The Battle of New Market in the Shenandoah Valley suffers from no lack of drama, interest, or importance. The ramifications of the May 1864 engagement, which involved only 10,000 troops, were substantial. Previous studies, however, focused on the Confederate side of the story. David Powell's, Union Command Failure in the Shenandoah: Major General Franz Sigel and the War in the Valley of Virginia, May 1864, provides the balance that has so long been needed. Union General Ulysses S. Grant regarded a spring campaign in the Valley of Virginia as integral to his overall strategy designed to turn Robert E. Lee's strategic western flank, deny his Army of Northern Virginia much needed supplies, and prevent other Confederates from reinforcing Lee. It fell to Union general and German transplant Franz Sigel to execute Grant's strategy in the northern reaches of the Shenandoah while Maj. Gen. George Crook struck elsewhere in southwestern Virginia. Sigel's record in the field was checkered at best, and he was not Grant's first choice to lead the effort, but a combination of politics and other factors left the German in command. Sigel met Confederate Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge and his small army on May 15 just outside the crossroads town of New Market. The hard-fought affair hung in the balance until finally the Union lines broke, and Sigel's Yankees fled the field. Breckinridge's command included some 300 young men from the Virginia Military Institute's Corps of Cadets. VMI's presence and dramatic role in the fighting ensured that New Market would never be forgotten, but pushed other aspects of this interesting and important campaign into the back seat of history. Award-winning author David Powell's years of archival and other research provides an outstanding foundation for this outstanding study. Previous works have focused on the Confederate side of the battle, using Sigel's incompetence as sufficient excuse to explain why the Federals were defeated. This methodology, however, neglects the other important factors that contributed to the ruin of Grant's scheme in the Valley. Union Command Failure in the Shenandoah delves into all the issues, analyzing the campaign from an operational standpoint. Complete with original maps, photos, and the skillful writing readers have come to expect from the pen of David Powell, Union Command Failure in the Shenandoah will satisfy the most demanding students of Civil War history.
Graduated from the Virginia Military Institute with a B.A. in history. He has spent years studying the Battle of Chickamauga and wrote several books on the campaign. His book Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign won the 2011 Richard Harwell Award for the best book on a Civil War topic published in the last year. In addition to his books, he has written articles for the magazines North & South and Gettysburg Magazine.
This is another fine Powell book, really shining in his analysis of command decisions and the strengths and weaknesses of the various commanders. Since the Confederate side has been done before, due to the actions of the V.M.I. cadets, Powell is slightly more focused on the Union's actions, particularly in the battle itself. In particular, Powell places Sigel's advance in its strategic context and offers a balanced appraisal of Sigel. Certainly he comes under some harsh criticism, but Powell makes it clear that Sigel is more of a scapegoat. He did not even want to fight at New Market, but his subordinates dragged him in. Sigel then made it worse by losing control of himself at key moments.
All in all, its a first rate book. My only gripes are the maps could have been better, the book cover shows Sigel at Pea Ridge, and the prose is best when Powell discusses the bigger picture as opposed to the actual fighting. That though is not enough to give it lower than a well earned five stars.
The Battle of New Market is probably the most famous small battle of the American Civil War. Its fame derived from the participation of a battalion of Virginia Military Institute (VMI) cadets on the Confederate side. Thus books and articles about the battle tend to focus on the Confederate side, including the most recent book, Valley Thunder: The Battle of New Market and the Opening of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, May 1864 (which I have not yet read). David Powell, acclaimed for his work on the Chickamauga Campaign, wrote this book to focus on what he sees as the neglected Union side of the campaign and battle.
This is not a large book, with only 212 pages. Less than 1/3 of that covers the day of the battle (May 15, 1864), which provides a typical battle narrative with particular attention to Union decisions. The majority of the book is spent on how and why the battle came about at all - from Union planning to how Franz Sigel ended up in charge of the operation to the condition of the units involved. The result is a campaign where nearly everything went wrong for the Union. The weather was problematic and the logistics messy. The troops were were mostly inexperienced, undertrained, and too few in number. Leadership and decision making was lacking not just from Sigel, but most of his key subordinates as well. Near-simultaneous movements by Crook and Averill into southwestern Virginia intended to support Sigel didn't work out as planned. Edward Ord waltzed into then out of the department, staying only long enough to disrupt plans and preparations. What a mess.
There are plenty of Footnotes and a few relevant maps - typical Savas Beatie. Powell's writing is as good would be expected from his other work.
A must read for Civil War buffs. I think those interested in military history in general will find the messy campaign worth reading, especially if you're more interested in the strategic and operational side of things than in-depth battle narratives.
Powell does his usual masterful job of laying out both the strategic overview and the tactical details in an engaging manner. The title reflects his perspective that while Sigel made mistakes, there is a lot more blame than just him to go around, from Grant on down to Sigel’s subordinates. The focus is on the command decisions of the Union side, as earlier books have primarily focused on the VMI cadets and other aspects of the Confederate side. (Ironic as Powell is a VMI graduate!). But Breckinridge, Imboden and others are featured with insight.
One star off because the editing is simply awful. Typos, incorrect capitalizations and even sentence fragments are found throughout the text. If you can overlook that, this slim volume (212 pages of text) is well worth your time.
The title explains why author David Powell tackled this topic. Powell indicates that the three prior treatments of the Battle of New Market have largely dismissed Federal Major General Franz Sigel as a bumbling buffoon. Powell uses the narrative to point out that many events in this campaign occurred not by Sigel, but by others, leaving Sigel to get along as best he could. Do not think, however, that Powell whitewashes Sigel’s decision making. He hold Sigel accountable for the bad decisions he made. Others were also culpable. An excellent book.