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Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare
Germany's 1941 seizure of Yugoslavia led to an insurgency as bloody as any in World War II. The Wehrmacht waged a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in response, and by 1943 German troops in Yugoslavia were engaged in operations that ranked among the largest of the entire European war. Their actions encompassed massive reprisal shootings, the destruction of entire villages, and huge mobile operations unleashed not just against insurgents but also against the civilian population believed to be aiding them. Terror in the Balkans explores the reasons behind the Wehrmacht's extreme security measures in southern and eastern Europe.
Ben Shepherd focuses his study not on the high-ranking generals who oversaw the campaign but on lower-level units and their officers, a disproportionate number of whom were of Austrian origin. He uses Austro-Hungarian army records to consider how the personal experiences of many Austrian officers during the Great War played a role in brutalizing their behavior in Yugoslavia. A comparison of Wehrmacht counter-insurgency divisions allows Shepherd to analyze how a range of midlevel commanders and their units conducted themselves in different parts of Yugoslavia, and why. Shepherd concludes that the Wehrmacht campaign's violence was driven not just by National Socialist ideology but also by experience of the fratricidal infighting of Yugoslavia's ethnic groups, by conditions on the ground, and by doctrines that had shaped the military mindsets of both Germany and Austria since the late nineteenth century. He also considers why different Wehrmacht units exhibited different degrees of ruthlessness and restraint during the campaign.
Ben Shepherd focuses his study not on the high-ranking generals who oversaw the campaign but on lower-level units and their officers, a disproportionate number of whom were of Austrian origin. He uses Austro-Hungarian army records to consider how the personal experiences of many Austrian officers during the Great War played a role in brutalizing their behavior in Yugoslavia. A comparison of Wehrmacht counter-insurgency divisions allows Shepherd to analyze how a range of midlevel commanders and their units conducted themselves in different parts of Yugoslavia, and why. Shepherd concludes that the Wehrmacht campaign's violence was driven not just by National Socialist ideology but also by experience of the fratricidal infighting of Yugoslavia's ethnic groups, by conditions on the ground, and by doctrines that had shaped the military mindsets of both Germany and Austria since the late nineteenth century. He also considers why different Wehrmacht units exhibited different degrees of ruthlessness and restraint during the campaign.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published April 13, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 9, 2018
This is a well written study examining the behaviour of the German occupation troops in troops in the former Yugoslavia in WW2. The levels of violence and savagery were much more aligned with the Eastern Front than other theatres’ in Europe. An example is the original army instruction that 100 civilians were to be executed for every German death and 50 civilians were to be executed for every German injured.
Firstly the author compares the behaviour of the German divisions involved. This is possible as the bulk of the occupation troops coming from the divisions of the same wave. Therefore they were very similarly equipped and trained. Despite this at times the divisions behaved very differently with naturally different results. So then he looked at the tying the divisional behaviour to the division commanders at the time and here there was quite a lot of correlation. Basically if the division commanders were from Austria and/or had most of their experience only on the Eastern front in WW1 then they would act more brutally towards the civilian population. Outside of the influence of the divisional commander additional factors that indicated more violent behaviour was lower training, lower combat strength and greater personal sense of risk.
Apart from personal accounts where reprisals were reported, he uses casualty and arms recovery data to indicate where the casualties reported were more likely to be due to reprisals against the population. For example, if the German reported partisan casualties were many times greater than their own then there was likely to be civilian reprisals included in the partisan casualty reports. This was even more likely where the Germans were not able to recover small arms from the battlefield in proportion with the partisan casualties. If they partisans were unarmed then they were in all probability not partisans at the time of death.
The author emphasises that this study is indicative but given it’s small sample size it is not the final answer in this area. However it is a very interesting read and a good addition to what drove the often barbaric actions of German occupational forces
4.5 stars
Firstly the author compares the behaviour of the German divisions involved. This is possible as the bulk of the occupation troops coming from the divisions of the same wave. Therefore they were very similarly equipped and trained. Despite this at times the divisions behaved very differently with naturally different results. So then he looked at the tying the divisional behaviour to the division commanders at the time and here there was quite a lot of correlation. Basically if the division commanders were from Austria and/or had most of their experience only on the Eastern front in WW1 then they would act more brutally towards the civilian population. Outside of the influence of the divisional commander additional factors that indicated more violent behaviour was lower training, lower combat strength and greater personal sense of risk.
Apart from personal accounts where reprisals were reported, he uses casualty and arms recovery data to indicate where the casualties reported were more likely to be due to reprisals against the population. For example, if the German reported partisan casualties were many times greater than their own then there was likely to be civilian reprisals included in the partisan casualty reports. This was even more likely where the Germans were not able to recover small arms from the battlefield in proportion with the partisan casualties. If they partisans were unarmed then they were in all probability not partisans at the time of death.
The author emphasises that this study is indicative but given it’s small sample size it is not the final answer in this area. However it is a very interesting read and a good addition to what drove the often barbaric actions of German occupational forces
4.5 stars
May 25, 2019
Very interesting read from a counterinsurgency standpoint. It's not so much a linear narrative of partisan warfare in Yugoslavia, but rather a unit-by-unit examination of six German infantry divisions involve in the initial occupation, and subsequent counterinsurgency against Tito's partisans, and the Chetniks.
His main focus is on whether the Germans engaged in hard-edged terror, or employed a softer touch, and how that played out. He posits that a lot depended on the division commander, and he points out that either those who were Austrian (with prior antagonisms, esp toward the Serbs), and/or experience on the Eastern Front in WW1 tended to orient them to brutal reprisals. Interesting theory as far as it goes, but he also admits there were a number of other contributing factors.
If you're interested in Wehrmacht experiences in irregular warfare, or the complex ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, and still more complicated military factions of WW2, namely the Germans, Italians, NDH Croatian regulars, Ustasha paramilitaries, Chetniks, and Tito's Partisans. Well written and strongly recommended if this piques your fancy.
His main focus is on whether the Germans engaged in hard-edged terror, or employed a softer touch, and how that played out. He posits that a lot depended on the division commander, and he points out that either those who were Austrian (with prior antagonisms, esp toward the Serbs), and/or experience on the Eastern Front in WW1 tended to orient them to brutal reprisals. Interesting theory as far as it goes, but he also admits there were a number of other contributing factors.
If you're interested in Wehrmacht experiences in irregular warfare, or the complex ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, and still more complicated military factions of WW2, namely the Germans, Italians, NDH Croatian regulars, Ustasha paramilitaries, Chetniks, and Tito's Partisans. Well written and strongly recommended if this piques your fancy.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews