The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory

Leavenworth Papers #21

by George W. Gawrych, U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Jerry D. Morelock

The Six Day War of June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Force (IDF) achieve a decisive military victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while sustaining relatively few casualties. Despite the subsequent image of Israel as a regional military superpower, Egypt attacked again in 1973, eventually resulting in a peace treaty that promised to return the entire Sinai to Egypt. It is the contention of "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" that the IDF's dramatic 1967 victory unconsciously created an albatross in the form of a belief in its own invulnerability coupled with the belief that Egypt would perform as poorly in the next war as it had in this one. In a spirit of overconfidence, Israel prepared to fight its next war just as it had in 1967. The 1973 attack caught Israel off guard, the Egyptians performed much better than expected, and, even after the IDF recovered from its initial stumbles, Egypt was by no means out of the game militarily. Once a cease-fire took effect, the Israelis quickly grasped how ill prepared their army had been for war and the resultant three weeks of hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties. As the author notes, "If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead - a figure four times the actual number." Given this situation, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat quickly proposed a negotiated peace, which a suddenly war-weary Israeli public warily accepted. Both as an incisive narrative of the 1973 war and an analysis of the self-deception and overconfidence that too decisive a victory can breed, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" is an invaluable work of scholarship as well as a cautionary tale for students and practitioners of modern warfare. Orginally published in 1996: 104 p. maps. ill.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Israel, Military History

104 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1996

About the author

George Walter Gawrych

Reviews

[Blue Morse]

Good summary on the 1973 Yom Kippur War from the strategic to tactical level of war. Additionally offers relevant insight for today on the danger of preparing to fight yesterday’s war.

[Ted]

This one was a quick read, basically just a brief review of the tactical and operational elements of the war, with just a surface-level treatment of strategy and geopolitics. (For more detail, I recommend Neff's "Warriors Against Israel" and/or O'Ballance's "No Victor, No Vanquished")

The premise that the author pushes forward here is that the failures of Israel in '73 should serve as a cautionary tale for the US Army. He compares the arrogant and patronizing view of Israel towards the Arab armies following the quick and relatively bloodless (for the Israelis) victories of '67 to the rapid destruction of the Iraqi Army by the US in Desert Storm and the emphasis on "decisive victory" with minimal casualties in the US Army doctrinal publications that followed.

This book was published in 1996, and a lot has changed since then. The "Mission Accomplished" moment in 2003 with regards to Operation Iraqi Freedom, certainly was blindly arrogant, and we did pay with our blood and treasure - but to an insurgency, not in a conventional conflict, as in the '73 war.

Yet our doctrine has changed a great deal, for both conventional and unconventional conflict, and today's FM 3-0 Operations is substantially different from the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations, which bears the brunt of the author's criticism.

Although I may criticize the current Operations Doctrine for its blatant effort to avoid substantive discussion of the future risks along the spectrum of unconventional warfare, when it comes to conventional risks it is the very opposite of arrogant:

"𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠; 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦, 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝐴𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟-𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑, 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑, 𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑, 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑦 𝑏𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡."

[Gary Klein]

This book highlighted the challenges of hubris, the challenge of anticipating future battlefields, and the necessity for in-conflict military adaptation. Armies must be mindful of the parable of David and Goliath; the smaller/weaker force can often find ways to counter larger/stronger force. Additionally, past successes are not a predictor of future battlefield success; especially if you do not continue to evolve and develop new technology/tactics. Finally, the end state of war is tied to politics, which does not always require tactical/operational success. Small victories, attrition, and national political will play a huge part in the outcomes of wars.

The Israeli Army of the late-1960s/early 1970s optimized itself to take advantage of their successes during the 1967 Six Day War, but the Egyptian Army had learned from that conflict as well. The Egyptian Army initiated the 1973 War using different tactics to counter Israeli strengths:

1. Dismounted anti-armor weapons to defeat Israeli tanks.
2. Anti-aircraft weapons to defeat Israeli aircraft.
3. Deception to deny the Israeli early warning.

The Israeli Army was able to evolve in-conflict to achieve tactical success, but not before the Egyptian Army was able to extract international and regional political victories.

[William Olenick]

A short history of this "long" war for Israel. Known by many names, such as the October War or the Yum Kippur War, it was of during the month of October 1973. The paper covers the actions down to division level of gives a good account of both the military and political decisions made. It shows the important lesson that a nation can not base its next war on the last war that it fought.....

[Nate Hill]

Excellent review of the ends, ways, and means of the Egyptian attack and subsequent Israeli defense of the Bar-Lev line. Prior to reading this book I had a flawed and incomplete understanding of Arab and Israeli military capabilities. This battle study focuses on the operational and tactical level of war with some description, but little analysis, of the strategic level of the conflict.

[Eric J. Hartsfield]

Very good

I thought this was a very good history of the campaign in the Sinai during the 1973 War but it does NOT cover the fighting in the Golan Heights. Dr. Gawrych provides a good overview of both Egyptian and Israeli thinking before the war and the consequences of the cease fire. Recommended if one is looking for quick but detailed description of the fighting in the Sinai.