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Simultaneity and Delay: A Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time
Throughoriginal speculations on the surprisingly complementary concepts ofsimultaneity and delay, and new interpretations of the great philosophers oftime, this book proposes an innovative theory of staggered time.
Inthe early 20th Century, Bergson and Husserl (following Einstein)made Simultaneity—what it means for events to occur at the same time—a centralmotif in philosophy.In the late 20thCentury, Derrida and Deleuze instead emphasized Delay—events staggered overdistant times.This struggle betweenconvergent and staggered time also plays out in 20th Centuryaesthetics (especially music), politics, and the sciences.
Despite their importance in the history ofphilosophy, this is the first book to comprehensively examine the concepts ofsimultaneity and delay.By puttingsimultaneity and delay into a dialectical relation, this book argues that timein general is organized by elastic rhythms. Lampert's concepts describe thetime-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, politicaldecision-making, neuronal delays, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting;and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour.
Inthe early 20th Century, Bergson and Husserl (following Einstein)made Simultaneity—what it means for events to occur at the same time—a centralmotif in philosophy.In the late 20thCentury, Derrida and Deleuze instead emphasized Delay—events staggered overdistant times.This struggle betweenconvergent and staggered time also plays out in 20th Centuryaesthetics (especially music), politics, and the sciences.
Despite their importance in the history ofphilosophy, this is the first book to comprehensively examine the concepts ofsimultaneity and delay.By puttingsimultaneity and delay into a dialectical relation, this book argues that timein general is organized by elastic rhythms. Lampert's concepts describe thetime-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, politicaldecision-making, neuronal delays, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting;and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour.
- GenresPhilosophy
272 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
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July 31, 2022
Jay Lampert's Simultaneity and Delay (S+D) begins on a very curious defensive note: "There should have been more about X in this book". That's its literal first sentence. And having got to the end of it - yeah, I can kinda see why. One would imagine that this would have been the consistent note of feedback among those whom Lampert first shared drafts of the book. Because in its aim to try and cover just about everything - from Platonic metaphysics to brain science, Husserlian phenomenology to the experience of time in music and cinema - the book feels weirdly underdeveloped. Part of it has to do with its skating around the title on its tin: while S&D seems to propose a 'dialectical theory of staggered time', the book is really less 'a' theory than a survey of a whole swathe of theories, before concluding (spoiler alert?) that 'the' theory is going to have to incorporate all of them, to some degree.
Adjusted for expectations then, S+D reads better as a sourcebook than a fully fleshed out defence of any particular line of thinking. And as a sourcebook - it's mostly pretty good. It's clear that Lampert has trawled through a vast amount of material, and while I wouldn't go so far as to say that this is a work of synthesis, it is, at least, a work of agglomeration. Lampert has done the reading so you don't have to, and he's able to relay his efforts comprehensively and competently. In fact some of the best parts of this book involve Lampert going outside the field of philosophy proper - the chapters on cognitive science and relativity in physics are full of wonder, and Lampert sheds plenty of new, philosophical light on some of the more sexy topics occasionally broached in the popular imagination: Benjamin Libet's famous half-second 'delay' between brain activity and the conscious recognition of having made a decision; Einstein's famous train and rocket-ship thought experiments in general relativity. These being just two of the handful of examples that benefit from Lampert's treatment in terms of simultaneity and delay.
Speaking of: why simultaneity and delay at all? Well, first because they surprisingly pop up all throughout reflections on time, from Plato to Derrida, and it's very cool to see them given explicit attention as themes of their own. Second, because - as Lampert is at pains to point out throughout - they provide an alternative armature to the dominant mode of thinking about time in terms of succession. Indeed, in many ways, this is the central opposition that governs the development of the book: simultaneity and delay over and against succession. And why is succession the bad guy? Well, primarily because succession is not, when all is said and done, all that temporal. Usually thought of in terms of 'instants' (from past, to present, to future), succession tends to lend itself equally to 'logical' unfolding, obscuring, in many cases, the effort to come to grips with time. S+D on the other hand, mark concepts that are, as it were, irreducibly temporal: each has a certain sense of intrinsic ‘distance’ and/or dis/synchrony ‘built-in’ to them, in a way that the lonely succession of moments simply cannot match.
Indeed, to the degree that there is ‘a’ theory expanded within, it largely has to do with the way in which succession in many cases derives from the play of both S+D. As a quick and dirty example, one may think of how we mark the succession of epochs (arbitrary example: from late medieval to renaissance, say) only to the degree that we hold each individual epoch as having a certain internal consistency - or simultaneity - to itself. Incidentally, this ‘priority’ of S&D over succession also plays a role in one of the heftier narrative threads that Lampert develops towards the end book, concerning a few key figures who function as philosophical lodestars of the book in general: for Lampert, both Derrida and Deleuze make decisive, respective advances over Husserl and Bergson, precisely to the extent that the former champion S+D over the latter’s privileging of succession. That this narrative - substantial in itself, and which must be read to be followed - is woven into just so much else, speaks a great deal to just how uneven and ‘lumpy’ this book is, throwing one thing after another at the wall to see what sticks. A decent amount does, but its messiness counts uncomfortably against it all in the last analysis.
Adjusted for expectations then, S+D reads better as a sourcebook than a fully fleshed out defence of any particular line of thinking. And as a sourcebook - it's mostly pretty good. It's clear that Lampert has trawled through a vast amount of material, and while I wouldn't go so far as to say that this is a work of synthesis, it is, at least, a work of agglomeration. Lampert has done the reading so you don't have to, and he's able to relay his efforts comprehensively and competently. In fact some of the best parts of this book involve Lampert going outside the field of philosophy proper - the chapters on cognitive science and relativity in physics are full of wonder, and Lampert sheds plenty of new, philosophical light on some of the more sexy topics occasionally broached in the popular imagination: Benjamin Libet's famous half-second 'delay' between brain activity and the conscious recognition of having made a decision; Einstein's famous train and rocket-ship thought experiments in general relativity. These being just two of the handful of examples that benefit from Lampert's treatment in terms of simultaneity and delay.
Speaking of: why simultaneity and delay at all? Well, first because they surprisingly pop up all throughout reflections on time, from Plato to Derrida, and it's very cool to see them given explicit attention as themes of their own. Second, because - as Lampert is at pains to point out throughout - they provide an alternative armature to the dominant mode of thinking about time in terms of succession. Indeed, in many ways, this is the central opposition that governs the development of the book: simultaneity and delay over and against succession. And why is succession the bad guy? Well, primarily because succession is not, when all is said and done, all that temporal. Usually thought of in terms of 'instants' (from past, to present, to future), succession tends to lend itself equally to 'logical' unfolding, obscuring, in many cases, the effort to come to grips with time. S+D on the other hand, mark concepts that are, as it were, irreducibly temporal: each has a certain sense of intrinsic ‘distance’ and/or dis/synchrony ‘built-in’ to them, in a way that the lonely succession of moments simply cannot match.
Indeed, to the degree that there is ‘a’ theory expanded within, it largely has to do with the way in which succession in many cases derives from the play of both S+D. As a quick and dirty example, one may think of how we mark the succession of epochs (arbitrary example: from late medieval to renaissance, say) only to the degree that we hold each individual epoch as having a certain internal consistency - or simultaneity - to itself. Incidentally, this ‘priority’ of S&D over succession also plays a role in one of the heftier narrative threads that Lampert develops towards the end book, concerning a few key figures who function as philosophical lodestars of the book in general: for Lampert, both Derrida and Deleuze make decisive, respective advances over Husserl and Bergson, precisely to the extent that the former champion S+D over the latter’s privileging of succession. That this narrative - substantial in itself, and which must be read to be followed - is woven into just so much else, speaks a great deal to just how uneven and ‘lumpy’ this book is, throwing one thing after another at the wall to see what sticks. A decent amount does, but its messiness counts uncomfortably against it all in the last analysis.
June 14, 2024
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020816: this is a three primarily reflecting my own uncertain philosophical skills, if not unfamiliarity with certain thinkers and their concepts of time. i wanted to try and follow 'time' as a subject in philosophy, rather than just read work on or by certain names in the continental tradition. i do not know how successful this has been. i have read some on and by husserl, on and by bergson, one on derrida, some on deleuze. so i can follow somewhat...
this text begins with ancient and medieval concepts of time as necessary background of concepts such as graphic representations of time in lines, in circles, in contrast between eternity and mere moments of human time, delaying, thus entirety of simultaneity, but these discussions do not interest me much, as plato and aristotle argue, as medieval seem more religious than properly philosophical. the modern concepts of time, especially as scientific variable of 'whatever-moment-at-all', is interesting conception, pragmatic 'use' of time. but this misses out on some question of time, as indeed husserl's problems of identifying time as moments of 'now' following 'moments have been' and preceding 'moments to be', and how can 'now' be 'now' if it replaces itself by being itself. no, not like i followed this. bergson i have a little better luck, but maybe that is because i like the idea of 'duration' and 'multiplicity', an essential difference of 'time' from 'space', though it might not be true 'time' is indivisible and 'rhythm' of various sorts... (16.2.18 elaboration: time is divisible but cannot be divided without altering 'quality', time is not homogenous 'quantity' to divide)
the contention of this text is that derrida in two cases solves husserl's problems- 'staggered time lines' and 'delay'- then deleuze solves bergson's- 'distance and simultaneity'- but there is a lot of close argument to get to these conclusions. if every 'delay' is embedded in every 'now' then 'simultaneity' occurs at a 'distance' to itself (derrida on husserl) then past and present co-exist (deleuze on bergson), co-ordinating 'delay' in order to retain simultaneity within a distance, this being bergson's problem with his 'duration'... i must confess this is now and will possibly continue to be beyond me... i do not know if there are just further books to read, or do i require tutorial help. there is a feeling his arguments make sense, particularly with bergson and deleuze, but this is more hopeful than convinced...
so maybe i will come back to this book, when i have 'time'...
020816: this is a three primarily reflecting my own uncertain philosophical skills, if not unfamiliarity with certain thinkers and their concepts of time. i wanted to try and follow 'time' as a subject in philosophy, rather than just read work on or by certain names in the continental tradition. i do not know how successful this has been. i have read some on and by husserl, on and by bergson, one on derrida, some on deleuze. so i can follow somewhat...
this text begins with ancient and medieval concepts of time as necessary background of concepts such as graphic representations of time in lines, in circles, in contrast between eternity and mere moments of human time, delaying, thus entirety of simultaneity, but these discussions do not interest me much, as plato and aristotle argue, as medieval seem more religious than properly philosophical. the modern concepts of time, especially as scientific variable of 'whatever-moment-at-all', is interesting conception, pragmatic 'use' of time. but this misses out on some question of time, as indeed husserl's problems of identifying time as moments of 'now' following 'moments have been' and preceding 'moments to be', and how can 'now' be 'now' if it replaces itself by being itself. no, not like i followed this. bergson i have a little better luck, but maybe that is because i like the idea of 'duration' and 'multiplicity', an essential difference of 'time' from 'space', though it might not be true 'time' is indivisible and 'rhythm' of various sorts... (16.2.18 elaboration: time is divisible but cannot be divided without altering 'quality', time is not homogenous 'quantity' to divide)
the contention of this text is that derrida in two cases solves husserl's problems- 'staggered time lines' and 'delay'- then deleuze solves bergson's- 'distance and simultaneity'- but there is a lot of close argument to get to these conclusions. if every 'delay' is embedded in every 'now' then 'simultaneity' occurs at a 'distance' to itself (derrida on husserl) then past and present co-exist (deleuze on bergson), co-ordinating 'delay' in order to retain simultaneity within a distance, this being bergson's problem with his 'duration'... i must confess this is now and will possibly continue to be beyond me... i do not know if there are just further books to read, or do i require tutorial help. there is a feeling his arguments make sense, particularly with bergson and deleuze, but this is more hopeful than convinced...
so maybe i will come back to this book, when i have 'time'...
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews