"Rebel Rulers skillfully blends theoretical insights into the factors that explain effective governance with rich ethnographic research to produce a thought-provoking analysis of how rebels (attempt) to govern the populations under their control." ― Journal of Politics Rebel groups are often portrayed as predators, their leaders little more than warlords. In conflicts large and small, however, insurgents frequently take and hold territory, establishing sophisticated systems of governance that deliver extensive public services to civilians under their control. From police and courts, schools, hospitals, and taxation systems to more symbolic expressions such as official flags and anthems, some rebels are able to appropriate functions of the modern state, often to great effect in generating civilian compliance. Other insurgent organizations struggle to provide even the most basic services and suffer from the local unrest and international condemnation that result. Rebel Rulers is informed by Zachariah Cherian Mampilly's extensive fieldwork in rebel-controlled areas. Focusing on three insurgent organizations—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in Congo, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan—Mampilly's comparative analysis shows that rebel leaders design governance systems in response to pressures from three main sources. They must take into consideration the needs of local civilians, who can challenge rebel rule in various ways. They must deal with internal factions that threaten their control. And they must respond to the transnational actors that operate in most contemporary conflict zones. The development of insurgent governments can benefit civilians even as they enable rebels to assert control over their newly attained and sometimes chaotic territories.
On one level, this book examines why certain rebel movements form governance structures and why those structures vary across rebel groups, focusing on the the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma in DRC. On a deeper level, it critiques ideas of the international state system in the Westphalian order, by showing how entities other than internationally-recognized states are capable of providing political and social order. At the same time, the author argues that we should not necessarily view rebel governance structures as proto-states or examples of new state formation, because rebel groups are always constrained by their state rivals and the lack of international recognition.
Pretty good polisci material on insurgent groups and the ways they govern territory they control. Mampilly’s case studies are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; SPLA/M, the confederation of rebels that eventually broke South Sudan away from plain old Sudan; and the Rally for Congolese Democracy, one of the major factions behind the overthrow of Laurent Kabila.
Mampilly arranges them in strata according to their governance success. The Tamil Tigers had a very robust governance structure, complete with courts, banks, health service, etc- this was written before their leader, Prabhakaran, essentially took his whole group with him in a doomed last stand against the Lankan army. SPLA/M was considerably less capable, but in a way almost as impressive in keeping the many ethnic groups involved working more or less together (alas, this also collapsed soon after South Sudan gained independence). Finally, RDC was never capable of doing much governance beyond extorting merchants at border crossings.
The conclusions Mampilly draws from his comparisons are pretty interesting, and I learned some things. Among others, the Tamil Tigers allowed the Lankan government to act in its territories for the purposes of welfare distribution (Sri Lanka apparently has/had a generous welfare state) and education. This reminds me of the stories I heard from Syria about the annual SAT-equivalent went ahead all throughout the civil war, administered on all sides- war is war, but the exams, especially in a former French colony, are the exams. Mampilly argues that insurgents do better at governance where they could inherit or work with robust state structures. This seems tricky, given that those seem to make insurgency less likely, but also seems to make sense.
In general, Mampilly seems to have a sensible perspective, refusing to act shocked by the sheer presence of insurgents like a lot of liberal/conservative social scientists, or attributing different outcomes to ineffable factors like “leadership” or “spirit.” A lot of success or failure comes down to facts on the ground- previous level of development, ethnic/sectarian rivalry, length of insurgency (longer insurgencies allow a Maoist strategy, which is the most successful in terms of creating a shadow government). It’s polisci so it’s not scintillating writing, but there’s much worse out there. In general, pretty good. ****
The author asks why do some rebel organisations establish sophisticated administrations that provide considerable public goods to civilians under their control, while others do little if anything for their denizens? Looking at cases from DRC, South Sudan and Sri Lanka on a spectrum from ineffective, to partially effective (provisions of security), and effective (security and public goods), he argues that the strategy sought by rebel groups depends on the state structures present before the war, as well as the ethnicity of those governing (contrasted to those governed). Additionally, he cites processes endogenous to the course of war as explaining the outcome of whether or not rebel groups are able to establish effective governance.
This has definitely helped me to better understand the variety of things to consider when thinking about why armed rebel groups form and how they can take on an effective non-state governance service for civilians and also the importance of this being effective for the protection of civilians who in sub Saharan Africa are often neglected by the internationally recognised state.