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Naval Air War in Korea
“In The Naval Air War in Korea, Dr. Hallion has captured the fact, feeling, and fancy of a very important conflict in aviation history, including the highly significant facets of the transition from piston to jet-propelled combat aircraft.”—Norman Polmar, author of Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th Edition
244 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1988
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About the author
Richard P. Hallion
73 books1 followerRichard P. Hallion is Senior Adviser for Air and Space Issues, Directorate for Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
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June 6, 2022
On July 3, 1950, a squadron of F9F Panther fighter jets from the U.S.S. Valley Forge appeared over the skies of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. Targeting the main airfields throughout the city, they strafed the Soviet-built fighters of the North Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) caught by surprise on the ground. The jets were soon followed by a force of F4U Corsair and AD Skyraider attack planes from the aircraft carrier, which bombed hangars and the local railroad network. By the time they were through, a good portion of the KPAF was destroyed, along with over a dozen locomotives and a key part of the country’s transportation infrastructure.
The attack was a historic one, not just as the first airstrike ever undertaken by jet airplanes but the first one launched by the United States Navy during the Korean War. It would soon be followed by hundreds more, as naval airpower emerged as an important part of the United Nations’ military effort to defeat the North Korean and Chinese Communists’ effort to conquer South Korea. Yet as Richard Hallion notes in his preface, much of their efforts were overshadowed by the more famous air battles fought between Sabres and MiG-15s. Hallion seeks to rectify this with a book that not only describes the operations of Navy and Marine Corps aviators during the conflict, but recounts the developments taking place at a pivotal moment in the history of American naval aviation.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the naval air war was how unprepared the United States Navy was for it. Just five years before, the Navy had triumphed in the first naval war ever fought between carrier-equipped navies. Yet this success was overshadowed by the weapon that had ended the war: the atomic bomb. In the postwar planning over the future shape of the American military, the Navy’s leadership fought strenuously to ensure that their branch would have a role to play in the use of this warfare-changing device. The result was the U.S.S. United States, a “supercarrier” capable of handling the heavy, long-range aircraft then needed to deploy such bombs. Not only did the political battles leading to the eventual cancellation of the United States damage the Navy politically, they distracted its leaders from consideration of other possible roles to be played by naval air power, largely because they seemed less relevant to what a future war would require.
The folly of this assumption was exposed in the summer of 1950 by the invasion of South Korea. In response to President Harry S. Truman’s decision to intervene, the Navy rushed their available carriers into the region, where they were soon employed attacking North Korean forces. Naval air power proved indispensable in the early weeks of the war, as the North Korean advance reduced the number of airfields available to United Nations (UN) forces and the United States Air Force (USAF) jets stationed in Japan lacked the range needed to strike enemy units. By contrast the carriers of Task Force 77 (TF 77) could function as mobile airfields that could provide airstrikes on short notice. Their value was demonstrated further during the Incheon landings, when five carriers conducted hundreds of close air support missions for the Marine and infantry forces attacking North Korean positions. By October UN ground forces had liberated South Korea and invaded the North, where their success was such that TF 77 was winding down their operations for a lack of available targets.
China’s intervention on behalf of North Korea changed all of this. In response to the massive Chinese offensive, naval aviators stepped up sorties in support of the now-retreating UN troops. Once the situation stabilized into a stalemate close to the original border between the two countries, the Navy sought to disrupt the North Koreans’ logistical network by attacking bridges, tunnels, and roads and rail lines. Hallion shares the frustration felt by many pilots with the constraints placed on air operations in an effort to limit the scope of the war, making clear his opinion that expanded strikes may well have brought about an armistice sooner. Airstrikes against enemy supply lines was just one of the many activities that occupied naval aviators, however, as over the next two years they found themselves undertaking a variety of missions, ranging from supporting intelligence operations behind enemy lines to escorting USAF B-29s on nighttime bombing strikes in North Korea.
As Hallion observes, all of this was a harbinger of how the United States Navy would employ naval aviation in the decades that followed. Instead of the “wide-ranging carrier battles” that defined its emergence as an offensive weapon, the primary role American carriers have played ever since was that of “a floating airfield operating within a relatively confined body of water close to hostile shores and for long periods.” That the Korean War was the first sustained example of such employment is part of the value of this book, as Hallion explains how admirals and aviators adapted to this new mission with skill and creativity. It’s a marvelous study that, while politically tendentious in a few places, is well worth reading for its description of the role naval airpower played in Korea and the analysis of its impact on the conflict.
The attack was a historic one, not just as the first airstrike ever undertaken by jet airplanes but the first one launched by the United States Navy during the Korean War. It would soon be followed by hundreds more, as naval airpower emerged as an important part of the United Nations’ military effort to defeat the North Korean and Chinese Communists’ effort to conquer South Korea. Yet as Richard Hallion notes in his preface, much of their efforts were overshadowed by the more famous air battles fought between Sabres and MiG-15s. Hallion seeks to rectify this with a book that not only describes the operations of Navy and Marine Corps aviators during the conflict, but recounts the developments taking place at a pivotal moment in the history of American naval aviation.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the naval air war was how unprepared the United States Navy was for it. Just five years before, the Navy had triumphed in the first naval war ever fought between carrier-equipped navies. Yet this success was overshadowed by the weapon that had ended the war: the atomic bomb. In the postwar planning over the future shape of the American military, the Navy’s leadership fought strenuously to ensure that their branch would have a role to play in the use of this warfare-changing device. The result was the U.S.S. United States, a “supercarrier” capable of handling the heavy, long-range aircraft then needed to deploy such bombs. Not only did the political battles leading to the eventual cancellation of the United States damage the Navy politically, they distracted its leaders from consideration of other possible roles to be played by naval air power, largely because they seemed less relevant to what a future war would require.
The folly of this assumption was exposed in the summer of 1950 by the invasion of South Korea. In response to President Harry S. Truman’s decision to intervene, the Navy rushed their available carriers into the region, where they were soon employed attacking North Korean forces. Naval air power proved indispensable in the early weeks of the war, as the North Korean advance reduced the number of airfields available to United Nations (UN) forces and the United States Air Force (USAF) jets stationed in Japan lacked the range needed to strike enemy units. By contrast the carriers of Task Force 77 (TF 77) could function as mobile airfields that could provide airstrikes on short notice. Their value was demonstrated further during the Incheon landings, when five carriers conducted hundreds of close air support missions for the Marine and infantry forces attacking North Korean positions. By October UN ground forces had liberated South Korea and invaded the North, where their success was such that TF 77 was winding down their operations for a lack of available targets.
China’s intervention on behalf of North Korea changed all of this. In response to the massive Chinese offensive, naval aviators stepped up sorties in support of the now-retreating UN troops. Once the situation stabilized into a stalemate close to the original border between the two countries, the Navy sought to disrupt the North Koreans’ logistical network by attacking bridges, tunnels, and roads and rail lines. Hallion shares the frustration felt by many pilots with the constraints placed on air operations in an effort to limit the scope of the war, making clear his opinion that expanded strikes may well have brought about an armistice sooner. Airstrikes against enemy supply lines was just one of the many activities that occupied naval aviators, however, as over the next two years they found themselves undertaking a variety of missions, ranging from supporting intelligence operations behind enemy lines to escorting USAF B-29s on nighttime bombing strikes in North Korea.
As Hallion observes, all of this was a harbinger of how the United States Navy would employ naval aviation in the decades that followed. Instead of the “wide-ranging carrier battles” that defined its emergence as an offensive weapon, the primary role American carriers have played ever since was that of “a floating airfield operating within a relatively confined body of water close to hostile shores and for long periods.” That the Korean War was the first sustained example of such employment is part of the value of this book, as Hallion explains how admirals and aviators adapted to this new mission with skill and creativity. It’s a marvelous study that, while politically tendentious in a few places, is well worth reading for its description of the role naval airpower played in Korea and the analysis of its impact on the conflict.
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