Statesmen and generals involved in the planning and execution of the war in Vietnam examine, in individual papers and discussions, the causes of American and South Vietnamese failures to realize established goals
I would actually give this book 3.5 stars; it is quite good and contains a great deal of important and fascinating historical information. That being said, books such as this one (which are, in effect, a sort of "final report" on an academic conference) are a gigantic pain in the ass to read due to their being by their very nature somewhat disjointed and occasionally quite boring.
This one, however, is well worth reading despite that concern...
While written just two years after the Vietnam War/Conflict ended, this is an interesting collection of essays by those associated with the war as to what went wrong, what was right and how we can learn from this conflict for the future. While I thought it was going to be a slugfest reading this, I found it enjoyable (if I can use that word) and appreciated the insight given by the many contributors.
The informational basis of this book wasn't bad but the format it was presented was not at all compelling and really quite disengaging. I've read works that are collections of works previously, but this one had very little flow.
This book is a useful reference document for academia but not something I would recommend to a casual reader looking to learn about the war.