial remarks were generally non-invasive, and one frequently finds clarificatory footnotes directing the reader from otherwise obscure remarks to the germane primary sources.
July 17, 2021
Imre had my undivided attention - at least whenever I had the mental capacity to follow his points. It isn't an easy book because it isn't an easy subject. I gave it a 5 star because he does a phenomenal job at pulling together many interesting elements from the domain of philosophy of science.
If you are interested in a synthesis of Popper's and Kuhn's ideas, this is a great book for that purpose. However, you should not start with Imre if you are just starting to explore this subject, it will overwhelm you from the start. :)
If you are interested in a synthesis of Popper's and Kuhn's ideas, this is a great book for that purpose. However, you should not start with Imre if you are just starting to explore this subject, it will overwhelm you from the start. :)
February 23, 2021
Her ne kadar düşüncelerin geliştirilme yılı bu sırada olmasa da bence Lakatos'un (bu kitabı özelinde) Kuhn ve Feyerabend sonrası ve Popper öncesi okunması bilim felsefesi okuması için en verimli sıra olabilir.
April 3, 2022
After having been introduced to Popper and Kuhn, the way in which Lakatos methodology avoids so many problems of their approaches is truly astonishing.
Sadly, I only had the chance to read about half of the book.
Sadly, I only had the chance to read about half of the book.
June 28, 2023
Lakatos is a bit dogmatic about Popper’s importance and uniqueness, but overall this was a great book! Each chapter was better than the last. He’s a clear writer, provides great historical detail, and asks insightful questions.
August 6, 2024
Un libro esencial para académicos, científicos e investigadores. Lakatos realiza un recorrido crítico por la historia de la ciencia y del conocimiento y culmina con el planteamiento de los programas de investigación científica. No obstante, el libro es denso y debe leerse pausadamente.
February 23, 2016
A dense, but excellent analysis.
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