Overall interesting book, and I feel like it provides a lot of things to really chew on... but I also feel like the latter application of his theological viewpoints on the last part leads something to be desired.
In the first part, I feel like he takes the bull by the horns himself, and engages with the view that religious self-recognition is the recognition of the Bible as a narrative authority, not a moral authority. That narrative comes in the context of the tradition and community that came before it, and the determinations are for genuine interaction. To this extent, the idea of biblical morality was deconstructed in a way which I find fascinating. The 10 Commandments aren't some merely tepid rules to follow, like a checkbook of ethics, rather it is an expression of a historical and narrative respectability in regards to the relationship of the Nation of Israel and God, and eventually God and His Church. He's more in favor of viewing Christianity as something that needs to follow these laws as narrative expressions, with minor expressions of faith being potentially prophecies for great and beautiful things. The importance of "you shall not kill" isn't to argue about what could be construed as killing, but what has the essence of killing, and what lacks the radical turn that Christ gave.
Part of his concern with the way that Liberal democracy is organized is that it is designed upon the sort of post-Hobbesian/Lockean perspective of creating a republic of distrusting individuals, where collective community action is considered to be less beneficial than a distrusting polity. Simultaneously, this de-emphasizes the sin and contempt of the human body of citizens, but also prioritizes self-satisfaction and happiness over full eudaimonic satisfaction. To Hauerwas, the Christian Church should be the first polity that the Christian belongs to, and the ethical action is the expression of "trying to make a world a better place". To him, if we were to make this place on earth the best, then we would be immortal. However, since we are not, there is a emphasis on the spiritual, not in a gnostic sense but in the sense that deaths are currently part of the plan, part of the narrative nature of the church.
This moves into part II: The underlying ethical structures that underlie Christianity some of which that are in some ways incompatible with the basis of liberalism and liberal ethics. Particularly that the only ethics that is justifiable is a universal one, that relies on Kantian frameworks in order to facilitate the considered ethical justifications. Specifically he draws the apparent tension between relativism and deontology, or the idea that there are ethical frameworks upon which the framework of society should be focused on the interactions of duty with individual and collective human behavior. In this way, the ethical frameworks of both relativism and deontology need to make way for a more nuanced eudaimonic perspective. Particularly, Hauerwas isn't entirely convinced but intrigued by MacIntyre's argument that the ethical frameworks for self-sacrifice, for a transcendent rather than a logical good, was only possible under a Christian framework, so it is entirely understandable that Kant was understandably concerned with an ethical framework that is relient on a Classical Theist (read: Ancient Greek philosopher) beliefs.
There is something revolutionary about the way in which the church should interact with ht society, particularly the elements in which the view that the formulation of a universal ethic should sidestep the much greater need for the development of universal community. War and violence, even in the most structured of just-war theories, constitute a view of the society that is pertaining to a certain understanding that the separations of states breaks apart universal human community, community facilitated through the metaphysical church.
To extend the discussion about ethical frameworks, Hauerwas kind of actually tries to revive classical Greek virtue, and particularly the argument that a Christian form of ethics should be most interested in a care-virtue eudaimonic ethic. Morality is a self-feeding process, and the act of being moral induces moral behavior among it's members. The law was given to teach and to guide, not to merely judge even though it became a witness against our sin. Jesus's law came to continue and twist the narrative, not merely be an encouragement.
Finally in Part III he attempts to apply this to modern ethical debates: The family, sex, and abortion.
The ethical and moral construction about society is the facilitation of a consistent ethic surrounding the family. Rather than viewing there to be "permissible" and "impermissible" relationships, the modern culture de-emphasizes social interactions into such a framework that prioritizes autonomy, rather than the moral encouragement, of children. Even the mentality that children are raised to "make good decisions" in life is in fact kind of bizarre. The tendency to flatten the entirety of the ethical discussion into an aspirational of a particular view of what relationships should look like. To this extent, he desires to shift the view of marriage as a virtuous relationship, one to encourage the moral unfolding of all people.
For an ethic of sex, he argues that a cut-and-dry answer of whether or not sexual activity in certain circumstances is allowed or not allowed is too rigid and unhelpful, not taking into account the true needs of the Church or of individuals. To this point, the sexual ethic needs to take into considerations both the "realist" and "romantic" perspective of sexual activity, incorporating both the narrative but also the recognition of the need for communal continuity in marriage.
Finally, a consideration from the perspective of abortion, which he addresses both directly but also using contraception as a consideration. He identifies that there are two avenues in which the arguments surrounding abortion form: First from the perspective of whether or not the fetus should be considered personal or not, and secondly identifying the role of a good parent in the context of abortion. To this point, both camps seem problematic when applying to these two considerations, usually devolving into a more "ritualistic" argument for either side with either the sacredness of parenthood or the freedom of individuals becoming a smokescreen. To this end, he argues that the Christian still needs to start from the perspective that there is a genuine good in the expectation of life but that doesn't justify legislative action, so the christian should advocate for the preservation of fetuses while addressing the concerns.
There's a lot that can be said, but overall: I find the idea of a communitarian-narrative theological approach to ethics rather interesting. I'm still not entirely convinced that he provides a sufficient basis in which to re-establish a sort of narrative virtue ethics, not to mention the question of whether or not a narrative ethical framework is too nominal, meaning that since it only exists as a theoretical construct and thereby may water down the import of such constructions. Given that, I do think that a more 'ecclesiological' approach to ethics is an interesting and helpful approach. That being said, I feel like his attempt to apply it to the various political debates are... less nuanced than desired. I feel like the chapter on sex was ok, but I feel like there's a lack of nuance in both the chapters on family and the discussion surrounding abortion, which I will address the latter first.
The chapter on abortion I feel like had problems, predominantly because I feel like he fell into a dichotomy that there's pro-abortion and anti-abortion views, instead of it being a wider spectrum. Many Christians are pro-life, but there's also many Christian who are pro-choice, and sometimes the same epistemic justification on the basis of hermeneutics is used by both. I wouldn't argue that the addition of a broader addressing of the hermeneutics would undercut his argument, and I do think that his positioning of advocating against abortion while providing the communal support for doing otherwise is a valid theological position, although must also take into consideration the social tensions that may arise in a community of pro-life and pro-choice Christians.
The discussion on family lacks the nuance to address the different forms of family, and how family relationships are complicated, and what constitutes family isn't merely the raising of children in a community. While he recognizes that community involves people who aren't married... It's kind of reductive in its approach, as I would argue there's forms of family which don't conform to a nuclear or extended families, some of which may or may not have children. I feel like the ethics of familial structure changes once you allow for queer-platonic relationships, spiritual friendships, joint families, or a variety of other relationship structures. Direct considerations from queer theology would have benefited this section, even if he disagreed with it.
All in all, I feel like the book was good, and I have a lot to chew on in regards to it, but I do wish he could have addressed the application in a little more detail.