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The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan
This is the first systematic, historical inquiry into the emergence of "victim consciousness" (higaisha ishiki) as an essential component of Japanese pacifist national identity after World War II. In his meticulously crafted narrative and analysis, the author reveals how postwar Japanese elites and American occupying authorities collaborated to structure the parameters of remembrance of the war, including the notion that the emperor and his people had been betrayed and duped by militarists. He goes on to explain the Japanese reliance on victim consciousness through a discussion of the ban-the-bomb movement of the mid-1950s, which raised the prominence of Hiroshima as an archetype of war victimhood and brought about the selective focus on Japanese war victimhood; the political strategies of three self-defined war victim groups (A-bomb victims, repatriates, and dispossessed landlords) to gain state compensation and hence valorization of their war victim experiences; shifting textbook narratives that reflected contemporary attitudes and structured future generations' understanding of the war; and three classic antiwar novels and films that contributed to the shaping of a "sentimental humanism" that continues to leave a strong imprint on the collective Japanese conscience.
280 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 8, 2024
i've been reading so many books about postwar japan that they're all melding into one big pot of goo in my head. i liked the chapter about hiroshima
July 19, 2022
Orr’s central argument in VaH is that Japan was able to largely avoid a sense of collective, as well as individual, responsibility for its aggression in what it calls The Great Pacific War (1937-1945) by claiming its people were the victims of military and/or corporate manipulations. Furthermore, this sense of victimhood was underscored because of the tremendous suffering endured from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In developing this ideology the middle level leaders and bureaucrats responsible for implementing the aggression which the country unleashed against its Asian neighbors, the USA, and such European countries as the UK, Netherlands, etc could evade any sense of guilt for their actions. And the populace in general did not have to acknowledge responsibility for their complicity with, let alone their open support for, these policies.
The author accomplished his goals in this book in a manner one would like to see in a scholarly approach to a topic. First, with 57 pages of notes, some of which are annotated, and a 14 page bibliography he relied on a wide array of primary and secondary Japanese and English language sources. The timely insertion of quotations from these sources often elaborated nicely on the point he was trying to make about an issue.
Second, Orr organized the book quite well. Chapters covered an array of separate topics to demonstrate how the sense of victimhood was communicated and reinforced in Japanese society in the post war years. These included the strategy of the American Occupation to focus on a handful of upper level leaders in the Tokyo War Crimes trials while absolving the Emperor of any responsibility. Or how the tragic consequences of the atomic bombings underscored the country’s perceptions of its having been a victim. How the war was taught via school textbooks and its depiction in fiction and film after the War were also covered in separate chapters. Finally, a chapter on the compensation of Japanese landlords and of people who repatriated from Asia after the War rounded out his presentation. Dividing most of the chapters into sections also assisted its organization.
Third, the author’s prose was largely direct and thus readable. When he used Japanese language vocabulary to try to provide a nuanced description of the mindset which the post war government and many Japanese scholars had about the War, he readily provided English translations.
VaH had some flaws, however. The chapter on school textbooks attempted to provide an overview of how these were shaped, actually censored, by the central government to meet its goal of endorsing an ideology of victimhood. In trying to cover a great deal of material this discussion was so general as to be of less value than I would have wished.
In the concluding chapter Orr briefly noted that some recognition of the trauma inflicted on so called ‘comfort women’ (Korean, Taiwanese, and other Asian sex slaves) was finally expressed by Japanese government officials in the early 1990’s. He also disclosed that these officials even offered an apology to Korea for its actions in this regard. But there was much more to this in the 90’s than Orr presented. More specifically, there were a handful of apologies and an acknowledgment that the women had been coerced into this ‘service.’ More conservative politicians strenuously objected to these efforts by their more moderate (and humane, IMHO) peers. This deficit in the book reflected something more general which Orr did not present: the impact which Japan’s emphasis on its own victimhood has had on its relations with its Asian neighbors. At the time of VaH’s publication in 2001 South Korea and China both still had tremendous resentments against Japan for its refusal to acknowledge its perpetration of wartime aggression against their civilian populations. Japan’s relations with these two countries still flounder today in important respects because of what these two neighbors call its ‘history problems.’
For those readers with more interest in this topic I would recommend Akiko Hashimoto’s The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan. Published in 2015 it offers a more current analysis from a sociological rather than a historical perspective. Since I read it some years ago, I plan to re-read it now with Orr’s arguments in mind.
The author accomplished his goals in this book in a manner one would like to see in a scholarly approach to a topic. First, with 57 pages of notes, some of which are annotated, and a 14 page bibliography he relied on a wide array of primary and secondary Japanese and English language sources. The timely insertion of quotations from these sources often elaborated nicely on the point he was trying to make about an issue.
Second, Orr organized the book quite well. Chapters covered an array of separate topics to demonstrate how the sense of victimhood was communicated and reinforced in Japanese society in the post war years. These included the strategy of the American Occupation to focus on a handful of upper level leaders in the Tokyo War Crimes trials while absolving the Emperor of any responsibility. Or how the tragic consequences of the atomic bombings underscored the country’s perceptions of its having been a victim. How the war was taught via school textbooks and its depiction in fiction and film after the War were also covered in separate chapters. Finally, a chapter on the compensation of Japanese landlords and of people who repatriated from Asia after the War rounded out his presentation. Dividing most of the chapters into sections also assisted its organization.
Third, the author’s prose was largely direct and thus readable. When he used Japanese language vocabulary to try to provide a nuanced description of the mindset which the post war government and many Japanese scholars had about the War, he readily provided English translations.
VaH had some flaws, however. The chapter on school textbooks attempted to provide an overview of how these were shaped, actually censored, by the central government to meet its goal of endorsing an ideology of victimhood. In trying to cover a great deal of material this discussion was so general as to be of less value than I would have wished.
In the concluding chapter Orr briefly noted that some recognition of the trauma inflicted on so called ‘comfort women’ (Korean, Taiwanese, and other Asian sex slaves) was finally expressed by Japanese government officials in the early 1990’s. He also disclosed that these officials even offered an apology to Korea for its actions in this regard. But there was much more to this in the 90’s than Orr presented. More specifically, there were a handful of apologies and an acknowledgment that the women had been coerced into this ‘service.’ More conservative politicians strenuously objected to these efforts by their more moderate (and humane, IMHO) peers. This deficit in the book reflected something more general which Orr did not present: the impact which Japan’s emphasis on its own victimhood has had on its relations with its Asian neighbors. At the time of VaH’s publication in 2001 South Korea and China both still had tremendous resentments against Japan for its refusal to acknowledge its perpetration of wartime aggression against their civilian populations. Japan’s relations with these two countries still flounder today in important respects because of what these two neighbors call its ‘history problems.’
For those readers with more interest in this topic I would recommend Akiko Hashimoto’s The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan. Published in 2015 it offers a more current analysis from a sociological rather than a historical perspective. Since I read it some years ago, I plan to re-read it now with Orr’s arguments in mind.
February 3, 2025
An extremely underrated book on the formation of the postwar Japanese identity.
This book should have been translated into Japanese (as far as I know, it hasn't been), and read widely in Japan. Orr's argument that self-assigned victimhood enabled Japan to forget about its wartime atrocities is so valid, and I say this as a Japanese citizen.
We Japanese have used Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a weaponized card to exonerate ourselves. America has been complicit in that delusion. This is a key to understanding the warped view on history in Japan.
In other words, the atomic bombs were godsends to many Japanese who wanted to show themselves as innocent civilians. That's the greatest irony I find in the history of WW2.
This book should have been translated into Japanese (as far as I know, it hasn't been), and read widely in Japan. Orr's argument that self-assigned victimhood enabled Japan to forget about its wartime atrocities is so valid, and I say this as a Japanese citizen.
We Japanese have used Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a weaponized card to exonerate ourselves. America has been complicit in that delusion. This is a key to understanding the warped view on history in Japan.
In other words, the atomic bombs were godsends to many Japanese who wanted to show themselves as innocent civilians. That's the greatest irony I find in the history of WW2.
November 15, 2010
Non tanto un libro di spessore teorico, quanto soprattutto cronachistico.
Quanto e come, e lungo quali percorsi il Giappone ha prodotto, gestito e negoziato una propria immagine di vittima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, e cos'ha significato quest'immagine nei confronti del ruolo effettivamente svolto dal paese nel conflitto come aggressore più che vittima, soprattutto nelle vicende in terra asiatica.
Il libro percorre i diversi territorî in cui s'è dispiegato e sviluppato tra alterne vicende il discorso del Giappone come vittima: il bombardamento atomico e i sopravvissuti allo stesso, i rimpatriati dalle ex colonie nipponiche, i grandi proprietarî terrieri spossessati dalle riforme introdotte dagli U.S.A., la figura dell'Imperatore descritto come "ingannato dai militari", le evoluzioni del resoconto del conflitto nei testi scolastici, le testimonianze della narrativa e del cinema, e così via.
La carne al fuoco è tanto per una visione sfaccettata, multiprospettica e diacronica che permette di correggere alcune idee comunemente diffuse quando si parla di Giappone e Guerra Mondiale.
Orr ad esempio decostruisce il luogo comune che il Giappone sia stato inevitabilmente "segnato" dalla Bomba, che invece ha assunto con un certo ritardo un posto centrale nell'immagine del paese come vittima di guerra. Una centralità oggetto di non poche tensioni, tra tentativi di ridefinizioni e appropriazioni da parte di un'opposizione di sinistra aspramente avversa alla nuova salda alleanza tra Giappone e Stati Uniti, e governi e movimenti conservatori interessati a diluire la carica politica dei fatti di Hiroshima e Nagasaki per conferire al Giappone, in un'ottica neonazionale, la missione speciale di paese dedicato a promuovere la pace nel Mondo e il contenimento degli armamenti atomici.
Oppure, nei capitoli sui libri di testo scolastici, viene messo in discussione il luogo comune che vuole il Giappone impegnato a senso unico in una campagna negazionista rispetto ai suoi crimini di guerra in Asia. Tutt'altro, l'evoluzione delle narrazioni dei libri di testo segue, più che gli interessi della politica, le contingenze dell'attualità. Ad esempio negli anni Sessanta, in cui in Asia e Africa tramonta il colonialismo, sempre più pagine vengono concesse alla lotta dei popoli asiatici contro gli occupanti nipponici. Ma anche in questo caso la narrazione si fa campo d'ambiguità, perché cinesi, coreani e quant'altri sono riconosciuti come vittime ma affiancati al popolo giapponese, ingannato dalla propria elité e anch'esso, quindi, vittima di guerra. Tutti vittime, nessun colpevole.
Il libro di Orr parla anche di molto altro, con gran messe di dati e date. Forse persino un po' troppi e senza mai chiarire del tutto il proprio punto di vista rispetto alla materia trattata, che pure si presterebbe a non poche riflessioni. Soprattutto, a parte qualche vaghissimo accenno, Orr manca di inserire il discorso "vittimistico" giapponese all'interno di una tendenza molto più ampia, quasi globale, e tipica del secondo dopoguerra, in cui la legittimità politica e sociale non ha più la propria base su discorsi di potenza, dominio o espansione bensì sulla capacità di definirsi e presentarsi come vittime o difensori delle vittime, spesso alla ricerca di alibi più o meno giustificabili.
Non solo, Orr si concentra quasi solo sul Giappone sino agli Settanta. Del proseguio del discorso dagli anni Ottanta in poi, e fino ai nostri giorni, non dice quasi nulla. Grave carenza, considerando come la retorica della "memoria" e del "non dimenticare" sia divenuta dominante in maniera quasi ossessiva proprio negli ultimi due o tre decenni, quelli che Orr praticamente trascura.
Quanto e come, e lungo quali percorsi il Giappone ha prodotto, gestito e negoziato una propria immagine di vittima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, e cos'ha significato quest'immagine nei confronti del ruolo effettivamente svolto dal paese nel conflitto come aggressore più che vittima, soprattutto nelle vicende in terra asiatica.
Il libro percorre i diversi territorî in cui s'è dispiegato e sviluppato tra alterne vicende il discorso del Giappone come vittima: il bombardamento atomico e i sopravvissuti allo stesso, i rimpatriati dalle ex colonie nipponiche, i grandi proprietarî terrieri spossessati dalle riforme introdotte dagli U.S.A., la figura dell'Imperatore descritto come "ingannato dai militari", le evoluzioni del resoconto del conflitto nei testi scolastici, le testimonianze della narrativa e del cinema, e così via.
La carne al fuoco è tanto per una visione sfaccettata, multiprospettica e diacronica che permette di correggere alcune idee comunemente diffuse quando si parla di Giappone e Guerra Mondiale.
Orr ad esempio decostruisce il luogo comune che il Giappone sia stato inevitabilmente "segnato" dalla Bomba, che invece ha assunto con un certo ritardo un posto centrale nell'immagine del paese come vittima di guerra. Una centralità oggetto di non poche tensioni, tra tentativi di ridefinizioni e appropriazioni da parte di un'opposizione di sinistra aspramente avversa alla nuova salda alleanza tra Giappone e Stati Uniti, e governi e movimenti conservatori interessati a diluire la carica politica dei fatti di Hiroshima e Nagasaki per conferire al Giappone, in un'ottica neonazionale, la missione speciale di paese dedicato a promuovere la pace nel Mondo e il contenimento degli armamenti atomici.
Oppure, nei capitoli sui libri di testo scolastici, viene messo in discussione il luogo comune che vuole il Giappone impegnato a senso unico in una campagna negazionista rispetto ai suoi crimini di guerra in Asia. Tutt'altro, l'evoluzione delle narrazioni dei libri di testo segue, più che gli interessi della politica, le contingenze dell'attualità. Ad esempio negli anni Sessanta, in cui in Asia e Africa tramonta il colonialismo, sempre più pagine vengono concesse alla lotta dei popoli asiatici contro gli occupanti nipponici. Ma anche in questo caso la narrazione si fa campo d'ambiguità, perché cinesi, coreani e quant'altri sono riconosciuti come vittime ma affiancati al popolo giapponese, ingannato dalla propria elité e anch'esso, quindi, vittima di guerra. Tutti vittime, nessun colpevole.
Il libro di Orr parla anche di molto altro, con gran messe di dati e date. Forse persino un po' troppi e senza mai chiarire del tutto il proprio punto di vista rispetto alla materia trattata, che pure si presterebbe a non poche riflessioni. Soprattutto, a parte qualche vaghissimo accenno, Orr manca di inserire il discorso "vittimistico" giapponese all'interno di una tendenza molto più ampia, quasi globale, e tipica del secondo dopoguerra, in cui la legittimità politica e sociale non ha più la propria base su discorsi di potenza, dominio o espansione bensì sulla capacità di definirsi e presentarsi come vittime o difensori delle vittime, spesso alla ricerca di alibi più o meno giustificabili.
Non solo, Orr si concentra quasi solo sul Giappone sino agli Settanta. Del proseguio del discorso dagli anni Ottanta in poi, e fino ai nostri giorni, non dice quasi nulla. Grave carenza, considerando come la retorica della "memoria" e del "non dimenticare" sia divenuta dominante in maniera quasi ossessiva proprio negli ultimi due o tre decenni, quelli che Orr praticamente trascura.
August 2, 2011
Explores the 3 main reasons behind Japan’s tendency to view itself as the Victim of the war that it started. Very good.
April 5, 2013
Boring, boring, boring.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews