This is excellent book on practical reasoning. Written for a popular audience, it addresses fundamental questions about moral reasoning in a plain language. But its simple presentation should not lead one to overlook the depth of the analysis. Without drawing such links, Gula's account of discernment recalls Nussbaum's work on Aristotle's particularism, Bernard Williams on internal reasons and the limits of abstract moral principles, Scanlon's claims concerning the normative nature of the act descriptions underlying moral absolutes, and Charles Taylor's notion of strong evaluation. All of this is to say that Gula's plain language masks a sophistication that should not be easily dismissed. Finally, anyone seeking to understand Pope Francis's understanding of discernment and Chapter 8 of Amoris Laetitia could benefit from reading this book. Especially interesting - and lacking from much work in moral theory - is an explicit appreciation of the distinction but necessary interrelation between the subjective appropriation of moral norms and the defense of their objectivity. Moralists would do well to recall this distinction and to consider how it ought to impact moral theory.
The author covers all the bases. In the first chapter, he defines conscience, and in the subsequent chapters, he names and then explores the various factors that enter into ethical reasoning. The book ends with a case history of medical ethics. The author notes that people come to priests for moral advice on medical issues more than any other.