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Arnhem 1944
On September 17, 1944, over 2,000 transport aircraft lifted off from airfields across England and set a course for Holland. They were the first wave of the largest airborne operation in history, code-named Operation Market Garden. Their task was to open a 60-mile corridor for Allied ground forces from the Belgian border to Arnhem on the Lower Rhine. Nine days later, the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division were evacuated from a precarious foothold 7 miles west of Arnhem, having failed utterly. William Buckingham’s account, based on new research, unearths the reasons why the attack really failed.
- GenresHistory
176 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review
June 13, 2017
Mixed thoughts:
On one hand, Buckingham provides a sound general argument that the operation failed due to planning. He takes aim at Browning for various planning flaws, Brereton for poor planning and not taking new intelligence into account, the transport wing commander for refusing to fly multiple air-lifts, the RAF for not taking army considerations into effect, and Gavin and Urquhart for not making a stand and demanding a change to the proposed use of their forces and their landing zones. These arguments, coupled with severe criticism of various formations taking part in the operation, make for a very interesting an eye-opening read.
However, the book is rife with speculation, hyperbolic comments, and jumping to unsupported conclusions. No primary sources are consulted either, so there is no real re-evaluation of what the original sources have to say or what they could help us learn. Furthermore, the book feels like a 200+ page character assassination of Frederick Browning. While Buckingham highlights the man's flaws and errors, he does so so heavy handily that one is left with the impression of a certain bias and an unwillingness to take Buckingham's arguments seriously until other sources have been consulted to build a more rounded picture of the man.
On one hand, Buckingham provides a sound general argument that the operation failed due to planning. He takes aim at Browning for various planning flaws, Brereton for poor planning and not taking new intelligence into account, the transport wing commander for refusing to fly multiple air-lifts, the RAF for not taking army considerations into effect, and Gavin and Urquhart for not making a stand and demanding a change to the proposed use of their forces and their landing zones. These arguments, coupled with severe criticism of various formations taking part in the operation, make for a very interesting an eye-opening read.
However, the book is rife with speculation, hyperbolic comments, and jumping to unsupported conclusions. No primary sources are consulted either, so there is no real re-evaluation of what the original sources have to say or what they could help us learn. Furthermore, the book feels like a 200+ page character assassination of Frederick Browning. While Buckingham highlights the man's flaws and errors, he does so so heavy handily that one is left with the impression of a certain bias and an unwillingness to take Buckingham's arguments seriously until other sources have been consulted to build a more rounded picture of the man.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review