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Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics
Offering a collection of fifteen essays that deal with issues at the intersection of phenomenology, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics, this 2005 book is divided into three parts. Part I contains a general essay on Husserl's conception of science and logic, an essay of mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, and an essay on phenomenology and modern pure geometry. Part II is focused on Kurt Godel's interest in phenomenology. It explores Godel's ideas and also some work of Quine, Penelope Maddy and Roger Penrose. Part III deals with elementary, constructive areas of mathematics. These are areas of mathematics that are closer to their origins in simple cognitive activities and in everyday experience. This part of the book contains essays on intuitionism, Hermann Weyl, the notion of constructive proof, Poincar� and Frege.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published June 6, 2005
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February 4, 2015
The author gives a good introduction on the subject of phenomenology in the philosophy of mathematics. He focuses on Kurt Gödel's views, to show how a phenomenological reflection on the mathematical concepts may help us, while at the same time carefully explaining what such concepts are, how they are a necessary feature of our consciousness.
One may be better off just picking and choosing a few articles, though. Especially the chapters on Gödel, which make up more than a third of the book, tread the same ground again and again. One gets a clearer idea of what's going on by just reading the most recent and thorough chapter (Gödel and the Intuition of Concepts) and skipping the rest.
Another third of the book consists of articles in which he engages with criticism from other philosophers of mathematics or philosophers of language, notably Quine and Maddy. Unfortunately, these articles again spend half their time going through the motions of explaining the basics of phenomenology and Godels views, only to tack on the actual engagement with other philosophies in a few pages. Not that these engagements are shallow, but you'd expect something more after the long build-up every chapter puts you through.
The points that the author makes are excellent, and very much worth reading. It's a pity that the format - a collection of essays which retread the same ground again and again and again - is pretty bad.
One may be better off just picking and choosing a few articles, though. Especially the chapters on Gödel, which make up more than a third of the book, tread the same ground again and again. One gets a clearer idea of what's going on by just reading the most recent and thorough chapter (Gödel and the Intuition of Concepts) and skipping the rest.
Another third of the book consists of articles in which he engages with criticism from other philosophers of mathematics or philosophers of language, notably Quine and Maddy. Unfortunately, these articles again spend half their time going through the motions of explaining the basics of phenomenology and Godels views, only to tack on the actual engagement with other philosophies in a few pages. Not that these engagements are shallow, but you'd expect something more after the long build-up every chapter puts you through.
The points that the author makes are excellent, and very much worth reading. It's a pity that the format - a collection of essays which retread the same ground again and again and again - is pretty bad.
Displaying 1 of 1 review