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Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology
How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More recently, however, they have also increasingly turned their attention to psychological connections between causal and counterfactual understanding or reasoning. At the same time, there has been a surge in interest in empirical work on causal and counterfactual cognition amongst developmental, cognitive, and social psychologists--much of it inspired by work in philosophy. In this volume, twelve original contributions from leading philosophers and psychologists explore in detail what bearing empirical findings might have on philosophical concerns about counterfactuals and causation, and how, in turn, work in philosophy might help clarify the issues at stake in empirical work on the cognitive underpinnings of, and relationships between, causal and counterfactual thought.
- GenresPhilosophyPsychology
288 pages, Paperback
First published October 27, 2011
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September 13, 2018
In Other Worlds
If one begins with the claim that A is the cause of B and takes this for a fact, then a counterfactual is the opposite: if A had not occurred, then B would not have resulted. A common example is the belief that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Serbian Nationalists led to the First World War. The counterfactual states that without the assassination there would have been no war. The observation that this type of statement is highly arguable provides a rich framework to explore. What is remarkable is that much of this research is so recent, and it's what this collection of 13 essays is about.
Philosophers look at the world and attempt to explain. The psychologists are intrigued with the explainers. The book contains papers from both groups, and some manage to bridge both fields. Most of the psychologist root their approach with a brief chapter (pp201-208) titled "The Simulation Heuristic" from the 1982 book Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases by Kahneman and Tverski which characterizes counterfactuals as a mental play applied as a test of the initial hypothesis of causality, whereas the philosophers in the group focus on the book Counterfactuals by David K. Lewis. (I found a copy and looked it over - somewhat dry and too much use of symbolic notation to struggle through). Another common reference was to the writings of David R. Mandel and for a taste he's also the author of Chapter 7.
For developmental psychologist experimental results show that the ability to use counterfactuals occur very early in life, around age 3 or 4. Some of the writers probe how counterfactuals affect emotions. Near misses tend to evoke greater regret - Olympic Bronze medalists tend to be happy as their counterfactual visions consider the difference between not placing at all vs silver, whereas the alternities for Silver are Bronze, which is nearly the same and the glorious position of being first with Gold. (pp176) Similarly when subjects were presented with situations with the same outcomes, such as having an accident, they rated the situation having greater regret if the victim had taken an unusual route rather than if they had taken the regular route - the irregularity more likely to be seen as the cause. Children could employ counterfactual emotions in themselves, but empathy for similar emotions in others waited until age 7.
Between philosophers there is some controversy as to whether speculations over things that haven't happened yet (future hypotheticals) qualify as counterfactual enough. Over generation of alternate hypotheses also muddy the field - what if Ferdinand had been killed at a different time, or by Croatians, Russians or Turks, or if he had been killed by a knife or a banana peel put in his path - there are an infinite number of causes that are entirely similar, but they do not invalidate the premise. Nor are low probability causes (he was killed by aliens) or results (he had a miraculous recovery) worthy of consideration. Counterfactuals also have to be seen as controllable - a discarded cigarette may be the cause of a fire, the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere, while necessary, is not (pp179). We do reduce causes to classes of causes (the ArchDuke was killed by a adversarial group - we don't care how, who or precisely when), but the usable counterfactual if not a polar opposite has an entirely different saliency wrt normal events. Counterfactuals also require a priori an understanding of causality. Dorothy Eddington points out (pp234) - one of the problems in dealing with causality is the difficulty of distinguishing laws-like behaviour from incidental generalizations.
Many of the observations are just plain fun. In Sobel's Ch 6 we learn from Slolnick and Bloom (2006) that children are able to distinguish between fictional worlds: They know Batman knows that Spongebob is a fictional character, and vice versa, but Squidbert is as real to Spongebob as Robin and the Joker are real to Bruce Wayne. This breaking of the 4th wall may also contribute to our fascination with literary crossovers, which are themselves counterfactuals. Other entertaining aspects of the book are the various scenarios where subjects were asked to use counterfactuals to determine causes, such as the case of a crime figure who was given a slow acting poison by one assassin, but who's car was rammed off a cliff by another. (pp157).
A very well written and informative read but highly academic. Often there's quick but unexpanded references to other papers but this would be expected by the target audience of upper level university students who will find this an excellent resource for essays and understanding the related issues, teachers and those with a very strong interest in cognitive psychology or the philosophy of logic and knowledge. With these caveats in mind, it's quite recommendable.
If one begins with the claim that A is the cause of B and takes this for a fact, then a counterfactual is the opposite: if A had not occurred, then B would not have resulted. A common example is the belief that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Serbian Nationalists led to the First World War. The counterfactual states that without the assassination there would have been no war. The observation that this type of statement is highly arguable provides a rich framework to explore. What is remarkable is that much of this research is so recent, and it's what this collection of 13 essays is about.
Philosophers look at the world and attempt to explain. The psychologists are intrigued with the explainers. The book contains papers from both groups, and some manage to bridge both fields. Most of the psychologist root their approach with a brief chapter (pp201-208) titled "The Simulation Heuristic" from the 1982 book Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases by Kahneman and Tverski which characterizes counterfactuals as a mental play applied as a test of the initial hypothesis of causality, whereas the philosophers in the group focus on the book Counterfactuals by David K. Lewis. (I found a copy and looked it over - somewhat dry and too much use of symbolic notation to struggle through). Another common reference was to the writings of David R. Mandel and for a taste he's also the author of Chapter 7.
For developmental psychologist experimental results show that the ability to use counterfactuals occur very early in life, around age 3 or 4. Some of the writers probe how counterfactuals affect emotions. Near misses tend to evoke greater regret - Olympic Bronze medalists tend to be happy as their counterfactual visions consider the difference between not placing at all vs silver, whereas the alternities for Silver are Bronze, which is nearly the same and the glorious position of being first with Gold. (pp176) Similarly when subjects were presented with situations with the same outcomes, such as having an accident, they rated the situation having greater regret if the victim had taken an unusual route rather than if they had taken the regular route - the irregularity more likely to be seen as the cause. Children could employ counterfactual emotions in themselves, but empathy for similar emotions in others waited until age 7.
Between philosophers there is some controversy as to whether speculations over things that haven't happened yet (future hypotheticals) qualify as counterfactual enough. Over generation of alternate hypotheses also muddy the field - what if Ferdinand had been killed at a different time, or by Croatians, Russians or Turks, or if he had been killed by a knife or a banana peel put in his path - there are an infinite number of causes that are entirely similar, but they do not invalidate the premise. Nor are low probability causes (he was killed by aliens) or results (he had a miraculous recovery) worthy of consideration. Counterfactuals also have to be seen as controllable - a discarded cigarette may be the cause of a fire, the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere, while necessary, is not (pp179). We do reduce causes to classes of causes (the ArchDuke was killed by a adversarial group - we don't care how, who or precisely when), but the usable counterfactual if not a polar opposite has an entirely different saliency wrt normal events. Counterfactuals also require a priori an understanding of causality. Dorothy Eddington points out (pp234) - one of the problems in dealing with causality is the difficulty of distinguishing laws-like behaviour from incidental generalizations.
Many of the observations are just plain fun. In Sobel's Ch 6 we learn from Slolnick and Bloom (2006) that children are able to distinguish between fictional worlds: They know Batman knows that Spongebob is a fictional character, and vice versa, but Squidbert is as real to Spongebob as Robin and the Joker are real to Bruce Wayne. This breaking of the 4th wall may also contribute to our fascination with literary crossovers, which are themselves counterfactuals. Other entertaining aspects of the book are the various scenarios where subjects were asked to use counterfactuals to determine causes, such as the case of a crime figure who was given a slow acting poison by one assassin, but who's car was rammed off a cliff by another. (pp157).
A very well written and informative read but highly academic. Often there's quick but unexpanded references to other papers but this would be expected by the target audience of upper level university students who will find this an excellent resource for essays and understanding the related issues, teachers and those with a very strong interest in cognitive psychology or the philosophy of logic and knowledge. With these caveats in mind, it's quite recommendable.
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