What do you think?
Rate this book
Hate Spin: The Manufacture of Religious Offense and Its Threat to Democracy
How right-wing political entrepreneurs around the world use religious offense—both given and taken—to mobilize supporters and marginalize opponents.
In the United States, elements of the religious right fuel fears of an existential Islamic threat, spreading anti-Muslim rhetoric into mainstream politics. In Indonesia, Muslim absolutists urge suppression of churches and minority sects, fostering a climate of rising intolerance. In India, Narendra Modi's radical supporters instigate communal riots and academic censorship in pursuit of their Hindu nationalist vision. Outbreaks of religious intolerance are usually assumed to be visceral and spontaneous. But in Hate Spin, Cherian George shows that they often involve sophisticated campaigns manufactured by political opportunists to mobilize supporters and marginalize opponents. Right-wing networks orchestrate the giving of offense and the taking of offense as instruments of identity politics, exploiting democratic space to promote agendas that undermine democratic values. George calls this strategy “hate spin”—a double-sided technique that combines hate speech (incitement through vilification) with manufactured offense-taking (the performing of righteous indignation). It is deployed in societies as diverse as Buddhist Myanmar and Orthodox Christian Russia. George looks at the world's three largest democracies, where intolerant groups within India's Hindu right, America's Christian right, and Indonesia's Muslim right are all accomplished users of hate spin. He also shows how the Internet and Google have opened up new opportunities for cross-border hate spin.
George argues that governments must protect vulnerable communities by prohibiting calls to action that lead directly to discrimination and violence. But laws that try to protect believers' feelings against all provocative expression invariably backfire. They arm hate spin agents' offense-taking campaigns with legal ammunition. Anti-discrimination laws and a commitment to religious equality will protect communities more meaningfully than misguided attempts to insulate them from insult.
In the United States, elements of the religious right fuel fears of an existential Islamic threat, spreading anti-Muslim rhetoric into mainstream politics. In Indonesia, Muslim absolutists urge suppression of churches and minority sects, fostering a climate of rising intolerance. In India, Narendra Modi's radical supporters instigate communal riots and academic censorship in pursuit of their Hindu nationalist vision. Outbreaks of religious intolerance are usually assumed to be visceral and spontaneous. But in Hate Spin, Cherian George shows that they often involve sophisticated campaigns manufactured by political opportunists to mobilize supporters and marginalize opponents. Right-wing networks orchestrate the giving of offense and the taking of offense as instruments of identity politics, exploiting democratic space to promote agendas that undermine democratic values. George calls this strategy “hate spin”—a double-sided technique that combines hate speech (incitement through vilification) with manufactured offense-taking (the performing of righteous indignation). It is deployed in societies as diverse as Buddhist Myanmar and Orthodox Christian Russia. George looks at the world's three largest democracies, where intolerant groups within India's Hindu right, America's Christian right, and Indonesia's Muslim right are all accomplished users of hate spin. He also shows how the Internet and Google have opened up new opportunities for cross-border hate spin.
George argues that governments must protect vulnerable communities by prohibiting calls to action that lead directly to discrimination and violence. But laws that try to protect believers' feelings against all provocative expression invariably backfire. They arm hate spin agents' offense-taking campaigns with legal ammunition. Anti-discrimination laws and a commitment to religious equality will protect communities more meaningfully than misguided attempts to insulate them from insult.
326 pages, Paperback
First published September 23, 2016
18 people are currently reading
219 people want to read
About the author
Cherian George
17 books47 followersCherian George, born in Singapore in 1965, is a journalist-turned-academic who has written on Singapore politics for 30 years. After studying social and political sciences at Cambridge and journalism at Columbia, he spent the 1990s working at the Straits Times. He received his PhD in communication at Stanford in 2003 and is currently a professor of media studies at Hong Kong Baptist University.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
November 19, 2017
Excellent book that helped me acquire a hefty scholarship
May 2, 2018
Ujaran kebencian menjadi “trending topic” hari ini di Indonesia, bahkan di seluruh dunia. Narasi ketakutan terhadap imigran muslim di AS saat kampanye pilpres Donald Trump serta kasus penistaan agama oleh Gubernur Ahok menjadi titik tolak buat saya untuk menyadari “buzzword” ini. Dampak ujaran kebencian ini luar biasa, membangun tembok pemisah tinggi-tinggi sehingga dapat dibedakan “kita dan mereka”, pengabaian terhadap suara minoritas, dan yang lebih parah mempersekusi bahkan membunuh siapa saja yang “liyan”. Di tengah aura demokrasi yang menjunjung tinggi kebebasan berekspresi, saya kemudian berhenti untuk merenung: apakah kebebasan berekspresi dalam demokrasi itu memang salah? Apakah memang selayaknya ekspresi kita dikontrol agar hidup kita selalu harmonis? Kompatibelkah demokrasi dengan budaya masyarakat non-Barat, khususnya Indonesia?
Pertanyaan renungan saya itu sedikit banyak dijawab dalam buku ini. Sedari bab awal sang penulis dengan tegas menyatakan bahwa ujaran kebencian dan keterhasutan merupakan ulah wirausahawan politik yang dengan sengaja menciptakan dan menggunakannya untuk kepentingan politiknya sendiri. Jika ujaran kebencian adalah sebuah penghinaan terhadap suatu kelompok, maka keterhasutan adalah sebuah perasaan tersinggung suatu kelompok atas karya, perkataan, barang, atau sikap kelompok tertentu yang sering ditandai dengan “kemarahan spontan”. Keduanya disebut sebagai pelintiran kebencian.
Penulis mengambil beberapa contoh pelintiran kebencian dari 3 negara besar dunia: India, Indonesia dan AS. Pemilihan tiga negara ini bukannya tanpa sebab. Tiga negara ini sengaja dipilih untuk memberikan gambaran jelas bahwa ujaran kebencian bukanlah monopoli agama tertentu saja, ia hadir terutama saat agama tersebut menjadi mayoritas. Baik Hindu di Indonesia, Islam di Indonesia, maupun Kristen di AS sama-sama melakukan pelintiran kebencian. Dalam setiap negara, penulis mengulas contoh-contoh pelintiran kebencian, aturan-aturan hukum yang mengatur pelintiran kebencian, dan reaksi masyarakat terhadap pelintiran kebencian.
Untuk contoh kasus Indonesia, penulis mengambil kasus Ahmadiyah, Syiah, kebencian anti-Kristen, dan Undang-Undang Penistaan Agama. Menarik di sini bahwa penulis menyatakan bahwa Indonesia masih cukup beruntung karena Islam moderat menjadi arus utama di negara ini ditandai dengan hadirnya organisasi NU dan Muhammadiyah. Nasionalisme sekular masih menjadi pilihan rakyat terbukti dengan terpilihnya Jokowi sebagai Presiden. Kelompok radikal sejatinya adalah minoritas dan terletak di pinggiran. Sayangnya, kelompok kecil yang berisik ini sering kali dibiarkan saja oleh aparat keamanan saat mereka berulah. Karena ditulis tahun 2015, buku ini tidak menyertakan kasus Ahok. Andai kasus Ahok disertakan dalam buku ini, narasi mengenai pelintiran kebencian di Indonesia saya bayangkan akan berubah 180 derajat.
Di bab akhir buku ini, penulis memberikan suatu “obat” agar pelintiran kebencian tidak merusakan tatanan hidup kita. Yang pertama negara harus mengambil tindakan terhadap pelaku ujaran kebencian, tetapi tidak kepada pihak yang merasa tersinggung. Hukum hanya melindungi manusia nyata (bukan gagasan, keyakinan, nabi atau Tuhan) dari ancaman nyata (bukan hanya perasaan tersinggung, tak peduli seberapa dalam itu). Yang kedua pemimpin negara harus mengambil sikap membela yang minoritas dan membiarkan mayoritas karena di mana-mana mayoritas kuat karena disokong oleh banyaknya anggota. Minoritas karena anggotanya kecil akhirnya memiliki suara yang lemah sehingga layak dibela.
Pertanyaan renungan saya itu sedikit banyak dijawab dalam buku ini. Sedari bab awal sang penulis dengan tegas menyatakan bahwa ujaran kebencian dan keterhasutan merupakan ulah wirausahawan politik yang dengan sengaja menciptakan dan menggunakannya untuk kepentingan politiknya sendiri. Jika ujaran kebencian adalah sebuah penghinaan terhadap suatu kelompok, maka keterhasutan adalah sebuah perasaan tersinggung suatu kelompok atas karya, perkataan, barang, atau sikap kelompok tertentu yang sering ditandai dengan “kemarahan spontan”. Keduanya disebut sebagai pelintiran kebencian.
Penulis mengambil beberapa contoh pelintiran kebencian dari 3 negara besar dunia: India, Indonesia dan AS. Pemilihan tiga negara ini bukannya tanpa sebab. Tiga negara ini sengaja dipilih untuk memberikan gambaran jelas bahwa ujaran kebencian bukanlah monopoli agama tertentu saja, ia hadir terutama saat agama tersebut menjadi mayoritas. Baik Hindu di Indonesia, Islam di Indonesia, maupun Kristen di AS sama-sama melakukan pelintiran kebencian. Dalam setiap negara, penulis mengulas contoh-contoh pelintiran kebencian, aturan-aturan hukum yang mengatur pelintiran kebencian, dan reaksi masyarakat terhadap pelintiran kebencian.
Untuk contoh kasus Indonesia, penulis mengambil kasus Ahmadiyah, Syiah, kebencian anti-Kristen, dan Undang-Undang Penistaan Agama. Menarik di sini bahwa penulis menyatakan bahwa Indonesia masih cukup beruntung karena Islam moderat menjadi arus utama di negara ini ditandai dengan hadirnya organisasi NU dan Muhammadiyah. Nasionalisme sekular masih menjadi pilihan rakyat terbukti dengan terpilihnya Jokowi sebagai Presiden. Kelompok radikal sejatinya adalah minoritas dan terletak di pinggiran. Sayangnya, kelompok kecil yang berisik ini sering kali dibiarkan saja oleh aparat keamanan saat mereka berulah. Karena ditulis tahun 2015, buku ini tidak menyertakan kasus Ahok. Andai kasus Ahok disertakan dalam buku ini, narasi mengenai pelintiran kebencian di Indonesia saya bayangkan akan berubah 180 derajat.
Di bab akhir buku ini, penulis memberikan suatu “obat” agar pelintiran kebencian tidak merusakan tatanan hidup kita. Yang pertama negara harus mengambil tindakan terhadap pelaku ujaran kebencian, tetapi tidak kepada pihak yang merasa tersinggung. Hukum hanya melindungi manusia nyata (bukan gagasan, keyakinan, nabi atau Tuhan) dari ancaman nyata (bukan hanya perasaan tersinggung, tak peduli seberapa dalam itu). Yang kedua pemimpin negara harus mengambil sikap membela yang minoritas dan membiarkan mayoritas karena di mana-mana mayoritas kuat karena disokong oleh banyaknya anggota. Minoritas karena anggotanya kecil akhirnya memiliki suara yang lemah sehingga layak dibela.
August 12, 2022
It’s surprising that this compelling book has not received greater attention. Written before the textbook hate spin event, the anti-Ahok rally in late December 2016, and Trump’s election that rode on an upsurge of populist rage hate spin campaigns fuelled for years, Cherian George is nothing but prescient. The book’s unapologetic message is as accessible as its lucid prose. They can be summarised as:
i. Hate spin is a double-tap of offence-making and offence-taking, neither standing apart from the other. The offendedness is the offensive.
ii. Hate spin is not a primal rage bursting out of the volcanic depths of personal religiosity. It is planned, manufactured, and intentionally driven towards strategic goals.
iii. Hate spin is mistaken by good-willed policymakers as a problem of insult whereas exploited by malicious actors as opoortunities to incite.
iv. Expressions of hate spin (offence-taking and -making) are not inevitable byproducts of multicultural living (at least not in the form that lingered as repertoires of Islamophobia, or indeed kafir-phobia) but are acts of ‘political entrepreneurship’ (p. 18) that threaten multicultural flourishing.
Simply put, George’s message is that ‘offence is manufactured’. To treat them as otherwise is naïve, if not downright dangerous. Given how the stakes have been raised following the book’s publication, one can’t help but agree.
On a personal level, it gels with my own observation of Malaysia where identity contentious politics is basically hate spin on high gears and on repeat (how else would you explain it’s always the same actors who took offence if indeed it’s a case of a sensitive ‘religion’)? It also resonates with my own frustrations with efforts to tackle hate speech that is framed more as societal-wide interventions (or re-education) instead of actor-centric ones. If hate spin is a problem of bad actors and not bad religion, it stands to reason only an actor-centric strategy can be right.
The book is also not coy about devising possible solutions, which this reader welcomes. The raising of media responsibility strikes me as particularly important. The boldness in prescriptions, including the suggestion of muckraking (p. 187), is impressive. A breath of fresh air even. One can’t help but feel exasperated these days by a liberal discourse that seems more obsessed with proving that it is the ‘better’ side when faced with uncivil opponents and uncouth tactics instead of thinking tactically and realistically about the issue.
There are, however, some unresolved tensions and darker conclusions if the book’s arguments are pushed a little further. For example, the book’s advocacy of assertive pluralism is commendable, but it does beg the question of who gets to be assertive, and how assertive one can/should be. If hate spin is indeed a political problem underpinned by majoritarian politics as well as a lack of political will to rein it in, there are limits as to how far pluralist-friendly CSOs in places like India, Indonesia, or even Pakistan and Malaysia can push back. At least to the extent they can do so without significant risks to personal safety. At the same time, if said assertiveness is to come from the state, it risks justifying a form of secular autocracy that oppresses not only religious interests but also civil liberties at large. Anyone familiar with the Middle East would know that the Faustian pact offered by its secular autocrats is often that of ‘jihadist/fundamentalist or me?’ The absence of hate spin can easily come at the cost of the absence of freedom.
In all honesty, I am sympathetic toward the idea of being assertive about pluralism instead of being passively idealistic about it. But that is necessarily a political project with considerable risks and arbitrary choices to be taken. This is more so the case when hate spin has grown more sophisticated, with dog-whistling being more prominent than outright faux pas that creates ‘GOTCHA!’ moments. I would have loved it if this book, as fearless as it already is, gets to set out the parameters of this politics of assertive pluralism. For example, in places such as Malaysia where the habits of majoritarianism infiltrated even the intellectual space, the assertiveness should be clear-minded. That is, its proponents should understand that the project is less about reclaiming lost grounds but rather holding it so that an insurgent pluralism can eventually grow.
Even as the book convincingly argued that it is manufactured offence we are dealing with today, and that any sidetracking from such a view is only going to reinforce the endgame of these bad-faith actors, there are still two questions we may not like the answers to.
First, who reinforces the politics of offence-taking, i.e. who popularises the primacy of ‘feelings’ as an anchor of righteousness? Admittedly, laying the groundwork for such an affective form of politics is not confined to conservative religious actors but also liberal ones, who are wont to call-outs and cancelling. I am not equating the moral position between them but rather raising the possibility that the relationality (if not ironic mirroring) between so-called conservative and liberal discourses could mean emancipatory identity politics reinforces restrictive ones.
