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Osprey New Vanguard #182
Italian Battleships of World War II
Italian Battleships of World War II by Mark Stille. Published by Osprey Publishing,2011, Paperback
- GenresWorld War IIHistory
48 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 29, 2021
This book provides a general overview of the Conte di Cavour, Andrea Doria and Littorio class battleships, both their design and their Second World War operations. It is fairly well illustrated, with a good number of photos and colour artworks, as well as a two-page spread of Vittorio Veneto from a 3D perspective with a cut-away section. The language is very accessible, and it would be easy to read by people who hadn’t previously read much about warship design or operations.
The writing is generally solid, but is frequently let down by the discussion tying itself in knots by trying to over-emphasise the aggressiveness of the Italian navy – for example, within one paragraph there’s the phrase “myth of Italian post-Taranto timidity” and yet, just two sentences later, it talks of the orders for the Italian fleet commander to be extra cautious. There are multiple, baffling (and very much incorrect) references to the Regia Marina not increasing their light AA due to not facing the thread of heavy air attack in the Mediterranean, while the narrative notes that almost all the serious damage to Italy’s battleships was done by aircraft (including one attack described as a heavy air attack). Not surprisingly, the discussion in the book of the disuse of the battle squadron for the invasion of Sicily does not mention Supermarina’s greatest concern was heavy air attack.
Keeping in mind the book is only 48 pages, it’s not surprising that the design and operational overviews are relatively brief, and this is perfectly reasonable in this kind of work. Most of the information presented is accurate, but sometimes the way it is presented is misleading (the horizontal armour on the Littorio class is given as total thicknesses, with no indication that it was spread over different decks until a throw-away comment at the end of the book, and Italian tests found the 70mm decapping belt plus 280mm cemented armour to be similarly effective as a single 350mm armour plate – while the book labels the belt as ‘relatively thin’. There is no mention of the 70mm armour above the armoured belt at all. On the positive side, though, the Littorio’s valuable and innovative auxiliary rudder system is mentioned, as was its innovative tower bridge structure.
The book’s weakest element is its commentary on strategy and the use of the battleships. Taranto was apparently not decisive (a very creative interpretation of half of the battle squadron being knocked out for months on end). The statement that “the Italians committed their battleships aggressively” is inconsistent with other sources (including translated works originally written by Italian authors with a deep knowledge of the Regia Marina) and, indeed, the orders of Supermarina (which are even mentioned in the book). While I have some sympathy for authors looking to correct the equally inappropriate picture of the Regia Marina of avoiding conflict at all costs, these over-corrections are just as inaccurate and misleading. This picture is pushed throughout the book (and particularly in the section on operations) and it is quite clear that the author omits key facts to strengthen their argument (which, even then, is inconsistent with the facts presented in the book).
The editing is mixed and there are a number of slips, like referring to the 4.7-inch AA guns on the Littorio Class in captions (on more than one occasion), or June 5 being described as being after June 14; Operation Husky is cited as starting on June 10; Italia is still referred to as Littorio after the name change; and so on. The book also has an odd habit of describing any sortie (including training shoots or fighter direction testing) as a “combat mission”, presumably to further its argument, but at the cost of the book being a reliable record.
Indeed, the greatest value of the book is probably in its bibliography, which other than omitting the more recent works by Bagnasco and de Toro, is sound. Surprisingly so, given the issues described above. There is also an index, which is welcome.
Overall, it’s a reasonable-but-not-great broad-brush look at the design of Italy’s Second World War battleships, with a twisted and misleading narrative of their use. The second element significantly devalues the book, and makes it impossible to recommend. Given the book is most likely to be read by people who haven’t read a lot of other material on the Regia Marina readers won’t know any better, and at best the book creates a new market for a similar brief work to set the record straight in the future. From my perspective, it's one star for the operational discussion and three stars for the design discussion, for a 2-star average.
For anyone serious about getting a more robust impression of the Littorio Class, the book by Bagnasco and de Toro does a far better job (both in detail, as one would hope given it’s far larger, but also in a far more accurate impression of the technical strengths and weaknesses of the vessels, and how they were used operationally, and their upcoming book on the Andrea Doria and Conte di Cavour ships is likely to do similar there. O’Hara and Cernsuci’s Struggle for the Middle Sea is a better place to look for discussion of the actual surface actions (although this issues with its strategic discussion as well).
The writing is generally solid, but is frequently let down by the discussion tying itself in knots by trying to over-emphasise the aggressiveness of the Italian navy – for example, within one paragraph there’s the phrase “myth of Italian post-Taranto timidity” and yet, just two sentences later, it talks of the orders for the Italian fleet commander to be extra cautious. There are multiple, baffling (and very much incorrect) references to the Regia Marina not increasing their light AA due to not facing the thread of heavy air attack in the Mediterranean, while the narrative notes that almost all the serious damage to Italy’s battleships was done by aircraft (including one attack described as a heavy air attack). Not surprisingly, the discussion in the book of the disuse of the battle squadron for the invasion of Sicily does not mention Supermarina’s greatest concern was heavy air attack.
Keeping in mind the book is only 48 pages, it’s not surprising that the design and operational overviews are relatively brief, and this is perfectly reasonable in this kind of work. Most of the information presented is accurate, but sometimes the way it is presented is misleading (the horizontal armour on the Littorio class is given as total thicknesses, with no indication that it was spread over different decks until a throw-away comment at the end of the book, and Italian tests found the 70mm decapping belt plus 280mm cemented armour to be similarly effective as a single 350mm armour plate – while the book labels the belt as ‘relatively thin’. There is no mention of the 70mm armour above the armoured belt at all. On the positive side, though, the Littorio’s valuable and innovative auxiliary rudder system is mentioned, as was its innovative tower bridge structure.
The book’s weakest element is its commentary on strategy and the use of the battleships. Taranto was apparently not decisive (a very creative interpretation of half of the battle squadron being knocked out for months on end). The statement that “the Italians committed their battleships aggressively” is inconsistent with other sources (including translated works originally written by Italian authors with a deep knowledge of the Regia Marina) and, indeed, the orders of Supermarina (which are even mentioned in the book). While I have some sympathy for authors looking to correct the equally inappropriate picture of the Regia Marina of avoiding conflict at all costs, these over-corrections are just as inaccurate and misleading. This picture is pushed throughout the book (and particularly in the section on operations) and it is quite clear that the author omits key facts to strengthen their argument (which, even then, is inconsistent with the facts presented in the book).
The editing is mixed and there are a number of slips, like referring to the 4.7-inch AA guns on the Littorio Class in captions (on more than one occasion), or June 5 being described as being after June 14; Operation Husky is cited as starting on June 10; Italia is still referred to as Littorio after the name change; and so on. The book also has an odd habit of describing any sortie (including training shoots or fighter direction testing) as a “combat mission”, presumably to further its argument, but at the cost of the book being a reliable record.
Indeed, the greatest value of the book is probably in its bibliography, which other than omitting the more recent works by Bagnasco and de Toro, is sound. Surprisingly so, given the issues described above. There is also an index, which is welcome.
Overall, it’s a reasonable-but-not-great broad-brush look at the design of Italy’s Second World War battleships, with a twisted and misleading narrative of their use. The second element significantly devalues the book, and makes it impossible to recommend. Given the book is most likely to be read by people who haven’t read a lot of other material on the Regia Marina readers won’t know any better, and at best the book creates a new market for a similar brief work to set the record straight in the future. From my perspective, it's one star for the operational discussion and three stars for the design discussion, for a 2-star average.
For anyone serious about getting a more robust impression of the Littorio Class, the book by Bagnasco and de Toro does a far better job (both in detail, as one would hope given it’s far larger, but also in a far more accurate impression of the technical strengths and weaknesses of the vessels, and how they were used operationally, and their upcoming book on the Andrea Doria and Conte di Cavour ships is likely to do similar there. O’Hara and Cernsuci’s Struggle for the Middle Sea is a better place to look for discussion of the actual surface actions (although this issues with its strategic discussion as well).
July 7, 2023
A short and useful introduction to the subject with excellent colour plates, photographs and technical detail.
June 22, 2013
Another top shelf Stille effort. He argues rather convincingly that the Italian Navy actually achieved its goals in the war, undermined mostly by fuel shortages.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews