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Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Gifford Lectures) by Onora O'Neill
Why has autonomy been a leading idea in philosophical writing on bioethics, and why has trust been marginal? In this important book, Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy so widely relied on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine rather than support relations of trust. She shows how Kant's non-individualistic view of autonomy provides a stronger basis for an approach to medicine, science and biotechnology, and does not marginalize untrustworthiness, while also explaining why trustworthy individuals and institutions are often undeservingly mistrusted. Her arguments are illustrated with issues raised by practices such as the use of genetic information by the police or insurers, research using human tissues, uses of new reproductive technologies, and media practices for reporting on medicine, science and technology. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics will appeal to a wide range of readers in ethics, bioethics and related disciplines.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
Hardcover
First published January 1, 2002
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About the author
Onora O'Neill
33 books32 followersOnora Sylvia O'Neill, Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve CH CBE FBA FRS (born 23 August 1941) is a philosopher and a crossbench member of the House of Lords.
The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.
She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
(from Wikipedia)
The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.
She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
(from Wikipedia)
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 21, 2016
Mainly limited to medical ethics, with a lot about new reproductive and genetic technologies. There is a long critical section about the media at the end.
I was intrigued by her concept from Kant of 'principled autonomy' – this did seem helpful and I can think of less awkward ways to interpret it without the language of law. She suggests that action/obligation is the best grounding for rights, which I also found helpful. What obligations for action are created when we define rights?
I couldn't really get a takeaway from the stuff about trust, and felt sometimes she was overly hostile to 'counter cultur[e]' but her realistic viewpoint, linking arguments and principles to real problems, make the discussion serious and worth thinking about. I think this is a relatively accessible philosophy book, and didn't have trouble following the arguments.
I was intrigued by her concept from Kant of 'principled autonomy' – this did seem helpful and I can think of less awkward ways to interpret it without the language of law. She suggests that action/obligation is the best grounding for rights, which I also found helpful. What obligations for action are created when we define rights?
I couldn't really get a takeaway from the stuff about trust, and felt sometimes she was overly hostile to 'counter cultur[e]' but her realistic viewpoint, linking arguments and principles to real problems, make the discussion serious and worth thinking about. I think this is a relatively accessible philosophy book, and didn't have trouble following the arguments.
November 1, 2021
The best book I know on bioethics from a Kantian perspective, especially the first half on the meaning of autonomy in Kant and in Mill, and how both diverge from the meaning it has come to have in bioethics, so that neither can be used to support the principle of autonomy.
March 9, 2007
Okay, I know some (ahem, Ms. Posey) don't want to be bothered by her. But, what can I say, I'm a sucker for relational autonomy.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews