Many saw the United States’ decisive victory in Desert Storm (1991) as not only vindication of American defense policy since Vietnam but also confirmation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Just as information-age technologies were revolutionizing civilian life, the Gulf War appeared to reflect similarly profound changes in warfare. A debate has raged ever since about a contemporary RMA and its implications for American defense policy. Addressing these issues, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the RMA debate. Focusing on the creation of a reconnaissance-strike complex and conceptions of parallel or nonlinear warfare, Keith L. Shimko finds a persuasive case for a contemporary RMA while recognizing its limitations as well as promise. The RMA’s implications for American defense policy are more ambiguous because the military lessons of the Iraq Wars need be placed in the context of judgments about national interests and predictions of future strategic environments.
Shimko assesses the possibility of an ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) regarding the way the US wages modern war. The author looks back at American warfare, with a cursory review of Vietnam and the First Gulf War, and considers the many modern factors that have might have fundamentally affected the character of war.
The author gives fair consideration to the potential of an ongoing information, precision, and/or air power revolution, but adequately demonstrates that none of these dynamics have necessarily changed the way the US wages war. They may have made the US more informed, more precise, and able to reach further into enemy territory from a standoff range, but they haven’t really changed the character of how the US strategizes or prosecutes war. He also discusses how the US tends to hypothesize adversaries in order to develop military strategy. This is a profound subject that deserves further research.
Shimko does appear to hope for an RMA that can adapt the US to be more effective at counterinsurgency, but I don’t think he digs deep enough into the challenges a democracy faces with regard to long-term wars. Additionally, while he discusses the weaknesses in fungibility of military assets, he disregards the role of political capital in war.
This book provides an informative overview of many of the recent innovations that have been included in warfare, and it provides a reasonable assessment on the question of an ongoing RMA. I was not convinced by the author’s recommendations – I believe a significant culture change requires some compelling need to change, and in a democracy, that usually requires public will. With the downshift of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, I don’t see that happening, short of a national crisis.
A very good overview of and balance perspective on the RMA debate, and how the Iraq wars served as a catalyst for that debate. For the most of the people that know that they're supposed to dislike the RMA (and EBO, RDO, NCW, etc) this is great place to start so that you can answer the question why with more than a parochial answer.
Also, the debate on future war has a very interesting framework by characterizing future threats by their significance versus likelihood. The author makes a great argument for how the DoD can actually chew gum and walk at the same time, even if the divergence "faith" to borrow from Kuhn's "Revolutions" is quite drastic.