Porphyry Introduction (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers)

by Porphyry

L'Isagoge est une introduction aux Categories. Porphyre y definit les cinq predicables (genre, espece, difference, propre et accident) et formule ce qui, grace a Boece, deviendra le principal probleme logique et metaphysique du Moyen Age occidental - le probleme des universaux -, ouvrant la querelle qui, jusqu'a la fin du XVe siecle, verra s'affronter realistes et nominalistes. La traduction francaise ici proposee est accompagnee du texte grec original et de la traduction latine de Boece.

Genres: Philosophy, Classics, Logic, Metaphysics, Nonfiction, Ancient, Ancient History

Paperback

First published January 1, 270

About the author

Porphyry's parents were Phoenician, and he was born in Tyre. His parents named him Malchus ("king") but his teacher in Athens, Cassius Longinus, gave him the name Porphyrius ("clad in purple"), possibly a reference to his Phoenician heritage, or a punning allusion to his name and the color of royal robes.

Porphyry of Tyre (Greek: Πορφύριος, Porphyrios, AD c. 234–c. 305) was a Neoplatonic philosopher who was born in Tyre. He edited and published the Enneads, the only collection of the work of his teacher Plotinus. He also wrote many works himself on a wide variety of topics. His Isagoge, or Introduction, is an introduction to logic and philosophy,and in Latin translation it was the standard textbook on logic throughout the Middle Ages. In addition, through several of his works, most notably Philosophy from Oracles and Against the Christians, he was involved in a controversy with a number of early Christians, and his commentary on Euclid's Elements was used as a source by Pappus of Alexandria. (Wikipedia)

Reviews

[Erick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Basically, this is an introduction to (or maybe a synopsis of) Aristotle's Categories by the Neo-Platonist Porphyry. I just finished Aristotle's logical works, so that subject matter is still fresh enough in my mind that nothing here struck me as terribly novel or elucidative. That being said, this work was popular during the Middle Ages and some have found it helpful when reading Aristotle's categorical writings.

I am going through Porphyry's works at the moment, so I will save my comments regarding him for other reviews.

[Virginia · Rating 5 out of 5]

I rate this five stars not because it's original in any way but because it's a very clear explanation of a dense text. Porphyry is, like Aquinas, sometimes better at writing Aristotle than Aristotle is. Highly recommended to anyone struggling with Aristotle but who doesn't want to use boring contemporary secondary texts. Porphyry rocks (pun very much intended).

[Illiterate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Porphyry reconciles Aristotle and Plato by treating the Categories as arising from language not ontology.

[Evan Leach]

This interesting little treatise was intended as an introduction to the categories of Aristotle. Specifically, it is concerned with the hierarchical classification of different things; readers familiar with the biological concept of taxonomy (kingdom > phylum > class > order > family > genus > species) will recognize many of the basic concepts and terminology that remain in use to this day.

I've read some Aristotle in my day, but I'm certainly not an expert, and I'd be lying if I said that I was able to make a lot of useful connections between Aristotle's writings and Porphyry's interpretation of his ideas. However, this treatise continues to have value as an interesting historical document: this work (as translated into Latin by Boethius) apparently was the standard academic textbook on logic for about 1,000 years after Porphyry's death, well into the Middle Ages. Readers interested in epistemology or the history of philosophy may find much to interest them here.

[Maria Schmidt · Rating 4 out of 5]

As usual with philosophy, this was a dense read. However, it did help me understand the five predicables better and gave me a few more tools to work with. Some of the new terms I learned include: separable accident, inseparable accident, and the three species of difference (common difference, proper difference, and most proper difference). If I understand correctly, these three species of difference are also generally called "difference," "property," and "accident." The first "contains all the differences which are under it in capacity, but not in energy." I believe energy here refers to a thing's current state of being.

[Tyler · Rating 4 out of 5]

For anyone who has read Aristotle's Categories, or really, believe it or not, his Prior Analytics, one will find this introduction by Porphyry a worthy companion. To be honest, it's all a little different than I believe Aristotle himself viewed his metaphysics. An easy comparison would be how species and genera work: Porphyry thinks all species could be genera of something else or all genera could be species of something else, but I don't believe that is how Aristotle views it: I believe Aristotle understood them as being significantly different: in addition to differences in number or form. Aristotle also always made sure to create a distinction for 'subaltern genera', signifying a genera which could not rightfully be termed as under any other genera (even though technically it was), and to which all species below it were termed to be. Subaltern genera were not tackled at all in this introduction.

Overall however, it was a decent read and an interesting interpretation of Aristotle. I would definitely recommend this to anyone who has read Prior/Posterior Analytics or The Topics.

[C. Clarke · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thank you, Porphyry

[Evan Kramer · Rating 5 out of 5]

These are my notes on the passage. Unfortunately, OneNote doesn't transfer all of my notes nicely, and so certain parts have to be omitted.

Genus

Descriptio of Genus: that which is predicated essentially of many things differing in species.

Differs from property in that genus is predicated of many species, whereas property is predicated only one species and to the individuals belonging to that species.

Genus different from difference and common accident. Though difference and common accident may be predicated of many things differing in species, they are not essentially predicated essentially, but qualitatively.

Species

Two kinds of species. That which is species only and that which is also a genus. The descriptio that applies to all species is this: that which falls under a genus or that which genus is predicated of essentially. The lowest species is also that which is predicated essentially of many things differing in number.

Difference

There are three meanings to difference. Commonly, it refers to anything that causes something to differ from either something else or itself (e.g., I differ from myself in having gone from being a boy to becoming a man, from not moving to moving). Properly, two things are said to differ whenever they differ because of some inseparable accident: being hooked nosed, greyness of eyes, etc. Strictly, two things differ insofar as they differ because of a specific difference (e.g., man differs from beast insofar as the former is rational and the latter irrational). Common and proper differences cause something to differ in quality. Strict or specific differences cause something to differ in essence.

From these essential or specific differences the divisions of genus into species arise and also definitions because definitions consist of a genus and specific difference.

There are separable and inseparable differences. Some examples of separable differences include being ill or well, in a state of rest or motion, etc. Inseparable differences include being rational, snubbed nosed, having grey eyes. Some inseparable differences exist per se and some per accidens. Examples of the latter include being snubbed nosed, having grey eyes, and having a scar. Examples of the former include being rational. Per se differences belong to the essence of a thing, whereas per accidens differences do not. Per se differences do not admit of more or less whilst per accidens differences do (we do not say something whose essence is being human that he or she is more human than another).

Among per se differences there are those by which we divide the genera and those by which the divided genera are constituted as species. For instance, animal contains animate and sensible, rational and irrational, etc. But it is by the difference animate and sensible that animal is constituted the substance (essence, genus, species) that it is. Also, we divide the genus animal into its species by rational and irrational. Man is constituted as man in virtue of being rational, and beast in virtue of its irrationality. Thus, it is rationality, though contained in an indeterminate way in the species, i.e., only potentially, that divides the genus and constitutes man as the species man.

The species is said to exceed the genus insofar as the difference is added to it, for if the genus contained all of the differentia it would contain contradictory predications (e.g., rational and irrational). It should be said, however, that the genus contains the differences of the subordinate species potentially, not actually. And it is the species which contains it actually.

Property

Porphyry gives four different definitions, which I will avoid reiterating. It is midway between accident and specific difference. It is something that every species without fail will possess even though it does not belong to the essence of the thing, insofar as it is not constitutive of the definition or species. In other words, the property (proprium) flows from the essence of the thing, but is not a part of its essence. For example, man is a rational animal and in virtue of this he is risible (able to laugh). While all members of the species possess this capacity in virtue of being human, it is not a part of the essence. Properties are also convertible: if there is a horse, there is a capacity to neigh; if there is the capacity to neigh there is a horse.

Accident

Def.: "What comes to be and passes away apart from the destruction of the substratum is an accident."

Separable accidents can exist separate from their substratum both in reality and in the intellect. For instance, a man can be sleeping at one moment and not at another (both in the intellect and reality). An inseparable accident can be separated from the substratum in the intellect but not in reality. For instance, we can consider the crow or the Ethiopian (LOL!) apart from his blackness in the intellect, but they cannot be separated in reality.

Alt. def: "accident is what can belong or not belong to the same thing, or what is neither a genus, nor a difference, nor a species, nor a property, but always exists in a substratum"

Common Characteristics of the Five Predicables

Common Characteristics of Genus and Difference

Both contain species, though difference does not contain all of the species that genera do. For example, rational contains the species man. Animal, likewise contains man, but it does, but contains other species that rational does not.

Another common characteristic is that the species and individuals depend upon their genus such that the species and individuals are destroyed if the genus or difference does not exist.

Difference Between Genus and Difference

Genus is predicated of more thing than the difference qua specific difference. The genus contains the specific differences potentially.

Genera are prior to their species. The destruction of the species does not entail the destruction of the genus, for genus can still be conceived of without some specific species (e.g., we can think of animal without man).

Genus is predicated essentially, whereas differences is predicated essentially.

Each species has only one genus, but can have multiple differences. Man differs from other animals in being mortal, rational, biped, etc.

Genus is like matter, whereas species is like form.

Common Characteristics of Genus and Species

Considering species as species only and not genus, species, like genus, are both prior to the things they are predicated of and are a "kind of whole."

Difference Between Genus and Species

Genus contains the species whilst species is contained by the genus. Genus can be predicated of its species, but not vice versa.

Common Characteristics of Genus and Property

Both consequences of the species. If there is a man, there is an animal. If there is a man, there is the capability of laughter.

Difference Between Genus and Property

Property is posterior and genus is prior. Moreover, property is convertible, but genus is convertible with nothing.

Common Characteristic of Genus and Accident

Predicated of many things.

Difference Between Genus and Accident

Genus is prior (conceptually) to its species, whereas accident is posterior (existentially?) to some individual. Moreover, all things that share in genus, do not share equally in genus, whereas not all that share in an accident share equally of the accident, but admits of more or less. Genus is predicated essentially of a species or individual, but accident is predicated qualitatively.

Common Characteristics of Difference and Species

Both are shared in equally and always present in the things of which they are predicated.

Difference Between Difference and Species

Difference predicated qualitatively and the species predicated essentially. Difference is prior to species insofar as a destruction of the species does not destroy the difference, but a destruction of the difference destroys the species.

Common Characteristics of Difference and Property

Both do not admit of less and more; they are equal shared by the things that partake of them. Porphyry also notes that they are present in every member of the species, not as in fact existing in them, but as the natural end of a things essence. Man is naturally biped. His nature is such that it tends toward this end (unless impeded or there is some interposing cause).

Difference Between Property and Difference

Difference can be predicated of many species, property only to the species it belongs to. Hence, difference is not convertible, whereas a property is.

Common Characteristics of Difference and Accident

Both predicated of many things. Difference and inseparable accident are always present in the things of which they are predicated. Just as two-footed is present in all crows, so also black is present in all of them as well. A crow could be conceived of without the latter (which is why it is an accident), but not without the former.

Properties of Difference and Accident

The difference contains rather than is contained (in contradistinction to accident). Moreover, accident admits of more and less, whereas difference does not.

Common Characteristics of Species and Property

They are co-extensive with one another.

Difference Between Species and Property

Species is able to be a genus of other species, whereas property belongs only to its own species. The species is always present actually in what it is predicated of, whereas the property may only be contain in potentiality.

Common Characteristics of Species and Accident

Each predicated of many things.

Difference Between Species and Accident

Species is predicated essentially, accident only qualitatively. Every substance shares in only one species, but many accidents (both separable and inseparable). The species is conceived of before the accidents (there must be some substratum in which accidents inhere). Sharing in species is equal, but in accidents they are not.

Common Characteristics of Property and Inseparable Accident

In whatever they exist in, the thing does not exist without them

Difference Between Property and Inseparable Accident

Property is predicated only of its proper species, whereas accidents exist in many species. Property does not admit of more or less, but accidents do. Properties are convertible, but accidents are not.

[Peter Bradley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)

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After reading Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, I decided to read a commentary on one or both texts. I wasn’t aware of any commentary on these texts written by the Angelic Doctor (although I have learned is one for On Interpretation, which was begun by St. Thomas and finished by Cardinal Cajetan.) I decided to go outre and pick up the one on Categories by the third-century pagan (and anti-Christian) Neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre.

I had assumed that reading Porphyry would be a difficult slog. Porphyry’s commentary was accessible and entertaining. The commentary is written as a dialogue between Porphyry and a hypothetical student. This framework allows Porphyry to flag where he is going in nice bite-size pieces. The “student'” contribution usually consists of saying, “you have explained this very well,” but occasionally, the student challenges Porphyry on some topic. If the reader is following, the “student” becomes a quasi-character to access the narrative.

Porphyry is an interesting historical figure. He was born in 234 AD and died in 305 AD., the year of Diocletian’s abdication of the imperial throne, an event that would lead in short order to the Christian hegemony over the Roman empire. During Porphyry’s lifetime, Christianity became a powerful challenge to the hegemony of paganism. He was alive during Diocletian’s persecution of Christianity and died about ten years before Constantine took control of the Roman empire.

Porphyry criticized Christianity. His critiques were very effective. They were based on his knowledge of the text of the Old Testament and his knowledge that Christianity was dependent on the Old Testament. He was an astute literary critic. One of his accomplishments was determining that the Book of Daniel had been written in the second-century BC and not in the sixth-century BC. As such, the “prophecies” of Daniel were debunked as mere history. Porphyry’s anti-Christian works were largely destroyed during the reign of Constantine, but extracts survived in Christian rebuttals to Porphyry. Book 19 of Augustine’s City of God analyzes and rebuts Porphyry. Augustine described Porphyry as the “most learned of philosophers, although one of the fiercest enemies of Christians.”

Porphyry was a disciple and student of the Neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus. Porphyry collected Plotinus’s writings into the Enneads, which are well-known to fans of classic philosophy. Porphyry lived an ascetic lifestyle. Robert Louis Wilken points out that becoming a philosopher involved a conversion process whereby a lifestyle of asceticism and virtue was adopted. In that regard, it seems Christianity and philosophy had much in common.

In his commentary, Porphyry deals with the conflict between Aristotle and Plato casually. Aristotle made particular things primary instances of being; Plato made universal things primary. Porphyry deals with this conflict by treating Aristotle’s focus on the particular as a focus on words. Porphyry can thereby ignore Aristotle’s contradictory ontological focus as a matter of grammar. (P 74.)

Reading this commentary allowed me to have a second look at the material. Porphyry follows Categories closely but pays attention to some details that went past me on the first read. The details were there, but Porphyry’s treatment brought those details into focus.

For example, I had not considered the significance of the title, “Categories.” I assumed that “Category” referred to the ten classes that Aristotle had defined for nouns and predicates. However, “kategoria” denoted the speech the prosecution gives against someone at trial, which is opposed by the defendant’s speech (“apologia.”) Porphyry argues that Aristotle “chose to call those utterances in which significant expressions are applied to things “predications” (kategoria.)” A predication is a simpler significant (signifying(?)) expression is employed and said of what it signifies, such as pointing to a stone and saying “this.” So, “category” means “predication” and comes from the prosecutor’s speech where the prosecutor points to the defendant, so to speak, and predicates various things about him.

For Porphyry, the ten categories are about words, which are in turn, about things. (“pragmata.”) “Beings are comprehended by the ten generic differentiae.” (p. 34.) “Words are like messengers that report to us about things, and they get their generic differentiae from things about which they report.” (p. 35.) Words are divided into nouns and verbs. Nouns are things; verbs contain an element of time and are about nouns.
Words can also be defined by comparing and contrasting their sounds and definitions into Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms, and Heteronyms. These terms become important later when Porphyry discusses the nine accidental categories. The differences can be diagrammed as follows:

Classification Similarity of Words Similarity of Definition/Description

Homonym Same Different
Synonym Same Same
Polyonym Different Same
Heteronym Different Different
Paronym Different grammatical forms Same root

“Common” is a homonym since it can mean something divisible into parts or used by several people without division. “Ajax, son of Telamon” and “Ajax, son of Oeleus” both have the name Ajax in common, but the name “Ajax” has different definitions in both cases. Another kind of homonym involves an image and the subject of the image. We can point to King Charles and a painting of King Charles and say, “that is King Charles.”

Polyonyms have multiple words for a single meaning, e.g., sword, blade, sabre, etc.

Paronyms get their names from a word but use a different grammatical ending, e.g., grammar, grammarian.

Synonyms have a common definition, albeit the definition may not be obvious. Porphyry calls “man” and “ox” synonyms insofar as they are both animals.

Porphyry moves on to the “said of or found in” distinction. His treatment of this is far clearer and more explicit than Aristotle's. Porphyry explicitly defines those things that are “found in” a subject as “accidents and that thing “said of” as universals. Thus, we get a diagram of the “four categories” based on accidents and universals:

The next subject is “differentiae.” Differentiae differ in genus, e.g., the difference between having two feet and four feet for animals. The differentiae are predicated of several different things and, therefore, constitutes a species. (P. 67.)

This takes the reader to the “ten ultimate categories” and the genera, species, and genus in each.

Substance is the single highest genus of substances. Nothing is prior to substance. The remaining nine categories are accidents that exist parasitically on substance. (p. 77, 78.) There is no contradictory/contrary to substance, but substances are receptive to characteristics (Accidents) which are receptive of contradiction or contraries (and affected by the contraries, e.g., Socrates is sick/healthy. (p. 91.) There is nothing intermediate between substances and accidents. (p. 87, 89.)

The nine remaining categories are divided by Aristotle into units of three: “Of things said without any combination, each signifies, either substance or quantity or qualification or relative or where or when or position or having or doing or being affected.” (p. 73; 1b27-8.)

Porphyry discusses the categories in terms of “proprium” and “differentiae.” The nine categories are not susceptible of definition, but they can be classed by “proprium” which are attributes common to a category and only to that category. (p. 91.) Following his methods, Porphyry develops the following points that I’ve organized into a grid:

Quantity
- No contrary
- More/less not quantity
- Differentiae – Discrete and continuous
- Proprium – to be called equal/unequal
Relation
- Depends on something else.
- Always plural and correlative.
- Defined by paronyms e.g., grammar/grammarian
- Contraries exist.
- Proprium – to be in relation to correlatives.
- Relation exists in the relationship, not in the substance.(p. 133.)
Quality
- 4 species of quality: states/ conditions; capacity; Affected Qualities; shape.
- Affected qualities are permanent.
- Contrariety exists in Quality.
- Negative states exist in Quality
- Proprium: Similarity and Dissimilarity.
Where
- Parasitic upon Quantity. (p. 158.)
- Requires “Place” which is a Quantity. When
- Parasitic upon Quantity. (p. 158.)
- Requires “Time” which is a Quantity. (p. 158.() Position
- “Position” refers to the position of a body as named by paronyms, e.g., to sit, to stand, to lie down.
- Sitting is a Relative.
Having Doing Being affected.
- “Being affected” involves temporary reactions, such as being frightened or shocked.

Porphyry describes the Categories as a beginning text in the class of logic. There is plenty of logical conundrums here. For example, knowledge is a Relation because there has to be someone with knowledge and some knowledge to be known. Some philosophers distinguished between general knowledge as a relation and specific knowledge as a quality. If that is unconvincing, Porphyry allows that knowledge could be both.

Likewise, perception is a Relation since there must be a perceiver and something perceived. The perceived is prior in this Relation since the perceived will exist without a perceiver, but one cannot be a perceiver without the perceived.

And that sounds like an answer to the question of the tree falling in the forest without someone to hear it.

Philosophy can be practical.

[Ænesidemus · Rating 3 out of 5]

Porphyry's treatment of the five predicables differs from Aristotle's in some respects. For one, Aristotle's conception is four-fold, but Porphyry's is five-fold. Aristotle treats of definition, proprium, genus, and accident; while Porphyry lays out an exposition of genus, species, difference, accident, and property. There seems to be some confusion surrounding the distinction between genus and species, so I'll just reiterate what Porphyry has to say on the matter: the two differ by their objects, namely, species has individuals as its object, but genus has species. Oxen and deer are both members of the genus 'Mammals', but each of them differ in species. I'll give the definition of accident and property, since they too often are confused. Accident is that which may be present or absent in a subject without its destruction. Property has four senses: (1) it is an accident that is exclusive to a single species, but not all members of that species necessarily have it. (2) not exclusive to one species, but all its members have it. (3) exclusive to one species and all possess it at the same time (4) exclusive to one species, all possess it and always. There's also the tricky concept of separable and inseparable, where the latter are further divided into intrinsic and accidental. This distinction is employed in the section on difference. Intrinsic differences are part of the definition of species, accidental differences are not. The last part of the lesson is quite tedious in that it is just a series of points explaining the relations and distinctions between the five predicables (e.g. it answers questions like how do genus and property, or, difference and accident differ). There are plenty of other books you could also read to gain a deeper understanding of Aristotle's ten genera, like the commentaries of Dexippus, Boethius, Ammonius Hermeias, Philoponus, and Simplicius, but this one is more friendly to the beginner.

[John Cairns · Rating 3 out of 5]

As an introduction to Aristotelian logic, therefore logic, it, along with Porphyry's Isagoge, is pretty good if not from the horse's mouth but through neo-platonist philosophical teeth mouthing Aristotle to make it compatible with Plato, as is apparently the bounden duty of the neo-platonists from AD 200 - 600 in 15,000 pages! the appendix says. I wish there were more because I'd want to read Porphyry's fifteen volumes against the Xians but these were burned in 448, presumably by Theodosius II, because better than any rational argument for Xianity which isn't reasonable anyway. They'd be faulty of course. Even in this book Porphyry resorts to god to substantiate an argument though his monotheistic god wasn't the Xian one. That's all I'm prepared to say over and above what I've already written, except without these commentaries we'd have a lot less understanding of Aristotle however skewed and making allowance for that.

[J. Boo]

Porphyry's Isagogue is an introduction to Aristotle's "Categories", and, in its translation into Latin by Boethius, was the standard textbook on logic in the West until the 1200s or even later. Lots of commentaries on the Isagogue exist by people you've heard of (if you've heard of a reasonable number of academicians), and parts were incorporated into other author's logic textbooks, e.g. William of Ockham's Summa Logicae.

[steve robertson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not "Introduction to Categories"

Many times this is misnamed. It is simply "Introduction by Prophyry" or "Isagoge" or "Introduction".
Still a worthwhile read on the five subjects: genus; species; differentia; property; accident.

[TR · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best introduction to philosophy. This should be the first philosophy text students read. They should read Aristotle's Categories and On Interpretations second.

[James Violand · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent! If only I had known it exsisted before I tackled Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. It would have saved my hours of diagramming the structures of proper argument.

[Rory Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

Porphyry (d.305) was a pagan neoplatonist philosopher, yet his Isagoge (Introduction) was at the heart of Christian scholastic education for around a thousand years. The book is essentially an introduction to Logic, or rather it is an introduction to how to use 5 key logical terms (Quinque voces): genus, species, difference properties, accidents.

This book was used as an introduction to Aristotle’s logical works (Organon), although it differs in nuance from aspects of those works. Aristotle’s distinction of terminology (in his Topics) was fourfold, omitting ‘species,’ so there are clear differences of emphasis; and a different agenda which seeks to harmonise some of the differences between Aristotle and Plato.

The author asks why does Porphyry pick the 5 terms which he does. It is not as if there weren’t other important words like ‘substance’ or ‘subject’ which needed explaining. His answer is that these 5 words already had a “corporate” history of being grouped together (p29), so the Commentary is pitched into a market place of ideas which shapes both its content and its purpose. Like all books, it is a product of its age. It is not an idealised treatment of the concepts propaedeutical to logic

Porphyry’s text is relatively short, its translation accounts for around 20 pages of this book. The rest of the book is commentary on the text, as well as some longer notes on themes arising from the text. The translation is clear and easy to read. It would have been helpful to have had the Greek on a facing page, as occasionally this book engages with reconstructions of the Greek text; but the book is already long so omitting the original text is an understandable decision.

In the (Latin) middle ages, this book was the source of important debates about “Universals,” and logical analytic tools such as the “tree of Porphyry.” This commentary touches upon those issues, noting for example, that ancient Greek commentators like Ammonius referred to the “tree” as a “chain” (109). But this book is focused upon Porphyry’s Greek text, not its Latin usage. So there is no analysis of issues like who coined the phrase ‘tree of Porphyry.’ There is, no doubt, another book which could be written on the Latin reception and usage of Porphyry, but this is not that book.

This is not the kind of book which most readers will want to read cover to cover. It is a good text to dip into, to highlight ideas around difficult passages in Porphyry. As a good commentary it provides the background to explain the ideas in Porphyry’s “Introduction” (Isagoge). It mostly relates Porphyry to the discussions of his era, as well as issues of consistency within Porphyry himself. It does not pursue the philosophical implications of Porphyry’s ideas, especially as they arise in modern thinking. For example, Porphyry assumes a philosophy of language which sees concepts as expressions of essences. Modern thinkers are generally troubled by that approach, but this book does not engage with those (modern) ideas.

The language of the book is demanding at times. Some readers will need an English dictionary on hand when it comes to words like “Protreptics” (p.xv) and “epexegetical” (p.46) But there are also some playful turns of phrase. Aristotle ‘muffs’ a distinction (p.109). And there is no point trying to identify influences upon Porphyry’s thinking because, “a possible benefactor is as valuable as an imaginary thaler.” (p.35).

Overall, this is an academic book for readers interested in reading and understanding Porphyry’s (Greek) Isagoge. What it does, it does very well, but its appeal is very niche.

[Miguel Angel Lozano · Rating 2 out of 5]

Un gran poder conlleva una gran responsabilidad La gran enseñanza de mi niñez dada por el tío Ben. Y es que no puedo evitar en pensarla al leer este texto: la teoría de las ideas ha dado frutos: ha nacido la lógica.

Normalmente se suele escuchar en las aulas que Aristóteles se separó de las ideas de su maestro Platón, y aunque si lo hizo (sólo de cierta forma), la mayor parte de los fundamentos de su filosofía parten ya de aceptar las ideas cómo algo. Sería difícil para mi explicarlo todo en una reseña, pero resumiendo lo más que puedo: de lo que van las ideas es, el intento de obtener lo general de lo particular. Ej. Si tuviéramos 35 árboles con distinta forma, la cuestión sería llegar a una definición que los incluya a todos. Una vez teniendo dicha definición podemos deducir aquello que es un árbol y lo que no; una definición es a la teoría de las ideas, lo que una espada a un guerrero.

Las definiciones establecen la pertenencia o no de otras ideas. Segmentan y es posible obtener la pura carnita, con una definición tenemos certeza de que pertenece y que no. Es una herramienta poderosísima. Basta decir que en pocos siglos desde su creación, la teoría de las ideas dio a luz: a su sistematización (la lógica), el pensamiento categorial, y, eventualmente, la ciencia.

El problema aparece cuando se olvida lo que se esta haciendo. Claramente establece Platón los límites de su teoría: todo dependerá de la definición. Si la definición es mala, no englobará todo lo que desees englobar. Quizá no pasaría nada si hiciéramos como Sócrates, y una vez errado reconociéramos nuestro error. Sin embargo, es difícil aceptar un fallo porque nos baja de la nube; duele, y es posible que nos mantengamos firmes. El problema es que en lugar de aprender y categorizar lo que vemos, oímos, y experimentamos, trataremos de normar lo que vemos, oímos, y experimentamos. Normar duramente para que el fenómeno encaje en nuestras categorías y no al revés.

El ejemplo más a la mano que tengo es el del cristianismo que tacha de degenerado, antinatural, inhumano, cualquier conducta que no se encuentre dentro de las categorías de alguien bueno. Éste, (el querer normarlo y forzar todo a que encaje) es en mi opinión, el mayor riesgo. Recordemos pues... hermanos, que cristo ha venid... jaja, no; pero en serio, creo que para evitar la arrogancia hay que hacer lo opuesto, ver lo que existe y tratar de elevarlo a concepto; y si aparece algo nuevo, no tacharlo de degenerado sino tratar de comprender cómo se gestó, cómo se diferencia de lo demás, etc.

Bien nos recuerda Platón que el objeto de conocimiento no es lo sensible sino lo inteligible, y que de lo particular no hay ciencia. El electrón no es uno determinado, la célula no es una célula particular de la piel de una persona; su estudio, y la teoría que se gesta de él: generaliza a las células individuales, haciéndolas participes de una célula general, pues, todas comparten su definición, a saber, la célula general es definida por los caracteres definidos similares, más nunca iguales en las células individuales, hay ciencia en lo general. Lo particular es demasiado complejo.

[Jack Booth · Rating 4 out of 5]

Porphyry's Isagoge is an ancient introduction to Aristotle's categories. Therefore it is not exactly original but merely an exploration. Primarily intended as a logical work, there are some important metaphysical presumptions that are of interest to those interested in ancient or medieval philosophy upon which this text had great influence. Despite its lack of originality and its brevity, it survived in the medieval west through the Latin translation of Boethius, along with several of Aristotle's logical works, which it was placed together with as a general introduction. The Isagoge would have been the first text any budding scholar of logic would have read.

The text is primarily an explication of five technical terms in Aristotlean logic: Genus, species, difference, property and accident. Porphyry explains the meaning of each of these terms and then compares and contrasts them to each other including stock examples to illustrate the differences. Knowledge of these terms should be helpful to anyone wanting to dive into Scholastic philosophy, such as Thomas Aquinas, who take understanding of such terminology for granted. Although, as other reviewers have noted, if you already have read and understood Aristotle's logical works then this text will be of limited value as it's largely an introduction, although there is still some historic value.

[Cesar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Porphyry here gives a more easy to read commentary of Aristotle's work, though in doing so takes a particular descriptivist reading of The Categories which seeks to further merge Aristotelian and Platonic thought. As an introduction to logic it is extremely basic, and though it would give some benefit to read much of the content does not serve as an introduction to logic as much as an introduction to some concepts at the core of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy and Aristotle's syllogistic logic.

[tradcat]

I don't think it's likely I'll find the edition I own on here, and I'm not really of the mind to add it in to the database as I don't think the other readers of this edition will ever log it.

In short, it is an introduction to Aristotle's Categories, as promised. Each page was mostly footnotes and I have no idea what the original language of this text is. It was extremely dense and yet extremely important as one dives further into philosophy.

[Santiago González · Rating 4 out of 5]

Uno de los libros más influyentes de la historia, Aristóteles era un genio y Porfirio lo explica todo muy bien, es cortito y va al grano, a veces más oscuro que otras pero en general bien, aunque al final hay muchas perogrulladas cuando empieza a hacer distinciones entre predicables, que además generalmente son las mismas. La introducción de Tecnos es fantástica.

[Jordi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential supplement in endeavours to understand Aristotle's Organon.

[Federico · Rating 2 out of 5]

Sostanzialmente una serie di definizioni. Probabilmente è inevitabile che sia interessante solo per gli specialisti.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dry, but helpful, it is a good introduction to Aristotle.

[Sara · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read the translation by Octavius Freire Owen, M. A. of Christ Church, Oxford. It might as well be in the original greek. It served only to complicate things. I feel like it was begging for an illustrated version, or one in which hierarchy could be better illustrated, for the words were legible, but their combinations were not.

I get the usefulness of the document and its historical importance, but holy shit was this translation confusing.

[John Cairns · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought I said: this is a good introduction to Aristotelian logic. (The finishing date is approximate.)

[John Cairns · Rating 3 out of 5]

Useful introduction to Aristotelian logic.

[Ana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just interesting