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War from the Top: German and British Military Decision Making during World War II
"Wilt writes . . . well and offers many sound perceptions." ―Choice
" . . . a stimulating book . . . a timely warning against overindulgence in hindsight in evaluating the great issues of the war . . . " ―Parameters
" . . . a significant new study . . . a clearly written, excellent book . . . " ―Airpower Journal
" . . . an impressive work of scholarship . . . " ―British Politics Group Newsletter
"Wilt's comparative approach permits us fresh perspectives on both sides of the war. Moreover, Wilt has chosen to compare two of the major rival belligerents at the most stimulating and interesting level at which such comparison might be made, the level of the summit of decision making―with the magnetic figures of Hitler and Churchill playing major roles in his narrative and analysis." ―Russell F. Weigley
"This is a masterful treatment of a complex subject and a must read book for anyone writing about the Second World War." ―The Historian
" . . . a stimulating book . . . a timely warning against overindulgence in hindsight in evaluating the great issues of the war . . . " ―Parameters
" . . . a significant new study . . . a clearly written, excellent book . . . " ―Airpower Journal
" . . . an impressive work of scholarship . . . " ―British Politics Group Newsletter
"Wilt's comparative approach permits us fresh perspectives on both sides of the war. Moreover, Wilt has chosen to compare two of the major rival belligerents at the most stimulating and interesting level at which such comparison might be made, the level of the summit of decision making―with the magnetic figures of Hitler and Churchill playing major roles in his narrative and analysis." ―Russell F. Weigley
"This is a masterful treatment of a complex subject and a must read book for anyone writing about the Second World War." ―The Historian
400 pages, Hardcover
First published August 22, 1990
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March 6, 2023
In an ambitious agenda, Wilt sets out to explore a ‘relatively neglected’ area of the history of WW2: a comparative research on German and British strategic decision making ‘from the top down’. However, he points out that this is not an attempt to study the origins of the military decision reached by the various combatants (p vii), but primarily an examination of the decisions once they have been formulated.’ (p vii)
Wilts explores this theme in four steps:
1. the roles of the national war leaders – Hitler and Churchill
2. the high-command systems – the mechanism the military used for running the war
3. the strategies worked out by the military decision makers
4. examples of the execution of their various strategies, including their successes and failures
The first three steps are addressed in his opening five chapters in which Wilt explores decisions made when directing, running and planning the war.
The final step is explored in the following six chapters. Wilt looks at eleven campaigns by each side to advance his theme. However although he selects eighteen land, sea, and air battles in these campaigns (four are explored from each side’s perspective), “Wilt’s focus is not on the battles but rather how and why the two antagonists conducted the war as they did.’.
Wilt provides some genuine insights on the key protagonists. He notes that Hitler ‘was bright – so bright, in fact, that he often put the generals and bureaucrats to shame, especially when it came to detailed knowledge on particular subjects.’ There are insightful précis on the characters of many of the German generals including von Brauchitsch, Halder, Jodl, and Keitel.
Wilt’s analysis is by necessity, undertaken at a high-level. However this makes it prone to superficial generalisations, and selective use or interpretation of examples. Wilt seems to have a blindspot, or a bias, in his assessment of British strategic leadership and Churchill in particular.
Wilt offers the sweeping generalisation that ‘Hitler would not take no for an answer. Churchill would.’ But there are so many counter-examples that could have been quoted to make this assertion meaningless. It would have been more accurate to note that Churchill surrounded himself with sycophants, used his position to bully people into supporting him and fired those who did not. Australian Prime Minister Menzies experienced this in February 1941 when he wrote sourly of Churchill’s preference for “Yes-men”…’ (David Day, Menzies & Churchill at War)
Wilt claims that ‘one of Churchill’s most noteworthy characteristics was his ability to separate the important from the unimportant, to get quickly to the heart of a matter, to simplify complex issues.’ Wilt offers no evidence for this sweeping generalisation. However there are numerous opposing examples. Lewin (The Chief) tells us how in August 1940 Churchill sent an ‘unprecedented document’ to Wavell which set out in ‘imperious clarity the dispositions and proper objectives’, in Churchill’s uninformed view, of all the forces in Wavell’s command as well as, incredibly, detailed instructions on road surfaces, canal widths and wells! Lewin's conclusion about Churchill, that ‘Out-of-date ideas, lack of technical knowledge and the passion for action could lead him to nag and rage over matters about which it was obvious … that he was wrong’, should have formed part of Wilt’s analysis. More examples are noted in the biography of General Alan Brooke, the British CIGS (War Diaries). Wilt even contradicts himself when he notes that Churchill ‘was constantly concerned about minutiae’ (p7-8).
Wilt tells us (twice, on page 18 and again at page 41) that ‘in general … Churchill appreciated the value of allies, Hitler did not.’ He highlights how the British, in contrast to the Germans, erected structures which took into account the views of their allies, including the French and then the Americans. He could have reinforced this by including Churchill’s quote: “The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.”
By contrast Wilt asserts that Hitler ‘never seemed to understand the necessity of allies in conducting war on such a vast scale’. However, this is not supported by the evidence. Through a combination of political and military pressure Hitler convinced Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and the Slovak Republic to join the Axis. In the second half of 1940 he went to great lengths to enlist Spain and Vichy France, but their onerous and conflicting requirements, and the Axis’ military setbacks resulted in his overtures proving fruitless. Surprisingly Wilt leaves out of his narrative Hitler’s failure to provide support to the Iraqi rebels (where early military intervention could have changed the outcome of the Anglo-Iraqi war), the Palestinians, and the Arab states more broadly. Also left unexplored is Hitler’s most critical strategic blunder which Fuller (The Decisive Battles of the Western World v3) believes ‘would in all probability have led to the complete overthrow of the Soviet colossus within a few months.’ Had Hitler advanced into the Soviet Union ‘as a liberator, not as a conqueror’, he could have enlisted the Belarussians, Ukrainians, Turkomans and peoples of Baltic States as allies.
Wilt argues that Hitler did not really care about the welfare of his troops but, by contrast that this ‘was simply not part of Churchill’s makeup.’ (p18) This assertion is not supported by any evidence. Time and again Churchill ordered positions to be held to the last man. For example, when Allied forces withdrew from British Somaliland in August 1940, Churchill excoriated Wavell via cable, labelling the low casualty numbers on the British side a mark of blatant cowardice. Wavell’s response – “A big butcher's bill is not necessarily evidence of good tactics.” – piqued Churchill’s anger and was not forgiven, ultimately contributing to Churchill’s decision to fire Wavell in June 1941. Churchill also disregarded the welfare of his troops in Singapore which he exhorted that there be "no question of surrender to be entertained until after protracting fighting among the ruins of Singapore city."
Wilt claims ‘there was considerable give-and-take between the nerve center in England and the tentacles in the war theatres’. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. It was the nerve center in England, which in practice means the autocratic Churchill, who insisted the pursuit of the defeated Italians in Libya be stopped; that troops be deployed to Crete and diverted to Iraq; that an inadequate Australian and New Zealand force be sent to Greece; that limited Navy resources be used to attack the French, and used to bombard Tripoli. There was no give-and-take. Churchill insisted on the deployments against the advice of Wavell, threatening him with dismissal and ultimately replacing him.
Wilt claims that British military leadership was responsible to the war cabinet, a collective body, and contrasts this to the Hitler’s dominance over German military leadership. (p35) This assertion is contradicted by the experience of Australian Prime Minister Menzies, who fumed against the dictatorial ways of Churchill. In his diary Menzies complained that the British War Cabinet failed to challenge Churchill. Further, in 1941 the War Cabinet failed to challenge Churchill's and then Eden’s fatal preoccupation with Greece. The War Cabinet did not intervene to ensure that an accurate military appreciation had been received before troops were committed. Nor did it ensure that the Australian and New Zealand governments had received the necessary information before allowing their troops to be deployed in the Balkans. They also failed to question the adequacy of Allied resources applied to all the other task for which Wavell was responsible, including defending the newly captured Tripolitania, maintaining the offensive in East Africa, and quelling the nascent uprising in Iraq. The result in both the Balkans and North Africa was, like the Churchill-inspired venture in Norway, a debacle.
Wilt discusses the British High Command but makes no comments on how the British communicated and coordinated with the Dominion governments. This was particularly relevant in the Mediterranean campaign where the Dominion forces deployed, including Australian, New Zealand, South Africa, Indian and African troops, typically outnumbered the British forces. Wilt concludes that ‘it is difficult to fault the organizational structure of the British High Command...’ (p41). But fault is not difficult to find. Wilt’s claim is only true if you adopt the position, as many in the British High Command seemed to, that Dominion troops were effectively ‘Foreign Legions’ (or mercenaries).
Despite the gaps noted, Wilt’s work is comprehensively, if not entirely thoroughly, researched with 51 pages of notes and a 27-page bibliography. Somewhat surprisingly however, Wilt leaves a large number of quotes in the text unreferenced, despite extensive use of endnotes, and on a number of occasions texts referenced in the end notes are not actually listed in the bibliography, or the reference in the endnotes refers to a title which is truncated in the bibliography. And, disappointingly, there are errors. For example a reference to CUS(40) CAB77/5 should be COS(40) CAB79/5 (p325). Given Wilt claims to have written this for historical specialists as well as the general reader, this is just sloppy.
More concerning than errors in the end notes are the errors in the text. For example Wilt has Manstein meeting Hitler on 17 January 1940 when the meeting actually occured, as noted in the dates in the references he cites as well as by other authors, on 17 February 1940. This is yet another example in the decline of editorial standards by publishers.
Overall, Wilts War from the Top is a rewarding read, particularly for a critical reader who has enough understanding of the history of World War 2 to not simply accept Wilt’s assertions without question.
Wilts explores this theme in four steps:
1. the roles of the national war leaders – Hitler and Churchill
2. the high-command systems – the mechanism the military used for running the war
3. the strategies worked out by the military decision makers
4. examples of the execution of their various strategies, including their successes and failures
The first three steps are addressed in his opening five chapters in which Wilt explores decisions made when directing, running and planning the war.
The final step is explored in the following six chapters. Wilt looks at eleven campaigns by each side to advance his theme. However although he selects eighteen land, sea, and air battles in these campaigns (four are explored from each side’s perspective), “Wilt’s focus is not on the battles but rather how and why the two antagonists conducted the war as they did.’.
Wilt provides some genuine insights on the key protagonists. He notes that Hitler ‘was bright – so bright, in fact, that he often put the generals and bureaucrats to shame, especially when it came to detailed knowledge on particular subjects.’ There are insightful précis on the characters of many of the German generals including von Brauchitsch, Halder, Jodl, and Keitel.
Wilt’s analysis is by necessity, undertaken at a high-level. However this makes it prone to superficial generalisations, and selective use or interpretation of examples. Wilt seems to have a blindspot, or a bias, in his assessment of British strategic leadership and Churchill in particular.
Wilt offers the sweeping generalisation that ‘Hitler would not take no for an answer. Churchill would.’ But there are so many counter-examples that could have been quoted to make this assertion meaningless. It would have been more accurate to note that Churchill surrounded himself with sycophants, used his position to bully people into supporting him and fired those who did not. Australian Prime Minister Menzies experienced this in February 1941 when he wrote sourly of Churchill’s preference for “Yes-men”…’ (David Day, Menzies & Churchill at War)
Wilt claims that ‘one of Churchill’s most noteworthy characteristics was his ability to separate the important from the unimportant, to get quickly to the heart of a matter, to simplify complex issues.’ Wilt offers no evidence for this sweeping generalisation. However there are numerous opposing examples. Lewin (The Chief) tells us how in August 1940 Churchill sent an ‘unprecedented document’ to Wavell which set out in ‘imperious clarity the dispositions and proper objectives’, in Churchill’s uninformed view, of all the forces in Wavell’s command as well as, incredibly, detailed instructions on road surfaces, canal widths and wells! Lewin's conclusion about Churchill, that ‘Out-of-date ideas, lack of technical knowledge and the passion for action could lead him to nag and rage over matters about which it was obvious … that he was wrong’, should have formed part of Wilt’s analysis. More examples are noted in the biography of General Alan Brooke, the British CIGS (War Diaries). Wilt even contradicts himself when he notes that Churchill ‘was constantly concerned about minutiae’ (p7-8).
Wilt tells us (twice, on page 18 and again at page 41) that ‘in general … Churchill appreciated the value of allies, Hitler did not.’ He highlights how the British, in contrast to the Germans, erected structures which took into account the views of their allies, including the French and then the Americans. He could have reinforced this by including Churchill’s quote: “The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.”
By contrast Wilt asserts that Hitler ‘never seemed to understand the necessity of allies in conducting war on such a vast scale’. However, this is not supported by the evidence. Through a combination of political and military pressure Hitler convinced Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and the Slovak Republic to join the Axis. In the second half of 1940 he went to great lengths to enlist Spain and Vichy France, but their onerous and conflicting requirements, and the Axis’ military setbacks resulted in his overtures proving fruitless. Surprisingly Wilt leaves out of his narrative Hitler’s failure to provide support to the Iraqi rebels (where early military intervention could have changed the outcome of the Anglo-Iraqi war), the Palestinians, and the Arab states more broadly. Also left unexplored is Hitler’s most critical strategic blunder which Fuller (The Decisive Battles of the Western World v3) believes ‘would in all probability have led to the complete overthrow of the Soviet colossus within a few months.’ Had Hitler advanced into the Soviet Union ‘as a liberator, not as a conqueror’, he could have enlisted the Belarussians, Ukrainians, Turkomans and peoples of Baltic States as allies.
Wilt argues that Hitler did not really care about the welfare of his troops but, by contrast that this ‘was simply not part of Churchill’s makeup.’ (p18) This assertion is not supported by any evidence. Time and again Churchill ordered positions to be held to the last man. For example, when Allied forces withdrew from British Somaliland in August 1940, Churchill excoriated Wavell via cable, labelling the low casualty numbers on the British side a mark of blatant cowardice. Wavell’s response – “A big butcher's bill is not necessarily evidence of good tactics.” – piqued Churchill’s anger and was not forgiven, ultimately contributing to Churchill’s decision to fire Wavell in June 1941. Churchill also disregarded the welfare of his troops in Singapore which he exhorted that there be "no question of surrender to be entertained until after protracting fighting among the ruins of Singapore city."
Wilt claims ‘there was considerable give-and-take between the nerve center in England and the tentacles in the war theatres’. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. It was the nerve center in England, which in practice means the autocratic Churchill, who insisted the pursuit of the defeated Italians in Libya be stopped; that troops be deployed to Crete and diverted to Iraq; that an inadequate Australian and New Zealand force be sent to Greece; that limited Navy resources be used to attack the French, and used to bombard Tripoli. There was no give-and-take. Churchill insisted on the deployments against the advice of Wavell, threatening him with dismissal and ultimately replacing him.
Wilt claims that British military leadership was responsible to the war cabinet, a collective body, and contrasts this to the Hitler’s dominance over German military leadership. (p35) This assertion is contradicted by the experience of Australian Prime Minister Menzies, who fumed against the dictatorial ways of Churchill. In his diary Menzies complained that the British War Cabinet failed to challenge Churchill. Further, in 1941 the War Cabinet failed to challenge Churchill's and then Eden’s fatal preoccupation with Greece. The War Cabinet did not intervene to ensure that an accurate military appreciation had been received before troops were committed. Nor did it ensure that the Australian and New Zealand governments had received the necessary information before allowing their troops to be deployed in the Balkans. They also failed to question the adequacy of Allied resources applied to all the other task for which Wavell was responsible, including defending the newly captured Tripolitania, maintaining the offensive in East Africa, and quelling the nascent uprising in Iraq. The result in both the Balkans and North Africa was, like the Churchill-inspired venture in Norway, a debacle.
Wilt discusses the British High Command but makes no comments on how the British communicated and coordinated with the Dominion governments. This was particularly relevant in the Mediterranean campaign where the Dominion forces deployed, including Australian, New Zealand, South Africa, Indian and African troops, typically outnumbered the British forces. Wilt concludes that ‘it is difficult to fault the organizational structure of the British High Command...’ (p41). But fault is not difficult to find. Wilt’s claim is only true if you adopt the position, as many in the British High Command seemed to, that Dominion troops were effectively ‘Foreign Legions’ (or mercenaries).
Despite the gaps noted, Wilt’s work is comprehensively, if not entirely thoroughly, researched with 51 pages of notes and a 27-page bibliography. Somewhat surprisingly however, Wilt leaves a large number of quotes in the text unreferenced, despite extensive use of endnotes, and on a number of occasions texts referenced in the end notes are not actually listed in the bibliography, or the reference in the endnotes refers to a title which is truncated in the bibliography. And, disappointingly, there are errors. For example a reference to CUS(40) CAB77/5 should be COS(40) CAB79/5 (p325). Given Wilt claims to have written this for historical specialists as well as the general reader, this is just sloppy.
More concerning than errors in the end notes are the errors in the text. For example Wilt has Manstein meeting Hitler on 17 January 1940 when the meeting actually occured, as noted in the dates in the references he cites as well as by other authors, on 17 February 1940. This is yet another example in the decline of editorial standards by publishers.
Overall, Wilts War from the Top is a rewarding read, particularly for a critical reader who has enough understanding of the history of World War 2 to not simply accept Wilt’s assertions without question.
March 5, 2008
This is some depressing Shit. But it is a very interesting book if you can get throught the anthropology gobbldey-gook language. But Seriously, a very unique take on the process of memory-formation in the middle east.
In a place so strife with political and religious violence, people use memory to create a platform for subversion of the daily traumas that they are forced to endure. It works in a similar way to forms of folklore that allow for a critique on the ruling powers.
Im reading it for my SR Seminar which is all about memory. One of the most thought provoking classes Ive ever taken.
In a place so strife with political and religious violence, people use memory to create a platform for subversion of the daily traumas that they are forced to endure. It works in a similar way to forms of folklore that allow for a critique on the ruling powers.
Im reading it for my SR Seminar which is all about memory. One of the most thought provoking classes Ive ever taken.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews