Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1962 by Joseph L. Harsh

by Joseph L. Harsh

WINNER OF THE 1999 JEFFERSON DAVIS AWARD Complementing Confederate Tide Rising, this detailed account focuses on the military campaign itself. Antietam languishes in the long, obscuring shadow cast by Gettysburg and Harsh advocates rethinking the Maryland campaign. He promotes the argument that Antietam was one of the most interesting, critical, and potentially enlightening episodes in U.S. history.

Genres: Civil War, History, American Civil War, Military Fiction, Military History

Paperback

First published September 10, 1999

Reviews

[Ecthelion · Rating 5 out of 5]

The definitive study of the Maryland Campaign.

It is my personal opinion that this study is FAR superior to the other popular work, Landscape Turned Red by Stephen Sears. Where Sears gets entangled by his own biases, Harsh sparkles, by giving well reasoned and evidenced interpretations of history. When reading this book you will be left with a fair critique of Lee and well reasoned praise of George McClellan.

The lasting impression I have of this work is that it completely revolutionizes the way history interprets Little Mac’s management of the campaign. Where for decades he has been spit roasted as sluggish and inept, Harsh argues positively that for these 3 weeks or so in Sept. 1862, Mac effectively saved the Union. It’s a point well reasoned, and one can’t help but agree.

Worth a read for any student of the Civil War.

[Brian Miracle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great analysis of Lee’s Maryland Campaign. As the title indicates, this covers the entire campaign, not just the Battle of Antietam. In fact, Antietam is covered in only about 60 pages.

The book attempts to get inside Robert E Lee’s head and the reasons for the campaign and various stages of it (the siege of Harper’s Ferry, the stand at South Mountain, and the Battle of Antietam and the subsequent retreat). It largely succeeds at this, with the last chapter being a discussion of historian opinions on the campaign. Recommended for a good understanding of the Maryland Campaign.

[Nicholas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Far from the glossy perspectives of some history books, Harsh's Taken at the Flood takes excruciating effort to analyze the correspondence of Lee, President Jefferson Davis, and the multitude of Confederate officers involved in the fights at South Mountain, Harper's Ferry, and Antietam. What he uncovers is a strong argument that Lee's foray into Maryland--the South's first incursion into Union territory--was not about trying to obtain foreign recognition, attack cities such as Baltimore or Philadelphia, or even occupy Union lands. Lee's invasion of the North was conducted to relieve the pressure on Richmond and grant the lands of Virginia some respite from constant ravaging. By moving into northern land, Lee hoped to panic the Lincoln administration and force the Union army--heavily demoralized and fractured after three months of defeat at Lee's hands--to leave the confines of D.C. and give battle. Lee would then maneuver and destroy the weakened Union army. Lee acknowledged that the South's manpower and resources were already starting to dwindle. Riding the crest of multiple victories since taking over the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee felt that time was running out and that potentially the penultimate opportunity to end the war with one final campaign now presented itself. This campaign could complete the demoralization of the Union army and the northern public and force peace overtures by the Lincoln administration. Harsh reveals Lee's campaign plan, however, was far from well thought out. Lee made dangerous assumptions that the Union armies at Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah Valley, where Lee wanted to establish his supply chain while campaigning in Maryland, would be vacated by the Union soldiers when they discovered Lee maneuvering northwards. The Union armies in the Valley elected to stand and fight, completely disrupting Lee's plans, forcing him to divide his army. George McClellan also departed the protective confines of D.C. much earlier than Lee predicted, resulting in heavy fighting at the gaps of South Mountain, where Lee's divided army took casualties it couldn't afford. Forced to wait for reunification with his army, Lee relinquished the initiative to McClellan. Pushing his soldiers too much over three months of campaigning resulted in broken and exhausted men, regardless of their high morale. Massive straggling culminated and Lee conceded that it directly contributed to his rebuke at Antietam. Indeed, Harsh pointedly states that Lee's obvious offensive mindedness blinded him to crafting a flexible campaign, one that also failed to properly utilize cavalry. After withdrawing from Antietam, Lee boldly maneuvered to resume the offensive by invading Maryland again, this time via Williamsport near Hagerstown. Only McClellan's probing at Lee's rear jostled the southern commander's realization that his time was up and his campaign was over. His campaign resulted in 31% casualties and the loss of over 50% of his line commanders. One cannot ignore Harsh's intriguing assessment of a very aggressive, and not always very tactically brilliant, Robert E. Lee.

[Vince · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't know that one could add more to their understanding of the Antietam Campaign after reading this book. Harsh covers everything in great detail (hour by hour in some cases) from 2nd Bull Run through the fight at Sharpsburg mostly from Lee's perspective, but also filling in with some of McClellan's as well. Quite a bit of Harsh's analysis is speculative, and even though there may be disagreements with some of his conclusions and interpretations, he is generally very convincing. The amount of detail makes it rough going from time to time (definitely not recommended as a bedtime read), but the attempt to get into the mind of Lee provides much for the reader to chew on if you stick with it.