Retrieving Doctrine: Essays in Reformed Theology

by Oliver D. Crisp

In this volume Oliver Crisp offers a set of essays that analyze the significance and contribution of several great thinkers in the Reformed tradition, ranging from John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards to Karl Barth. Crisp demonstrates how these thinkers navigated pressing theological issues in their historical settings and in what ways contemporary readers can draw important insights from the tradition relevant to current discussions.

Genres: Theology

209 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2010

About the author

Oliver D. Crisp (PhD, University of London, DLitt, University of Aberdeen) is professor of analytic theology at the University of St. Andrews. He is the author of several books, including Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic Theology, Saving Calvinism: Expanding the Reformed Tradition, Jonathan Edwards Among The Theologians, and The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ. He is a founding editor of the Journal of Analytic Theology, and co-organizes the annual Los Angeles Theology Conference with Fred Sanders.

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Retrieving Doctrine: Explorations in Reformed Theology, Oliver D. Crisp, Paternoster, 2010, 209 pages.

Paul Helm says Retrieving Doctrine (RD) "will further enhance [Crisp's] reputation as a historically sensitive dogmatic theologian who puts the tools of analytic philosophy to good use" (RD, back cover). Bringing the tools of analytic philosophy to bear on the task of doing theology is to do 'analytic theology' (which I talked about here). Analytic theology brings exciting advancements, rigor, and clarity to the discipline of theology, and Oliver Crisp is a rising star and a leading example of how to do analytic theology.

Crisp stands within the Reformed tradition and so much of his writing interacts with the theologians and questions of Reformation theology (though he has published books on more ecumenical topics, e.g., the nature of Christ's divinity and humanity and questions that arise from the incarnation, as well as discussing the atonement, and hell). In RD, Crisp looks at theologians who broadly stand within the Reformed tradition, and he takes up a specific topic within their theology and presents it, analyzes it, and evaluates it. The book comes in three parts, divided further into nine chapters.

Part one is titled, Creation and Providence. Crisp first looks at "John Calvin on Creation and Providence." He discusses Calvin's views of God's motive in creating, God's freedom in creating, God's decrees, and God's involvement with and governing of creation. These discussions get into God's glory, natural theology, determinism and compatibilism, voluntarism, and some problems that some think arise from Calvin's views on these matters, perhaps leading some to wonder if some other account of God and his relation to the world is better. One particular criticism comes from Barthians who complain that Calvin's view is not Christological enough. Crisp responds that it does look this way in the Institutes, but not if one reads Calvin's commentaries too, which show Calvin's doctrine of creation and providence to have much more Christological emphasis than some suppose. I would have liked to see interaction with contemporary models of compatibilism in this chapter, perhaps even wondering if Calvin's view was flawed or could be strengthened.

The next chapter in this section, chapter two, is on "Karl Barth on Creation." Here the question is over whether Barth was too Christological, and what problems this might raise. Crisp only looks some controversial issues involved in Barth's doctrine of creation proper. The discussion is situated by putting Barth next to views of creation held by the Reformed strand of the Western theological tradition. Crisp begins by pointing to four areas of conceptual overlap between Barth and the Reformed stream (e.g., the acts of the trinity as indivisible, creation as a free act, supralapserianism (true of many but not all Reformed), and the connection between creation and the covenant of grace). Crisp next looks at four areas of disagreement (e.g., proper understanding of creation requires faith, the denial of the apologetic purpose of creation, thinking of creation as a 'saga' rather than broadly historical events, and whether the creative act itself was a timeless act by an atemporal God). Crisp concludes that Barth's position has several problems, but several insights worthy of interaction as well.

Part two comes under the heading, Sin and Salvation. Chapter three is the first chapter of this section and it is on "Jonathan Edwards on the Imputation of Sin." In this chapter Crisp looks at Edwards' notoriously difficult thinking on the doctrine of original sin and the imputation of it to Adam's posterity. Crisp rehearses Edwards' position on and defense of the doctrine of original sin, locating Edwards' as a defender of the classical Reformed position. He then discusses Edwards' theology of imputation, which brings up the debate between mediate and immediate imputation and how God establishes this union. He discusses the Augustinian realist view of this union as well as the Federalist view of Calvin. He looks at the debates surrounding Edwards' position on the union. Crisp sides with those (like John Murray) who claim Edwards was federalist on the matter; however, Crisp says Murray fails to take note of the unique metaphysical insights Edwards' brought to bear on his understanding of the metaphysical union had between Adam and his progeny. Next, Crisp looks at Paul Helm's non-federalist but immediate union interpretation. He ultimately comes down against Murray, Helm, and others, claiming that Edwards' forged his own unique view, believing the metaphysics involved were required to save Reformed desiderata. Essentially, Edwards' fused elements of realism and federalism together, forming a via media.

Chapter four is on "Francis Turretin on the Necessity of the Incarnation." This chapter looks at the long-time debate over whether Christ's Incarnation was in some sense necessary. Crisp first lays out Turretin's position on the matter---the Incarnation is necessary because of divine justice, and offers a nine premise argument of Turretin's reasoning here. The necessity results from other decrees, such that if God creates a world with fallen sinners requiring salvation, and God deigns to save some, then the Incarnation is necessary. It is conditionally necessary, then, since, ex hypothesis, God did not have to create and he did not have to save anyone. To this view of Turretin's Crisp raises three objections. The first is the unjustifiable cost objection, the second is that it impinges upon God's freedom, and the last objection is the modal implications of Turretin's view: in short, given what Turretin says about God’s justice as an attribute needing displaying, the same goes for mercy or grace, and so if God creates fallen creatures needing salvation, mercy requires he at least save some. Crisp argues that Turretin's position has the resources to rebut the first two but not the last objection (he rebuts the second by saying Turretin held that God has LFW). Here I would have liked to see more interaction with, or at least references to, views on God's freedom as sui generous, not properly categorized as any model of creature freedom (whether compatibilist or libertarian). Contemporary philosophers relevant here are Timothy O' Connor and Kevin Timpe.

The next chapter in this section is on "John McLeod Campbell and Non-Penal Substitution." Crisp looks at Edwards' doctrine of the atonement, noting that it works for both a penal substitutionary view and a non-penal substitutionary vicarious penitence view. Only a God-man could bear the penalty of sin, but also a God-man could offer the perfect penance for sin. McLeod Campbell thought the traditional view was beset with several problems, and that it made divine benevolence into something arbitrary. This non-penal substitutionary view is shown by Crisp to be consistent with active obedience, the divine attributes, retributive justice, and limited atonement. Crisp also pulls from the resources of philosophy of language and speech-act theories in particular to shore up initial defects of this non-penal substitutionary view. Crisp offers several objections to Campbellian view (e.g., how do we say we are sorry for another's guilt and have it do the same job as if the guilty were to do it, why the cross was necessary for this view of the atonement, and it cannot explain how the penal consequences pertaining to our sin is dealt with by this kind of atonement). Crisp maintains that all objections can be met by a defender of non-penal substitution, and this theory might avoid some of the unsavory implications of the traditional penal-substitutionary view (note: see Crisp "Original Sin and Atonement" in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (eds. Thomas Flint and Michael Rea, 2009, pp. 430-51), for a defense of penal substitution).

The final chapter of this section, chapter six, is "On Karl Barth's Denial of Universalism." Those familiar with Barth and his views of Christ, the atonement and election will know that it is a criticism of some that Barth's view entails universalism (the doctrine that all will be saved), however, Barth denied that universalism is the case, and hence we have an inconsistency. Crisp rigorously analyzes Barth's view and shows that it indeed does appear that Barth's position logically requires universalism. Crisp then looks at Barth's response, which is to note that his position certainly appears to lead to universalism but, because God is free and salvation is a free gift, we cannot be certain of universalism. Crisp says that this "out" simply contradicts the explicit premises of Barth's view, which do imply that we can be certain that all men whoever will be saved. He says the problem is similar to saying that (I will switch up the analogy for American readers) all the Republican incumbents have been reelected and so will return to congress, but the future candidacy of all Republican candidates is uncertain.

Part three is on The Christian Life. The first chapter of this section is "John Calvin and Petitioning God." The chapter covers Calvin's discussion of impetration vis-à-vis the objection that it is useless to pray to God if he has decreed whatsoever comes to pass (e.g., divine determinism, which, Crisp says, is the view of the Reformers). The problem is that since God knows what we will ask and what we will need, and since God is essentially good and will thus give us what is good for us all things considered, and since God has already determined what comes to pass (so that what we pray for isn't a "two-way contingent"), even our prayers, then impetration is useless or pointless. We cannot cause God to do anything. Crisp responds by pointing out that Calvin's doctrine of prayer is of a piece with his doctrine of providence, and his understanding of the two compliments each other. The broadest way to summarizes Calvin's responses is that he says prayer is a means God uses to conform our will and desires to God's. Moreover, Crisp takes some of the arguments used by Paul Helm to show that there is a sense we may say that our prayers cause God to act. This is shown by an analogy between author and his story's plotline, where later things in the story happen because of former things. God may ordain that our prayers are, say, the cause of his healing a little girl of cancer. I would have liked to see Calvin's defensive argument extended to pointing out how classical Arminian or Molinist views don't offer any more solice than theistic determinism.

Chapter eight is on "John Williamson Nevin on the Church." Here Crisp looks at the high church views of Nevin and the interesting metaphysical assumptions that propelled his view of the nature of the church and of Christ's union with his bride. Crisp notes that much of Nevin's views on the matter are indebted to and rest on assumptions of German idealism. However, Crisp notes that Nevin's view of the organic nature of the church can also be found in thinkers like Aquinas and Calvin. This leads to discussing a shortcoming in Nevin's understanding of the union between Christ and his elect and Adam and his progeny. Crisp does not want to be too harsh on Nevin, since union with Christ is clearly very mysterious; however, Crisp thinks we can see a bit further than Nevin. This leads to a discussion of mereology and other metaphysical arguments (such as how an entire acorn might be the first phase of the life of an oak, and, especially in Adam's case and ours, pass its disease on to the oak. This gets into realism again and a mediate view of imputation. Then there is also the view that FALLEN HUMANITY and REDEEMED HUMANITY are wholes that are prior to their parts, but the parts are added during time. Crisp also hints that four-dimensionalism might be used to make sense out of some of Nevin's views.). Crisp ends by noting that one could agree with much of Nevin even if one does not care for the German idealism, opting instead for a better account gleaned from contemporary metaphysics. He notes that there are many more questions that need asking, but says Nevin has bequeathed an integrated and interesting account of Christian life in the church as has Nevin. While Nevin may not have had the right answers, he was asking the right questions.

Chapter nine is the final chapter; it is on "Jonathan Edwards and the Qualification for Communion." Essentially, Crisp situates the discussion between Edwards, halfway covenant theology, and Stoddardism. The argument was over what is required of one to be a communicate member. Edwards' ultimately settled on requiring a profession of faith that one trusts on Christ and believes he or she belongs to his people. The objections were that Edwards' thought he could divine who the elect were, or that he required too much (especially if, with his opponents, you viewed the meal as an evangelistic tool). Crisp shows that Edwards' rebuts these objections and also has a metaphysical view of the union between Christ and his elect that requires the profession of faith. This is also coupled with a strongly realized view of Christ and his body, not simply something that will happen at the eschaton. The meal was between lover and beloved and served to unite the two who were growing together into an even more intimate connection, but one that would not confuse or confound Creator and creature. In this chapter Crisp distanced Edwards from paedocommunion, but I thought this could profit from more discussion.

Having briefly summarized the contents of RD, I will make a couple points that are more practical. The book has a couple of purposes. First, it engages in good discussion of several important issues, bringing up questions and problems theologians can try to answer or deal with. It is also good in descriptive content, explaining positions held by popular Reformed theologians (or theologians who claim the tradition a la Barth) that many would not have the opportunity to distill for themselves due to time or interest. Second, however, is that the book models analytic theology. Even if one is already familiar with the topics discussed, one may benefit from seeing how the topics may be discussed and inspected by one wielding tools of analytic philosophy. This second end is perhaps more useful than the first since none of the chapters are exhaustive on their topic, and all of them seem to bring up more questions than it answers. But this is a good thing. This is job security for the theologian!

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Crisp highlights key (but often marginalized) ideas from several Reformed thinkers. He is “retrieving” aspects of doctrine that aren’t usually talked about. He analyzes Calvin on Creation, Providence and Prayer; Edwards on Original Sin; Turretin on sin and necessity; Barth on universal salvation, and others.

The book is a short model on how to do analytic theology. It mostly succeeds. There are a few chapters where Crisp either spent too much time with too little payout, or not enough time at all. Nonetheless, some essays, like the ones on Barth and Nevin, score major gains. It is on these two thinkers I will spend most of the review.

Karl Barth’s denial of universal salvation

Barth’s problem was that he posited a model of Christology and election that entailed universal salvation, yet he denied this was his teaching. Crisp shows that it was. The payoff here is that Evangelical Barthians must now acknowledge their position leads to universalism. Introductory premises:

A1. There is a domain of moral agents comprising all human agents.

A2. By Christ’s death atonement is procured for the sin and guilt of those for whom he died.

(1) Given A1 and A2, Christ’s death atones for the sin of all human agents.

(2) Christ’s death is sufficient for all human agents (CD II/2, p. 271).

(3) This work is completed at the cross.

(4) This work is appropriated, not on the traditional gloss of ‘repent and believe,’ but by agents coming to realize that ‘this is what God in Jesus Christ has done for you’ (Ibid., 317ff).

(5) Christ is the Elect One.

(6) Christ is the Reprobate One.

(7) All human agents are elect only in a derivative sense of having a saving relation to the set of the Elect and its single member, Christ.

(8)The Sin of all human agents is atoned for by Christ, the Reprobate one.

But (8) seems to entail universalism, which Barth does not want. So perhaps he means it in this sense:

(8*) All human agents are reprobate only in the derivative sense of having a relation to the set of the reprobate and its single member, Christ.

But this would entail:

(9) All human agents are simultaneously members of the sets ‘elect-in-Christ’ and ‘reprobate-in-Christ.”

But this is incoherent. Therefore, Barth must mean (8) instead of (8*). Given (8) we now have:

(9*) All human agents are members of the set ‘elect-in-Christ.’

At this point Barth can escape (9*) by affirming some sort of Libertarian free-will, but Barth doesn’t do this (and he gives good reasons for not doing it). Therefore, Barth must hold to something like,

(10) All human agents are necessarily (and derivatively) elect-in-Christ by virtue of his universally efficient atonement.

But now we are back at universalism, unless Barth can posit a new way out:

(11) A human agent for whom Christ died may reject Christ and may ultimately not be saved.

This is fallacious, given (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) and (9*). Further, (11) is Arminianism, which Barth claims to reject.

This isn't a refutation of Barth, but it does place enormous strain on his system.

John Williamson Nevin on the Church

Instead of the visible/invisible church, Nevin posits the Ideal Church and its manifestation in time. It is an organic whole springing from a common ground. While Nevin has much good to say, it’s not clear he can fully escape “visible” and “invisible” categories. For example, he would rightly want to affirm OT saints as part of the church, yet since they have died they aren’t “visible.”

For all of Nevin’s problems, though, much of his teaching is simple Augustinian realism. One wonders, though, what it would take to shore up Nevin’s conclusions without using his German Idealism.

Another difficulty: if there is a metaphysically real union with the old Adam and a metaphysically real union with Christ, then how are these two distinct?

Crisp gives a fine summary of Nevin’s conclusions on p. 172:

(1) The Church is mystically united to Christ.

(2) The church isn’t the Incarnation, part two. Rather it is a continuation of the new creation brought about by the Incarnation.

(3) OT sacraments are largely preparatory (I think Cocceius held to a similar view).

(4)The Church has an ideal aspect and a concrete (externalizing) aspect.

(5) The ideal is perfect in all respects; the concrete is imperfect but gradually realizing the perfect.

(6) Adam and his progeny are an organic whole.

(7) Christ and the church are another organic whole.

[Sooho Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

With analytic clarity and fastidiousness, Retrieving Doctrine offers an eclectic collection of essays in Reformed Theology by Oliver D. Crisp, a forerunner in analytic theology. The classic "greats" of the Reformed Tradition, such as Calvin, Edwards (and Barth, if one classifies him as such!), and some lesser known are critically and graciously engaged over complex and easily confused (and often misconstrued) issues concerning each theologian. For example, Edwards and the metaphysics of imputation of sin, Calvin on petitioning the foreknowing God, Barth's paradoxical denial of universalism, Nevin's Real and Ideal Church, Turretin's thoughts on "Incarnation Anyway" approach, and more. The impression one is left with is the breadth of the Reformed Tradition; surely, this 500 year old Tradition cannot be pigeon-holed to be just "justification by faith" (a crucial crux of the Tradition, nevertheless).

Crisp, here, is not merely interested in clarifying confusion but sees constructive value for contemporary theology. One such value can be the practice of thinking with and, with caution, against the "greats." How they were wrong is just as, if not more, important to ask than how they were right: theologians of today both stand at the shoulders and must attempt to see beyond the mistakes of the past. In other words, we must not merely ignore nor copy the past but think with the Tradition.

Cf. www.sooholee.wordpress.com

[James Rivera · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most frustrating things about reading a lot of philosophical and analytic theology is that when I go back to regular theological books—even academic ones—they often feel unclear and imprecise. They tend to lack nuance, and they don’t explain conceptual distinctions in a way that makes sense if you’re used to a more philosophical approach.

Oliver Crisp does a masterful job of using philosophy to engage with theological concepts and views that have been forgotten, reintroducing them with real precision and analytic rigor. This book is a great example of that.

Five out of five—highly recommend.

[Tim Goldsmith · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some books are really hard to qualify. It was only 200 pages long, but took me a solid three months. Essays on creation and providence, sin and salvation, empetration, imputation and communion were all fascinating and mind-enlarging. That said, it sometimes felt like Crisp was trying to be confusing.
If you want to read a book that really digs into classical reformed doctrines and brings an Edwardsian and then new twist on them, then this is the book for you. But if you want it to be an easy read, go find a Keller book!

[Ian · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting read. Some essays stray into the area of splitting hairs on unnecessary issues but in general they’re thought provoking or useful for deeper studies.

[Douglas Fyfe · Rating 3 out of 5]

a good collection of Crisp's essays, and for me a great insight into US theology.

however Crisp is in many places in need of an editor - what he says is often sloppy, or there are typographical errors, or he is asserting not an historically Reformed position but his own preference as a (supposedly) devastating critique of a theologian of great stature.

what this book did do well was raise questions (sometimes inadvertently) for further discussion. the sections are well structured over several fascinating topics, all of which beg further discussion. well worth a read.

[John]

A very rich exercise in theology that retrieves the contributions and controversies of the reformed tradition and applies them for contemporary use. This is not Church History, nor is it exactly historical theology. But retrieval of doctrine, and putting it to the test of analysis. This is not light reading from Crisp. But worth the time.