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From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War
On April 12, 1945, Franklin Roosevelt died and Harry Truman took his place in the White House. Historians have been arguing ever since about the implications of this transition for American foreign policy in general and relations with the Soviet Union in particular. Was there essential continuity in policy or did Truman's arrival in the Oval Office prompt a sharp reversal away from the approach of his illustrious predecessor? This study explores this controversial issue and in the process casts important light on the outbreak of the Cold War. From Roosevelt to Truman investigates Truman's foreign policy background and examines the legacy that FDR bequeathed to him. After Potsdam and the American use of the atomic bomb, both which occurred under Truman’s presidency, the U.S. floundered between collaboration and confrontation with the Soviets, which represents a turning point in the transformation of American foreign policy. This work reveals that the real departure in American policy came only after the Truman administration had exhausted the legitimate possibilities of the Rooseveltian approach of collaboration with the Soviet Union.
- GenresHistory
414 pages, Hardcover
First published October 23, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
February 16, 2014
This is primarily a history of the transition from FDR to Truman and the slow evolution of policy that ensued, ultimately leading to the rise of the Cold War. Miscamble explores policies, personalities and the inside maneuvering and influences of key advisers... it sounds dull, but it isn't. Perhaps the most affecting aspect is the treatment afforded to Stalin and the insistence on defining Stalin as a man of rational goals and peace, an ally in the trues sense of the word, despite ample evidence to the contrary dating back to Stalin's mutual non-aggression pact with Hitler and Stalin's active support of the Nazi war effort against France and Britain, the famines and millions of deaths, the show trials and purges, the division of Poland - half to Nazi Germany, half to Soviet Russia, his invasion of the Baltics and war with Finland, his decidedly non-mutual demand for war materiel assistance with no favorable policy or actions in return, his demands for control of occupied territory, his demands to occupy Japan after being formally at war with Japan for one week before Japan surrendered, the strong opinions and advice of successive US Ambassadors to Russia who took up their post with the view that Russia was a cooperative ally and a rational regime interested in a fair peace only to change their views 180° after actual experience with Soviet Russia. FDR ignored it all - telling aides that he had a hunch he could win over Stalin... a hunch he never refuted. FDR also had the regrettable trait of keeping everything to himself, playing aides off against each other, and never letting anybody know his true intent or policy goals. He was his own Secretary of State, keeping his actual SecState in the dark. His closest aides and advisers were Soviet sympathizers who consistently argued the Soviet side of policy issues, vehemently opposing any restrictive policy or quid pro quo demands.
When FDR died, Truman stepped into the Presidency with the firm intention of continuing FDR's policies -- but that was in essence a matter of him feeling his way in the dark. He, too, was beset with close advisers who were adamant Soviet sympathizers, to the point of insisting, in effect, that the United States subordinate its interests and foreign polices to the interests of the Soviet Union for fear of alienating Russia.
Now, looking back, it is simply appalling the extent to which FDR and subsequently Truman determinedly refused to recognize the reality of Soviet Russia, indeed, treated Great Britain as a more serious threat to world order and international peace than the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov consistently refused to concede any US points in the several formal negotiations following the end of the war, refused to cooperate in the structure of the new United Nations, refused to agree to abide by the terms of the Yalta Conference for Poland and other East European states, the Truman reaction was to assume that the US (Truman and his Secretary of State Byrnes) could go over Molotov's head and Stalin would countermand Molotov... failing to even consider the nature of the Stalin dictatorship and how naive they were in that belief. Averell Harriman was US Ambassador to Russia, and had a clear understanding of Stalin's regime - Truman ignored him. Truman is also illuminated as less decisive and accountable than conventional wisdom has portrayed him. Conventional wisdom is largely based upon Truman's own accounts of events and interactions offered years after the fact, and clearly embellished to support Truman's own self-image. Miscamble refutes many of the most familiar Truman anecdotes through carefully researched diaries, notes and other documentation. Truman was a careful, deliberative executive who solicited advice and opinions from a variety of aides and officials before acting. The first couple of years he was further slow and deliberative in his policy making by his determination to "do what FDR would have done." It is a fascinating sub-plot of Miscamble's excellent work, the authentic Truman as opposed to the mythical Truman of anecdotal provenance in these years.
Eventually, of course, Truman began to recognize the Soviet Union for what it was and develop policy accordingly. Those advisers such as Harriman, Kennan and opposition figures like Dulles began to be heard over the blindly sympathetic Soviet apologists and thus began the Cold War. All in all, this is a fascinating and well written, exhaustively researched and foot-noted, history of a short but critical period from roughly the Yalta Conference through the transition following FDR's sudden death and the end of the war negotiations and policies to the early onset of Cold War, roughly 1947. It's a great read - interesting throughout.
When FDR died, Truman stepped into the Presidency with the firm intention of continuing FDR's policies -- but that was in essence a matter of him feeling his way in the dark. He, too, was beset with close advisers who were adamant Soviet sympathizers, to the point of insisting, in effect, that the United States subordinate its interests and foreign polices to the interests of the Soviet Union for fear of alienating Russia.
Now, looking back, it is simply appalling the extent to which FDR and subsequently Truman determinedly refused to recognize the reality of Soviet Russia, indeed, treated Great Britain as a more serious threat to world order and international peace than the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov consistently refused to concede any US points in the several formal negotiations following the end of the war, refused to cooperate in the structure of the new United Nations, refused to agree to abide by the terms of the Yalta Conference for Poland and other East European states, the Truman reaction was to assume that the US (Truman and his Secretary of State Byrnes) could go over Molotov's head and Stalin would countermand Molotov... failing to even consider the nature of the Stalin dictatorship and how naive they were in that belief. Averell Harriman was US Ambassador to Russia, and had a clear understanding of Stalin's regime - Truman ignored him. Truman is also illuminated as less decisive and accountable than conventional wisdom has portrayed him. Conventional wisdom is largely based upon Truman's own accounts of events and interactions offered years after the fact, and clearly embellished to support Truman's own self-image. Miscamble refutes many of the most familiar Truman anecdotes through carefully researched diaries, notes and other documentation. Truman was a careful, deliberative executive who solicited advice and opinions from a variety of aides and officials before acting. The first couple of years he was further slow and deliberative in his policy making by his determination to "do what FDR would have done." It is a fascinating sub-plot of Miscamble's excellent work, the authentic Truman as opposed to the mythical Truman of anecdotal provenance in these years.
Eventually, of course, Truman began to recognize the Soviet Union for what it was and develop policy accordingly. Those advisers such as Harriman, Kennan and opposition figures like Dulles began to be heard over the blindly sympathetic Soviet apologists and thus began the Cold War. All in all, this is a fascinating and well written, exhaustively researched and foot-noted, history of a short but critical period from roughly the Yalta Conference through the transition following FDR's sudden death and the end of the war negotiations and policies to the early onset of Cold War, roughly 1947. It's a great read - interesting throughout.
January 21, 2022
This book does a great job of introducing a newer approach to Cold War scholarship. Miscamble's "reading forward" offers a fresh take on analyzing Truman's presidency and picking up where FDR left off.
However, the bias in this book is staunchly anti-FDR and his approach to analyzing Stalin is relying on snippets covered in other historian's research. This book does a great job of looking into Truman, but an adequate job of painting pictures of Roosevelt and Stalin's roles in early Cold War Foreign Policy formation.
However, the bias in this book is staunchly anti-FDR and his approach to analyzing Stalin is relying on snippets covered in other historian's research. This book does a great job of looking into Truman, but an adequate job of painting pictures of Roosevelt and Stalin's roles in early Cold War Foreign Policy formation.
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February 9, 2013Miscamble’s book provides excellent groundwork to Truman’s transitional foreign policy and the evolution of the Cold War. Miscamble delivers a diplomatic history that sets out to correct simplistic analyses that have placed fault for the Cold War solely with Truman’s policies. Miscamble argues such revisionist approaches are evidentially weak and composed of faulty hypotheses. He challenges histories that assert Truman, upon taking office, intentionally set about reversing Roosevelt’s diplomatic cooperation with Stalin and took a stand of contentious conflict. Rather than “reading history backwards” (xiii), Miscamble approaches his work as the evolution and development of policy from Truman’s perspective. By tracing Truman’s actions from Roosevelt’s death through the late 1940s, Miscamble supports his primary argument that Truman’s intentions, and ultimately his actions, were to continue Roosevelt’s commitments and policies with the Soviet Union.
In order to set the foundation for his argument, Miscamble begins by explaining Roosevelt’s intentions toward Stalin. Miscamble takes serious issue with Roosevelt’s diplomatic relationship with Stalin. He argues Roosevelt was out of touch with Stalin’s intentions and much too cooperative. Although Miscamble credits Roosevelt’s economic planning, he contends Roosevelt’s policies were not realistic for the post-war era. More concerned with colonial ambitions than communist expansion, Roosevelt seemed to believe the US relationship with Stalin was key to European peace, even at the expense of its relationship with Britain. Miscamble colors Roosevelt’s plans for a post-war world as naïvely dependent on collaboration with and civilization of the Soviet “beast” (323). Roosevelt held a “tragic misperception” that he could build a bond of friendship with Stalin” (53). Roosevelt’s hopeful romanticism coupled with a tendency to make decisions hastily without regard for their implications and consequences does not escape Miscamble’s criticism of Truman’s predecessor.
Thrust into the presidency without information that Roosevelt should have provided him as Vice President, Truman had to learn foreign policy “on the job.” Miscamble thoroughly blames Roosevelt for Truman’s lack of foreign relation knowledge, and for creating a situation that left Truman no choice but to rely on a myriad of advisors, his own as well Roosevelt’s, particularly informal Soviet adviser Joseph Davies, Roosevelt’s ambassador to Moscow. Miscamble asserts that Davies, like Roosevelt, held an inadequate understanding of Stalin and, in turn, misinformed the President. Secretary of state James Byrnes worked closely with Davies, confirming the administration’s conciliatory practices toward the Soviets. According to Miscamble, Truman’s reliance on Roosevelt’s advisers and upon Byrnes is evidence Truman intended to continue Roosevelt’s policies.
Indeed, Miscamble argues, Truman’s extended continuation of Roosevelt’s policies was a serious flaw. Adherence to Roosevelt’s ideologies toward the Soviet Union prevented Truman from recognizing Stalin’s expansionist geopolitical designs. Truman also failed to recognize how World War II reshaped the United States’ place in world relations and how that was incompatible with Roosevelt’s intentions, a factor Truman’s own advisers also failed to comprehend.
Miscamble insists the policy of containment was not premeditated, but arose in 1947, the year following the Clifford-Elsey Report. The fact that Truman did not act on the report is yet another factor that indicates his intent to continue Roosevelt’s cooperation. Truman’s policies toward Stalin represented a vacillating process inconsistent with prior historical arguments. Miscamble attempts to dispel those inconsistencies, challenging the evidence that produced them. For example, Miscamble spends some time on Truman’s break with Byrnes, an event some historians contend was related to Byrnes’ conciliatory nature toward Stalin. Miscamble argues it was not about Stalin at all, but rather about Byrnes’ disrespectful relationship with Truman, differing opinions, and the presidential campaign.
Although Miscamble argues, at times rather forcefully, that Truman’s policies were an extension of Roosevelt’s intentions, he is critical that Truman was too slow to implement hardline policies against Stalin. The administration spent too much time placating and negotiating, rather than keeping accurate tabs on events. Regardless, Miscamble asserts that it is unlikely actions by the administration to keep Stalin in check would have made any difference in averting the Cold War. The blame, according to Miscamble, therefore falls almost solely on the Soviet side.
Miscamble’s dedication to the priesthood is evident by the sense of ethics and morality that influence his views toward Stalin, the “moral monster” (193) and the bombing of Japan. He further challenges arguments that the dropping of bombs on Japan was not motivated by political intent to intimidate Stalin, but as a necessary step against a country that would not otherwise have surrendered. Miscamble’s section on the bombs reads like a direct response to the “distorted” and “faulty assumption” (220) of Gar Alperovitz and his failure to credit the administration with the correct (and moral) choice of dropping the bombs first to save lives, but also to prevent Soviet control of Hokkaido.
Miscamble humanizes the complexity of Truman’s situation. He describes the messiness of policy making during war, and conveys well the uncertainties and confusion Truman faced in dealing with Stalin. Miscamble is harsh on Roosevelt, but attributes faults to Truman as well. Miscamble does not apply any concept of humanity to Stalin. While Truman is an example of humanity with all its flaws and hopes, Miscamble makes of Stalin a demon to which even great political leaders could not stand strong.
The greatest strength in Miscamble’s book is his succinct ability to formulate, adhere, and support his argument. Though much of the material is not new to the historiography, it is presented and challenged in a way that calls into question the revisionist argument of Truman’s fault in the creation of the Cold War. It is a new analysis of old sources that complicates the old history and is, in Miscamble’s view, long overdue.
In order to set the foundation for his argument, Miscamble begins by explaining Roosevelt’s intentions toward Stalin. Miscamble takes serious issue with Roosevelt’s diplomatic relationship with Stalin. He argues Roosevelt was out of touch with Stalin’s intentions and much too cooperative. Although Miscamble credits Roosevelt’s economic planning, he contends Roosevelt’s policies were not realistic for the post-war era. More concerned with colonial ambitions than communist expansion, Roosevelt seemed to believe the US relationship with Stalin was key to European peace, even at the expense of its relationship with Britain. Miscamble colors Roosevelt’s plans for a post-war world as naïvely dependent on collaboration with and civilization of the Soviet “beast” (323). Roosevelt held a “tragic misperception” that he could build a bond of friendship with Stalin” (53). Roosevelt’s hopeful romanticism coupled with a tendency to make decisions hastily without regard for their implications and consequences does not escape Miscamble’s criticism of Truman’s predecessor.
Thrust into the presidency without information that Roosevelt should have provided him as Vice President, Truman had to learn foreign policy “on the job.” Miscamble thoroughly blames Roosevelt for Truman’s lack of foreign relation knowledge, and for creating a situation that left Truman no choice but to rely on a myriad of advisors, his own as well Roosevelt’s, particularly informal Soviet adviser Joseph Davies, Roosevelt’s ambassador to Moscow. Miscamble asserts that Davies, like Roosevelt, held an inadequate understanding of Stalin and, in turn, misinformed the President. Secretary of state James Byrnes worked closely with Davies, confirming the administration’s conciliatory practices toward the Soviets. According to Miscamble, Truman’s reliance on Roosevelt’s advisers and upon Byrnes is evidence Truman intended to continue Roosevelt’s policies.
Indeed, Miscamble argues, Truman’s extended continuation of Roosevelt’s policies was a serious flaw. Adherence to Roosevelt’s ideologies toward the Soviet Union prevented Truman from recognizing Stalin’s expansionist geopolitical designs. Truman also failed to recognize how World War II reshaped the United States’ place in world relations and how that was incompatible with Roosevelt’s intentions, a factor Truman’s own advisers also failed to comprehend.
Miscamble insists the policy of containment was not premeditated, but arose in 1947, the year following the Clifford-Elsey Report. The fact that Truman did not act on the report is yet another factor that indicates his intent to continue Roosevelt’s cooperation. Truman’s policies toward Stalin represented a vacillating process inconsistent with prior historical arguments. Miscamble attempts to dispel those inconsistencies, challenging the evidence that produced them. For example, Miscamble spends some time on Truman’s break with Byrnes, an event some historians contend was related to Byrnes’ conciliatory nature toward Stalin. Miscamble argues it was not about Stalin at all, but rather about Byrnes’ disrespectful relationship with Truman, differing opinions, and the presidential campaign.
Although Miscamble argues, at times rather forcefully, that Truman’s policies were an extension of Roosevelt’s intentions, he is critical that Truman was too slow to implement hardline policies against Stalin. The administration spent too much time placating and negotiating, rather than keeping accurate tabs on events. Regardless, Miscamble asserts that it is unlikely actions by the administration to keep Stalin in check would have made any difference in averting the Cold War. The blame, according to Miscamble, therefore falls almost solely on the Soviet side.
Miscamble’s dedication to the priesthood is evident by the sense of ethics and morality that influence his views toward Stalin, the “moral monster” (193) and the bombing of Japan. He further challenges arguments that the dropping of bombs on Japan was not motivated by political intent to intimidate Stalin, but as a necessary step against a country that would not otherwise have surrendered. Miscamble’s section on the bombs reads like a direct response to the “distorted” and “faulty assumption” (220) of Gar Alperovitz and his failure to credit the administration with the correct (and moral) choice of dropping the bombs first to save lives, but also to prevent Soviet control of Hokkaido.
Miscamble humanizes the complexity of Truman’s situation. He describes the messiness of policy making during war, and conveys well the uncertainties and confusion Truman faced in dealing with Stalin. Miscamble is harsh on Roosevelt, but attributes faults to Truman as well. Miscamble does not apply any concept of humanity to Stalin. While Truman is an example of humanity with all its flaws and hopes, Miscamble makes of Stalin a demon to which even great political leaders could not stand strong.
The greatest strength in Miscamble’s book is his succinct ability to formulate, adhere, and support his argument. Though much of the material is not new to the historiography, it is presented and challenged in a way that calls into question the revisionist argument of Truman’s fault in the creation of the Cold War. It is a new analysis of old sources that complicates the old history and is, in Miscamble’s view, long overdue.
January 11, 2026
Read for graduate seminar. I found myself really enjoying reading Miscamble’s work and occasionally chuckling at his manner of writing and occasional jabs he took at any number of historians or historical figures.
October 27, 2018
Way more detail on the Roosevelt to Truman transition that most people would want. But it had some interesting insights into the decision to drop the atomic bombs.
January 19, 2013
Father/Dr. Miscamble sets out to complicate the overly dichotomous characterizations of the Truman Presidency in this well written, albeit controversial book. Instead of viewing Truman's foreign policy as a reversal of his predecessor's (FDR)accommodationist style approach with the Soviet Union, Miscamble presents the reader with a thoughtful and optimistic man who used every means possible to continue the legacy of FDR. Miscamble claims that Truman was not the Cold Warrior many have depicted, nor should he be shouldered with the accusation that he initiated the Cold War. Instead, Miscamble revisits some of the anecdotes which have contributed to this perception and defuses them. While I found this portion of the book fairly convincing, Miscamble unfortunately finds himself defending some of Truman's least popular decisions in the process, including the use of atomic weapons in Japan. Although he argues that Truman was much more accommodating before 1947, he acknowledges that after this period Truman started to take a heavy handed stance toward the Soviet Union because his initial kindness only encouraged Soviet expansion. This view, of course, has been accepted by an entire camp of historians and does not necessarily set Miscamble apart from others such as Gaddis. However, unlike many of these historians, Miscamble presents his argument openly in terms of morality and encourages this interpretation among historians. For some readers (including myself) this might seem problematic since he spends an entire chapter using moral justifications for the use of atomic weapons on civilian populations (and the use of total war in general). Further, this moral interpretation is used to justify US interventionist policy set into force during the second Truman administration, which many now view as one major contributor to some of the bloodiest conflicts in world history occurring throughout Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Aside from these criticisms, the work (like many within Cold War history) often uses Stalin to represent the entire Soviet Union and its own interventionist policies.
Using almost solely US and British sources, the work by no means considers the Soviet perspective, nor (and in my opinion more importantly) does it consider the Global South, the location of most of the Cold War's hot wars. The book is clearly a policy history of the US and had no intention of taking a global approach. In essence, I have criticized the book on something it never set out to do, however it seems that to provide useful answers to policy questions in a global era, a global interpretation might be warranted. Miscamble's writing style is very developed and the book reads very smoothly, considerably more so than most academic monographs. If I were to recommend this work, I would do so along with some "revisionist" and global approaches toward the same topic.
Using almost solely US and British sources, the work by no means considers the Soviet perspective, nor (and in my opinion more importantly) does it consider the Global South, the location of most of the Cold War's hot wars. The book is clearly a policy history of the US and had no intention of taking a global approach. In essence, I have criticized the book on something it never set out to do, however it seems that to provide useful answers to policy questions in a global era, a global interpretation might be warranted. Miscamble's writing style is very developed and the book reads very smoothly, considerably more so than most academic monographs. If I were to recommend this work, I would do so along with some "revisionist" and global approaches toward the same topic.
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