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Value-Free Science?: Ideals and Illusion
It has long been thought that science is our best hope for realizing objective knowledge, but that, to deliver on this promise, it must be value free. Things are not so simple, however, as recent work in science studies makes clear. The contributors to this volume investigate where and how values are involved in science, and examine the implications of this involvement for ideals of objectivity.
- GenresSciencePhilosophy
256 pages, Hardcover
First published February 19, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 14, 2025
an expansive collection of papers on the value free ideal in philosophy of science and how acceptance of value ladenness may affect scientific objectivity and inquiry. the different writing styles and ideas from a variety of authors was very nice on my brain, although some chapters were more convoluted than others as expected, and made getting through the book much easier
October 18, 2022
Value Free Science does not exist. Although what that claims means, depends on what people count as values.
Traditionally people have distinguished between facts which were scientifically provable and values which were opinions or expressions of approval. Everyone accepts that values come into every human enterprise, as resources have to be allocated, and that requires ranking and evaluations.
The more interesting question is whether values enter into our evaluation of logic itself, and reasoning towards conclusions. Proponents of the fact value distinction insist that it doesn’t, or at least shouldn’t. And where it does, then that is a hall mark of bad science.
The fact-value distinction began breaking down about 100 years ago when Philosophers found that trying to dismiss ethics as simply emotions, did not work. Then about 60 years ago Scientists began to wonder about bias and values within the reasoning processes of science itself.
Kuhn’s 1962 book on Paradigm shifts within Science is an important part of this story and the authors of this book are building upon his original insights. They show that the very definition of a fact depends upon choices which scientists make. What turns a hypothesis into a fact is an interpretation of evidence, but interpretations typically embed preferences and prioritisations, which are values.
For example, should a theory be valued for its capacity to ‘explain’ already observed and documented phenomena? Or is it ‘prediction’ of novel and unexpected outcomes which is the hallmark of a properly scientific theory? Depending on how people answer that question, they can arrive at differing views of what counts as a proven fact.
One of the examples discussed by the book is a study of liver cancer based upon rats fed dioxin for two years. Over a 14 year period, three different teams of scientists interpreted the findings of the study to give very different conclusions about cancer (p124). These are not differences due to logical failures. They are differences due to choices of interpretation. They are differences of values, not facts and they lead to very different conclusions about what the facts of cancer are.
This book stays firmly in the arena of Science. There are informative chapters on bias in science, especially sexism. The data tends to be 1980s focused, so it is questionable how relevant some of the conclusions are. And modern readers would probably like to know more about race, too.
Missing from the book was a sharper philosophical perspective, and a pressing of the philosophical issues about foundationalism and the very concepts of rationality. It is true that people make choices about types of evidence and scientific theory, but don’t we also make choices about rationality itself. Intuitionist logic expresses different preferences than classical logic. Post Modernists construe rationality very differently to Enlightenment rationalists. So, right at the very heart of thinking and rationality itself, values play a role which is not always understood or appreciated.
The success of science often depends upon methodological materialism, and the refusal to settle for metaphysical explanations. But that can all too easily slip into an ideological commitment to physicalism, which is no more justifiable than a superstition. Yet one can be more easily seen as a value, whereas the other isn’t, especially when it is espoused by someone who otherwise insists upon the objectivity of Science.
What this book does well, is that it forces readers to pause and reflect upon assumptions that they might otherwise take for granted. What it does less well, is drill down and press the philosophical issues hard enough.
Overall the book is written clearly and accessible for non-expert readers. It is a little dated in its examples and data use, but the principles of the arguments remain relevant.
Traditionally people have distinguished between facts which were scientifically provable and values which were opinions or expressions of approval. Everyone accepts that values come into every human enterprise, as resources have to be allocated, and that requires ranking and evaluations.
The more interesting question is whether values enter into our evaluation of logic itself, and reasoning towards conclusions. Proponents of the fact value distinction insist that it doesn’t, or at least shouldn’t. And where it does, then that is a hall mark of bad science.
The fact-value distinction began breaking down about 100 years ago when Philosophers found that trying to dismiss ethics as simply emotions, did not work. Then about 60 years ago Scientists began to wonder about bias and values within the reasoning processes of science itself.
Kuhn’s 1962 book on Paradigm shifts within Science is an important part of this story and the authors of this book are building upon his original insights. They show that the very definition of a fact depends upon choices which scientists make. What turns a hypothesis into a fact is an interpretation of evidence, but interpretations typically embed preferences and prioritisations, which are values.
For example, should a theory be valued for its capacity to ‘explain’ already observed and documented phenomena? Or is it ‘prediction’ of novel and unexpected outcomes which is the hallmark of a properly scientific theory? Depending on how people answer that question, they can arrive at differing views of what counts as a proven fact.
One of the examples discussed by the book is a study of liver cancer based upon rats fed dioxin for two years. Over a 14 year period, three different teams of scientists interpreted the findings of the study to give very different conclusions about cancer (p124). These are not differences due to logical failures. They are differences due to choices of interpretation. They are differences of values, not facts and they lead to very different conclusions about what the facts of cancer are.
This book stays firmly in the arena of Science. There are informative chapters on bias in science, especially sexism. The data tends to be 1980s focused, so it is questionable how relevant some of the conclusions are. And modern readers would probably like to know more about race, too.
Missing from the book was a sharper philosophical perspective, and a pressing of the philosophical issues about foundationalism and the very concepts of rationality. It is true that people make choices about types of evidence and scientific theory, but don’t we also make choices about rationality itself. Intuitionist logic expresses different preferences than classical logic. Post Modernists construe rationality very differently to Enlightenment rationalists. So, right at the very heart of thinking and rationality itself, values play a role which is not always understood or appreciated.
The success of science often depends upon methodological materialism, and the refusal to settle for metaphysical explanations. But that can all too easily slip into an ideological commitment to physicalism, which is no more justifiable than a superstition. Yet one can be more easily seen as a value, whereas the other isn’t, especially when it is espoused by someone who otherwise insists upon the objectivity of Science.
What this book does well, is that it forces readers to pause and reflect upon assumptions that they might otherwise take for granted. What it does less well, is drill down and press the philosophical issues hard enough.
Overall the book is written clearly and accessible for non-expert readers. It is a little dated in its examples and data use, but the principles of the arguments remain relevant.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews