Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War

by William Spaniel

William Spaniel, author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook, returns with a compelling exploration of the origins of war. Using the same crystal clear logic of the Game Theory 101 series, he investigates important questions about war, 1) Can two perfectly intelligent, perfectly unbiased leaders still send their countries to war with each other? 2) Why has Iran taken its nuclear program underground (literally)? 3) Why did the United States--the clear victors of the Spanish-American War--nevertheless write a check for more than $500 million to make Spain surrender? 4) Why do most interstate wars end in peaceful compromise and not the military defeat of one side? 5) Why do virtually all civil wars end the opposite way, and what makes the few peacefully settled civil wars different from the rest? 6) How do nuclear weapons--humanity's deadliest creations--paradoxically keep the peace? 7) Why is war the worst possible outcome of a crisis negotiation? 8) What is the difference between preventive and preemptive war, and why on earth does the media use these terms interchangeably? 9) Why are states as trustworthy as poker players at the bargaining table? 10) Why do states willingly pick fights with stronger opponents and yet pacify weaker opponents? William Spaniel answers these questions by constructing game theoretical models of crisis bargaining. Fully illustrated, with more than 100 images, The Rationality of War will make you rethink everything you "know" about political violence. As consumers and producers of war, it is a must read for any citizen of a liberal democracy.

Genres: Political Science, Mathematics

199 pages, Kindle Edition

First published August 1, 2012

Reviews

[Jose Ignacio · Rating 5 out of 5]

For amateurs of game theory like me.

[Nathan Crow · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent book.

The author considers war from a game theory point of view (his book game theory 101 is also excellent). Initially, it would appear that there is never a situation in which rational actors (those mythical creatures) would choose war because there is always a negotiated settlement that has a higher payoff (primarily because the costs of war are so high).

This book examines four situations in which war becomes a rational decision:
1. Preventative war — when a current power feels that a rising power may eventually become a threat.
2. Private information— when actors have different estimates of the probability of victory. For example state A might estimate its probability of victory to be high, but state B just developed a new weapon or got a new shipment of tanks or something. This can screw up negotiations because the estimates of the utility of war are not correct.
3. Issue indivisibility — some things that deemed worth fighting over can’t be divided (osama bin laden for example). Civil Wars have this problem as well (there can be only one government).
4. Preemptive war — these are cases where the advantages of striking first outweigh the cost of war making first strike tempting. This ends up looking like a prisoner’s dilemma situation where both sides would be better off not fighting a war, but the first strike advantage means neither side can trust the other thus making first strike the most likely option.

[Paulo Ribeiro · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is elegant. The most complicated math it uses is multiplication, but they model war decently enough to study its main factors. You still need some math tolerance to read it, though, because it relies a lot in math proofs (even if simple, it can be tiring).

Some interesting insights on strategy and conflicts resolution.