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An introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce,: Interpreted as a system,
In the twenty-four years since this book was first published, interest in the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce has grown considerably. He has been widely recognized as the father of pragmatism, a precursor of symbolic logic, and a worker in the field of the philosophy of science. Naturally enough, Mr. Feibleman devotes proper attention to these areas. Moreover, he details Peirce's less well-known contributions to metaphysics, ethics, and psychology.
The book has two aims. The first is to offer an introduction to the general philosophy of Peirce. The second has to do with the system implicit in Peirce's work. His writings were certainly unorganized, even though his ideas were not. Because of the kind of man he was, or perhaps because of the restraining force of adverse circumstances, but probably due to a combination of both causes, Peirce himself never formulated his system, though more than once he made plans to do so. His fault was one of method of presentation, not one of thought. In other words, Peirce had a systematic philosophy which he set down unsystematically. His scattered papers make a convincing argument that their sole purpose is to perfect an implicit system of philosophy. Mr. Feibleman's purpose is to make the implicit explicit.
The book has two aims. The first is to offer an introduction to the general philosophy of Peirce. The second has to do with the system implicit in Peirce's work. His writings were certainly unorganized, even though his ideas were not. Because of the kind of man he was, or perhaps because of the restraining force of adverse circumstances, but probably due to a combination of both causes, Peirce himself never formulated his system, though more than once he made plans to do so. His fault was one of method of presentation, not one of thought. In other words, Peirce had a systematic philosophy which he set down unsystematically. His scattered papers make a convincing argument that their sole purpose is to perfect an implicit system of philosophy. Mr. Feibleman's purpose is to make the implicit explicit.
503 pages, Hardcover
First published February 15, 1970
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October 11, 2024
AN EXCELLENT INTRODUCTION AND EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE'S THOUGHT
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, who was the founder of Pragmatism in philosophy.
Author James Feibleman wrote in the Introduction to the paperback edition of this book, "In the twenty-four years since this book was first published, a large body of literature about Peirce has grown up. He has been widely recognized as the father of pragmatism, a precursor of symbolic logic, and a worker in the field of the philosophy of science. Less well known are his contributions to metaphysics, to ethics, to psychology, and to many other disciplines. He was a thinker of the first rank, and it is not necessary to call him the American Leibniz in order to acknowledge the force of his originality."
He points out, "Science, Peirce discovered, cannot be pursued without imagination. Since science sprang from magic, only those people who had allowed their fancies some rein could have scientific ability. But, on the other hand, uncontrolled imagination never led to science. Rather was it a special kind of imagination that was required... There is a sensuous quality to the scientific imagination, but the method of science very soon transcends mere sense experience." (Pg. 47)
Of Peirce's arguments against "False Skepticism," he observes, "the universal doubt which Descartes required for his first principle ... is limited, first, by its inability to be applied to itself... Thus, the first part of Peirce's refutation, is logical, universal doubt is contradictory. The second part of Peirce's refutation is psychological. Feigned skepticism, he maintained, is a false attitude... Doubt must start where beliefs are held, if the doubt is to be genuine. But to pretend doubt where is does not exist is not to get anywhere with first principles." (Pg. 70-71)
He explains, "Peirce called his Platonic ideas sometimes universals but more usually generals... Absolutes are inexplicable, so that to maintain that generals are subject to growth is to render them somewhat more explicable... A universal or general, of course, refers to something real: the regularity of a common relationship; it is neither exclusively actual nor an invention of men... The reality of generals is not a proposition that brings with it the necessity for regarding any and every general as real. The difficulty is to determine not whether generals can be real but which generals are real." (Pg. 179)
Peirce said, "Properly speaking, `we have no power of introspection... for the very reason that it is our immediate consciousness.' The fact is that `consciousness may be set down as one of the most mendacious witnesses that ever was questioned. But it is the only witness there is; and all we can do is to put it into the sweat-box and torture the truth out of it, with such judgment as we can command.;" (Pg. 226)
He defines Pragmatism: "'Pragmatism is not a [world view] but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear'... `it ought, in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In the second place, it ought to... help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension'... Pragmatism thus aims at achieving that clarity and directness which Descartes had established as the goal of knowledge. For `after all pragmatism solves no real problem. It only shows that supposed problems are not real problems.' ...Pragmatism, however, is `a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call "intellectual concepts" ... of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective facts may hinge...'" (Pg. 296-297)
He states, "For Peirce, pragmatism meant believing in God. `If a pragmatist is asked what he means by the word `God', he can only say that... if study and contemplation of the psycho-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's work or conversation, then that analogue of a mind... is what he means by `God'... because the discoveries of science, their enabling us to PREDICT what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it were... So, then, the question being whether I believe in the reality of God... I answer, Yes. I further opine that pretty nearly everybody more or less believes this, including many of the scientific men of my generation who are accustomed to think the belief is entirely unfounded... the facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned.'" (Pg. 420-421)
He expounds Peirce's position: "Religion is not opposed to science... The religious spirit is at the basis of scientific endeavor. But although science, philosophical science, should `ultimately influence religion... it should be allowed to do so only with secular slowness and the most conservative caution.'" (Pg. 430-431)
This is a comprehensive, balanced, and extremely helpful guide to the ideas of the "first great American philosopher," and will be "must reading" for anyone wanting to study Peirce.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, who was the founder of Pragmatism in philosophy.
Author James Feibleman wrote in the Introduction to the paperback edition of this book, "In the twenty-four years since this book was first published, a large body of literature about Peirce has grown up. He has been widely recognized as the father of pragmatism, a precursor of symbolic logic, and a worker in the field of the philosophy of science. Less well known are his contributions to metaphysics, to ethics, to psychology, and to many other disciplines. He was a thinker of the first rank, and it is not necessary to call him the American Leibniz in order to acknowledge the force of his originality."
He points out, "Science, Peirce discovered, cannot be pursued without imagination. Since science sprang from magic, only those people who had allowed their fancies some rein could have scientific ability. But, on the other hand, uncontrolled imagination never led to science. Rather was it a special kind of imagination that was required... There is a sensuous quality to the scientific imagination, but the method of science very soon transcends mere sense experience." (Pg. 47)
Of Peirce's arguments against "False Skepticism," he observes, "the universal doubt which Descartes required for his first principle ... is limited, first, by its inability to be applied to itself... Thus, the first part of Peirce's refutation, is logical, universal doubt is contradictory. The second part of Peirce's refutation is psychological. Feigned skepticism, he maintained, is a false attitude... Doubt must start where beliefs are held, if the doubt is to be genuine. But to pretend doubt where is does not exist is not to get anywhere with first principles." (Pg. 70-71)
He explains, "Peirce called his Platonic ideas sometimes universals but more usually generals... Absolutes are inexplicable, so that to maintain that generals are subject to growth is to render them somewhat more explicable... A universal or general, of course, refers to something real: the regularity of a common relationship; it is neither exclusively actual nor an invention of men... The reality of generals is not a proposition that brings with it the necessity for regarding any and every general as real. The difficulty is to determine not whether generals can be real but which generals are real." (Pg. 179)
Peirce said, "Properly speaking, `we have no power of introspection... for the very reason that it is our immediate consciousness.' The fact is that `consciousness may be set down as one of the most mendacious witnesses that ever was questioned. But it is the only witness there is; and all we can do is to put it into the sweat-box and torture the truth out of it, with such judgment as we can command.;" (Pg. 226)
He defines Pragmatism: "'Pragmatism is not a [world view] but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear'... `it ought, in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In the second place, it ought to... help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension'... Pragmatism thus aims at achieving that clarity and directness which Descartes had established as the goal of knowledge. For `after all pragmatism solves no real problem. It only shows that supposed problems are not real problems.' ...Pragmatism, however, is `a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call "intellectual concepts" ... of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective facts may hinge...'" (Pg. 296-297)
He states, "For Peirce, pragmatism meant believing in God. `If a pragmatist is asked what he means by the word `God', he can only say that... if study and contemplation of the psycho-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's work or conversation, then that analogue of a mind... is what he means by `God'... because the discoveries of science, their enabling us to PREDICT what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it were... So, then, the question being whether I believe in the reality of God... I answer, Yes. I further opine that pretty nearly everybody more or less believes this, including many of the scientific men of my generation who are accustomed to think the belief is entirely unfounded... the facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned.'" (Pg. 420-421)
He expounds Peirce's position: "Religion is not opposed to science... The religious spirit is at the basis of scientific endeavor. But although science, philosophical science, should `ultimately influence religion... it should be allowed to do so only with secular slowness and the most conservative caution.'" (Pg. 430-431)
This is a comprehensive, balanced, and extremely helpful guide to the ideas of the "first great American philosopher," and will be "must reading" for anyone wanting to study Peirce.
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