THE GERMAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER SKETCHES A THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1973 book, “The application of the Marxian theory of crisis to the altered reality of ‘advanced capitalism’ leads to difficulties. This fact has given rise to interesting attempts to conceive of the old theorems in new ways or, alternatively, to develop new crisis theorems in their place. In the preparatory phase of empirical projects … we have also examined such approaches; the argumentation sketched in Part II of my essay sums up what I have learned from these discussions… referring to in-house working papers is intended … to indicate the unfinished character of the discussions, which have by no means yet led to consensus.
"In addition, I am concerned that the clarification of very general structures of hypotheses not be confused with empirical results… a theory of social evolution … is today still scarcely at all developed… [but] the close connection between material questions of a theory of contemporary social formation and foundational problems that… can be clarified within the framework of a theory of communicative competence.”
He states, “It is my conjecture that the fundamental mechanism for social evolution in general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn. Not LEARNING, but NOT-LEARNING is the phenomenon that calls for explanation at the socio-cultural state of development. Therein lies, if you will, the rationality of man. Only against this background does the overpowering irrationality of the history of the species become visible.” (Pg. 15)
He admits, “At the moment I can see no possibility of cogently deciding the question about the chances for a self-transformation of advanced capitalism. But I do not exclude the possibility that economic crises can be permanently averted, although only in such a way that contradictory steering imperatives that assert themselves in the pressure for capital realization would produce a series of other crisis tendencies. The continuing tendency toward disturbance of capitalist growth can be administratively processed and transferred, by stages, through the political and into the socio-cultural system.” (Pg. 40)
He suggests, “The class compromise weakens the organizational capacity of the latently continuing classes. On the other hand, scattered secondary conflicts also become more palpable, because they so not appear as objective systemic crises, but directly provoke questions of legitimation. This explains the functional necessity of making the administrative system, as far as possible, independent of the legitimating system.” (Pg. 69)
He argues, “The patterns of priorities that [John Kenneth] Galbraith analyzed from the point of view of ‘private wealth versus public poverty’ result from a class structure that is, as usual, kept latent. In the final analysis, this class structure is the source of the legitimation deficit.” (Pg. 73) He adds, “As long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a widespread, technocratic common consciousness … can maintain a sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs do not have to culminate in a crisis.” (Pg. 70)
He asserts, “Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the ‘rationality’ of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a COMMON interest ascertained WITHOUT DECEPTION… The discursively formed will may be called ‘rational’ because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively shared.” (Pg. 108)
He observes, “the repoliticization of the biblical inheritance observable in contemporary theological discussion (Pannenberg, Moltmann, Solle, Metz), which goes together with a leveling of this-worldly/other-worldly dichotomy, does not mean atheism in the sense of a liquidation without trace of the idea of God---although the idea of a PERSONAL God would hardly seem to be salvageable with consistency from THIS critical mass of thought. The idea of God is transformed …into the concept of a Logos that determines the community of believers and the real life-context of a self-emancipating society. ‘God’ becomes the name for a communicative structure that forces men, on pain of a loss of their humanity, to go beyond their accidental, empirical nature to encounter one another INDIRECTLY, that is, across an objective something that they themselves are not.” (Pg. 121)
This book will appeal to those studying Habermas’s thought and its development.