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Summa Theologiae: Volume 2: The Mind and Power of God, Part 1, Questions 14-26
Paperback
Published January 1, 1969
About the author
Thomas Aquinas
2,546 books1,130 followersPhilosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of Italy and the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle and elements of Neoplatonism, a system that Plotinus and his successors developed and based on that of Plato, within a context of Christian thought; his works include the
Summa contra gentiles
(1259-1264) and the
Summa theologiae
or theologica (1266-1273).
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
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June 4, 2024
THE SECOND PART OF THOMAS’S MASSIVE COMPENDIUM OF THEOLOGY
Thomas Aquinas (‘Thomas of Aquino’; i.e., present-day Lazio, Italy;1225-1274) was an extremely influential Italian Dominican friar, philosopher, theologian and Doctor of the Church. (He often cites Aristotle, who he refers to as ‘The Philosopher,’ as well as the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd [known as ‘Averroes’ in the West], who Thomas calls ‘the Commentator.’)
He wrote in the Foreword, “We have considered the divine substance; it remains to consider its operations. Now there are two kinds of operation, one that remains in the agent, and another that goes out to produce an external effect. We shall therefore treat in the first place of God’s knowledge and will---for knowing is in the person who knows, and willing in the person who wills---and afterwards of God’s power, which is envisaged as the principle of divine operation going out to produce an external effect.”
He notes, “God’s knowledge is the cause of things. For God’s knowledge stand to all created things as the artist’s to his products… Now it is clear that God causes things through his intellect, since his existence is his act of knowing. His knowledge, therefore, must be the cause of things when regarded in conjunction with his will. Hence God’s knowledge as the cause of things has come to be called the ‘knowledge of approbation.’’” (Pg. 32-33, Q14, A8)
He explains, “A thing understood… can have a relation to mind either essentially or incidentally. The relation is essential if it is to a mind on which the thing depends for its existence; incidental if to a mind by which the thing can be known… We conclude, then, that truth is primarily in intellect; and secondarily in things, by virtue of a relation to intellect as to their origin.” (Pg. 62-63, Q16, A1)
He says, “truth in the strict sense is in intellect alone, and things are said to be true with reference to truth in some intellect. Therefore the changeableness of truth is to be considered with reference to intellect… If there should be an intellect in which there cannot be alteration of opinions, and whose grasp no thing can escape, in such an intellect truth is unchangeable. Such is the divine intellect… Therefore truth in the divine intellect is unchangeable. On the other hand truth in our intellect is changeable. Not that truth itself is the subject of change, but that our intellect changes from truth to falsity; for in that sense forms may be said to be changeable.” (Pg. 76, Q16, A8)
He states, “when we act deliberately we do not will of necessity. Neither then in whatever God wills of necessity… About the objects willed by God, note that there is a reality he wills of absolute necessity, yet this is not true of everything real. His will is necessarily related to his own goodness, which is its proper objective. Hence he wills his own goodness necessarily, rather as we cannot but wish our own happiness… Now God wills things other than himself in so far as they are set towards his goodness as unto their end… Granted that God wills whatever he does from eternity the inference is not that he has to, except on a supposition that he does.” (Pg. 104-105, Q19, A3)
He asserts, “Because it is the universal cause of all things, God’s will cannot but achieve its effect. So whatever seems to depart from his will from one point of view returns to it from another… as each and everything is good so also is it willed by God… we can speak of a justice that ANTECEDENTLY wishes every man to live, but CONSEQUENTLY pronounces the capital sentence… So by analogy God antecedently wills all men to be saved, yet consequently wills some to be condemned as justice requires… Clearly, then, whatever God wills simply speaking comes about, though what he wills antecedently does not… A first cause can be prevented from achieving its effect through failure in a secondary cause when it is not the universally first cause which embraces within itself all causality. Such… is the will of God, and from its plan no effect can stray in any way at all.” (Pg. 113-115, Q19, A6)
He argues, “That anybody becomes worse is not by God’s willing it. Evil decidedly makes anything worse. Therefore God does not will it… it is out of the question that any evil as such can be directly willed… Nevertheless an evil is desired indirectly, as resulting from a good. And this appears in every kind of appetite.” (Pg. 121, Q19, A9)
He observes, “God loves all existing things. For in so far as it is real each is good; the very existence of each single thing is good, and so also is whatever it rises to… in so far as it has any reality or any goodness at all each thing must needs be willed by God. God therefore wills some good to each existing thing, and since loving is no other than willing good to someone, it is clear that God loves everything.” (Pg. 133, Q20, A2)
He contends, “How right it is that God should predestine human beings… everything falls under his providence, [and] the function of that providence is to arrange things to an end. Now the destiny to which creatures are ordained by God is twofold. One… is eternal life… Not only human beings but angels as well are predestined… Even were predestination revealed to some by special privilege, it were better not revealed to everyone; that would breed despair in the non-predestined, and negligence in the predestined.” (Pg. 162-163, Q23, A1)
He continues, “the foreknowledge of merits is not the motive or reason of predestination… No one has been so mad as to hold that our merits were the cause of God’s predestining on the part of his activity. The question comes down to this, Has predestination considered as an effect some cause? This is tantamount to asking whether God has pre-ordained that he would grant the effect of predestination to a person because he deserves it.” (Pg. 170-171, Q23, A5)
He explains, “The Book of Life is the list of those enrolled for eternal life. Grace and divine predestination, which never fails, are the two factors determining the entry. Whoever has grace is by this very face worthy of eternal life. yet sometimes the title may be lost, for some who are set towards it may nevertheless lapse through grave sin. Whereas others who are bound for eternal life by divine predestination are irrevocably written down in the Book of Life; their names… are never struck off.” (Pg. 187, Q24, A3)
He notes, “By common profession God is almighty. Yet it seems hard to lay one’s finger on the reason, because of doubt about what is meant by ‘all’ when you say that God can do all. Yet looked at aright, when you say God has the power for everything, you are correctly interpreted as meaning this: that since power is relative to what is possible, divine power can do everything that is possible, and on this account is God called omnipotent.” (Pg. 194-195, Q25, A3) He continues, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God’s omnipotence… Nevertheless some things were in the realm of the merely possible when they remained yet to be done, but now when they have been done they have ceased to be possible. Now they cannot be undone, and therefore, so we say, not even by God.” (Pg. 198-199, Q25, A4)
(Incidentally, it is a myth that Medieval philosophers debated the question, “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin”; but at the same time, some of the questions discussed by men like Thomas seem rather “esoteric” to us; e.g., “Whether the Procession of Love in God is Generation?” [Pt. 1, Q27, A4]; ‘Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?” [Pt. 1, Q52, A3])
This remarkable book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Medieval theology and (to a lesser extent) philosophy.
Thomas Aquinas (‘Thomas of Aquino’; i.e., present-day Lazio, Italy;1225-1274) was an extremely influential Italian Dominican friar, philosopher, theologian and Doctor of the Church. (He often cites Aristotle, who he refers to as ‘The Philosopher,’ as well as the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd [known as ‘Averroes’ in the West], who Thomas calls ‘the Commentator.’)
He wrote in the Foreword, “We have considered the divine substance; it remains to consider its operations. Now there are two kinds of operation, one that remains in the agent, and another that goes out to produce an external effect. We shall therefore treat in the first place of God’s knowledge and will---for knowing is in the person who knows, and willing in the person who wills---and afterwards of God’s power, which is envisaged as the principle of divine operation going out to produce an external effect.”
He notes, “God’s knowledge is the cause of things. For God’s knowledge stand to all created things as the artist’s to his products… Now it is clear that God causes things through his intellect, since his existence is his act of knowing. His knowledge, therefore, must be the cause of things when regarded in conjunction with his will. Hence God’s knowledge as the cause of things has come to be called the ‘knowledge of approbation.’’” (Pg. 32-33, Q14, A8)
He explains, “A thing understood… can have a relation to mind either essentially or incidentally. The relation is essential if it is to a mind on which the thing depends for its existence; incidental if to a mind by which the thing can be known… We conclude, then, that truth is primarily in intellect; and secondarily in things, by virtue of a relation to intellect as to their origin.” (Pg. 62-63, Q16, A1)
He says, “truth in the strict sense is in intellect alone, and things are said to be true with reference to truth in some intellect. Therefore the changeableness of truth is to be considered with reference to intellect… If there should be an intellect in which there cannot be alteration of opinions, and whose grasp no thing can escape, in such an intellect truth is unchangeable. Such is the divine intellect… Therefore truth in the divine intellect is unchangeable. On the other hand truth in our intellect is changeable. Not that truth itself is the subject of change, but that our intellect changes from truth to falsity; for in that sense forms may be said to be changeable.” (Pg. 76, Q16, A8)
He states, “when we act deliberately we do not will of necessity. Neither then in whatever God wills of necessity… About the objects willed by God, note that there is a reality he wills of absolute necessity, yet this is not true of everything real. His will is necessarily related to his own goodness, which is its proper objective. Hence he wills his own goodness necessarily, rather as we cannot but wish our own happiness… Now God wills things other than himself in so far as they are set towards his goodness as unto their end… Granted that God wills whatever he does from eternity the inference is not that he has to, except on a supposition that he does.” (Pg. 104-105, Q19, A3)
He asserts, “Because it is the universal cause of all things, God’s will cannot but achieve its effect. So whatever seems to depart from his will from one point of view returns to it from another… as each and everything is good so also is it willed by God… we can speak of a justice that ANTECEDENTLY wishes every man to live, but CONSEQUENTLY pronounces the capital sentence… So by analogy God antecedently wills all men to be saved, yet consequently wills some to be condemned as justice requires… Clearly, then, whatever God wills simply speaking comes about, though what he wills antecedently does not… A first cause can be prevented from achieving its effect through failure in a secondary cause when it is not the universally first cause which embraces within itself all causality. Such… is the will of God, and from its plan no effect can stray in any way at all.” (Pg. 113-115, Q19, A6)
He argues, “That anybody becomes worse is not by God’s willing it. Evil decidedly makes anything worse. Therefore God does not will it… it is out of the question that any evil as such can be directly willed… Nevertheless an evil is desired indirectly, as resulting from a good. And this appears in every kind of appetite.” (Pg. 121, Q19, A9)
He observes, “God loves all existing things. For in so far as it is real each is good; the very existence of each single thing is good, and so also is whatever it rises to… in so far as it has any reality or any goodness at all each thing must needs be willed by God. God therefore wills some good to each existing thing, and since loving is no other than willing good to someone, it is clear that God loves everything.” (Pg. 133, Q20, A2)
He contends, “How right it is that God should predestine human beings… everything falls under his providence, [and] the function of that providence is to arrange things to an end. Now the destiny to which creatures are ordained by God is twofold. One… is eternal life… Not only human beings but angels as well are predestined… Even were predestination revealed to some by special privilege, it were better not revealed to everyone; that would breed despair in the non-predestined, and negligence in the predestined.” (Pg. 162-163, Q23, A1)
He continues, “the foreknowledge of merits is not the motive or reason of predestination… No one has been so mad as to hold that our merits were the cause of God’s predestining on the part of his activity. The question comes down to this, Has predestination considered as an effect some cause? This is tantamount to asking whether God has pre-ordained that he would grant the effect of predestination to a person because he deserves it.” (Pg. 170-171, Q23, A5)
He explains, “The Book of Life is the list of those enrolled for eternal life. Grace and divine predestination, which never fails, are the two factors determining the entry. Whoever has grace is by this very face worthy of eternal life. yet sometimes the title may be lost, for some who are set towards it may nevertheless lapse through grave sin. Whereas others who are bound for eternal life by divine predestination are irrevocably written down in the Book of Life; their names… are never struck off.” (Pg. 187, Q24, A3)
He notes, “By common profession God is almighty. Yet it seems hard to lay one’s finger on the reason, because of doubt about what is meant by ‘all’ when you say that God can do all. Yet looked at aright, when you say God has the power for everything, you are correctly interpreted as meaning this: that since power is relative to what is possible, divine power can do everything that is possible, and on this account is God called omnipotent.” (Pg. 194-195, Q25, A3) He continues, “anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God’s omnipotence… Nevertheless some things were in the realm of the merely possible when they remained yet to be done, but now when they have been done they have ceased to be possible. Now they cannot be undone, and therefore, so we say, not even by God.” (Pg. 198-199, Q25, A4)
(Incidentally, it is a myth that Medieval philosophers debated the question, “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin”; but at the same time, some of the questions discussed by men like Thomas seem rather “esoteric” to us; e.g., “Whether the Procession of Love in God is Generation?” [Pt. 1, Q27, A4]; ‘Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?” [Pt. 1, Q52, A3])
This remarkable book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Medieval theology and (to a lesser extent) philosophy.
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