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Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950
Chronicles the showdown between the U.S. Airforce and the Navy over the role of carrier aviation in the national security framework.
- GenresHistory
442 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
November 18, 2012
Provides an overview of the inter-Service battles that waged in the late-1940s. Barlow's goal was to highlight the importance that the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949 in saving naval carrier aviation. However, though he does identify some of the key differences in perspective on national defense strategy that shaped the debates, Barlow's analysis seems to be more geared to the political machinations that were the real driving force behind the revolt.
An excellent examination of post-War defense politics; a less than useful examination of divergent views on the role of air power in the post-War US military.
An excellent examination of post-War defense politics; a less than useful examination of divergent views on the role of air power in the post-War US military.
September 5, 2022
In the 1920s, the Army Air Corps attempted to strip the U.S. Navy of its aviation units, believing all military aviation its birthright. After the U.S. Air Force was founded as an independent branch of the military in 1947, it made another effort to take over all military aviation. Here are some of the battle lines in the resultant power struggle:
• Prior to 1947, the War and Navy Departments had been independent, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy had been part of the president’s cabinet. In 1947, the military was combined into a unified Department of Defense, with the Secretary of Defense reporting to the president and the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army and Navy reporting to the Secretary of Defense. This unified structure gave the Air force the opening it needed to press its case for control of all military aviation.
• The Navy had traditionally been viewed as America’s first line of defense, its walls of wood in the days of sail and its walls of steel afterwards. The Air Force believed that it could replace the Navy in this role by patrolling with long-range aircraft. I find this quite interesting. In the pivotal battle of Midway, land-based bombers were used against the Japanese fleet but failed to hit anything because high-level bombers and the dumb bombs of that era could be easily evaded by a ship, even one as large as an aircraft carrier or battleship. It took short-range dive bombers from aircraft carriers to hit and disable the Japanese carriers. Apparently, the Air Force never got the memo or ignored it.
• World War II had featured strategic bombing of German and and Japanese cities and industrial facilities. Studies conducted after the war questioned its effectiveness for several reasons. The accuracy of even daylight bombing wasn’t particularly great. German arms output hadn’t been significantly reduced by a massive air campaign, and Germany had surrendered only after almost the whole country had been overrun by ground forces. The immolation of numerous Japanese cities had failed to break Japan’s will to fight, and Japan surrendered only after the atomic bomb had been dropped on two of its cities. In spite of these studies, the Air Force retained its commitment to strategic bombing while modifying it to incorporate the atomic bomb as its primary weapon.
• Recognizing that the most likely adversary after World War II would be the Soviet Union, a large continental power, the Air Force felt that the Navy would be a minor contributor. The Navy, in contrast, envisioned a responsibility for control of the sea, a legacy of Alfred Thayer Mahan (The Influence of Sea Power upon History) that was confirmed in both world wars when Germany, a continental power with an ineffective surface fleet, used a modest submarine fleet to target Britain’s merchant fleet and twice almost succeeded in starving the British Isles into submission.
• The Air Force’s idea of a war with the Soviet Union involved breaking the will of its population to fight with a barrage of atomic bombs against its population centers. In a dictatorship such as the one overseen by a butcher like Joseph Stalin, the will of the people means nothing. In fact, the Navy had other objections to this approach. First, the American people would probably have strong moral objections to this style of warfare. Second, accuracy of high-level bombing under combat conditions meant that even a nuclear strike on a military target might be ineffective. Third, the B-36 bombers the Air Force had in mind were slow and easily intercepted by the fighters the Soviet Union was beginning to field. Finally, if the Department of Defense put all its eggs into the B-36 basket and it failed, what was the backup plan?
• Because of the size and weight of early atomic bombs, they could be delivered only via land-based bombers within the purview of the Air Force. The Navy, having fought an air war in the Pacific, recognized that in the event of war, there would be viable targets out of range for land-based bombers but vulnerable to attack by carrier aircraft. Any effort by the Navy to get carrier planes capable of delivering atomic bombs were viewed as turf violations by the Air Force.
• The Navy, wanting to use its carriers for tactical deployment of nuclear weapons envisioned a flush-deck carrier, one that lacked an island. A plane large enough to carry a nuclear weapon of that vintage required a substantial wingspan, and the island of a straight-deck carrier constituted an obstacle for take-offs and landings of such a large plane.
• The Air Force perspective of carrier planes had been formed in the inter-war years when they were inferior to land-based aircraft. The need to take off from a short runway had resulted in weight restrictions, and some of that weight was tied up with more robust landing gear and a tailhook. As a result, they could carry less armament than comparable land-based aircraft. World War II had changed that, and newer, more powerful carrier planes such as the Hellcat and Avenger had gone head-to-head with land-based Japanese aircraft and won. The Navy had caught up, but the Air Force didn’t get the memo.
• The Air Force thought that it was easy to learn how to take off from and land on an aircraft carrier, that they didn’t need pilots dedicated full-time to carrier aviation, that pilots reassigned from an air base to a carrier could easily enough adapt to flying from a carrier. The Navy, in contrast, had twenty-five years of experience with carrier operations and knew just how difficult it was. Furthermore, it had fully integrated its pilots into its line officer structure. Aircraft carriers were commanded by aviators who had already had one command at sea. That allowed them to balance the needs of their air wings with the needs of the rest of the fleet, something that would be much more difficult without career naval aviators.
• After a war ends, there is almost always a push to reduce military spending, and the different branches compete for part of a seemingly ever smaller pie, and this is often accomplished by denigrating the contribution of the other branches. A newcomer, the Air Force proved to be a quick learn and got good at denigrating the Navy. In the meantime, the Navy’s civilian leadership wanted to be a team player and didn’t fight back although the Admirals recognized that their vision of national defense was completely incompatible with what the Air Force was promulgating. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense was increasingly siding with the Air Force.
In the revolt of the admirals, a number of admirals, culminating with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), testified before Congress outlining their vision of modern warfare and their concerns with the one championed by the Air Force. The pro-Air-Force Secretary of Defense and, for that matter, the compliant Secretary of the Navy, who lacked any naval experience, had wanted them to shut up and salute and just tell Congress what the Secretary of Defense wanted them to hear. Au contraire, the admirals gave Congress testimony educated by their own years of experience. The CNO paid the price for his honest; he was promptly fired. However, this testimony earned the Navy champions in Congress, and the military of today started to take shape. Naval aviation was preserved. The Navy never got its flush-deck carrier, but it did get the more useful and versatile angled flight deck supercarrier.
The author is not denigrating the Air Force; nor am I. It performs a vital role in national defense. Its problem is that it developed an outsized view of its role, value and capabilities and, had it gotten its way, would have undermined national security. I applaud the admirals who at the risk of their careers took a stand for a more balanced approach to our nation’s defense.
• Prior to 1947, the War and Navy Departments had been independent, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy had been part of the president’s cabinet. In 1947, the military was combined into a unified Department of Defense, with the Secretary of Defense reporting to the president and the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army and Navy reporting to the Secretary of Defense. This unified structure gave the Air force the opening it needed to press its case for control of all military aviation.
• The Navy had traditionally been viewed as America’s first line of defense, its walls of wood in the days of sail and its walls of steel afterwards. The Air Force believed that it could replace the Navy in this role by patrolling with long-range aircraft. I find this quite interesting. In the pivotal battle of Midway, land-based bombers were used against the Japanese fleet but failed to hit anything because high-level bombers and the dumb bombs of that era could be easily evaded by a ship, even one as large as an aircraft carrier or battleship. It took short-range dive bombers from aircraft carriers to hit and disable the Japanese carriers. Apparently, the Air Force never got the memo or ignored it.
• World War II had featured strategic bombing of German and and Japanese cities and industrial facilities. Studies conducted after the war questioned its effectiveness for several reasons. The accuracy of even daylight bombing wasn’t particularly great. German arms output hadn’t been significantly reduced by a massive air campaign, and Germany had surrendered only after almost the whole country had been overrun by ground forces. The immolation of numerous Japanese cities had failed to break Japan’s will to fight, and Japan surrendered only after the atomic bomb had been dropped on two of its cities. In spite of these studies, the Air Force retained its commitment to strategic bombing while modifying it to incorporate the atomic bomb as its primary weapon.
• Recognizing that the most likely adversary after World War II would be the Soviet Union, a large continental power, the Air Force felt that the Navy would be a minor contributor. The Navy, in contrast, envisioned a responsibility for control of the sea, a legacy of Alfred Thayer Mahan (The Influence of Sea Power upon History) that was confirmed in both world wars when Germany, a continental power with an ineffective surface fleet, used a modest submarine fleet to target Britain’s merchant fleet and twice almost succeeded in starving the British Isles into submission.
• The Air Force’s idea of a war with the Soviet Union involved breaking the will of its population to fight with a barrage of atomic bombs against its population centers. In a dictatorship such as the one overseen by a butcher like Joseph Stalin, the will of the people means nothing. In fact, the Navy had other objections to this approach. First, the American people would probably have strong moral objections to this style of warfare. Second, accuracy of high-level bombing under combat conditions meant that even a nuclear strike on a military target might be ineffective. Third, the B-36 bombers the Air Force had in mind were slow and easily intercepted by the fighters the Soviet Union was beginning to field. Finally, if the Department of Defense put all its eggs into the B-36 basket and it failed, what was the backup plan?
• Because of the size and weight of early atomic bombs, they could be delivered only via land-based bombers within the purview of the Air Force. The Navy, having fought an air war in the Pacific, recognized that in the event of war, there would be viable targets out of range for land-based bombers but vulnerable to attack by carrier aircraft. Any effort by the Navy to get carrier planes capable of delivering atomic bombs were viewed as turf violations by the Air Force.
• The Navy, wanting to use its carriers for tactical deployment of nuclear weapons envisioned a flush-deck carrier, one that lacked an island. A plane large enough to carry a nuclear weapon of that vintage required a substantial wingspan, and the island of a straight-deck carrier constituted an obstacle for take-offs and landings of such a large plane.
• The Air Force perspective of carrier planes had been formed in the inter-war years when they were inferior to land-based aircraft. The need to take off from a short runway had resulted in weight restrictions, and some of that weight was tied up with more robust landing gear and a tailhook. As a result, they could carry less armament than comparable land-based aircraft. World War II had changed that, and newer, more powerful carrier planes such as the Hellcat and Avenger had gone head-to-head with land-based Japanese aircraft and won. The Navy had caught up, but the Air Force didn’t get the memo.
• The Air Force thought that it was easy to learn how to take off from and land on an aircraft carrier, that they didn’t need pilots dedicated full-time to carrier aviation, that pilots reassigned from an air base to a carrier could easily enough adapt to flying from a carrier. The Navy, in contrast, had twenty-five years of experience with carrier operations and knew just how difficult it was. Furthermore, it had fully integrated its pilots into its line officer structure. Aircraft carriers were commanded by aviators who had already had one command at sea. That allowed them to balance the needs of their air wings with the needs of the rest of the fleet, something that would be much more difficult without career naval aviators.
• After a war ends, there is almost always a push to reduce military spending, and the different branches compete for part of a seemingly ever smaller pie, and this is often accomplished by denigrating the contribution of the other branches. A newcomer, the Air Force proved to be a quick learn and got good at denigrating the Navy. In the meantime, the Navy’s civilian leadership wanted to be a team player and didn’t fight back although the Admirals recognized that their vision of national defense was completely incompatible with what the Air Force was promulgating. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense was increasingly siding with the Air Force.
In the revolt of the admirals, a number of admirals, culminating with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), testified before Congress outlining their vision of modern warfare and their concerns with the one championed by the Air Force. The pro-Air-Force Secretary of Defense and, for that matter, the compliant Secretary of the Navy, who lacked any naval experience, had wanted them to shut up and salute and just tell Congress what the Secretary of Defense wanted them to hear. Au contraire, the admirals gave Congress testimony educated by their own years of experience. The CNO paid the price for his honest; he was promptly fired. However, this testimony earned the Navy champions in Congress, and the military of today started to take shape. Naval aviation was preserved. The Navy never got its flush-deck carrier, but it did get the more useful and versatile angled flight deck supercarrier.
The author is not denigrating the Air Force; nor am I. It performs a vital role in national defense. Its problem is that it developed an outsized view of its role, value and capabilities and, had it gotten its way, would have undermined national security. I applaud the admirals who at the risk of their careers took a stand for a more balanced approach to our nation’s defense.
October 27, 2024
A great book, providing a detailed history of the events surrounding the 1949 Congressional Hearings made famous by the adverse testimony of senior Navy Officers against the policies and budget decisions of the Department of Defense. The author, military historian Jeffrey Barlow, covers in detail the events leading up to, during, and after the hearings. At issue were the divergent views of military doctrine between the Navy and the Air Force, fueled by ongoing controversies with Department of Defense unification, budget limitations, and attempts by the Secretary of Defense to pursue strategic air power as a singular military doctrine. The book ties together the complex interplay of changing strategy, evolving military doctrine, and the scramble for new technology which defined the late 1940s. My revelation was that the "revolt of the Admirals" was preceded by a revolt of the Captains, as Barlow details the many actions undertaken by more junior Navy officers to ensure the Admirals were able to publicly express their concerns to Congress. Highly recommended for anyone interested in understanding the intricate dynamics of service relationships, technological advancement, and evolving doctrine that shaped the post-World War II military establishment. Includes a great assessment of why the Navy and Air Force developed such different approaches to their air power doctrine.
March 26, 2023
Superbly researched and referenced. The B-36 was a capable platform but overcome by technology evolution. Sometimes we have to adjust path and let go of the rice bowl. It's regretful that Navy Leaders had to resort to but I commend these men - and many leaders above them who were pulled into this challenge. I love jointness - everyone who has served joint usually has the same appreciation and we serve well together. We're now facing a new jointness of public/private partnering to align against the new threats to the Global Operating System. Here, we have mis/disinformation creating schisms both globally and nationally, and a rapidly evolving hybrid and asymmetric playing field. God help us.
Read
July 10, 2020Interesting!
Men who put service above self, challenged the politicians for the good of the country. For every professional military officer who's a louse (and they do exist) there are a score like these.
Men who put service above self, challenged the politicians for the good of the country. For every professional military officer who's a louse (and they do exist) there are a score like these.
Read
September 16, 2021A great coverage of the Admiral's revolt of the 1950s
September 8, 2016
This is a change of for me of what the history was that was the post war fight for what was the defense establishment. On one side we have the newly independent USAF trying to say big bombers and nukes and the bombers will get thru. On the other we have the USN who sees carrier aviation as vital not only to national defense but to the survival of the service and a independent arm from a combined forces sort of setup. The story is split two ways, we are presented with an early attempts by the USAF leadership to lead a fight to unify under the common "defense services" banner everything and everyone. The Air Force would get all the planes and the Army would get everything else. That leads to issues and to not only the infamous Key West Agreement but also an attempt to define what is post WW2 defense policy. The nuke'em till they glowed and then some was the USAF view but the premier units of SAC were barely up to the task in 1948 let alone in 1949. The Navy realizes they are getting shut out of nuclear war policy making and need to get in it. Fights over carriers, long range bombers and carriers with long range bombers lead to congressional oversight. Add in some civilians in leadership that wanted lackeys and not challenging debate, some naval aviators who don't know tact and we have a great story. The two downsides to this book, is its a little dense in the sense that the author gets lost in minutia of events and people. Second, the footnotes are thick as a jungle and what you need to reference numerous times to help fill in background material or even where the author amplifies analysis of that minutia. If you are interested in the history of the revolt and the fiasco that it has created even today with regards to who owns what in policy making then this is a good book.
March 24, 2010
In sum, the book is a series of he said/she said accounts while never getting down to the real questions of: 1)How did the AF view it's role in national defense? 2)How did Navy aviation view it's role in national defense? 3)Where did their views conflict? 4) How did history and independent contemporary analysis (OSD/academia) support the two viewpoints? 5) How/why did the conflict degrade into political maneuvering?
If someone was interested in this event I would recommend reading the conclusion and then chapters 9 and 10. The rest is void unless you are interested in personalities vice the substance of the debate.
The biggest thing I gained from the book was more background on USAF's fixation on strategic/nuclear bombardment in the years leading up to Vietnam. In other words, the fixation/tendency seems to be organizational since the Army Air Force's inception and it persists until the challenges of the Vietnam Air War and the efforts of the Fighter Mafia in the 1960s.
If someone was interested in this event I would recommend reading the conclusion and then chapters 9 and 10. The rest is void unless you are interested in personalities vice the substance of the debate.
The biggest thing I gained from the book was more background on USAF's fixation on strategic/nuclear bombardment in the years leading up to Vietnam. In other words, the fixation/tendency seems to be organizational since the Army Air Force's inception and it persists until the challenges of the Vietnam Air War and the efforts of the Fighter Mafia in the 1960s.
November 26, 2012
To the extent that this book describes the DETAILED ins and outs of the interservice rivalry and animosity that existed in the wake of NSC 1947 and the end of WWII, it does a fine job. Where it falls short, in my opinion, is supporting its contention that the "Revolt of the Admirals" was critical to the future of naval aviation. There is some scant anecdotal evidence that the testimony was key to future procurement of a flush-deck carrier (necessary for big atomic-bomb carrying planes), but that's about it. I'd have been more satisfied if the author simply set forth to tell the "behind-the-scenes" story of the revolt without trying to tie a lesson to it.
January 22, 2016
Clear and Well-Written
Though this book was originally produced as an academic work, it is blissfully-free of the well-known defect of that form - that is to say dull, jargon-filled impenetrability. Instead, this is a clear and excellent account of the strategic thinking of a portion of the senior leadership of the Navy and Air Force during the early days of the Cold War. While that might seem like an arcane and irrelevant topic today, the work is in fact shockingly relevant to the present and represents essential reading for anyone who wants to think seriously about the future of the armed forces.
Though this book was originally produced as an academic work, it is blissfully-free of the well-known defect of that form - that is to say dull, jargon-filled impenetrability. Instead, this is a clear and excellent account of the strategic thinking of a portion of the senior leadership of the Navy and Air Force during the early days of the Cold War. While that might seem like an arcane and irrelevant topic today, the work is in fact shockingly relevant to the present and represents essential reading for anyone who wants to think seriously about the future of the armed forces.
July 4, 2007
A must read for readers interested in how the Navy shifted to a Carrier based vice Battleship based Navy. A clear picture of the infighting between the Navy and Army Air Forces/US Air Force dealing with control of forces and stratigic composition.
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