Self-Knowledge

Oxford Readings in Philosophy

by Quassim Cassam (Editor)

This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of the Self" by Roderick M. Chisholm, "Introspection" by D. M. Armstrong, "The First Person" by G. E. M. Anscombe, "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I" by Hector-Neri Casta((n-))eda, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" by John Perry, "Self-Identification" by Gareth Evans, and "The First Person--and Others" by P. F. Strawson. The only reader of its kind, Self-Knowledge fills a major gap in the history of philosophy
and will be an accessible addition to a wide range of courses.

Genres: Philosophy

Paperback

First published March 10, 1994

About the author

Quassim Cassam is professor of philosophy at the University of Warwick. He writes on self-knowledge, perception, epistemic vices and topics in Kantian epistemology.

Reviews

[Cassidy Brinn]

Dualists made mistakes. No actual I exists seperately from my body. No definable subject nesting within, seeing through my eyes, hearing through my ears, and most especially not touching through my skin. What Kant et al insist upon is a logical generalized form of subjectivity, but in the actual world my body is necessary to my I, or else I'd have no access to that spatial and temporal unity that makes personal experience possible.

Physical experience is immune to misidentification relative to the first person prounoun. This holds even if I hook my brain up to a second person who goes and looks at the marble arch, and thereby believe that I am at the marble arch. The situation here is not that I know that someone is standing in front of the marble arch, and mistakenly identify that someone as myself. I don't know anything and am under a complete illusion, so my error is not one of misidentification. (Cassam got that argument from Gareth Evans)

Subjectivity is objectivity from the inside. Objectivity is subjectivity from the outside. There is no absolute split.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is mostly about self-awareness--that is, awareness of the self--and other issues having to do with indexicals and the first-person. I know of no collection that has a better, more representative sample of articles on the subject. It's a great book.