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The Biology of Moral Systems
Despite wide acceptance that the attributes of living creatures have appeared through a cumulative evolutionary process guided chiefly by natural selection, many human activities have seemed analytically inaccessible through such an approach. Prominent evolutionary biologists, for example, have described morality as contrary to the direction of biological evolution, and moral philosophers rarely regard evolution as relevant to their discussions.The Biology of Moral Systems adopts the position that moral questions arise out of conflicts of interest, and that moral systems are ways of using confluences of interest at lower levels of social organization to deal with conflicts of interest at higher levels. Moral systems are described as systems of indirect reciprocity: humans gain and lose socially and reproductively not only by direct transactions, but also by the reputations they gain from the everyday flow of social interactions.The author develops a general theory of human interests, using senescence and effort theory from biology, to help analyze the patterning of human lifetimes. He argues that the ultimate interests of humans are reproductive, and that the concept of morality has arisen within groups because of its contribution to unity in the context, ultimately, of success in intergroup competition. He contends that morality is not easily relatable to universals, and he carries this argument into a discussion of what he calls the greatest of all moral problems, the nuclear arms race.Crammed with sage observations on moral dilemmas and many reasons why an understanding of evolution based on natural selection will advance thinking in finding practical solutions to our most difficult social problems. � Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences Richard D. Alexander is Donald Ward Tinkle Professor of Evolutionary Biology, Department of Biology, and Curator of Insects, Museum of Zoology, University of Michigan. A recipient of numerous awards, Dr. Alexander is the author of Darwinism and Human Affairs.
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First published December 31, 1987
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
August 18, 2017
Alexander proposes a moral-political theory based on evolutionary biology. Our primary task as biological beings, he argues, is to reproduce. From this, all else flows. (1) Our interests are unique because of the deep genetic infusion from maternal and paternal lines. (2) This variability of inborn “interest,” combined with life experience, requires moral, political and religious belief systems to promote and manage self-interest. Groups first consist of kin relationships, but then also include like-minded individuals who support each other through reciprocal relationships to promote a collective self-interest. But groups also involve extensive intra-group competition over resources and mating privileges that are managed through the norms of reciprocity or through a pretend reciprocity that masks deceit. (3)
Faced with global threats, Alexander extends the logic of his theory. We are now forced to see self-interest as part of a planetary interest to prevent mass-scale nuclear devastation. Under what he calls an “everybody-will-lose-big- and –equally” scenario, we realize that it’s in everybody’s interest to work for the collective planetary interest. This is his hope for the species, though he then notes that a “strong element of tragedy will permanently stalk the human species.”
While Alexander relies heavily on kin selection (“inclusive fitness”) that promotes the interest of direct and “collateral” (non-descendent) relations, he accepts this Hamilton (1964) argument without question. But under kin selection, the altruistic promotion of the interest of non-direct descendants (nieces, nephews, cousins) makes less sense than it does for direct-line descendants. Why, genetically, would “care” jump across genetic lines? And if the gene is the unit of selection, sibling rivalry (competition for support, attention) makes just as much sense as kin-based altruism since survival occurs under both scenarios. (4) Also, kin selection doesn’t explain why adoption of non-kin is common and works. Most importantly, as kin selection does not apply to the clearly evident other-regarding behavior among non-kin, evolutionary theorists beginning with Trivers (1971) have to import “reciprocal altruism,” which is a whole different dynamic since it involves non-kin. (5)
This raises the issue of whether, aside from direct parent-child relationships, kin selection is necessary to explain altruistic behavior and whether there are alternative explanations. For example, could the “nurturing” capacities in parent-child relationships extend not only to the adoption of non-kin but also to group members? Isn’t this seen with the emotions of sympathy, empathy and love, which all exhibit the affective force of mutual attachment that, from an evolutionary perspective, is (and still is) essential for group solidarity and the tribalism that Darwin saw? (6) Also, and consistent with Alexander’s comments about the individual’s uniqueness, a good many people who do not operate in this nurturing way (especially within larger group settings) abide by the rules of reciprocal altruism along the lines of what Alexander suggests: we support others because this is necessary if we are to receive support (and survival benefits) in return. This support, in other words, is given not out of attachment, but because it is useful. (7)
Alexander’s writing style is heavy. His paragraphs are long and thick. The clarity of his argument would benefit from editing. I did not understand his “senescence theory” (why we die) and its relevance to his overall argument.
(1) “In terms of evolutionary history,” Alexander writes, “the ultimate interests of organisms, including humans, are in maximizing the likelihood of survival of their genetic materials through reproduction…” Later he adds that “it is always true that the cumulative history of natural selection continues to influence our actions by the set of genes it has provided humanity. Our learning biases and emotional responses, for example, are not random or manufactured from thin air; they are the products of the unbroken process of evolution by natural selection that extends across the whole of history, into our pre-human past, and millions of years before that.” Having said this, Alexander later clarifies: “To say that we are evolved to serve the interests of our genes in no way suggests that we are obliged to serve them.”
(2) He refers to “genetic individuality” that results in “individuality of interests” and writes that “in sexually reproducing organisms like ourselves conflicts of interest arise and exist because of histories of genetic individuality….”
(3) We become “atoms of sociality” and the tension implicit in this terminology between individual interest and group life is evident. Reciprocity is less than pure; it is utilitarian or pretend. Alexander proposes that consciousness arose to escape the obligations of reciprocity through deceit and to detect deceptive behavior among competitors: “Consciousness…is a game of life in which the participants are trying to comprehend what is in one another’s minds before, and more effectively than, it can be done in reverse. This is the reason for the great significance of time, foresight, and planning in human activities, and for the bringing of time-related and –sequenced activities into consciousness.”
(4) Replication and survival benefits occur for both cooperation and cooperation. Dies this suggest that the twin poles of human behavior seen throughout history and everything in between, have a genetic origin?
(5) Humans “incidentally acquired reciprocal altruism,” Alexander writes, which is an odd, off-hand way to refer to something so central to his theory.
(6) The group becomes a form of Dawkins’ extended phenotype (though Dawkins might not see it this way) as being part of a group was essential for the individual’s survival.
(7) The social relationships are utilitarian. The bigger issue here, though, is that there’s not one human nature but a variable human nature. On this point, within a single individual or among all humans, Alexander writes that, “In light of the biological separation of lifetimes into somatic and reproductive effort, it is curious that moral philosophers’ views of moral behavior usually require either 100% selfishness or 100% altruism but scarcely every combinations of the two….The reason seems to be the view that consistency is required in moral behavior (i.e., to be moral one must advocate for himself only those rights and privileges he will advocate equally strongly for all others), and a dual human nature (i.e., involving both egoistic and altruistic tendencies or acts) has inconsistency built into it.” Alexander references Michael Ruse’s “four possible kinds of people in respect to sociality,” which outlines four broad types of human nature: “the brazen cheater or open egoist;” the “sneaky cheater (insincere altruist);” the “honorable egoist” who acknowledges rules but “knowingly operates to serve his own ends;” and “ the self-professed altruist…whose life is largely or wholly concerned with serving others.”
Faced with global threats, Alexander extends the logic of his theory. We are now forced to see self-interest as part of a planetary interest to prevent mass-scale nuclear devastation. Under what he calls an “everybody-will-lose-big- and –equally” scenario, we realize that it’s in everybody’s interest to work for the collective planetary interest. This is his hope for the species, though he then notes that a “strong element of tragedy will permanently stalk the human species.”
While Alexander relies heavily on kin selection (“inclusive fitness”) that promotes the interest of direct and “collateral” (non-descendent) relations, he accepts this Hamilton (1964) argument without question. But under kin selection, the altruistic promotion of the interest of non-direct descendants (nieces, nephews, cousins) makes less sense than it does for direct-line descendants. Why, genetically, would “care” jump across genetic lines? And if the gene is the unit of selection, sibling rivalry (competition for support, attention) makes just as much sense as kin-based altruism since survival occurs under both scenarios. (4) Also, kin selection doesn’t explain why adoption of non-kin is common and works. Most importantly, as kin selection does not apply to the clearly evident other-regarding behavior among non-kin, evolutionary theorists beginning with Trivers (1971) have to import “reciprocal altruism,” which is a whole different dynamic since it involves non-kin. (5)
This raises the issue of whether, aside from direct parent-child relationships, kin selection is necessary to explain altruistic behavior and whether there are alternative explanations. For example, could the “nurturing” capacities in parent-child relationships extend not only to the adoption of non-kin but also to group members? Isn’t this seen with the emotions of sympathy, empathy and love, which all exhibit the affective force of mutual attachment that, from an evolutionary perspective, is (and still is) essential for group solidarity and the tribalism that Darwin saw? (6) Also, and consistent with Alexander’s comments about the individual’s uniqueness, a good many people who do not operate in this nurturing way (especially within larger group settings) abide by the rules of reciprocal altruism along the lines of what Alexander suggests: we support others because this is necessary if we are to receive support (and survival benefits) in return. This support, in other words, is given not out of attachment, but because it is useful. (7)
Alexander’s writing style is heavy. His paragraphs are long and thick. The clarity of his argument would benefit from editing. I did not understand his “senescence theory” (why we die) and its relevance to his overall argument.
(1) “In terms of evolutionary history,” Alexander writes, “the ultimate interests of organisms, including humans, are in maximizing the likelihood of survival of their genetic materials through reproduction…” Later he adds that “it is always true that the cumulative history of natural selection continues to influence our actions by the set of genes it has provided humanity. Our learning biases and emotional responses, for example, are not random or manufactured from thin air; they are the products of the unbroken process of evolution by natural selection that extends across the whole of history, into our pre-human past, and millions of years before that.” Having said this, Alexander later clarifies: “To say that we are evolved to serve the interests of our genes in no way suggests that we are obliged to serve them.”
(2) He refers to “genetic individuality” that results in “individuality of interests” and writes that “in sexually reproducing organisms like ourselves conflicts of interest arise and exist because of histories of genetic individuality….”
(3) We become “atoms of sociality” and the tension implicit in this terminology between individual interest and group life is evident. Reciprocity is less than pure; it is utilitarian or pretend. Alexander proposes that consciousness arose to escape the obligations of reciprocity through deceit and to detect deceptive behavior among competitors: “Consciousness…is a game of life in which the participants are trying to comprehend what is in one another’s minds before, and more effectively than, it can be done in reverse. This is the reason for the great significance of time, foresight, and planning in human activities, and for the bringing of time-related and –sequenced activities into consciousness.”
(4) Replication and survival benefits occur for both cooperation and cooperation. Dies this suggest that the twin poles of human behavior seen throughout history and everything in between, have a genetic origin?
(5) Humans “incidentally acquired reciprocal altruism,” Alexander writes, which is an odd, off-hand way to refer to something so central to his theory.
(6) The group becomes a form of Dawkins’ extended phenotype (though Dawkins might not see it this way) as being part of a group was essential for the individual’s survival.
(7) The social relationships are utilitarian. The bigger issue here, though, is that there’s not one human nature but a variable human nature. On this point, within a single individual or among all humans, Alexander writes that, “In light of the biological separation of lifetimes into somatic and reproductive effort, it is curious that moral philosophers’ views of moral behavior usually require either 100% selfishness or 100% altruism but scarcely every combinations of the two….The reason seems to be the view that consistency is required in moral behavior (i.e., to be moral one must advocate for himself only those rights and privileges he will advocate equally strongly for all others), and a dual human nature (i.e., involving both egoistic and altruistic tendencies or acts) has inconsistency built into it.” Alexander references Michael Ruse’s “four possible kinds of people in respect to sociality,” which outlines four broad types of human nature: “the brazen cheater or open egoist;” the “sneaky cheater (insincere altruist);” the “honorable egoist” who acknowledges rules but “knowingly operates to serve his own ends;” and “ the self-professed altruist…whose life is largely or wholly concerned with serving others.”
August 10, 2010
For what this does, it does it pretty well. . . . Alexander is a respected evolutionary theorist. Those, of course, who dispute that evolutionary theory is (a) valid or (b) applicable to humans probably won't be interested in this volume. For those who are interested in the possible linkage of evolution and moral systems, this is a thought provoking work. Whether or not one agree with Alexander, the work does spark question s about how evolution may have shaped moral behavior.
December 5, 2020
Discusses common evolutionary biology/psychology topics and applies them to moral issues. Proposes that morals arise due to conflicts of interest. Emphasizes the threat of nuclear armageddon.
notable
October 25, 2021Maybe, morality is evolving human behavior for its own purposes?
October 14, 2016
The second half of the book I did not find to be as great as the first half - some parts of the second half seem a little bit dated, and I in particular disliked Alexander's repeated assertions in the last chapters that nuclear war c/would lead to human extinction, rather than some more plausible and less severe, yet still terrible, outcomes - but despite this fact there's no way I'm not giving this book five stars; I guess in a way Alexander had in my mind earned that rating already by the time I'd read the first 100 pages or so of the book. It's a book full of great stuff, and definitely a must-read to anyone interested in the origins of human morality and related topics. It takes a while to read, but this is time well-spent.
December 26, 2007
I must come forward and admit that I have not read this book - rather I have read Alexander's Essay "How Did Humans Evolve: Reflections on a Uniquely Unique Species" in which many of his same beliefs and ideas were summarized. In short, he states that humans began to co-operate to give us an edge in competing with each other. The co-evolution of these two forces caused our quick evolution and led us to where we are today. It seems like his book would have more moral implcations and would flesh out his ideas very nicely. However, if the book is as dry as his essay, it might not be worth the read.
Read
May 26, 2019Theodore Beale said that he really "appreciate[s] the thinking that Camille Paglia uses to arrive at the wrong answers". I don't think this is quite there, but it's definitely in the neighborhood.
There's something about the end that I think was wonky. He said things that made sense for a great deal of the book, then in the last chapter things got pretty silly. It zooms over into a space between Santa Barbara School EP, and Hayek, which I think everyone can agree is undesirable.
For the most part, I think it's a swell book, though.
There's something about the end that I think was wonky. He said things that made sense for a great deal of the book, then in the last chapter things got pretty silly. It zooms over into a space between Santa Barbara School EP, and Hayek, which I think everyone can agree is undesirable.
For the most part, I think it's a swell book, though.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews