The relationship between the French army and the regime provides one of the central themes in the history of the Third Republic. From its foundation in 1870, the republic sought to integrate the army of Louis-Napoleon into a left-leaning, democratic political system. This experiment failed, historians have argued, because the social origins, political attitudes and professional values of the officer corps sabotaged cooperation with the republic. The nation paid a bloody price for this failure on the battlefields of the Great War. Dr Porch's book challenges many standard assumptions about the place of the army in French political life between 1871 and 1914. The events of the 'Dreyfus years' are examined from the army's standpoint. Dr Porch examines the impact of the Dreyfus affair on the crucial tactical and armaments debates of the immediate pre-war years, tracing the origins of the costly 'spirit of the offensive' while providing the answer to the French army's near disastrous failure to the development of the colonial army and its place within the military structure is also assessed for the first time.
Douglas Porch is an American historian, academic and a Professor and former Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs for the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee in 1967 and a Ph. D. from Cambridge University in 1972. He has been a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, a guest lecturer at the Marine Corps University, a post-doctoral research fellow at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris and the Mark W. Clark Professor of History at The Citadel.
Granted that the book is now 30 years old, but it was still an interesting look into the French Army of the pre-Great War period. It seems that most of the armies lost their way in this period. The French case was compounded by the dysfunctional nature and governmental instability of the Third Republic. I'll have to see if there's anything more recent. Most of my reading of late has been more focused on the Central Powers side.
A macro look at the organization and growth (or lack thereof) of the French army in the early decades of the third republic. Porch's examination helps to highlight the reasons the French army was outclassed at the start of the Great War.