Second, if hate spin is the work of a vocal and vicious minority, one can ask why do the majority allow these actors to speak for them? I am not referring to the case of terrorism here (as the majority does speak out) but rather cases where theological issues are involved (such as rights to apostasy for Muslims, or LGBTQ rights and equality). In these instances, the ‘silent’ religious majority are silent even if they are disgusted by hate spin tactics because they feel that doing otherwise might mean ceding their strong theological beliefs to godless ‘secular’ forces. If so, George’s idea of assertive pluralism is limited not by the industriousness of hate spin agents, but rather the (ultra)conservative outlooks of believers who are by all standards moderate in their daily interactions and temperaments.
In any case, I am by no means suggesting that these questions and concerns are glaring shortcomings that drained away a highly engrossing reading experience. Indeed, there are stimulating meditations inspired by an important and thoughtful book. At this point, one can only hope more awareness, and indeed interventions, about hate spin will come. Because it does not seem like this phenomenon is going to leave us anytime soon.
i. Hate spin is a double-tap of offence-making and offence-taking, neither standing apart from the other. The offendedness is the offensive.
ii. Hate spin is not a primal rage bursting out of the volcanic depths of personal religiosity. It is planned, manufactured, and intentionally driven towards strategic goals.
iii. Hate spin is mistaken by good-willed policymakers as a problem of insult whereas exploited by malicious actors as opoortunities to incite.
iv. Expressions of hate spin (offence-taking and -making) are not inevitable byproducts of multicultural living (at least not in the form that lingered as repertoires of Islamophobia, or indeed kafir-phobia) but are acts of ‘political entrepreneurship’ (p. 18) that threaten multicultural flourishing.
Simply put, George’s message is that ‘offence is manufactured’. To treat them as otherwise is naïve, if not downright dangerous. Given how the stakes have been raised following the book’s publication, one can’t help but agree.
On a personal level, it gels with my own observation of Malaysia where identity contentious politics is basically hate spin on high gears and on repeat (how else would you explain it’s always the same actors who took offence if indeed it’s a case of a sensitive ‘religion’)? It also resonates with my own frustrations with efforts to tackle hate speech that is framed more as societal-wide interventions (or re-education) instead of actor-centric ones. If hate spin is a problem of bad actors and not bad religion, it stands to reason only an actor-centric strategy can be right.
The book is also not coy about devising possible solutions, which this reader welcomes. The raising of media responsibility strikes me as particularly important. The boldness in prescriptions, including the suggestion of muckraking (p. 187), is impressive. A breath of fresh air even. One can’t help but feel exasperated these days by a liberal discourse that seems more obsessed with proving that it is the ‘better’ side when faced with uncivil opponents and uncouth tactics instead of thinking tactically and realistically about the issue.
There are, however, some unresolved tensions and darker conclusions if the book’s arguments are pushed a little further. For example, the book’s advocacy of assertive pluralism is commendable, but it does beg the question of who gets to be assertive, and how assertive one can/should be. If hate spin is indeed a political problem underpinned by majoritarian politics as well as a lack of political will to rein it in, there are limits as to how far pluralist-friendly CSOs in places like India, Indonesia, or even Pakistan and Malaysia can push back. At least to the extent they can do so without significant risks to personal safety. At the same time, if said assertiveness is to come from the state, it risks justifying a form of secular autocracy that oppresses not only religious interests but also civil liberties at large. Anyone familiar with the Middle East would know that the Faustian pact offered by its secular autocrats is often that of ‘jihadist/fundamentalist or me?’ The absence of hate spin can easily come at the cost of the absence of freedom.
In all honesty, I am sympathetic toward the idea of being assertive about pluralism instead of being passively idealistic about it. But that is necessarily a political project with considerable risks and arbitrary choices to be taken. This is more so the case when hate spin has grown more sophisticated, with dog-whistling being more prominent than outright faux pas that creates ‘GOTCHA!’ moments. I would have loved it if this book, as fearless as it already is, gets to set out the parameters of this politics of assertive pluralism. For example, in places such as Malaysia where the habits of majoritarianism infiltrated even the intellectual space, the assertiveness should be clear-minded. That is, its proponents should understand that the project is less about reclaiming lost grounds but rather holding it so that an insurgent pluralism can eventually grow.
Even as the book convincingly argued that it is manufactured offence we are dealing with today, and that any sidetracking from such a view is only going to reinforce the endgame of these bad-faith actors, there are still two questions we may not like the answers to.
First, who reinforces the politics of offence-taking, i.e. who popularises the primacy of ‘feelings’ as an anchor of righteousness? Admittedly, laying the groundwork for such an affective form of politics is not confined to conservative religious actors but also liberal ones, who are wont to call-outs and cancelling. I am not equating the moral position between them but rather raising the possibility that the relationality (if not ironic mirroring) between so-called conservative and liberal discourses could mean emancipatory identity politics reinforces restrictive ones.
Second, if hate spin is the work of a vocal and vicious minority, one can ask why do the majority allow these actors to speak for them? I am not referring to the case of terrorism here (as the majority does speak out) but rather cases where theological issues are involved (such as rights to apostasy for Muslims, or LGBTQ rights and equality). In these instances, the ‘silent’ religious majority are silent even if they are disgusted by hate spin tactics because they feel that doing otherwise might mean ceding their strong theological beliefs to godless ‘secular’ forces. If so, George’s idea of assertive pluralism is limited not by the industriousness of hate spin agents, but rather the (ultra)conservative outlooks of believers who are by all standards moderate in their daily interactions and temperaments.
In any case, I am by no means suggesting that these questions and concerns are glaring shortcomings that drained away a highly engrossing reading experience. Indeed, there are stimulating meditations inspired by an important and thoughtful book. At this point, one can only hope more awareness, and indeed interventions, about hate spin will come. Because it does not seem like this phenomenon is going to leave us anytime soon.
January 21, 2018
What a useful book, I warmly recommend it. It's well put together and very accessible. I picked it up because I wanted to make my woolly intuitions a bit sharper around issues of hate speech and religious offence. Cherian George takes you through the development of international legislation relating to human rights, including freedom of speech and the right to protection from 'real' harm. He offers three contextual studies based in three of the world's largest democracies - India, Indonesia, and the U.S. - looking at the effects upon democracy, and upon the lives of scapegoated minorities, when legal instruments purposed for freedom and protection are abused for political gain. He challenges the myth that outbreaks of intolerance are spontaneous responses to offence, and argues that they are strategically manufactured for the benefit of the powerful, mobilising majorities against vulnerable minorities whom the law was supposed to protect. George helpfully complexifies the issue by exploring it in very different contexts, with different religions in differing positions of power, and looking not only at state and legal responsibilities, but also the role of civic society and the part we all have to play in creating a just and democratic way forward. Definitely worth the effort of reading.
December 1, 2021
This book is a bit boring for me. This book is indeed important, regarding tolerance and hatred towards certain groups that are currently on the rise. It was like reading material for college.
March 13, 2018
Buku ini membuat saya capek karena informasinya sungguh banyak, dan rasanya sayang kalau dilewat begitu saja. Maka saya tulis ulang ke buku catatan sembari menambahkan satu dua komentar.
Banyak yang mengatakan kalau 2018 adalah tahun politik bagi segenap masyarakat Indonesia yang akan mengikuti Pilpres 2019 mendatang. Belajar dari pengalaman Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 lalu, pengamat politik memperkirakan strategi para capres untuk menjadi RI 1 mungkin akan sama. Dengan memanfaatkan berita hoaks, ujaran kebencian, dan mungkin mengorganisir pelintiran kebencian.
Sesungguhnya gejala awal sudah banyak, seperti misalkan narasi presiden saat ini anti kelompok tertentu, pro pengusaha asing, dan lain-lain. Supaya tidak terjebak dalam wacana yang disodorkan oleh pihak-pihak berkepentingan, maka membaca buku ini jadi perlu. Sehingga kita bisa memahami manakah ketersinggungan yang murni, dan mana yang dibuat-buat demi tujuan tertentu. Seperti misalkan, mungkin, menjadikan jagoannya kepala daerah.
Cherian George sendiri mengambil contoh dari 3 negara yang memang terdampak kasus pelintiran kebencian: India, Amerika, dan Indonesia. Analisanya jernih dan penjelasannya runut. Mudah dikunyah oleh mereka yang mungkin tidak tahu sama sekali akan kasus semacam ini. Tak hanya itu, buku ini pun kaya dengan referensi yang juga menarik dibaca lebih lanjut.
Banyak yang mengatakan kalau 2018 adalah tahun politik bagi segenap masyarakat Indonesia yang akan mengikuti Pilpres 2019 mendatang. Belajar dari pengalaman Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 lalu, pengamat politik memperkirakan strategi para capres untuk menjadi RI 1 mungkin akan sama. Dengan memanfaatkan berita hoaks, ujaran kebencian, dan mungkin mengorganisir pelintiran kebencian.
Sesungguhnya gejala awal sudah banyak, seperti misalkan narasi presiden saat ini anti kelompok tertentu, pro pengusaha asing, dan lain-lain. Supaya tidak terjebak dalam wacana yang disodorkan oleh pihak-pihak berkepentingan, maka membaca buku ini jadi perlu. Sehingga kita bisa memahami manakah ketersinggungan yang murni, dan mana yang dibuat-buat demi tujuan tertentu. Seperti misalkan, mungkin, menjadikan jagoannya kepala daerah.
Cherian George sendiri mengambil contoh dari 3 negara yang memang terdampak kasus pelintiran kebencian: India, Amerika, dan Indonesia. Analisanya jernih dan penjelasannya runut. Mudah dikunyah oleh mereka yang mungkin tidak tahu sama sekali akan kasus semacam ini. Tak hanya itu, buku ini pun kaya dengan referensi yang juga menarik dibaca lebih lanjut.
September 20, 2018
A wise woman once told me that law is an inherently flawed practice because it is the attempt to solve moral problems with procedural solutions. Morality and the practice of pluralism is in no way absolute, finite or simple – especially with globalization and the way that politics have evolved. This book excellent portrayed both sides of this story – the legal structures of the world’s three largest democracies surrounding freedom of speech and expression and how those laws (and the mongers of intolerance) actually impact minority peoples and beliefs.
Looking specifically at the US – I am going to keep this simple because if you don’t know how I feel about this country by now – then I guess I just need to be more brash. The idea of freedom and frankly democracy in this country is largely a big façade of glittering generality that is only a reality if you are a straight white male. The rest of us are presently in some ways screwed and some of us have a long, long history of being royally screwed. If you believe Fox News to be a source of truth then you fall into the categories described in this FACTUALLY based book. I know facts may escape you here because #faithbeforefacts or #foxbeforefacts , but nevertheless you are complicit in scapegoating minorities for political gain and villainizing people who are yearning for the freedoms you so staunchly defend. This book would be good for you to read – and work to educate yourself about the system you play into.
Looking specifically at the US – I am going to keep this simple because if you don’t know how I feel about this country by now – then I guess I just need to be more brash. The idea of freedom and frankly democracy in this country is largely a big façade of glittering generality that is only a reality if you are a straight white male. The rest of us are presently in some ways screwed and some of us have a long, long history of being royally screwed. If you believe Fox News to be a source of truth then you fall into the categories described in this FACTUALLY based book. I know facts may escape you here because #faithbeforefacts or #foxbeforefacts , but nevertheless you are complicit in scapegoating minorities for political gain and villainizing people who are yearning for the freedoms you so staunchly defend. This book would be good for you to read – and work to educate yourself about the system you play into.
February 7, 2017
A must read!
Read
May 5, 2017345.0288 G3475 2016
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews